THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 


THE   SIEGE    OF 
C  HARLESTON 


AND  THE  OPERATIONS  ON  THE 
SOUTH  ATLANTIC  COAST  IN 
THE  WAR  AMONG  THE  STATES 


BY 


SAMUEL  JONES 

Formerly  Major-General  C.  S.  A. 


NEW   YORK 

THE  NEALE  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 
1911 


Copyright,  1911,  by 
The  Neale  Publishing  Company 


FOREWORD 

BY  THE  AUTHOR'S  DAUGHTER 

The  following  brief  historical  study  is  a  fragment 
of  a  work  which  was  intended  to  cover  the  opera 
tions  against  Charleston  from  their  beginning  to 
their  consummation.  The  author,  General  Samuel 
Jones,  late  of  the  Army  of  the  Confederate  States, 
died  before  its  completion  and  before  he  had  reached 
the  consideration  of  his  own  services  in  the  defense 
of  Charleston.  The  work  is  published  from  an  un 
finished  manuscript  left  among  the  author's  papers, 
and  after  the  lapse  of  a  number  of  years.  It  is 
offered  now  in  the  belief  that  it  will  be  found  of  value 
and  interest  to  the  student  of  military  history. 

General  Samuel  Jones  was  born  December  17, 
1819,  at  Woodfield,  the  plantation  home  of  his 
parents,  in  Powhatan  County,  Virginia.  His  father, 
Samuel  Jones,  was  a  nephew  and  ward  of  Governor 
William  Giles,  of  Virginia,  under  whose  care  he  was 
brought  up,  and  a  graduate  of  Princeton  College. 
General  Jones'  mother  was  Ann  Moseley,  daughter 
of  Mr.  Edward  Moseley,  of  Powhatan  County. 
General  Jones  was  appointed  a  cadet  at  West  Point 
Military  Academy  from  Virginia  July  i,  1837,  and 
was  graduated  and  promoted  to  brevet  second  lieu 
tenant  July  i,  1841,  and  to  be  second  lieutenant  in 

271097 


6          THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  Second  Artillery  September  28,  1841.  His  first 
duty  was  on  the  Maine  frontier,  at  Houlton,  pending 
the  Disputed  Territory  controversy.  He  was  on 
duty  at  West  Point,  1846-51,  as  assistant  professor 
of  mathematics  and  assistant  instructor  in  artillery 
and  infantry  tactics.  He  was  appointed  assistant  to 
the  Judge  Advocate  of  the  Army  at  Washington  and 
continued  in  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  his  posi 
tion  until  he  resigned  his  commission  in  the  Army  of 
the  United  States  April  27,  1861.  On  May  i,  1861, 
he  was  made  Major  of  Artillery  in  the  military 
force  of  Virginia  and  later  promoted  to  be  Colonel. 
On  July  22,  1861,  he  was  made  Chief  of  Artillery 
and  Ordnance  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 
He  served  on  the  staff  of  General  Beauregard  at  the 
first  battle  of  Manassas,  and  was  promoted  to  be 
Brigadier  General  July  22,  1861,  and  appointed  to 
the  command  of  the  brigade  of  General  Bartow, 
which  had  lost  its  gallant  commander  on  the  field  of 
Manassas.  (The  brigade  consisted  of  the  Seventh, 
Eighth,  Ninth  and  Eleventh  Georgia,  and  the  Fourth 
Kentucky  Regiments  of  Infantry  and  Alberto's  Artil 
lery.)  On  January  22,  1862,  General  Jones  was 
appointed  to  the  command  of  the  department  of 
which  Pensacola  was  the  headquarters.  He  was  pro 
moted  to  be  Major  General  May  10,  1862,  and  on 
September  23,  1862,  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  Department  of  East  Tennessee.  From  April 
to  October,  1864,  he  was  in  command  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida,  and 
from  January  to  May,  1865,  of  the  Department  of 
Florida  and  South  Georgia.  Here  he  made  one  of 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON          7 

the  last  stands  of  the   Confederacy,   and  held  his 
position  until  the  surrender  at  Appomattox. 

General  Jones  was  an  accomplished  soldier  and 
gentleman,  proficient  in  the  sciences  which  entered 
into  his  military  education,  ardently  attached  to  his 
profession  of  arms,  and  true  to  its  highest  ideals 
of  conduct.  In  private  life  he  possessed  in  a  high 
degree  the  qualities  which  win  and  keep  affection  and 
esteem. 

EMILY  READ  JONES. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C, 
September  2,   1911. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I  13 

Ordinance  of  Secession — South  Carolina  Secedes — Fort 
Moultrie  dismantled — Major  Anderson  transfers 
command  to  Fort  Sumter — South  Carolina  takes 
possession  of  Fort  Moultrie  and  Castle  Pinckney — 
Star  of  the  West  fired  on — Dissensions  in  Presi 
dent's  Cabinet — Virginian  Peace  Conferences — Inau 
guration  of  Lincoln  as  President — Shall  Sumter 
be  evacuated? 


CHAPTER  II 


Sumter  to  be  reinforced — Batteries  erected  on  Morris 
and  Sullivan  Islands — General  Beauregard  assigned 
to  command  in  Charleston — Charleston's  defenses 
strengthened — Fort  Sumter  prepares  for  assault — 
Beauregard  demands  surrender  of  Sumter — Refused 
— Sumter  fired  on — War  fleet  unable  to  succor 
Anderson — Evacuation  of  Sumter. 


CHAPTER  III 


War  in  earnest — South  Atlantic  Coast  invested — Ad 
miral  DuPont  in  command — Fleet  scattered — Hilton 
Head's  defenses — Forts  Beauregard  and  Walker  at 
tacked — Masterly  evolutions  of  fleet — Colonel  Wag 
ner  disabled — Fort  Walker  taken — Fort  Beauregard 
evacuated — Sherman  occupies  Hilton  Head. 


47 


io        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 


CHAPTER  IV    61 

Port  Royal  occupied — Panic  of  inhabitants — Looting 
Beaufort — Tybee  Island — Gunboat  reconnoissance  of 
South  Carolina  waters — General  Lee  in  command  of 
military  department — South  Carolina's  military  force 
— Want  of  artillery — Scarcity  of  arms. 


CHAPTER  V 74 

Confederate  defense  centered  on  Charleston — Military 
districts — Sherman's  broad  opportunities — Capture 
of  Savannah  planned — Delays — Fernandina  occu 
pied — Jacksonville  and  St.  Augustine  abandoned — 
Reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski  planned — Difficulties  of 
approval — Fort  Pulaski — Siege  of  Pulaski — Reduc 
tion  and  surrender. 


CHAPTER  VI    87 

Blockade — Lack  of  Confederate  resources — Inferiority 
of  equipment — Charleston's  strategic  value — Invest 
ment  of  Charleston — Charleston  and  Savannah  Rail 
road — Denfenses  of  railroad — James  Island — Unsuc 
cessful  assault — Vigor  of  Confederate  fire — Con 
federate  position  again  assaulted — Engagement  at 
Secessionville — Federal  reports  of  action — Federal 
Republic — Within  the  Confederate  lines. 


CHAPTER  VII    117 

Operations  on  the  South  Atlantic  Coast — General 
Hunter's  policy — Expedition  up  the  St.  John's — 
Capture  of  St.  John's  Bluff — General  Hunter  is  suc 
ceeded  by  Major  General  Ormesby  Mitchell — Ex 
pedition  toward  Pocotaligo — Engagement  at  Framp- 
ton's  plantation  and  Pocotaligo — Negro  troops — 
General  Saxton's  activities — Contraband. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        n 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  VIII    143 

Strengthening  the  blockade — Palmetto  State  and  Chicora 
— Blockading  fleet  attacked — Result  of  engagement 
— Federal  reports — Blockade  raised — Foreign  con 
sul's  report — Diversity  of  statements — Capture  of 
the  Isaac  Smith. 

CHAPTER  IX    164 

The  Merrimac — The  monitors — Fort  McAlister — Advance 
on  Charleston — Fort  Sumter  again  assailed — Iron 
clads  in  action — Result  of  Confederate  fire  to  iron 
clads — Report  of  action — Confederate  loss — Review 
of  the  engagement — Lincoln's  dispatch — Feeling  in 
the  North — Investment  of  Charleston  postponed. 

CHAPTER  X   190 

Federal  lack  of  co-operation — Army  and  navy  at  odds — 
Hunter  and  DuPont  relieved  of  commands — Gill- 
more  in  command  of  army — Dahlgren  commands 
navy — Topography  of  Charleston  harbor  and  city 
— Gillmore's  plan  of  operations — Strength  of  the 
defense — Attack  on  Morris  Island — Success  of  move 
ment — Confederate  loss — Assault  of  Battery  Wag 
ner — Repulse — Loss  on  both  sides. 

CHAPTER  XI    222 

Battery  Wagner's  armament  increased — Its  importance 
in  the  defense  of  Charleston — Attack  on  Federal 
position — Success — Wagner  again  bombarded — Whole 
Confederate  defenses  engaged — Terrific  fire — Scenes 
in  Charleston — Suffering  of  the  besieged — Bayonet 
assault — Repulse — Confederate  loss — Federal  loss — 
Bombardment  continues. 


12        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 


CHAPTER  XII    247 

Assault  of  Wagner  abandoned — Its  reduction  by  siege 
planned — Fort  Sumter  again  bombarded — Siege 
operations — Federal  defenses — Death  of  Captain 
Wampler — Sumter  silenced — The  "Swamp  Angel" — 
Surrender  of  Sumter  and  Morris  Island  demanded 
— Charleston  bombarded. 


CHAPTER  XIII 262 

Resumption  of  operations  against  Wagner — Siege  lines 
tightened — Losses  and  sick  list  enormous — North 
clamors  for  reduction  of  Charleston — Night  attack 
on  Wagner — Repulse — Wagner  bombarded — Horrors 
of  the  siege — Evacuation  of  Morris  Island — Con 
federate  loss. 


CHAPTER  XIV 278 

Dahlgren  demands  surrender  o  f  Fort  Sumter — Fort 
Moultrie  engaged — Assault  of  Fort  Sumter — Disas 
trous  result — Army  and  navy  mutually  jealous — 
Obstacles  in  approach  to  Charleston — Can  the  harbor 
be  entered? — Second  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter 
— Sumter  still  resists — What  now? — Operations 
against  Charleston  abandoned. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 


CHAPTER  I 

Ordinance  of  Secession — South  Carolina  Secedes — Fort  Moul- 
trie  dismantled — Major  Anderson  transfers  command  to  Fort 
Sumter — South  Carolina  takes  possession  of  Fort  Moul- 
trie  and  Castle  Pinckney — Star  of  the  West  fired  on — 
Dissensions  in  President's  Cabinet — Virginian  Peace  Con 
ferences — Inauguration  of  Lincoln  as  President — Shall 
Sumter  be  evacuated? 

When,  on  the  2Oth  of  December,  1860,  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  people  of  South  Carolina,  in  con 
vention  assembled,  passed  by  a  unanimous  vote  an 
Ordinance  of  Secession  dissolving  the  connection  of 
that  State  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
Charleston  which  for  a  long  time  had  been  one  of 
the  most  important  seaports  on  the  Atlantic  coast 
of  America,  became  a  point  of  increased  interest 
and  solicitude  both  in  this  country  and  abroad. 

Of  the  constitutional  questions  involved  in  the  act 
of  secession  it  is  no  part  of  the  writer's  purpose  to 
treat.  He  proposes  to  give  with  the  circumstances 
leading  to  them  only  a  connected  narrative  of  the 
principal  military  and  naval  operations  against 
Charleston  and  on  the  South  Atlantic  coast  which 


i4        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

followed  the  secession  of  South  Carolina  and  ten 
other  Southern  States. 

Immediately  on  the  withdrawal  of  South  Carolina 
from  the  Union, — indeed  for  many  weeks  before  the 
passage  of  the  Ordinance  of  Secession, — the  condi 
tion  of  the  military  defenses  of  Charleston  harbor 
became  most  naturally  a  question  of  grave  import 
ance.  At  that  time  Fort  Moultrie,  on  Sullivan's 
Island,  was  the  only  one  of  the  forts  constructed  for 
the  defense  of  the  harbor  that  was  occupied  by 
United  States  troops.  It  was  garrisoned  by  Com 
panies  E  and  H  of  First  Regiment  United  States 
Artillery,  Major  Robert  Anderson,  of  that  regiment, 
commanding,  the  aggregate  force  present  being  less 
than  eighty  men. 

When  Congress  met  in  December  it  was  generally 
understood  that  the  convention  of  the  people  of 
South  Carolina  which  had  been  called  to  meet  at 
Columbia  on  the  iyth  would  surely  and  speedily 
pass  an  Ordinance  of  Secession.  In  anticipation  of 
that  event  the  representatives  in  Congress  from  that 
State  called  upon  the  President,  Mr.  Buchanan,  and 
assured  him  that  their  State  would  in  no  way  molest 
the  forts  until  time  and  opportunity  could  be  had 
for  the  consideration  and  amicable  adjustment  of 
all  questions  growing  out  of  the  altered  relations 
between  the  State  and  general  government,  pro 
vided  the  latter  would  not  in  the  meantime  send 
reinforcements  to,  or  change  the  military  status  in, 
the  harbor  of  Charleston.  The  President  declined 
to  give  any  formal  pledge  in  regard  to  the  course 
he  would  pursue,  but  it  is  claimed,  on  what  authority 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        15 

need  not  be  stated  here,  that  he  approved  of  the 
suggestions,  and  that  an  informal  understanding  was 
arrived  at  to  the  effect  that  the  military  status  in 
Charleston  harbor  should  remain  unchanged  pend 
ing  negotiations  for  the  amicable  adjustment  of  all 
questions  relating  to  public  property,  including  the 
forts  within  the  limits  of  the  State.  And  to  the  end 
that  there  might  be  no  needless  delay  in  the  settle 
ment  of  those  important  questions,  one  of  the  first 
acts  of  the  convention  after  passing  the  Ordinance 
of  Secession  was  to  depute  Mr.  Robert  W.  Barn- 
well,  Mr.  James  H.  Adams,  and  Hon.  James  L. 
Orr,  eminent  citizens  of  the  State,  to  proceed  to  the 
city  of  Washington  "to  treat  with  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  for  the  delivery  of  the  forts, 
magazines,  lighthouses,  and  other  real  estate,  with 
their  appurtenances,  within  the  limits  of  South  Caro 
lina,  and  also  for  an  apportionment  of  the  public 
debt,  and  for  a  division  of  all  other  property  held 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  as  agents 
of  the  Confederated  States,  of  which  South  Caro 
lina  was  recently  a  member;  and  generally  to  nego 
tiate  as  to  all  other  measures  and  arrangements 
proper  to  be  made  and  adopted  in  the  existing  rela 
tion  of  the  parties,  and  for  the  continuance  of  peace 
and  amity  between  this  Commonwealth  and  the  Gov 
ernment  at  Washington." 

On  the  nth  of  December,  a  few  days  after  the 
interview  between  the  President  and  the  represen 
tatives  of  South  Carolina,  instructions  were  sent 
from  the  War  Department  to  Major  Anderson,  in 
accordance  with  the  understanding  claimed  to  have 


1 6        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

been  agreed  on.  They  were  in  substance  that  he 
should  carefully  avoid  every  act  which  would  need 
lessly  tend  to  provoke  aggression,  and  to  that  end 
he  was  instructed,  not  without  evident  and  imminent 
necessity  to  occupy  any  position  which  could  be  con 
strued  into  the  assumption  of  a  hostile  attitude.  At 
the  same  time  he  was  ordered  to  hold  possession  of 
the  forts  in  the  harbor,  and  if  attacked  "to  defend 
himself  to  the  last  extremity,"  or,  as  subsequently 
modified,  "as  long  as  any  reasonable  hope  remained 
of  saving  the  fort."  His  force  was  obviously  too 
small  to  occupy  more  than  one  of  the  three  forts  in 
the  harbor,  but  an  attack  on,  or  attempt  to  take  pos 
session  of,  any  one  he  should  regard  as  an  act  of 
hostility,  and  in  that  event  he  was  authorized  to 
occupy  that  one  of  the  forts  which  in  his  judgment 
could  be  most  easily  defended.  He  was  further 
authorized  to  take  this  precautionary  measure  when 
ever  he  might  have  tangible  evidence  of  a  design  on 
the  part  of  the  authorities  of  South  Carolina  to  pro 
ceed  to  any  hostile  act. 

Those  instructions  are  such  as  are  not  infrequently 
given  by  a  military  superior  to  an  inferior,  when 
the  former  has  not,  or  does  not  choose  to  express,  a 
clear  and  distinct  purpose  as  to  what  is  to  be  done 
by  the  latter.  In  such  cases  the  instructions  are  so 
worded  as  in  any  event  to  shield  the  one  who  gives, 
and  throw  the  responsibility  of  action  on  the  one 
who  has  to  execute  them. 

It  was  as  well  known  at  the  War  Department  as 
to  Major  Anderson,  that  Fort  Sumter  could  at  that 
time  be  more  easily  and  securely  held  than  could 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON         17 

Fort  Moultrie.  If  Major  Anderson  had  remained 
at  Moultrie,  the  weaker  post,  and  had  he  been  at 
tacked,  and  his  post  captured,  he  would  have  been 
liable  to  censure  under  his  instructions.  Under  the 
same  instructions,  if  he  abandoned  the  weaker  and 
occupied  the  stronger  fort,  he  thereby  became  open 
to  censure  for  taking  a  "position  which  could  be  con 
strued  into  the  assumption  of  a  hostile  attitude." 

Major  Anderson  was  in  the  embarrassing  posi 
tion  which  besets  a  soldier  "when  the  bugle  gives  an 
uncertain  sound."  He  ardently  desired  to  avoid,  if 
possible,  a  hostile  collision,  and  he  believed — or 
apprehended — that  a  collision  would  occur  if  he  re 
mained  at  Fort  Moultrie.  He  was  a  well  trained 
and  tried  soldier,  and  an  accomplished  gentleman, 
with  a  high  and  scrupulous  sense  of  honor.  He 
acted  as  might  have  been  expected  of  such  an  officer 
so  circumstanced. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2yth  of  December  Charles 
ton  and  Washington  and  the  whole  country  were 
startled  by  the  announcement  that  during  the  preced 
ing  night  Major  Anderson  had  dismantled  Fort 
Moultrie,  spiked  the  guns,  burned  the  carriages,  cut 
down  the  flagstaff,  and  transferred  his  little  com 
mand  to  Fort  Sumter.  An  explanation  of  his  course 
was  immediately  demanded  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
and  as  promptly  given.  Anderson  replied  that  he 
had  reason  to  believe  the  authorities  of  South  Caro 
lina  designed  to  proceed  to  a  hostile  act.  He  aban 
doned  Fort  Moultrie  because  he  was  certain  that  if 
attacked,  his  garrison  would  be  sacrificed  and  the 
command  of  the  harbor  lost.  He  had  spiked  his 


1 8        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

guns  and  burned  their  carriages  to  prevent  their 
being  used  against  himself;  that  if  attacked,  his  gar 
rison  would  never  have  surrendered  without  a  fight; 
and  he  had  felt  it  to  be  his  solemn  duty  to  remove 
his  command  from  a  fort  which  he  could  not 
probably  hold  longer  than  forty-eight  or  sixty  hours, 
to  one  in  which  his  power  of  resistance  was  greatly 
increased.  And  he  might  have  added,  if  it  would 
have  been  respectful,  that  he  could  hold  Sumter  long 
enough  to  give  the  Administration  time  to  decide 
on  the  course  it  would  pursue  in  the  critical  emer 
gency  and  assume  the  responsibility  which  properly 
belonged  to  it  instead  of  devolving  it  on  one  of  its 
subordinate  officers. 

This  act  of  Major  Anderson  produced  serious 
complications  both  in  the  political  and  military 
States.  The  government  of  South  Carolina,  regard 
ing  it  as  a  violation  of  the  pledge,  expressed  or 
implied,  to  maintain  the  status  quo,  immediately  took 
possession  of  Fort  Moultrie  and  Castle  Pinckney 
and  other  public  property.  And  the  political  excite 
ment  throughout  the  country  was  greatly  heightened. 

As  yet  South  Carolina  was  the  only  State  which 
had  seceded,  and  it  was  by  no  means  certain  that 
she  would  not  continue  to  be  alone  in  that  move 
ment.  The  course  of  Major  Anderson  and  the  atti 
tude  assumed  by  the  Government  in  Washington 
went  far  toward  precipitating  secession  in  other 
States.  Its  effect  in  Georgia  was  quickly  manifested. 
There  was  a  fort — Pulaski — at  the  entrance  to  the 
Savannah  River  which  was  not  garrisoned,  but  in 
the  care  of  an  ordnance  sergeant.  What  more  prob- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        19 

able,  judging  by  what  had  just  occurred  in  Charles 
ton  harbor,  than  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  would  speedily  throw  a  garrison  into  Fort 
Pulaski  and  thus  close  the  entrance  from  the  sea  to 
Savannah  in  the  event  of  the  secession  of  Georgia? 
Excitement  ran  high  in  the  State,  especially  in  Savan 
nah.  Governor  Brown  of  that  State  had  in  the 
previous  November  called  a  convention  of  the  people 
of  the  State  to  meet  on  the  i6th  of  January,  but 
long  before  the  convention  could  meet  the  fort  which 
commanded  the  approach  to  the  chief  city  of  the 
State  would  be  occupied  by  United  States  troops 
unless  step?  were  taken  to  prevent  it.  Assurances 
came  from  trusted  representatives  in  Washington 
that  the  United  States  Government  would  resort  to 
coercive  measures,  and  produced  the  profoundest 
sensation.  Notwithstanding  that  the  State  was  still 
in  the  Union  and  its  ultimate  secession  extremely 
doubtful,  leading  citizens  of  Savannah  had  resolved 
to  seize  Fort  Pulaski  without  waiting  for  the  as 
sembling  of  the  convention  and  its  doubtful  action, 
or  for  the  sanction  of  the  Executive  of  the  State. 
Somewhat  more  moderate  counsel,  however,  pre 
vailed,  and  it  was  agreed  to  await  the  action  of  the 
Governor,  who,  on  an  urgent  request  from  the 
Mayor  of  Savannah,  hastened  to  that  city,  where  he 
arrived  on  the  evening  of  January  2.  Late  in  the 
night,  and  after  mature  deliberation,  he  ordered  Col 
onel  Alexander  R.  Lawton,  commanding  the  First 
Georgia  Volunteers,  to  take  possession  of  Fort 
Pulaski,  "and  to  hold  it  against  all  persons,  to  be 


20        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

abandoned  only  under  orders  from  me  or  under 
compulsion  by  an  overpowering  hostile  force. ": 

The  next  day  Colonel  Lawton,  with  detachments 
of  the  Chatham  Artillery  (Captain  Claibourne),  the 
Savannah  Volunteer  Guard  (Captain  Scrivin),  and 
the  Oglethorp  Light  Infantry  (Captain  Bartow),2 
numbering  about  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  men, 
took  formal  possession  of  the  fort  without  opposi 
tion,  in  the  name  of  the  State  of  Georgia. 

Fuel  was  added  to  the  fire  by  the  sailing  from 
New  York  on  January  5,  under  instructions  from 
the  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  of  the  steamer  Star 
of  the  West,  with  two  hundred  men,  Lieutenant 
Charles  R.  Wood,  Ninth  United  States  Infantry, 
commanding,  to  reinforce  and  provision  Fort 
Sumter.  The  Star  of  the  West  arrived  off  the  bar 
of  Charleston  harbor  late  in  the  night  of  the  8th, 
and  early  in  the  morning  crossed  the  bar  and  pro 
ceeded  up  the  main  channel  toward  Sumter,  the 
Union  ensign  flying  from  the  flagstaff.  She  was 
warned  off  by  shots  fired  across  her  bow  from  a 
battery  at  Cumming's  Point,  but,  disregarding  the 
warning,  she  ran  up  a  large  United  States  flag  at 
her  fore  and  proceeded  on  her  course,  when  the  fire 
was  directed  at  her,  three  shots  striking  her.  The 
vessel  then  came  about  and  steamed  away,  to  New 
York. 

'The  Governor's  order  was  in  writing,  and  is  of  interest  as 
a  part  of  the  history  of  the  terms.     See  Appendix. 
'Killed  at  first  battle  of  Manassas. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        21 

The  Cabinet  was  hopelessly  divided  in  opinion. 
The  Secretary  of  State  had  resigned  because  the 
President  would  not  send  reinforcements  to  Charles 
ton,  The  Secretary  of  War,  regarding  Major  An 
derson's  movement  as  a  breach  of  faith  with  the 
representatives  of  South  Carolina,  resigned  because 
the  President  would  not  withdraw  the  troops  from 
Fort  Sumter  and  from  the  harbor  of  Charleston. 
Startling  events  followed  one  another  rapidly.  In 
quick  succession  the  States  of  Mississippi,  Florida, 
Alabama,  Georgia,  and  Louisiana  seceded  from  the 
Union.  A  congress  of  representatives  of  those  States 
assembled  at  Montgomery,  Ala.,  on  February  4  and 
inaugurated  a  new  government,  giving  to  it  the  name 
of  "The  Confederate  States  of  America,"  which 
was  soon  joined  by  other  Southern  States. 

It  is  difficult  at  this  day  to  conceive  the  excitement 
and  anxiety  that  pervaded  Washington  city  during 
that  eventful  winter  and  spring.  The  lobbies  of 
the  hotels  and  of  the  Capitol  and  the  galleries  of 
the  two  houses  of  Congress  were  thronged  with 
eager  crowds  discussing,  or  listening  to  the  discus 
sions  of,  the  all-absorbing  question  of  the  day.  As 
State  after  State  seceded,  and  it  was  known  that  its 
representatives  in  Congress  would  rise  in  their  places 
to  announce  the  fact  and  withdraw,  anxious  crowds 
poured  into  the  Capitol,  and  long  before  the  hour 
of  meeting  of  the  houses  the  galleries  were  packed 
to  the  extent  that  it  was  difficult  to  escape  from  them 
before  the  adjournment,  which  was  often  far  into 
the  night. 

To  no  class  in  the  country  were  the  passing  events 


22        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

of  more  absorbing  and  vital  interest  than  to  the 
officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy  who  were  natives 
and  citizens  of  the  Southern  States.  They  could  but 
watch  with  feverish  anxiety  the  march  of  events 
which  they  were  powerless  to  influence,  though  so 
nearly  concerned  in,  and  which  were  hastening 
rapidly  and  inevitably  to  a  result  which  most  of  them 
unquestionably  deeply  deplored.  Many  of  them, 
as  their  States  seceded,  resigned  their  commissions 
and  returned  to  their  homes  in  the  South.  Their 
resignations  were  accepted,  and  they  left  the  old 
service  and  joined  the  new,  unmolested  by  the  Fede 
ral  authorities,  no  one  at  that  day  openly  impugning 
their  honor  and  integrity  for  pursuing  the  path  to 
which,  in  their  judgment,  duty  and  honor  prompted. 

Probably  the  preponderance  of  opinion  at  the 
time  was  that  a  disruption  of  the  Union  was  inevi 
table  and  would  be  effected  without  war — when  a 
Southern  and  Northern  republic  would  exist  side 
by  side  for  a  time,  but  a  brief  time;  that  when  party 
rancor  which  then  raged  so  fiercely  subsided  and  it 
should  become  obvious  that  the  mutual  interests  of 
the  different  sections  were  more  potent  than  the 
questions  which  unhappily  antagonized  and  divided 
them  the  two  would  come  together  again  in  a  new 
and  more  satisfactory  union  under  one  government 
and  one  flag. 

In  the  meantime  good  and  patriotic  men  in  all 
sections  of  the  country,  statesmen  in  the  better  sense 
of  the  term,  as  distinct  from  mere  party  politicians, 
were  throwing  oil  on  the  troubled  waters  and  striv 
ing  with  all  their  might  to  bring  about  an  amicable 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        23 

adjustment  of  all  questions  in  dispute,  to  avert,  if 
possible,  the  calamities  of  war,  which  the  course  of 
fanatics  and  party  politicians  in  both  sections,  who 
prized  party  ascendancy  above  the  public  weal,  had 
for  years  tended  to  bring  upon  the  country. 

To  this  end  a  Peace  Conference  assembled  in 
Washington  on  February  4.  It  originated  in  the 
General  Assembly  of  Virginia,  which,  deprecating 
secession,  invited  the  other  States  to  send  commis 
sioners  to  meet  five  of  her  own  most  eminent  citizens, 
"to  consider,  and,  if  practicable,  agree  upon  some 
suitable  adjustment  of  the  questions  which  were  then 
rending  the  Union  asunder."  Twenty-one  States- 
seven  slave-holding  and  fourteen  non-slave-holding 
—were  represented.  It  was  presided  over  by  the 
venerable  Ex-President  John  Tyler,  and  contained 
many  eminent  and  patriotic  citizens  of  the  States 
represented.  A  plan  of  adjustment  was  agreed  upon, 
which  it  was  earnestly  hoped  would  prove  satisfac 
tory  to  all  concerned.  It  was  reported  in  both  houses 
of  Congress,  but  the  withdrawal  from  that  body  of 
the  representatives  of  six  States  had  left  one  party 
largely  in  the  ascendancy,  and  the  plan  proposed  by 
the  Peace  Conference  was  rejected,  not  without 
manifestations  of  contempt. 

President  Buchanan  succeeded  in  tiding  over  the 
few  remaining  days  of  his  administration  without 
bringing  on  a  war  between  the  States. 

One  of  his  last  acts  was  to  intimate  indirectly 
through  a  distinguished  Senator — Mr.  Hunter  of 
Virginia,  to  Mr.  Davis,  President  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy — that  he  would  be  pleased  to  receive 


24        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

in  Washington  a  commissioner  or  commissioners 
from  the  Confederate  Government,  and  would  lay 
before  the  Senate  any  communication  that  might  be 
made  through  them.  On  this  invitation  Mr.  Craw 
ford  of  Georgia,  Mr.  Forsyth  of  Alabama,  and  Mr. 
Roman  of  Louisiana  were  appointed  special  com 
missioners  to  represent  the  Confederate  States  in 
Washington. 

On  the  4th  of  March,  just  one  month  after  the 
Government  of  the  Confederate  States  had  been 
established  and  put  in  operation,  Mr.  Lincoln  was 
inaugurated  as  President  of  the  United  States.  All 
eyes  were  eagerly  directed  to  the  new  President  with 
the  most  anxious  solicitude,  as  to  the  course  he  would 
pursue  under  the  complicated  and  embarrassing  cir 
cumstances  that  surrounded  him. 

The  representatives  of  the  Confederacy  were  not 
formally  and  officially  received  by  the  President,  but 
in  a  few  days  after  the  inauguration  they  were, 
through  the  agency  of  two  Justices  of  the  Supreme 
Court, — Justices  Nelson  of  New  York  and  Campbell 
of  Alabama, — in  communication  with  Mr.  Seward 
and  other  members  of  President  Lincoln's  Cabinet. 

The  all-important  question,  What  should  be  the 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  Con 
federated  States?  seemed  to  depend  on  the  course 
which  the  former  would  pursue  in  regard  to  Fort 
Sumter.  If  the  troops  were  withdrawn  and  amicable 
relations  maintained,  it  was  believed  that  the  eight 
remaining  slave-holding  States  would  remain  in  the 
Union,  and  time  and  the  efforts  of  lovers  of  the 
Union  throughout  the  whole  country  might  develop 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        25 

some  satisfactory  solution  of  the  political  conflict. 
If,  however,  an  attempt  were  made  to  throw  rein 
forcements  and  provisions  into  Sumter,  thus  mani 
festing  a  purpose  to  coerce  the  States  which  had 
seceded,  a  hostile  collision  would  ensue,  and  some— 
perhaps  all — of  the  remaining  slave-holding  States 
would  secede  and  join  the  Southern  Confederacy. 
Unquestionably  a  vast  majority  of  intelligent  men 
in  the  Southern  States  believed,  without  the  shadow 
of  a  doubt,  that  any  and  every  State  of  the  Union 
possessed  an  inherent  and  reserved  right  to  secede 
for  cause,  and  that  it  rested  with  a  convention  of  the 
people  of  the  State,  duly  convened,  to  decide  abso 
lutely  when  a  cause  had  arisen.  Probably  a  ma 
jority  of  the  same  people  believed  that  no  sufficient, 
cause  had  at  that  time  arisen.  An  attempt,  however, 
to  coerce  into  the  Union  a  State  which  had  seceded, 
thus  converting  a  union  of  consent  into  one  of  force, 
would  be  generally  regarded  as  so  radical  and  dan 
gerous  an  infringement  of  the  rights  of  the  States 
as  not  only  to  justify,  but  to  demand,  secession  as 
the  only  adequate  mode  and  measure  of  redress. 

Eminent  gentlemen  high  in  official  position,  zeal 
ous  in  devotion  to  the  Union,  whose  opinions  and 
counsel  were  entitled  to  weight,  strongly  advised  the 
evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter.  Among  them  were  Lieu 
tenant-  General  Scott,  General-in-Chief  of  the  Army, 
and  General  Totten,  Chief  of  Engineers. 

The  President,  in  great  doubt  and  perplexity  as 
to  the  best  course  to  pursue  in  regard  to  Fort  Sum 
ter,  addressed  the  following  brief  note  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War: 


26        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  March  15,  1861. 
To  THE  HONORABLE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

Dear  Sir:   Assuming  it  to  be  possible  to  now  provision  Fort 
Sumter,   under   all   the   circumstances  is  it   wise  to   attempt  it? 
Please  give  me  your  opinion  in  writing  on  this  question. 
Your  obedient  servant, 

A.  LINCOLN. 

The  Secretary  replied  that  he  had  been  most  re 
luctantly  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be 
unwise  to  make  such  an  attempt.  His  opinion  was 
based  on  those  of  the  army  officers  who  had  ex 
pressed  themselves  on  the  subject,  including  the 
General-in-Chief  of  the  Army,  the  Chief  of  Engi 
neers,  and  all  of  the  officers  then  within  Fort  Sumter, 
whose  written  opinions  the  Secretary  embodied  in 
his  answer.  The  plan  proposed  by  Mr.  G.  V.  Fox, 
late  of  the  navy,  would,  he  said,  be  entitled  to  his 
favorable  consideration  if  he  "did  not  believe  that 
the  attempt  to  carry  it  into  effect  would  initiate  a 
bloody  and  protracted  conflict.  No  practical  benefit 
will  result  to  the  country  or  the  Government  by 
accepting  the  proposal  alluded  to,  and  I  am  there 
fore  of  the  opinion  that  the  cause  of  humanity  and 
the  highest  obligation  to  the  public  interest  would 
be  best  promoted  by  adopting  the  counsels  of  those 
brainy  and  experienced  men  whose  suggestions  I 
have  laid  before  you." 

General  Scott,  who  six  weeks  previously  had 
strenuously  opposed  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter 
and  had  urged  that  it  be  reinforced,  had  under  the 
altered  aspect  of  affairs  changed  his  opinion.  To 
attempt  it  now  would,  in  his  opinion,  require,  in 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        27 

addition  to  the  means  already  at  command,  a  fleet 
of  war  vessels, — which  could  not  be  assembled  in 
less  than  four  months, — five  thousand  additional 
regular  troops,  and  twenty  thousand  volunteers.  To 
organize  such  a  force,  even  if  undertaken  imme 
diately  and  without  the  sanction  of  Congress,— 
which  was  not  then  in  session, — could  not  in  his 
opinion  be  done  in  less  than  six  or  eight  months. 
uAs  a  practical  military  question,"  he  said,  "the  time 
for  succoring  Fort  Sumter,  with  any  means  at  hand, 
had  passed  away  nearly  a  month  ago.  Since  then 
a  surrender  under  assault  or  from  starvation  has 
been  merely  a  question  of  time."  The  abandon 
ment  of  the  fort  in  a  few  weeks  he  regarded  as  a 
sure  necessity,  and  since  it  must  be  done  "the  sooner, 
the  more  graceful  on  the  part  of  the  government." 
He  went  further,  and  advised  the  abandonment  of 
Fort  Pickens,  at  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  of  Pen- 
sacola;  and,  in  addition  to  the  military  reasons  as 
signed  for  this  course,  added  the  further  reason  that 
"our  Southern  friends  are  clear  that  the  evacuation 
of  both  the  forts  would  instantly  soothe  and  give 
confidence  to  the  eight  remaining  slave-holding  States 
and  render  their  cordial  adherence  to  this  Union 
perpetual." 

The  same  views  were  most  forcibly  presented  by 
General  Totten,  Chief  of  Engineers,  in  a  memo 
randum  read  by  him  before  the  President  and  Cabi 
net  on  March  15  in  the  presence  of  General  Scott, 
Commander  Stringham,  and  Mr.  Fox.  And  again 
on  April  3  General  Totten,  impelled  by  a  profound 
sense  of  duty  and  "under  the  strongest  convictions 


28        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

on  some  military  questions  upon  which  great  political 
events  seem  about  to  turn,"  urged  the  same  views  in 
regard  to  both  Forts  Sumter  and  Pickens  in  a  letter 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  which  he  said:  "In  ad 
dition  to  what  I  have  heretofore  said  as  to  the 
impracticability  of  efficiently  re-enforcing  and  sup 
plying  this  fort  [Sumter],  I  will  now  say  only  that 
if  the  fort  was  fitted  with  men  and  munitions  it  could 
hold  out  but  a  short  time.  It  would  be  obliged  to 
surrender  with  loss  of  life,  for  it  would  be  bravely 
and  obstinately  defended,  and  the  greater  the  crowd 
within,  the  greater  the  proportionate  loss.  This  issue 
can  be  averted  only  by  sending  a  large  army  and 
navy  to  capture  all  the  surrounding  forts  and  bat 
teries,  and  to  assemble  and  apply  these  there  is  now 
no  time.  If  we  do  not  evacuate  Fort  Sumter  it  will 
be  wrested  from  us  by  force."  He  added  in  con 
clusion:  "Having  no  personal  ambition  or  party 
feeling  to  lead  or  mislead  me  to  conclusions,  I  have 
maturely  studied  the  subject  as  a  soldier  bound  to 
give  all  his  faculties  to  his  country,  which  may  God 
preserve  in  peace." 

The  Hon.  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  the  popular  leader 
of  a  large  party  whose  ardent  love  for  the  Union 
no  one  could  question,  had  introduced  in  the  Senate 
a  resolution  advising  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops 
from  all  forts  within  the  Southern  Confederacy, 
except  those  at  Key  West  and  the  Dry  Tortugas; 
and  urged  its  passage  in  an  earnest  speech.  Deeply 
as  he  deplored  the  establishment  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy,  its  existence  de  facto  he  declared  could 
not  be  denied,  and  it  was  entitled  to  the  forts  within 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        29 

its  limits.  He  was  the  leader  of  a  party,  and  spoke 
by  authority.  "I  proclaim  boldly/'  he  said,  "the 
policy  of  those  with  whom  I  act.  We  are  for 
peace." 

The  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward,  himself  im 
pressed  upon  the  President  and  commissioners  of 
the  Southern  Confederacy,  through  the  agency  of 
Justices  Campbell  and  Nelson  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
that  no  attempt  would  be  made  by  the  United  States 
Government  to  reinforce  or  revictual  Fort  Sumter, 
and  that  the  then  existing  military  status  in  Charles 
ton  harbor  should  not  be  changed  in  any  way  preju 
dicial  to  the  Southern  Confederacy.  He  authorized 
Justice  Campbell  to  write,  as  he  did,  to  Mr.  Davis, 
that  before  the  receipt  of  his  letter  he  (Mr.  Davis) 
would  have  learned  by  telegraph  that  the  order  for 
the  evacaution  of  Fort  Sumter  had  been  given.  On 
April  7,  no  such  order  having  yet  been  given,  and 
certain  military  and  naval  preparations  which  it  was 
well  known  the  United  States  Government  was  mak 
ing  having  caused  much  feverish  apprehension,  Jus 
tice  Campbell  addressed  a  letter  to  Mr.  Seward, 
asking  if  the  assurances  the  latter  had  given  him 
were  well  or  ill-founded,  to  which  Mr.  Seward  re 
plied:  "Faith  as  to  Sumter  fully  kept — wait  and  see." 
When  that  last  assurance  was  given  Lieutenant  Tal- 
bot,  of  the  army,  and  Mr.  Chew,  confidential  mes 
sengers  for  the  War  and  State  departments,  were 
speeding  away  to  Charleston,  bearing  to  the  Gov 
ernor  of  South  Carolina  and  to  Major  Anderson 
assurances  that  Sumter  would  be  speedily  revictualed. 

The  Peace  Conference,  and  all  who  were  labor- 


3o        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

ing  for  peace,  had  failed  to  accomplish  the  purpose 
so  ardently  desired.  Other  and  more  potent  influ 
ences  were  at  work,  which  influences  frustrated  and 
brought  to  naught  all  efforts  to  attain  an  amicable 
adjustment  of  the  political  complications. 


CHAPTER  II 

Sumter  to  be  reinforced — Batteries  erected  on  Morris  and  Sulli 
van  Islands — General  Beauregard  assigned  to  command  in 
Charleston — Charleston's  defenses  strengthened — Fort  Sum 
ter  prepares  for  assault — Beauregard  demands  surrender  of 
Sumter — Refused — Sumter  fired  on — War  fleet  unable  to 
succor  Anderson — Evacuation  of  Sumter. 

Pending  the  informal  negotiations  for  peace,  plans 
were  devised  and  preparations  made  to  reinforce 
and  revictual  Fort  Sumter.  Captain  G.  V.  Fox,  late 
of  the  United  States  Navy,  and  Colonel  Lawson, 
both  confidential  agents  of  the  Government,  had  at 
different  times  passed  from  Washington  through 
Charleston  to  Sumter,  and  returned,  ostensibly  for 
the  purpose  of  arranging  with  Major  Anderson  the 
details  for  the  evacuation;  but  really,  as  subsequently 
appeared,  to  ascertain  by  personal  observation  the 
practicability  and  expediency  of  reinforcing  and  re- 
victualing  the  fort.  Captain  Fox  intimated  to  Major 
Anderson  the  purpose  of  his  visit,  but  made  no 
definite  arrangement  with  him,  nor  even  disclosed  to 
him  his  plans.  Finally  on  the  8th  of  April  Lieu 
tenant  Talbot  and  Mr.  Chew,  the  confidential  agents 
of  the  War  and  State  departments  at  Washington, 
arrived  in  Charleston  with  assurances  for  Major 
Anderson,  which  they  were  not  permitted  to  deliver, 
that  if  he  could  hold  out  until  the  I2th  his  garrison 

31 


32        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

would  be  reinforced  and  supplied;  and  before  leaving 
Charleston,  on  the  same  date,  they  informed  Gov 
ernor  Pickens  and  the  Confederate  general  com 
manding  that  the  Government  would  provision  Fort 
Sumter, — peaceably,  if  possible;  forcibly,  if  neces 
sary. 

The  decision  of  the  Government  to  reinforce  and 
revictual  Sumter  was  communicated  to  Major  An 
derson  in  a  letter  sent  through  the  mail,  and  dated 
April  4.  Replying  through  the  Adjutant  Major, 
Anderson  expressed  great  surprise  at  the  receipt  of 
the  information,  coming  as  it  did  so  quickly  after 
and  positively  contradicting  the  assurances  which 
Mr.  Crawford  had  telegraphed  he  was  authorized 
to  make.  It  was  too  late  then,  he  said,  to  offer  any 
advice  in  regard  to  Captain  Fox's  plan — then  in  pro 
cess  of  execution — for  the  relief  of  the  fort.  He 
doubted  the  practicability  of  the  plan,  but  whether 
the  attempt  should  succeed  or  fail,  the  result  he  was 
sure  would  be  most  deplorable.  He  ought,  he  mod 
estly  said,  to  have  been  informed  that  the  expedition 
was  to  sail.  On  the  contrary,  he  had  gathered  from 
his  conversation  with  the  Government's  confidential 
messenger,  Colonel  Lawson,  that  the  plan  hinted  at 
by  Captain  Fox  would  not  be  attempted,  and  he  con 
cludes:  "We  shall  strive  to  do  our  duty,  though  I 
frankly  say  that  my  heart  is  not  in  this  war  which  I 
see  is  to  be  thus  commenced." 

On  the  5th  and  6th  of  April  the  Confederate  com 
missioners  then  in  Washington  telegraphed  Mr. 
Toombs,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  Confederate 
States,  that  active  preparations  were  in  progress  to 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        33 

dispatch  troops  and  supplies  to  sea,  conveyed  by  war 
vessels.  It  was  rumored  that  the  expedition  was  to 
sail  for  San  Domingo,  but  Charleston  was  believed 
to  be  its  real  destination.  The  New  York  Tribune 
of  April  ii  announced  that  the  main  object  of  the 
expedition  was  the  relief  of  Sumter,  and  that  a  force 
would  be  landed  which  would  overcome  all  opposi 
tion.  That  announcement  was  promptly  telegraphed 
to  the  government  at  Montgomery  and  the  authori 
ties  in  Charleston. 

On  the  loth  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War 
instructed  the  general  commanding  in  South  Caro 
lina  that  if  he  felt  confident  that  Mr.  Chew  had  been 
properly  authorized  to  announce  the  purpose  of 
the  United  States  Government  to  provision  Fort 
Sumter,  he  would  at  once  demand  the  surrender  of 
the  fort;  and,  if  refused,  proceed  to  reduce  it.  In 
the  meantime  the  naval  expedition  which  had  been 
fitted  out  in  New  York  had  gone  to  sea  and  was 
steaming  for  Charleston  harbor. 

Major  Anderson  had  carried  with  him  from 
Moultrie  to  Sumter  only  about  three  months'  supply 
of  food,  and  the  garrison  would  of  necessity  capitu 
late  when  it  had  consumed  that  supply,  provided  it 
were  not  revictualed.  That  could  only  be  done  by 
vessels  passing  in  through  one  of  the  channels.  Bat 
teries  had  been  erected  along  the  channel  shore  of 
Morris  Island  to  guard  the  main  channel,  and  on 
Sullivan's  Island  to  guard  Maffit's  Channel.  Prepa 
rations  had  also  been  made,  with  all  the  care  and 
dispatch  that  could  be  employed,  for  the  reduction 
of  Sumter  if,  unhappily,  it  should  become  necessary 


34        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

to  resort  to  force.  These  preparations  were  of  such 
a  nature  as  to  leave  little  doubt  of  the  speedy  accom 
plishment  of  that  purpose  when  the  emergency 
should  arise. 

Brigadier  General  Beauregard,  assigned  to  com 
mand  of  the  military  forces  in  and  around  Charles 
ton,  entered  on  that  duty  early  in  the  first  week  of 
March.  He  made  some  modifications  of  and  addi 
tions  to  the  works  already  constructed  and  in  course 
of  construction.  There  were  batteries  at  Fort  John 
son,  an  old  dilapidated  work  on  James  Island, — at 
and  near  Cumming's  Point,  the  northern  extremity 
of  Morris  Island.  Sullivan's  Island  was  further 
strengthened  by  mortar  batteries  to  the  east  of  Fort 
Moultrie,  and  its  western  end  by  a  masked  battery 
to  enfilade  the  channel  front  of  Sumter.  There  was 
also  a  floating  battery  of  long-range  guns  off  the 
western  end  of  Sullivan's  Island,  designed  by  and 
constructed  under  the  direction  of  Captain  John  Ran 
dolph  Hamilton,  late  an  officer  of  the  United  States 
Navy.  The  guns  of  Fort  Moultrie  had  been  re 
paired  and  remounted  and  were  in  readiness  for 
action.  There  were  mortar  batteries  near  Mount 
Pleasant  on  the  mainland  to  the  northward  in  Christ 
Church  parish,  and  at  Castle  Pinckney,  between 
Sumter  and  the  city.  At  Cumming's  Point,  thirteen 
hundred  yards  from  Sumter,  was  a  battery  of  long- 
range  guns,  among  them  the  first  Blakely  rifle  gun 
ever  used  in  this  country — a  present  to  South  Caro 
lina  from  Mr.  Charles  K.  Prioleau,  of  Charleston, 
which  had  just  arrived  from  England.  Near  this 
was  an  ironclad  land  battery,  devised  and  constructed 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        35 

by  Mr.  (afterward  General)  C.  H.  Stevens,  of 
Charleston,  a  line  of  ten  detached  batteries  of  two 
guns  each  stretched  along  the  channel  front  of 
Morris  Island.  To  light  up  the  channel  at  night 
lest  vessels  might  attempt  to  enter  unperceived,  two 
strong  Drummond  lights  were  established  at  suitable 
points — one  on  Morris,  the  other  on  Sullivan's 
Island.  The  lights  were  purchased  in  New  York 
and  arrived  in  Charleston  in  the  latter  part  of  March 
or  early  in  April.  Fort  Sumter  was  thus  encircled 
by  a  line  of  batteries  varying  in  distance  from  1300 
to  2450  yards,  and  mounting  thirty  guns  and  seven 
teen  mortars,  in  readiness  for  action.  The  batteries 
were  manned  mainly  by  the  First  South  Carolina 
Regular  Artillery  and  detachments  of  the  First 
Regular  Infantry  and  volunteer  artillery  companies. 
Colonel  Maxey  Gregg's  regiment — First  South 
Carolina  Volunteers — was  on  Morris  Island  and 
had  charge  of  the  channel  batteries.  Colonel  Peta- 
grew's  Rifle  Regiment  and  the  Charleston  Light 
Dragoons  guarded  the  eastern  part  of  Sullivan's 
Island.  General  James  Simons  commanded  on 
Morris  Island,  the  batteries  there  being  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  DeSaus- 
sure.  General  R.  G.  M.  Dunovant  commanded  on 
Sullivan's  Island,  the  batteries  then  being  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  R.  S. 
Ripley,  formerly  of  the  United  States  Artillery,  Cap 
tain  Ransom  Calhoun  commanding  Fort  Moultrie. 
Captain  Hollanquist  commanded  the  masked  or  en 
filading  battery  near  the  west  end  of  Sullivan's 
Island.  Captain  Hamilton  commanded  the  floating 


36        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

battery  of  his  own  construction,  and  a  Dahlgren  gun 
near  by.  Captain  Martin  commanded  the  mortar 
battery  near  Mount  Pleasant,  and  Captain  George 
S.  Thomas  that  at  Fort  Johnson. 

Probably  no  more  novel  military  force  ever  before 
assembled  under  arms  for  actual  service  than  that 
assembled  for  the  defense  of  Charleston  at  that 
time.  The  Ordinance  of  Secession  which  had  been 
passed  by  a  unanimous  vote  of  the  representatives 
of  the  people  in  convention  assembled  was  sustained 
with  great  unanimity  by  the  mass  of  the  people  in 
person,  and  by  a  lavish  expenditure  of  private  means. 
Gentlemen  of  wealth  contributed  liberally  to  arm 
and  equip  the  volunteers  who  were  called  into  the 
service.  Some  of  them  placed  companies  and  batta 
lions  in  the  field.  A  gentleman  long  past  the  period 
of  life  when  military  service  may  be  exacted  of  the 
citizen,  was  seen  walking  post  as  a  sentinel  on 
Morris  Island.  He  had  at  his  own  cost  armed  and 
equipped  a  company  and  then  given  the  command  of 
it  to  a  younger  brother,  serving  himself  as  a  private 
in  the  ranks.  Gentlemen,  the  owners  of  large  landed 
estates,  served  with  their  sons  and  nephews  as  pri 
vates  in  the  ranks,  toiled  with  the  pick  and  shovel 
side  by  side  with  their  own  negro  slaves  in  the  con 
struction  of  earthwork  and  in  the  various  other 
laborious  work  incident  to  life  in  camp  in  active 
service. 

Fort  Sumter,  when  occupied  by  Major  Anderson, 
was  in  an  unfinished  condition,  and  for  many  days 
afterwards — in  the  opinion  of  Captain  (now  Gen 
eral)  Doubleday,  an  officer  of  the  garrison — might 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        37 

have  been  easily  captured  by  escalade.  It  was  not, 
however,  the  policy  of  South  Carolina, — or  later  of 
the  Southern  Confederacy, — to  proceed  to  any 
hostile  act  while  negotiations  were  in  progress  for 
the  peaceable  possession  of  the  fort.  The  little  gar 
rison  labored  diligently  in  mounting  guns  and  put 
ting  it  in  condition  to  secure  it  from  assault.  In  a 
short  time  forty-eight  guns  of  calibers  from  twenty- 
four  pounds  to  ten-inch  columbiads  were  mounted 
and  ready  for  action.  In  addition,  one  ten-  and 
four  eight-inch  columbiads  were  arranged  on  the 
parade,  to  be  used  as  mortars  to  throw  shells  into 
Charleston  and  on  Cumming's  Point.  The  garrison 
consisted  of  six  commissioned  officers  and  seventy- 
three  enlisted  men.  There  were  also  three  officers 
and  forty  mechanics  and  employees  of  the  Corps  of 
Engineers.  The  commissioned  officers  were  Rob 
ert  Anderson,  Captain  Abner  Doubleday,  Captain 
Truman  Seymour,  First  Lieutenant  Jefferson  C. 
Davis,  Second  Lieutenant  Norman  I.  Hall,  all  of 
the  First  Regiment  of  Artillery;  Captain  J.  G. 
Foster  and  Lieutenants  G.  W.  Snyder  and  R.  K. 
Meade,  United  States  Engineers;  and  Assistant  Sur 
geon  S.  W.  Crawford,  United  States  Army. 

On  the  afternoon  of  April  1 1  General  Beauregard 
sent  to  Major  Anderson  by  three  of  his  aides-de-camp 
—Captain  Stephen  D.  Lee,  Ex-Senator  James  Ches- 
nut,  and  Lieutenant  A.  R.  Chisholm — a  formal  de 
mand  for  the  immediate  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter, 
with  the  offer  to  allow  him  to  take  from  the  fort  all 
company  arms  and  property  and  all  private  property 
— he  with  his  officers  and  men  to  be  transported  to 


3  8        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

any  port  in  the  United  States  that  he  might  desig 
nate,  and  to  salute  his  flag  on  lowering  it.  Major 
Anderson  replied  in  writing,  declining  in  appropriate 
terms  to  comply  with  the  demand,  but  said  verbally 
to  the  officers  who  bore  the  summons:  "I  will  await 
the  first  shot,  and  if  you  do  not  batter  us  to  pieces 
we  will  be  starved  out  in  a  few  days."  His  reply 
was  telegraphed  to  the  Confederate  Secretary  of 
War,  who,  seizing  upon  the  last  informal  verbal 
expression  as  opening  a  possible  way  of  escape  from 
a  resort  to  force,  instructed  General  Beauregard  to 
inform  Major  Anderson  that  if  he  would  designate 
a  reasonable  time  when  he  would  evacuate  the  fort, 
and  agree  in  the  meantime  not  to  use  his  guns  against 
Charleston  or  its  defenses,  fire  would  not  be  opened 
on  Sumter,,  To  this  offer  Major  Anderson  replied 
carefully  and  guardedly  as  to  the  terms,  that  if  pro 
vided  with  suitable  means  of  transportation  he 
would  evacuate  the  fort  at  noon  on  the  I5th  "should 
I  not  receive  prior  to  that  time  contrary  instructions 
from  my  Government,  or  additional  supplies. "  He 
would  not  in  the  meantime  use  his  guns  against  the 
Confederates  unless  compelled  to  do  so  by  some 
hostile  act  against  "this  fort  or  the  flag  of  my  Gov 
ernment  by  the  Confederate  forces  or  any  part  of 
them ;  or  by  the  commission  of  some  act  manifesting 
a  hostile  purpose  against  the  fort  or  the  flag."  The 
reply  was  equivalent  to  a  refusal  of  the  offer,  be 
cause  General  Beauregard  and  Major  Anderson  had 
ample  reason  for  believing  that  an  expedition  for 
the  relief  of  Sumter  had  sailed  from  New  York  and 
was  then  within  a  few  miles  of  Charleston  harbor, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        39 

and  would  not  be  allowed  to  enter  if  it  could  be 
prevented.  Colonel  Chesnut,  the  bearer  of  the  mes 
sage,  therefore  formally  notified  Major  Anderson, 
by  authority  of  his  chiefs,  that  fire  would  be  opened 
on  Sumter  in  one  hour.  It  was  then  twenty  minutes 
past  three  o'clock  A.  M. 

At  half-past  four  o'clock  on  Friday,  April  12, 
Captain  George  S.  James,  at  Fort  Johnson,  on  an 
order  from  Captain  Stephen  D.  Lee,  of  General 
Beauregard's  staff,  aimed  and  fired  the  first  shell, 
which  fell,  bursting,  on  the  parade  ground  of  Fort 
Sumter. 

It  was  the  initial  shot  of  the  war,  the  first  harsh 
note  of  a  reveille  which  called  the  gunners  to  their 
posts,  and  before  five  o'clock  the  whole  circle  of 
batteries  was  in  active  play  on  the  majestic  fort  in 
the  center.  For  nearly  two  hours  Sumter  remained 
silent;  then  about  seven  o'clock  opened;  the  bom 
bardment  became  general  and  continued  throughout 
the  day.  The  effect  of  the  fire  on  Sumter  was  plainly 
visible.  The  vertical  fire  from  the  mortar  batteries 
was  surprisingly  accurate,  and  so  effective  that  the 
barbet  guns,  which  were  of  the  heaviest  caliber,  were 
soon  abandoned,  several  having  been  dismounted  by 
the  long-range  guns,  and  the  fire  from  the  fort  was 
confined  to  the  casemate  guns.  Fire  was  maintained 
with  spirit  and  effect,  and  directed  mainly  against 
Cumming's  Point,  Fort  Moultrie,  and  the  batteries 
near  and  to  the  west  of  it.  At  night  the  fire  from 
Sumter  ceased,  only  to  husband  the  scant  supply  of 
ammunition.  At  the  commencement  of  the  action 
there  were  but  seven  hundred  cartridges  in  the  fort. 


40        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

All  blankets,  company  clothing  not  in  use,  and  hos 
pital  bedding  were  cut  up  to  be  converted  into  car 
tridge  bags,  and  men,  when  not  at  the  guns,  diligently 
stitched  through  the  long  day  and  night — with  the 
only  six  needles  in  the  fort — in  the  preparation  of 
cartridges.  The  Confederate  fire  slackened,  but 
continued  slowly,  and,  mingling  with  the  uproar  of 
a  storm  of  wind  and  rain  which  prevailed,  dropped 
shells  on  the  fort  at  intervals  of  about  fifteen  minutes 
through  the  night. 

There  was  no  bread  or  flour  in  the  fort,  and  in  the 
gray  dawn  the  garrision  breakfasted  on  salt  pork  and 
a  scant  remnant  of  rice  sifted  as  well  as  practicable 
from  fragments  of  broken  window  glass  which  an 
accident  had  mingled  with  it. 

Early  in  the  afternoon  of  the  I2th  three  war 
vessels  had  been  seen  off  the  bar,  where  they  were 
joined  by  others  early  in  the  morning  of  the  I3th. 
The  presence  of  the  fleet  bearing,  as  was  well  known, 
reinforcements  and  supplies  incited  both  the  assail 
ants  and  defenders  of  the  fort  to  increased  activity. 
The  Confederate  fire  was  resumed  at  early  dawn 
with  greater  rapidity  and  accuracy  than  during  the 
previous  day.  During  the  morning  Lieutenant  Alfred 
Rhett  had  been  firing  hot  shot  from  thirty-two 
pounders  in  Moultrie,  and  with  effect,  as  was  soon 
manifested.3  About  eight  o'clock  a  small  column 
of  smoke  was  seen  rising  above  the  fort,  and  soon 

3The  officers'  quarters  had  been  set  on  fire  the  day  before, 
but  the  upper  cisterns  having  been  pierced  by  shot,  the  water 
flooded  the  quarters  and  extinguished  the  fire. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        41 

increased  to  large  volume  over  the  officer's  quarters, 
the  roof  of  which  had  been  penetrated  by  hot  shot. 
It  was  impossible  to  extinguish  the  flames,  which 
spread  rapidly.  The  burning  quarters  were  near  the 
main  magazine,  which  it  was  plain  would  be  so  en 
circled  with  fire  as  to  make  it  necessary  to  close  the 
doors — if  even  that  would  prevent  an  explosion.  All 
officers  and  men  not  at  the  guns  worked  rapidly  and 
with  a  zeal  quickened  by  the  imminence  of  the  peril, 
to  remove  the  powder,  but  the  flames  spread  so 
rapidly  that  only  fifty  barrels  were  taken  out  and 
distributed  through  the  casemates  before  the  intense 
heat  made  it  necessary  to  close  the  doors  of  the 
magazine  and  pack  earth  against  them.  The  Con 
federate  fire  was  quickened,  and  soon  the  whole 
range  of  officers'  quarters  was  in  flames.  The  wind 
carried  the  fire  to  the  roof  of  the  barracks  and  the 
hot  shot  dropping  on  the  burning  building  increased 
the  conflagration,  which  soon  spread  to  both  bar 
racks.  Dense  clouds  of  smoke  and  cinders  were 
driven  by  the  wind  into  the  casemates,  the  smoke 
blinding  and  stifling  the  men  and  the  sparks  setting 
fire  to  boxes  and  clothing  huddled  together.  This 
made  it  perilous  to  keep  the  powder  which  had  been 
rescued  from  the  magazine  at  so  much  peril,  and  it 
was  tumbled  through  the  embrasure  into  the  bay. 

The  fire  reached  the  magazine  of  grenades  ar 
ranged  in  the  stairs,  towers,  and  implement  rooms, 
exploding  the  grenades,  destroying  the  tower  at  the 
west  gorge  angle,  and  nearly  destroying  the  other. 
The  effect  of  the  explosion,  and  the  direct  fire  on  the 
towers,  was  to  damage  and  fill  the  stairways  with 


42        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

debris  so  as  to  render  it  almost  impossible  to  reach 
the  terre-plein. 

Amid  the  storm  of  fire  from  without  and  within 
the  fire  from  the  fort  was  most  gallantly  maintained. 
Filled  with  admiration  of  the  pluck  of  the  men  who 
stood  to  their  guns  with  such  indomitable  will  when 
it  seemed  they  were  in  imminent  danger  of  being 
blown  skyward  by  the  explosion  of  thirty  thousand 
pounds  of  powder  in  the  magazines,  many  Confed 
erates  sprang  to  the  parapets,  and  at  every  shot  from 
the  fort  waved  their  hats  and  loudly  cheered  its 
brave  defenders.  About  one  o'clock  the  flagstaff, 
which  had  been  repeatedly  struck,  fell.  The  flag 
was  secured  by  Lieutenant  Hall  and  hoisted  on  a 
temporary  staff  by  Lieutenant  Snyder  and  two  labor 
ers,  Hart  and  Dosie  of  the  Engineers.  In  the  inter 
val  between  the  fall  and  hoisting  of  the  flag  General 
Beauregard  dispatched  three  of  his  aides  to  the  fort 
with  an  offer  of  assistance  to  extinguish  the  fire, 
which  offer,  however,  was  respectfully  declined. 

Seeing  the  flag  down  and  believing  the  garrison 
to  be  in  imminent  peril,  Ex-Senator  Wigfall — one  of 
General  Beauregard's  aides-de-camp  who  was  with 
the  troops  on  Morris  Island — with  the  permission 
of  General  Simons  pulled  in  a  small  boat,  with  one 
man,  Private  Gourdine  Young  of  the  Palmetto 
Guard,  to  Sumter.  Being  permitted  to  enter,  he  urged 
a  suspension  of  hostilities,  with  a  view  to  capitula 
tion.  He  expressed  to  Major  Anderson  the  high 
admiration  his  gallant  defense  had  inspired  in  all 
who  witnessed  it,  and  assured  him  of  the  most  honor 
able  and  liberal  terms.  Major  Anderson  acceded 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        43 

to  the  proposal,  naming  as  his  terms  the  same  that 
had  been  offered  him  on  the  I  ith,  and  the  white  flag 
was  hoisted.  In  the  meantime  General  Beaure- 
gard's  aides,  who  had  been  dispatched  with  the 
offer  of  assistance,  had  arrived,  and  ascertaining  from 
them  that  the  visit  of  Senator  Wigfall  was  not  au 
thorized  by  the  general  commanding,  Major  An 
derson  declared  that  he  would  immediately  raise  his 
flag  again  and  renew  the  action,  but  consented  to 
delay  until  General  Beauregard  could  be  communi 
cated  with.  The  brief  negotiations  resulted  in  the 
capitulation  of  the  fort  a  little  after  dark,  on  the 
same  terms  which  had  been  offered  on  the  i  ith. 

With  the  exception  of  burning  the  quarters  of  the 
officers  and  men,  a  disaster  which  would  not  have 
occurred  if  they  had  been  made  originally  fire-proof, 
the  fort  had  sustained  but  little  damage.  The  dis 
tance  of  the  nearest  breaching  battery  was  thirteen 
hundred  yards,  too  great  for  effective  work  with  the 
guns  then  in  use.  The  main  gates  had  been  de 
stroyed,  but  they  could  readily  have  been  built  up 
with  stone  and  rubbish.  The  quarters  were  for  com 
fort,  not  for  defensive  purposes,  and  were  an  element 
of  weakness  from  the  beginning.  When  they  had 
been  burned  without  exploding  the  magazine,  with 
sufficient  labor  the  fort  could  have  been  made  more 
defensible  than  it  was  when  the  action  commenced. 
The  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  longer  defense  were 
the  lack  of  cartridges  and  men.  The  men  could 
have  subsisted  many  days  on  the  salt  pork  in  store 
and  would  cheerfully  have  done  so.  But  with  a  fleet 
bearing  reinforcements  and  supplies  in  full  view  for 


44        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

twenty-four  hours  without  making  an  effort  to  reach 
the  fort,  there  was  no  encouragement  to  the  garrison 
to  hold  out  in  the  hope  of  possible  relief  before  the 
alternative  of  starvation  would  compel  a  capitulation. 

The  war  steamers  Powhatan,  Pawnee,  and  Poca- 
hontas,  the  steamer  transport  Baltic,  and  three  steam 
tugs  had  been  prepared  to  carry  succor  to  Fort  Sum- 
ter,  and  sailed  from  New  York  on  the  9th  and  loth. 
The  Baltic,  which  carried  the  reinforcements  and 
supplies,  the  Pawnee,  and  Pocahontas  arrived  off 
Charleston,  w7here  they  found  the  Harriet  Lane  early 
on  the  morning  of  the  I2th.  The  passage  had  been 
stormy.  One  of  the  tugs  was  driven  into  Wilming 
ton  by  stress  of  weather  and  neither  of  the  others, 
nor  the  Powhatan,  arrived.  The  sea  was  running 
high  off  Charleston,  and  Mr.  Fox  waited,  but  in 
vain,  for  the  Powhatan  before  attempting  to  enter. 
That  steamer  was  regarded  as  better  constructed  and 
equipped  for  fighting  than  any  other  of  the  expedi 
tion,  and  carried,  besides,  the  launches  which  were 
to  have  been  used  to  throw  men  and  supplies  into 
Sumter.  But  it  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  expe 
dition  and  its  destination  changed  on  the  7th  with 
out  the  knowledge  of  Mr.  Fox,  by  the  President, 
at  the  instance  of  the  Secretary  of  State.  Captain 
Rowan,  of  the  Pawnee,  seized  an  ice  schooner,  which 
he  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Mr.  Fox,  who  intended 
to  go  in  it  with  succor  for  the  fort  on  the  night  of 
the  I3th,  but  before  night  set  in  the  white  flag  was 
hoisted  over  Sumter. 

In  the  public  mind  some  odium  attached  to  the 
commandery  of  the  naval  expedition  for  failing  to 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        45 

attempt  to  throw  the  reinforcements  and  supplies 
into  Sumter.  The  concurrent  opinion,  however,  of 
the  officers  within  the  fort  and  of  others  whose 
duties  required  of  them  careful  study  of  the  situa 
tion,  was  that  any  persistent  attempt  to  accomplish 
the  proposed  object  would  not  only  have  failed,  but 
would  have  ended  disastrously. 

It  had  been  agreed  between  General  Beauregard 
and  Major  Anderson  that  the  Union  garrison  should 
evacuate  the  fort  the  next  day,  as  soon  as  the  neces 
sary  preparations  could  be  made.  A  steamer  would 
carry  the  garrison  to  any  port  in  the  United  States 
that  Major  Anderson  might  designate,  or  transfer 
it  to  one  of  the  vessels  then  off  the  harbor.  Major 
Anderson  preferred  the  latter  course. 

While  saluting  the  flag  one  man,  Private  Daniel 
Hough,  was  instantly  killed,  one  Private  Edward 
Galway  mortally,  and  four  severely  wounded  by  the 
premature  discharge  of  a  gun  and  the  explosion  of 
a  pile  of  cartridges.  The  Confederate  commander 
ordered  that  the  unfortunate  man  who  had  been 
killed  should  be  buried  with  military  honors,  and  the 
wounded  properly  cared  for.  At  four  o'clock  P.  M. 
on  Sunday  the  I4.th  the  Union  garrison  marched  out, 
colors  flying  and  the  band  playing  "Yankee  Doodle," 
and,  embarking  on  the  steamer  Isabel,  passed  out 
over  the  bar,  where  it  was  transferred  to  the  steamer 
Baltic,  and  sailed  away  for  New  York.  As  the  Isabel 
passed  through  the  channel  the  Confederate  soldiers 
manifested  their  respect  for  Major  Anderson  and 
his  gallant  command  by  standing  silent  and  uncov 
ered  in  front  of  their  batteries. 


46        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Roswell  S.  Ripley,  command 
ing  a  battalion  consisting  of  Captain  Hollanquist's 
company  of  the  First  South  Carolina  Artillery,  and 
the  Palmetto  Guard,  Captain  Cuthbert  command 
ing,  succeeded  Major  Anderson  and  the  two  com 
panies  of  the  First  United  States  Artillery  as  the 
garrison  of  the  fort.  The  Confederate  and  palmetto 
flags  were  hoisted  side  by  side  over  Fort  Sumter, 
and  amid  enthusiastic  cheers  saluted  by  the  bat 
teries  around  the  harbor. 

When  the  news  of  the  bombardment  and  reduc 
tion  of  Sumter  was  flashed  over  the  telegraphic 
wires  the  whole  country  was  startled  and  electrified. 
The  question  of  peace  or  war  which  had  so  long 
trembled  in  the  balance  was  no  longer  doubtful. 
Hostilities  had  commenced.  This  was  the  begin 
ning  of  a  war  in  which  before  it  closed  the  United 
States  alone,  in  addition  to  a  vast  naval  force,  armed, 
equipped,  and  brought  into  the  field  nearly  three 
millions  of  soldiers,  of  whom  nearly,  if  not  quite, 
four  hundred  thousand  lost  their  lives  in  the  service. 
How  many  were  brought  into  the  field  by  the  Con 
federate  States,  and  what  the  loss  of  life,  will  prob 
ably  never  be  known.  The  knowledge  has  been  lost 
with  the  cause  they  served. 


CHAPTER  III 

War  in  earnest — South  Atlantic  Coast  invested — Admiral  Du- 
Pont  in  command — Fleet  scattered — Hilton  Head's  defenses 
— Forts  Beauregard  and  Walker  attacked — Masterly  evolu 
tions  of  fleet — Colonel  Wagner  disabled — Fort  Walker  taken 
— Fort  Beauregard  evacuated — Sherman  occupies  Hilton 
Head. 

The  theater  of  the  war  which  had  virtually  com 
menced  in  Charleston  harbor  on  the  I2th  of  April, 
1 86 1,  was  soon  transferred  to  distant  fields  in  other 
States,  and,  with  the  exception  of  a  blockading  fleet 
off  her  coast,  South  Carolina  was  for  many  months 
exempt  from  the  presence  of  a  hostile  force.  Neither 
party  to  the  contest  was  prepared  for  war.  Indeed, 
for  many  weeks  after  the  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter 
the  country  was  not  fully  awake  to  the  fact  that  war 
on  a  gigantic  scale  had  commenced.  There  was  a 
breach  in  the  Union,  and  a  hostile  collision — happily 
without  the  shedding  of  blood — had  occurred  in  the 
harbor  of  Charleston.  Face  to  face  with  actual  hos 
tilities,  those  in  the  North  charged  with  the  conduct 
of  affairs  might,  it  was  hoped,  pause  to  weigh  well 
and  count  the  cost  of  a  war  to  coerce  into  the  Union 
the  States  which  had  seceded  and  further  to  reflect 
what  would  be  the  worth  of  a  Union  of  States 
"pinned  together  by  bayonets,"  as  Mr.  Greely  forci 
bly  expressed  and  deprecated.  The  first  battle  of  Ma- 

47 


48        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

nassas,  or  Bull  Run,  went  far  towards  dispelling  any 
expectation  of  an  amicable  settlement  of  the  difficul 
ties,  but  even  after  that  event  hope  was  cherished 
that  the  war  would  be  very  brief.  Mr.  Seward, 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  labored  dili 
gently  to  impress  on  the  country,  and  on  foreign 
governments  through  their  diplomatic  representa 
tives,  that  the  contest  would  be  ended  in  sixty  or 
ninety  days.  In  the  meantime  preparations  for  war 
went  forward  rapidly.  Early  in  August  prepara 
tions  were  commenced  for  sending  a  combined  land 
and  naval  expedition  to  some  point  on  the  South  At 
lantic  coast.  Admiral  S.  F.  DuPont  was  selected  to 
command  the  naval  and  Brigadier  General  T.  W. 
Sherman  the  land  forces,  and  the  two  in  concert  were 
charged  with  the  organization  of  their  respective 
commands. 

The  troops  were  furnished  by  Pennsylvania  and 
New  York  and  all  of  the  New  England  States  except 
Vermont.  There  were  thirteen  infantry  regiments 
organized  into  three  brigades,  and  of  troops  not 
brigaded,  the  First  New  York  Engineers,  Colonel 
Edward  W.  Sewell,  Third  Rhode  Island  Artillery 
(heavy),  Colonel  Nathaniel  W.  Brown,  and  Battery 
E,  Third  United  States  Artillery,  Captain  John 
Hamilton.  The  brigades  were  commanded  respec 
tively  by  Brigadier  General  Egbert  L.  Viele,  Briga 
dier  General  I.  I.  Stevens  and  Brigadier  General 
Horatio  G.  Wright.  The  organization  was  desig 
nated  as  "The  Expeditionary  Corps"  and  its  aggre 
gate  strength  the  day  before  it  sailed  was  twelve 
thousand  six  hundred  and  fifty-three  (12,653). 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        49 

The  land  and  naval  forces  had  assembled  by  Oc 
tober  22  in  Hampton  Roads,  Va.,  where  it  was 
detained  until  the  29th  by  foul  weather  and  the  ab 
sence  of  some  of  the  transports.  Great  precaution 
had  been  taken  to  keep  its  destination  a  profound 
secret,  and  it  sailed  under  sealed  orders.  Neverthe 
less  its  destination  was  known  to  the  Confederate 
Government  and  to  the  commanding  general  in 
South  Carolina  before  it  left  the  Capes  of  Virginia. 
Indeed,  without  direct  information,  it  could  scarcely 
have  been  doubted  that  it  was  destined  for  Port 
Royal,  S.  C.,  which  was  not  only  the  best  and  most 
commodious  port  on  the  Atlantic  coast  south  of  the 
Capes  of  Virginia,  but  best  situated  as  a  base  of 
operations  both  by  land  and  water  on  the  coasts  of 
South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida. 

The  expedition,  which  consisted  of  fifty  vessels, 
sailed  on  October  29,  Flag  Officer  DuPont's  flag  fly 
ing  over  the  steam  frigate  W 'abash.  It  was  the  larg 
est  fleet  that  had  ever  sailed  under  the  American 
flag.  It  had  been  preceded  the  day  before  by  a  fleet 
of  twenty-five  coal-laden  schooners,  convoyed  by  the 
sloop-of-war  Vandalia,  with  orders  in  the  event  of 
parting  company  to  rendezvous  off  the  mouth  of 
Savannah  River. 

When  the  fleet  had  cleared  the  Capes  of  Virginia, 
much  care  and  time  were  expended  in  forming  it  into 
a  double  echelon  line,  and  when  that  was  accom 
plished  it  proceeded  majestically  on  its  course.  On 
the  morning  of  November  2  only  one  sail  of  all  the 
vast  naval  armament  was  visible  from  the  deck  of 


50        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  flagship  W abash.  During  the  afternoon  of  the 
ist  rough  weather  set  in,  gradually  increasing  to  a 
heavy  gale  from  the  southeast,  and  in  the  night  it 
rose  to  a  hurricane,  scattering  the  fleet.  During  the 
2d  the  weather  moderated  and  the  vessels  began  to 
heave  in  sight.  Of  the  men-of-war  the  Isaac  Smith, 
Lieutenant  W.  A.  Nicholson  commanding,  one  of 
the  most  efficient  and  best  armed  steamers  of  her 
class,  had  narrowly  escaped  foundering  in  the  gale, 
throwing  overboard  her  entire  formidable  battery. 
Thus  relieved,  she  was  enabled  to  go  to  the  assist 
ance  of  the  steamer  Governor,  which  was  in  a  most 
critical  condition,  and  in  imminent  peril  of  founder 
ing.  The  Governor  had  on  board  a  fine  battalion 
of  six  hundred  marines,  Major  I.  G.  Reynolds  com 
manding.  The  most  strenuous  and  heroic  efforts  of 
the  commander  and  crew  of  the  Isaac  Smith  to 
rescue  the  imperiled  marines  failed,  but  later  the 
steam  frigate  Sabine,  Captain  Cadwallader  Ringgold, 
commanding,  came  to  the  rescue.  Every  movable 
article  on  the  Governor  had  been  thrown  overboard 
to  lighten  her,  and  the  Sabine  succeeded  in  rescuing 
from  the  wreck  before  it  went  down  the  crew  and  all 
of  the  marines  except  a  corporal  and  six  privates. 
Some  of  the  transport  steamers  were  lost  and  others 
were  saved  only  by  throwing  overboard  horses  and 
cargoes.  None  of  the  troop  transports  were  lost. 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th  the  flagship  and  nearly 
all  of  the  fleet  were  off  the  bars  of  Port  Royal  har 
bor,  when,  under  Flag-officer  DuPont's  order,  it  was 
joined  by  the  frigate  Saratoga,  Captain  Sardoner, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        51 

of  the  blockading  fleet  off  Charleston.  That  evening 
and  the  next  morning  the  war  vessels  and  transports 
passed  over  the  bar  and  anchored. 

The  coast  line  of  Port  Royal  is  such  as  to  make 
it  exceedingly  difficult  of  defense  by  land  batteries. 
The  headlands  on  Hilton  Head  Island  to  the  south 
ward,  and  Bay  Point  to  the  northward,  are  nearly 
three  miles  apart.  At  so  great  a  distance  none  but 
works  of  great  strength,  armed  with  guns  of  the 
heaviest  caliber  and  longest  range,  could  make  any 
formidable  opposition  to  the  entrance  of  a  powerful 
fleet.  General  Beauregard,  relieved  about  the  end 
of  May  from  duty  in  South  Carolina,  before  leaving 
had  examined  the  coast  and  designated  certain  points 
at  which  defensive  works  should  be  constructed.  The 
importance  of  Port  Royal  and  the  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  defending  it  were  alike  obvious.1  He  planned 
the  works  for  the  harbor  and  designated  their  arma 
ments,  which  it  was  essential  should  be  guns  of  the 
heaviest  caliber  for  the  water  fronts.  Under  the 
direction  of  Major  James  H.  Trapier,  of  the  En 
gineers,  and  subsequently  under  the  administration 
of  Brigadier  General  Roswell  S.  Ripley,  who  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Depart 
ment  of  South  Carolina  on  the  2ist  of  August,  the 
works  at  the  designated  points  were  commenced,  and 
the  construction  was  pressed  forward  with  all  the 
means  available.  Major  Francis  D.  Lee,  of  the  South 

1He  advised  that  no  attempt  be  made  to  construct  works 
for  its  defense,  but  yielded  to  the  urgent  representations  of 
the  Governor  of  the  State,  with  the  condition  that  the  works 
should  be  formidable  in  themselves  and  heavily  armed. 


52        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

Carolina  Engineers,  was  charged  with  the  construc 
tion  of  the  work  on  Hilton  Head,  called  Fort 
Walker,  and  Captain  Gregory  of  one  on  Bay  Point, 
called  Fort  Beauregard.  They  were  not  commenced 
until  late  in  July,  and  were  incomplete  and  not  armed 
agreeably  to  the  prescribed  plan,  because  suitable 
guns  could  not  be  procured.  Instead  of  seven  ten- 
inch  guns,  as  had  been  designated  for  the  water 
front  of  Fort  Walker,  there  was  but  one  gun  of  that 
class.  The  other  twenty-three  guns  mounted  were  of 
lighter  caliber,  two  of  them  being  twelve-pounders. 
Brigadier  General  Thomas  F.  Drayton,  a  landed 
gentleman  whose  plantations  were  in  the  immediate 
vicinity,  commanded  the  military  district  in  which 
Port  Royal  was  embraced.  His  brother,  Captain 
Percival  Drayton,  commanded  the  Union  steam 
sloop-of-war  Pocahontas.  The  garrison  of  Fort 
Walker  consisted  of  Companies  A  and  B  of  the  Ger 
man  Artillery,  Captains  D.  Werner  and  H.  Harmes; 
Company  C,  Ninth  (afterwards  the  Eleventh)  South 
Carolina  Volunteers,  Captain  J.  Bedon,  manning  the 
guns  on  the  water  front;  all  under  command  of 
Major  A.  M.  Huger,  First  Artillery,  South  Carolina 
Militia.  The  flank  and  rear  guns  were  manned  by 
detachments  from  Captains  Bedon's,  Canaday's  and 
White's  companies,  Ninth  Volunteer  Infantry.  A 
reserve  was  commanded  by  Captain  White.  The 
entire  force  in  the  work  numbered  two  hundred  and 
twenty  men,  the  whole  commanded  by  Colonel  John 
A.  Wagner,  First  South  Carolina  Militia  Artillery. 
The  whole  force  on  the  island  was  687  men.  Across 
the  channel  and  distant  2  5/8  miles  from  Fort 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        53 

Walker,  on  Bay  Point  Island,  was  Fort  Beauregard. 
It  mounted  nineteen  guns  of  about  the  same  class  as 
those  in  Fort  Walker,  and  was  manned  by  two  com 
panies,  the  Beaufort  Artillery,  Captain  Stephen  El 
liott,  Jr.,  and  Captain  Harrison's  Company  of  In 
fantry.  Captain  Elliott  commanded  the  fort.  Com 
modore  Tattnall  commanded  three  small  river 
steamers  which  a  single  broadside  from  the  flagship 
alone  could  probably  have  sunk. 

On  the  5th,  while  four  of  the  Union  war  vessels 
were  reconnoitering,  a  few  shots  were  exchanged 
between  them  and  the  forts  and  Commodore  Tatt- 
nall's  steamboats,  but  with  little  damage  to  either 
side.  On  the  6th  a  heavy  westerly  wind  prevailed, 
making  it  unadvisable  to  attack.  The  morning  of 
the  7th  was  calm  and  bright,  the  water  of  the  bay 
smooth,  and  with  not  a  ripple  to  disturb  the  accuracy 
of  fire. 

Early  in  the  morning  signals  from  the  flagship 
warned  the  commanders  of  the  different  war  vessels 
more  than  four  miles  outside  of  a  straight  line 
connecting  the  positions  of  the  two  forts  to  form 
line  and  prepare  for  action.  At  the  head  of  the 
main  column  was  the  flagship  W 'abash,  Commander 
C.  R.  P.  Rodgers,  followed  in  the  order  named  by 
the  side-wheel  steam  frigate  Susquehanna,  Captain 
I.  S.  Sardoner;  sloops-of-war  Mohican,  Commander 
S.  W.  Gordon;  Seminole,  Commander  J.  P.  Gillis: 
Pawnee,  Lieutenant  Commander  R.  H.  Wyman;  and 
gunboats  Unadilla,  Lieutenant  Commander  Napo 
leon  Collins;  Ottawa,  Lieutenant  Commander 
Thomas  H.  Stephens;  Pembina,  Lieutenant  Com- 


54        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

mander  John  P.  Bankhead;  and  the  sail  sloop-of- 
war  Fandalia,  Commander  Francis  S.  Haggerty, 
towed  by  the  Isaac  Smith,  Lieutenant  Commander 
J.  W.  A.  Nicholson.  The  latter  vessel,  as  has  been 
stated,  had  thrown  her  guns  overboard  in  the  gale. 
In  the  flanking  column  and  little  more  than  a  ship's 
length  distant,  were  the  Bienville,  Commander 
Charles  Steadman  leading;  the  gunboats  Seneca, 
Lieutenant  Commander  Daniel  Ammen;  Penguin, 
Lieutenant  Commander  P.  A.  Rudd,  and  the  Au 
gusta,  Commander  E.  G.  Parrott. 

Flag-officer  DuPont's  plan  of  action,  carried  out 
with  much  precision,  was  to  lead  his  main  column — 
the  different  steamers  something  more  than  a  ship's 
length  apart — on  an  elliptical  course,  passing  up  the 
main  channel  at  the  distance  of  about  eight  hundred 
yards  from  Fort  Walker,  delivering  their  fire  on  that 
fort  as  long  as  the  guns  could  be  trained  upon  it; 
then  turning  seaward  and  approaching  to  within 
about  six  hundred  yards,  again  deliver  fire  as  long 
as  the  guns  could  be  brought  to  bear.  The  operation 
was  to  be  continued  until  the  fort  should  be  silenced. 
The  flanking  column  delivered  its  fire  on  Fort  Beau- 
regard  while  passing  up,  then  directed  its  attention 
to  Commodore  Tattnall's  little  river  boats,  which 
had  steamed  out  of  Beaufort  River  to  take  part  in 
the  action.  The  Flag-officer  cautioned  the  com 
manders  of  his  gunboats  that  he  knew  Tattnall  well 
as  an  officer  of  courage  and  capacity,  and  it  was 
highly  probable  that  in  the  heat  and  smoke  of  battle 
he  would  endeavor  to  pass  out  and  destroy  the  trans 
ports  on  which  was  General  Sherman's  Expedition- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        55 

ary  Corps.  If  he  attempted  it,  his  steamboats  must 
be  destroyed.  Tattnall's  puny  fleet  was  soon  driven 
off,  however,  and  took  shelter  in  Skull  Creek  to  the 
northwest.  The  gunboats  then  took  favorable  posi 
tions  to  the  northward  of  Fort  Walker,  and  while 
the  main  column  moved  slowly  and  majestically  on 
its  prescribed  course,  delivering  a  direct  fire,  the 
gunboats  poured  in  a  most  destructive  flank  fire,  all 
the  more  effective  because  the  fort  had  not  been  pro 
vided  with  traverses.  Later  in  the  action  the  Poca- 
hontas,  Commander  Percival  Drayton,  which  had 
been  delayed  by  injuries  received  in  the  gale,  steamed 
into  the  harbor  and  taking  suitable  position  opened 
on  Fort  Walker. 

The  majestic  fleet  continued  to  move  on  its  course 
and  deliver  its  fire  with  the  regularity  of  machinery, 
and  the  skill  and  deliberate  coolness  of  the  officers 
and  gunners,  the  weight  and  excellence  of  the  arma 
ments,  and  the  glossy  smoothness  of  the  water,  made 
the  fire  wonderfully  accurate  and  destructive. 

It  was  a  most  unequal  conflict.  The  contrast  be 
tween  the  batteries  engaged  was  very  marked.  The 
fleet  carried  150  guns,  many  of  them  of  the  heaviest 
and  most  approved  pattern  then  in  use;  the  ammuni 
tion  and  equipments  were  perfect  of  their  kind,  and 
the  officers  and  men  who  directed  and  worked  them 
were  engaged  in  their  legitimate  occupation,  to  which 
they  had  been  thoroughly  trained.  There  were 
twenty  guns  of  much  lighter  caliber  mounted  in  Fort 
Walker, — against  which  the  attack  was  mainly  di 
rected, — many  of  them  hastily  mounted  on  impro- 


56        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

vised  carnages,  not  adapted  to  the  guns,  after  the 
fleet  appeared  off  the  harbor,  and  the  ammunition 
was  defective.  The  manufacture  of  heavy  ordnance 
and  ammunition  was  almost  an  unknown  industry  in 
the  South  prior  to  the  war.  Probably  there  was  not 
a  man  in  Fort  Walker  who  had  been  trained  to  the 
use  of  heavy  guns.  The  commanding  officer  himself 
aimed  and  fired  the  first  gun,  and  owing  to  defective 
fuse  the  shell  burst  near  the  muzzle.  Some  ammu 
nition  did  not  fit  the  guns, — the  shells  could  not  be 
driven  home, — but  they  were  nevertheless  fired,  with 
more  risk  to  those  who  worked  them  than  to  those 
at  whom  they  were  aimed.  The  ten-inch  gun,  the 
heaviest  and  only  one  of  the  kind  in  the  fort 
bounded  from  its  carriage  at  the  fourth  or  fifth  dis 
charge,  and  was  useless  during  the  remainder  of  the 
action.  The  twenty-four-pounder  rifle  was  choked 
while  ramming  down  a  shell,  and  lay  idle  during  the 
engagement.  There  was  no  gun  on  the  flank  to 
reply  to  the  gunboats  near  the  mouth  of  Fish  Hall 
Creek,  the  thirty-two  pounder  on  the  right  flank 
having  been  shattered  by  a  shot  early  in  the  action. 
The  inexperienced  gunners  at  these  very  defective 
batteries  were  firing  at  steamers  constantly  in  motion, 
and  often  beyond  effective  range  of  the  guns. 

General  Drayton  crossed  over  to  Hilton  Head 
early  in  the  morning  of  the  5th,  and  assumed  the 
general  direction  of  affairs.  Captain  Stewart's  Com 
pany  of  the  Ninth  South  Carolina  Regiment,  which 
occupied  a  battery  at  Braddock's  Point,  the  extreme 
southern  point  of  the  island,  was  ordered  up  to  rein 
force  Captain  Elliott  at  Battery  Beauregard.  But 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        57 

the  order  miscarried,  the  company  did  not  move 
until  the  7th,  and  its  passage  to  Beauregard  was 
intercepted  by  the  Union  gunboats.  Late  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  6th  450  men  of  the  Georgia  In 
fantry,  Captain  Berry  commanding,  and  Captain 
Read's  Battery  of  two  twelve-pounder  howitzers  and 
50  men  arrived.  They  had  been  sent  by  Brigadier 
General  Lawton  to  reinforce  the  troops  on  Hilton 
Head.  A  little  later  Colonel  DeSaussure's  Regi 
ment,  the  Fifteenth  South  Carolina  Volunteers,  650 
strong,  arrived  at  Seabrook's  Wharf  on  Skull  Creek, 
and  passed  over  to  within  supporting  distance  of 
Fort  Walker.  There  were  therefore  on  Hilton 
Head  on  the  7th  about  1450  men,  220  of  whom  were 
in  Fort  Walker.  They  were  there  to  defend  the 
island  against  the  Union  fleet  manned  by  full  com 
plements  of  men,  and  carrying  150  guns,  a  battalion 
of  600  marines,  and  General  Sherman's  Expedition 
ary  Corps  of  12,653 — aggregate.  The  action  com 
menced  about  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  con 
tinued  about  four  and  a  half  hours.  A  few  minutes' 
fire  of  the  fleet  convinced  the  most  sanguine  in  the 
fort  that  the  contest  was,  for  them,  hopeless;  the 
fight  was  continued  simply  as  a  point  of  honor. 
About  eleven  o'clock  General  Drayton  carried  Cap 
tain  Read's  artillery  company  to  the  assistance  of 
the  men  in  the  fort,  who,  from  excessive  labor  for 
several  days  and  during  the  action,  were  greatly 
exhausted.  Between  twelve  and  one  o'clock  Colonel 
Wagner,  commanding  the  fort,  was  disabled  by  a 
fragment  of  a  shell,  and  was  succeeded  by  Major 
Huger.  Soon  after  one  o'clock  but  three  guns  were 


58        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

in  serviceable  condition  on  the  water-front,  and  the 
ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted.  The  order  was 
given  to  stop  the  hopeless  struggle  and  abandon  the 
fort.  Captain  Harmes,  with  three  gun  detachments, 
was  left  to  maintain  a  show  of  resistance  by  a  slow 
fire  from  the  three  serviceable  guns,  while  the 
wounded  were  carried  to  the  rear.  The  garrison 
then  abandoned  the  fort,  gained  their  supports,  and 
the  whole,  including  Colonel  W.  H.  Stiles'  Georgia 
Regiment,  which  had  just  arrived,  retreated  hastily 
from  the  island.  The  flight  of  the  garrison  was 
seen  and  reported  "from  the  tops,"  when  the  flag- 
officer  dispatched  Commander  John  Rodgers  on 
shore  with  a  flag  of  truce.  Rodgers,  finding  that  the 
fort  had  been  abandoned,  at  2  :2O  hoisted  the  Union 
flag  on  the  deserted  fort.  A  little  later  Commander 
C.  H.  P.  Rodgers  was  ordered  ashore  with  a  detach 
ment  of  seamen  and  marines,  and  took  possession 
of  the  work. 

General  Sherman  and  his  corps  from  their  trans 
ports  were  spectators  of  the  action,  in  which  they 
took  no  part.  A  great  part  of  the  General's  means 
for  disembarking  his  command  had  been  lost  during 
the  storm  at  sea.  When  the  action  was  over  the 
troops  commenced  landing,  and  the  fort  was  turned 
over  by  Commander  Rodgers  to  General  H.  G. 
Wright,  whose  brigade  was  the  first  to  disembark. 
No  attempt  was  made  to  pursue  the  retreating  Con 
federates,  who  did  not  leave  the  island  at  Ferry 
Point  on  Skull  Creek  until  half-past  one  o'clock  the 
next  morning.  Flag-officer  Tattnall's  steamboats, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        59 

after  aiding  in  ferrying  the  troops  across  Skull 
Creek,  proceeded  to  Savannah  by  the  inland  passage. 

Comparatively  little  attention  had  been  given  by 
the  fleet  to  Fort  Beauregard.  It  was  an  easy  prey 
after  Fort  Walker  was  taken.  The  inability  of  the 
forts  to  protect  the  harbor  against  the  fleet  had  been 
made  manifest,  and  any  attempt  longer  to  hold  Bay 
Point  would  not  only  have  been  futile,  but  in  all 
probability  would  have  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
the  whole  force  on  the  island.  Colonel  Donovant 
therefore  ordered  Captain  Elliott  to  evacuate  the 
fort,  and  all  of  the  troops  on  the  island  retreated 
during  the  afternoon  and  night  to  Beaufort,  by  a 
narrow  trail  known  to  but  few,  across  Edding's 
Island,  which  is  little  more  than  an  impenetrable 
marsh.  Nothing  but  what  the  men  carried  on  their 
persons  could  be  taken  over  such  a  trail.  The  re 
treat  was  effected  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
enemy,  or  it  might  have  been  cut  off  by  gunboats 
passing  up  Beaufort  River  and  Station  Creek  to 
Jenkins'  Landing  and  White  Hall  Ferry.  The  Con 
federate  loss  on  Hilton  Head  was  eleven  killed  and 
thirty-five  seriously  wounded,  and  in  Fort  Beaure 
gard  Captain  Elliott  and  twelve  men  were  badly 
wounded.  In  the  fleet  eight  were  killed  and  twenty- 
three  wounded. 

General  Sherman  completed  the  disembarkation 
of  his  corps  on  the  8th,  the  greater  part  landing  on 
Hilton  Head,  where  the  construction  of  an  extensive 
intrenched  camp  was  commenced  and  pressed  for 
ward  rapidly  to  completion.  Engineer  officers  made 
reconnoissances  of  the  island  for  the  location  of  such 


60        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

defensive  works  as  might  be  needed  to  make  it  a 
secure  base  of  operations.  At  Braddock's  Point,  on 
the  southern  extremity  of  the  island,  one  lo-inch 
gun,  two  5^ -inch  rifles,  and  two  12-pounder  howit 
zers  were  found,  which  were  designed  for  a  battery 
in  the  course  of  construction  at  that  point. 


CHAPTER  IV 

Port  Royal  occupied — Panic  of  inhabitants — Looting  Beaufort — 
Tybee  Island — Gunboat  reconnoissance  of  South  Carolina 
waters — General  Lee  in  command  of  military  department — 
South  Carolina's  military  force — Want  of  artillery — Scarcity 
of  arms. 

If  evidence  were  needed  to  show  that  the  States 
which  first  withdrew  from  the  Union  did  not  con 
template  a  war  of  coercion  as  one  of  the  first  conse 
quences  of  secession,  none  more  conclusive  could  be 
presented  than  the  defenseless  condition  of  those 
States  when  the  war  commenced.  For  it  is  inconceiv 
able  that  intelligent  men  charged  with  the  conduct 
of  public  affairs  would  have  plunged  their  States,  so 
unprepared,  into  so  unequal  a  war.  However  well 
assured  they  may  have  been  of  the  right  of  a  State 
to  withdraw  from  the  Union,  or  however  strong  may 
have  been  their  convictions  that  separation  from  the 
Northern  States  would  contribute  greatly  to  the 
prosperity  and  happiness  of  their  own  States,  they 
would  surely  have  deferred  the  practical  assertion 
of  the  right  of  secession  until  they  had  made  some 
adequate  preparation  for  the  maintenance  of  their 
independence.  They  had  no  navy,  and  no  means  of 
building  up  one  of  sufficient  strength  in  time  to  be  of 
any  avail  in  the  defense  of  hundreds  of  miles  of  sea- 
coast — a  seacoast  which  was  undefended  by  forts 

61 


62        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

and  therefore  was  thus  at  the  mercy  of  a  hostile 
naval  power. 

The  occupation  of  Port  Royal  by  the  land  and 
naval  forces  of  the  United  States  was  a  fatal  blow 
to  the  domestic  and  social  institutions  and  life  of  that 
section  of  country.  It  at  once  reduced  the  planters 
of  that  region  from  affluence  to  poverty,  a  sudden 
reverse  of  fortune  for  which  their  easy  and  luxurious 
mode  of  life  for  generations  had  peculiarly  unfitted 
them. 

For  many  miles  inland  the  South  Atlantic  coast  is 
penetrated  and  intersected  by  innumerable  bays,  tor 
tuous  rivers,  creeks,  and  bayous,  which  were  navi 
gable  by  steamers  of  considerable  capacity  and  draft. 
The  arable  land  of  the  islands  formed  by  those 
water-courses  is  very  fertile,  producing  various  crops 
in  abundance,  especially  the  finest  sea  island  cotton 
in  the  world.  These  lands  were  generally  owned  in 
large  plantations  by  gentlemen  to  whom  they  had 
descended  from  father  to  son  for  several  genera 
tions,  and  were  cultivated  by  negroes  who  had  been 
inherited  with  the  land  on  which  they  lived. 

Probably  no  class  of  people  ever  lived  in  greater 
luxury  and  ease  than  the  proprietors  of  the  sea 
islands  and  adjoining  plantations  on  the  mainland. 
The  waters  teemed  with  shell  and  other  fish  in  great 
variety  and  excellence,  and  in  season  were  covered 
with  innumerable  water  fowl.  Deer,  wild  turkeys, 
and  other  game  were  abundant  on  the  islands,  and 
all  requisites  for  comfortable  and  luxurious  living 
which  the  land  and  water  did  not  produce  in  kind 
were  procurable  from  the  proceeds  of  the  cultivated 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        63 

crops.  The  commodious  residences  of  the  planters 
were  generally  surrounded  by  extensive  grounds, 
shaded  by  stately  oaks,  magnolias,  and  other  forest 
trees  gracefully  festooned  with  the  long  gray  hang 
ing  moss,  and  adorned  by  a  lavish  wealth  of  vines, 
shrubs,  and  flowers  which  in  that  mild  climate  grow 
in  a  profuse  luxuriance  unknown  in  colder  regions. 
Many  of  the  houses  were  models  of  comfort  and 
luxury,  adorned  with  works  of  art  and  well-selected 
libraries, — and  served  by  retinues  of  well-trained  ser 
vants — in  all  respects  suitable  residences  for  the  re 
fined  and  cultivated  proprietors,  generally  educated 
gentlemen  who  divided  their  time  between  the  man 
agement  of  their  estates  and  the  direction  of  political 
affairs,  enlivened  by  field  sports  and  in  dispensing 
the  generous  hospitality  which  was  characteristic  of 
their  order. 

The  occupation  of  Port  Royal  exposed  the  whole 
of  the  region  of  country  to  the  invaders,  whose  gun 
boats  and  transports  could  penetrate  through  all  the 
ramifications  of  the  watercourses  to  the  very  doors 
of  planters'  residences.  The  planters  and  their  sons 
capable  of  bearing  arms  were  generally  in  the  army, 
their  wives  and  children  residing  on  their  estates  in 
the  accustomed  confident  security,  surrounded  by  the 
numerous  plantation  and  house  servants,  fearing 
nothing  from  them  while  their  moral  influence  and 
restraint  remained  undisturbed.  The  appearance  of 
the  Union  gunboats  produced  the  wildest  panic  in 
those  communities — homes  were  hastily  abandoned 
by  their  white  inhabitants,  the  women,  flying  from 


64        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

perils  worse  to  them  than  death,  left  their  luxurious 
homes  to  the  pillage  of  bands  of  demoralized 
negroes. 

The  day  after  landing  at  Hilton  Head  General 
Sherman  reports  to  the  Adjutant  General:  "The 
effect  of  this  victory  is  startling.  Every  white  inhabi 
tant  has  left  the  island.  The  wealthy  islands  of 
Saint  Helena,  Ladies'  and  most  of  Port  Royal  are 
abandoned  by  the  whites,  and  the  beautiful  estates 
of  the  planters,  with  all  their  immense  property,  left 
to  the  pillage  of  hordes  of  apparently  disaffected 
blacks,  and  the  indications  are  that  the  panic  has 
extended  to  the  fort  on  the  north  end  of  Reynolds' 
Island  commanding  the  fine  anchorage  of  Saint 
Helena  Sound." 

The  "hordes  of  blacks"  had  not  a  monopoly  of 
the  pillage  of  the  "immense  property  left  on  the  fine 
estates";  opportunities  and  temptations  to  pillage 
were  too  many  and  strong  to  be  resisted.  They  recall 
the  temptation  that  beset  the  early  British  conquerors 
of  Bengal  when  the  victory  of  Plassey  placed  the 
untold  treasures  of  Moorshedabad  at  their  disposal; 
and  Lord  dive's  famous  exclamation  when  defend 
ing  himself  in  the  House  of  Commons  for  the  share 
he  received  of  the  treasures  of  that  magnificent  capi 
tal,  "By  God,  Mr.  Chairman,  at  this  moment  I  stand 
astonished  at  my  own  moderation."  In  a  short  time 
there  was  little  of  value  left  on  those  plantations. 

Three  days  after  landing  General  Sherman  was 
constrained  to  issue  a  general  order  rebuking  some 
of  his  officers  and  men  for  their  active  participation 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        65 

in  the  pillage,  and  instructing  his  brigade  and  other 
commanding  officers  to  suppress  all  such  depreda 
tions. 

About  fifteen  miles  above  Bay  Point  was  the  beau 
tiful  town  of  Beaufort — a  town  of  private  residences 
belonging  to  the  wealthiest  planters  on  the  islands. 
The  town  was  noted  for  the  beauty  and  elegance  of 
its  private  residences  and  grounds,  and  nowhere  in 
South  Carolina,  or  in  any  other  State,  was  there  a 
more  refined,  cultivated,  and  hospitable  community. 
On  the  8th  the  gunboats  Seneca,  Penguin,  and  Pern- 
bina  steamed  cautiously  up  Beaufort  River,  with 
orders  from  Flag-officer  DuPont,  if  fired  on  from 
batteries,  as  it  was  supposed  they  would  be,  to  retire 
out  of  range  and  notify  the  flag-officer,  that  a  proper 
force  might  be  sent  to  reduce  the  works.  But  there 
were  no  batteries  on  the  river-banks,  and  when  the 
gunboats  came  in  sight  of  the  town  a  few  horsemen 
were  seen  riding  away.  There  was  not  a  white 
person  in  the  town,  which  swarmed  with  negroes 
frantically  plundering  the  luxurious  residences  and 
carrying  away  their  costly  booty  in  every  boat  or 
other  conveyance  they  could  lay  their  hands  on. 

The  negroes  left  on  the  islands  soon  became 
objects  of  solicitude  and  embarrassment  to  the  Union 
general  commanding.  They  dearly  loved  and  luxu 
riated  in  idleness,  and  when  freed  from  the  control 
and  direction  of  their  masters  freely  indulged  their 
natural  propensity.  Comparatively  few  of  them 
came  into  the  military  posts,  and  to  the  surprise  of 
the  industrious  and  thrifty  troops  from  New  Eng 
land,  they  manifested  little  inclination  to  work  regu- 


66        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

larly  for  wages.  So  long  as  they  could  procure  food 
they  preferred  to  remain  in  idleness  at  their  old  and 
often  devastated  homes.  Many  of  those  who  came 
into  the  posts  and  engaged  to  work,  tired  of  it  and 
escaped  back  to  their  old  haunts.  Proverbially  im 
provident  and  accustomed  all  their  lives  to  being 
cared  for  and  supplied  with  the  necessaries  of  life 
by  their  masters,  they  naturally  looked  to  the  white 
people  who  had  come  among  them  for  food  and 
clothing.  Common  humanity  required  that  they 
should  not  be  allowed  to  starve,  and  it  was  plain 
that  they  would  soon  be  a  heavy  tax  on  the  commis 
sary  and  quartermaster's  departments.  To  relieve 
the  Government  of  such  a  burden  and  make  the 
negroes  self-sustaining,  General  Sherman  divided  the 
part  of  the  country  under  his  control  into  districts 
of  convenient  size  for  efficient  supervision,  over  each 
of  which  he  purposed  to  appoint  an  agent  or  over 
seer  to  organize  the  negroes  and  direct  them  in 
working  the  plantations.  All  of  the  horses  and 
mules  having  been  carried  off,  and  most  of  them 
appropriated  to  the  use  of  the  United  States  Gov 
ernment,  it  was  necessary  to  procure  others,  and 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  having  regard  to  the 
interest  of  the  government  in  the  cultivation  of  cot 
ton,  called  on  the  Secretary  of  War  to  furnish  the 
necessary  teams. 

While  the  land  forces  were  engaged  in  short 
reconnoissances  of  Hilton  Head  and  other  neighbor 
ing  islands,  and  making  themselves  secure  and  com 
fortable  in  their  newly  acquired  positions,  most  of 
the  naval  vessels  were  sent  to  the  various  blockading 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        67 

stations,  and  the  lighter  draft  gunboats  were  sent  off 
to  reconnoiter  the  country  bordering  the  inland  navi 
gable  waters  up  and  down  the  coast.  Commander 
Percival  Drayton,  a  native  of  that  part  of  the 
country,  went  northward  toward  Charleston  in  the 
Pawnee,  accompanied  by  the  Pembina  and  the 
steamer  Vixen  of  the  Coast  Survey.  His  knowledge 
of  the  country  well  fitted  him  for  the  duty,  and  he 
was  accompanied  by  Captain  Boutelle,  whose  long 
service  in  that  quarter  on  coast  survey  duty  had 
given  him  accurate  knowledge  of  the  watercourses 
and  the  positions  of  the  residences  of  planters,  where 
he  had  often  been  a  welcome  guest.  On  Otter  Island 
at  the  entrance  to  Saint  Helena  Sound  they  found  a 
deserted  field-work.  This  was  deemed  an  important 
point,  and  Flag-officer  DuPont  undertook  to  guard 
it  until  some  of  the  land  forces  could  occupy  it. 
Going  up  the  Coosaw  River  another  abandoned 
field-work  was  found  near  the  mouth  of  Bamwell 
Creek.  Ascending  the  Ashepoo  about  four  miles, 
another  abandoned  earthwork  was  found.  A  little 
later  the  same  commander  ascended  the  last  men 
tioned  river  to  the  mouth  of  Mosquito  Creek,  where 
the  inland  navigation  to  Charleston  commences,  and 
landing  on  Hutchinson  Island  found,  that  the  barns 
and  other  outhouses  had  been  burned  by  the  owners 
on  the  approach  of  the  gunboats.  No  white  person 
— only  some  negroes — were  found  on  the  island. 

Extending  his  reconnoissance,  he  went  into  North 
Edisto.  Quite  an  extensive  line  of  abandoned  earth 
works  was  found  on  Edisto  Island.  Learning  from 
some  negroes  that  there  was  a  Confederate  camp 


68        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

at  Rockville,  a  pretty  village  on  a  river  bluff  on 
Wadmalaw  Island,  a  few  miles  from  Edisto,  Com 
mander  Drayton  approached  in  the  Fixen,  followed 
by  the  gunboats.  The  camp  was  occupied  by  a  batta 
lion  of  292  men,  of  Colonel  John  L.  Branch's  Rifle 
Regiment,  Colonel  Branch  commanding.  On  the 
approach  of  the  gunboats  Colonel  Branch  withdrew 
his  battalion  beyond  range.  Fifty  marines  and 
sailors  were  landed  at  the  wharf,  where  there  was 
no  sign  of  life.  The  camp,  which  was  about  a  mile 
distant,  had  been  abandoned,  Colonel  Branch  appre 
hending  that  if  he  did  not  withdraw  his  command  it 
would  be  cut  off  from  escape  to  Johns'  Island,  and 
captured. 

Commander  John  Rodgers  in  the  Flag,  accompa 
nied  by  the  Seneca  and  Pocahontas,  reconnoitered 
Tybee  Island  at  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah,  and 
receiving  no  reply  to  his  fire  on  the  earthworks,  dis 
covered  that  they,  too,  had  been  dismantled  and 
abandoned.  This  point  also  that  flag-officer  deemed 
of  sufficient  importance  to  be  held  by  the  navy  until 
General  Sherman  could  find  it  convenient  to  occupy 
the  island  with  a  part  of  his  troops. 

Commander  C.  R.  P.  Rodgers  examined  Warsaw 
Sound,  Wilmington  River,  Ossabaw,  Ogeechee,  and 
Vernon  rivers.  A  fort  on  Warsaw  Island  was  found 
to  have  been  dismantled  and  abandoned.  A  few 
miles  up  Wilmington  River  an  occupied  work  was 
found,  and  another  on  Green  Island,  commanding 
Vernon  River,  the  Little  Ogeechee,  Hell  Gate,  and 
the  passage  from  Vernon  River  into  the  Great 
Ogeechee.  This  fort  indicated  that  it  was  occupied, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        69 

by  throwing  a  couple  of  shells  at  very  long  range  at 
the  gunboats,  the  first  sign  of  opposition  they  had 
encountered  since  the  bombardment  of  Forts  Walker 
and  Beauregard. 

Before  Christmas  the  inland  waters  had  been  ex 
amined  by  the  navy  from  the  Stono  to  Ossabaw 
Sound,  and  the  only  occupied  works  were  at  those 
extreme  points  of  that  line  of  coast.  The  plantations 
visited  presented  pictures  of  destruction  and  desola 
tion.  The  appearance  of  Commander  Drayton's 
boats  in  the  vicinity  of  a  plantation  was  generally  a 
signal  to  the  master  or  his  agent  to  apply  the  torch 
to  his  cotton  houses,  to  prevent  that  valuable  crop 
from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The 
reconnoisances  were  made  in  the  latter  part  of  No 
vember  and  late  into  December.  If  they  had  been 
made  earlier  the  armaments  of  some  of  the  aban 
doned  works  might  have  fallen  into  their  hands. 

When  it  was  known  in  Richmond  that  the  fleet 
and  expeditionary  corps  had  arrived  at  Port  Royal, 
an  order  issued  from  the  War  Department,  Novem 
ber  5,  constituting  the  coast  of  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,  and  Florida  a  military  department,  and 
assigning  General  Lee  to  the  command.  That  officer 
hastened  to  his  new  field  of  duty  and  assumed  com 
mand  under  most  discouraging  circumstances.  He 
went  immediately  to  Coosawhatchie,  the  nearest 
point  on  the  Charleston  &  Savannah  Railroad  to 
Port  Royal  Ferry,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  7th, 
while  riding  to  Hilton  Head,  met  General  Ripley 
and  learned  from  him  that  the  Confederate  troops 
were  retreating  from  Forts  Walker  and  Beauregard 


70        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

and  the  enemy  in  complete  possession  of  that  the 
finest  harbor  on  the  coast.  It  was  plain  that  posses 
sion  of  that  important  harbor  gave  the  enemy  control 
of  the  inland  navigation  and  all  of  the  islands  on  the 
coast,  and  most  seriously  threatened  both  Charles 
ton  and  Savannah.  His  sloops-of-war  and  large 
steamers  could  ascend  Broad  River  to  Mackay's 
Point,  the  mouth  of  the  Pocotaligo,  less  than  ten 
miles  from  the  Charleston  &  Savannah  Railroad; 
his  gunboats  could  ascend  some  miles  up  both  the 
Coosawhatchie  and  Pocotaligo  rivers,  and  smaller 
boats  could  ascend  still  further  toward  the  road. 
There  were  no  guns  in  position  to  resist  the  power 
ful  naval  batteries,  and  there  was  no  recourse  left  to 
General  Lee  but  to  prepare  to  meet  the  enemy  in 
the  field,  and  if  the  enemy  should  move  forward 
with  the  promptness  and  vigor  which  the  number 
and  capacity  of  the  war  vessels  and  transports  then 
in  Port  Royal  harbor  indicated  he  was  capable  of 
throwing  into  his  campaign,  the  prospects  of  meet 
ing  him  successfully  in  the  field  were  exceedingly  dis 
couraging. 

On  retreating  from  Hilton  Head  General  Thomas 
F.  Drayton  halted  his  command  of  less  than  a  thou 
sand  men  at  Bluffton,  about  eleven  miles  from  Fort 
Walker.  The  Georgia  troops  which  had  joined  him 
the  day  before  continued  on  to  Savannah.  Colonel 
Donovant,  after  crossing  his  command  of  six  or 
seven  hundred  men  to  the  mainland  at  Port  Royal 
Ferry,  was  halted  at  Garden's  Corner,  a  mile  or  so 
on  the  road  to  Pocotaligo.  Neither  of  these  com 
mands  had  brought  anything  with  them  except  their 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        71 

arms  from  the  islands,  and  were  in  very  destitute 
condition.  Colonel  Clingman's  regiment  of  North 
Carolina  volunteers,  six  companies  of  Colonel  Ed 
wards'  infantry,  and  Colonel  Martin's  cavalry  regi 
ment, — the  two  last  of  South  Carolina  volunteers, — 
were  at  and  near  Coosawhatchie.  There  was  no 
field  artillery.  The  whole  force  from  Charleston  to 
the  Savannah  River  was  less  than  four  thousand 
men.  On  November  19,  two  weeks  after  the  Union 
forces  had  arrived  in  Port  Royal  harbor,  the  Gov 
ernor  of  South  Carolina  reported  to  General  Lee 
that  there  were  13,100  South  Carolina  troops  in  the 
State.  That  was  probably  the  number  down  on  the 
rolls,  and  small  as  it  was  greatly  exceeded  the  num 
bers  present  for  duty.  That  force  was  distributed 
from  Georgetown  to  Hardeeville,  S.  C.,  a  distance 
of  about  175  miles.  Over  about  half  of  the  distance 
only  was  there  railroad  communication.  A  large 
proportion  of  this  force  was  necessarily  held  in  the 
works  for  the  defense  of  Charleston. 

On  November  10  General  A.  R.  Lawton,  com 
manding  in  Georgia,  reported  to  General  Lee  that 
he  had  only  about  5500  troops,  2000  of  them  under 
General  Mercer,  near  Brunswick.  The  remainder 
were  between  the  Altamaha  and  Savannah,  and  all 
but  500  of  them  within  twenty  miles  of  the  latter 
city.  Of  his  whole  force  but  500  were  cavalry,  and 
there  were  but  three  field  batteries,  very  scantily  sup 
plied  with  horses. 

As  late  as  December  24  General  Lee,  writing  to 
Judge  Magrath,  President  of  the  State  Convention 
(about  to  assemble),  in  regard  to  the  preparations 


72        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

for  the  defense  of  the  State,  says:  "I  have  not  been 
able  to  get  an  accurate  report  of  the  troops  under 
my  command  in  the  State.  I  hope  it  may  be  as  large 
as  you  state,  but  I  am  sure  those  for  duty  fall  far 
short  of  it.  For  instance,  DeSaussure's  brigade  is 
put  down  at  3420  men.  When  last  in  Charleston 
(the  day  I  inquired)  I  was  informed  that  in  one 
regiment  there  were  no  men  for  duty  in  camp  on 
the  race  course,  and  in  the  other  about  200.  Colonel 
Branch,  I  am  told,  had  only  about  200  men  with  him 
at  Rockville,  though  I  have  had  no  official  report  of 
his  retreat  from  there.  The  companies  of  mounted 
men  in  the  service  are  very  much  reduced.  The 
Charleston  Light  Dragoons  and  Rutledge  Mounted 
Rifles  have  about  45  men  each.  The  companies  of 
Colonel  Martin's  regiment  are  very  small.  One  of 
them,  Captain  Fripp's,  reports  4  commissioned  offi 
cers  and  19  privates.  It  is  very  expensive  to  retain 
in  service  companies  of  such  strength,  and  I  think 
all  had  better  be  reorganized.  I  have  only  on  this 
line  [the  letter  was  written  at  his  headquarters  at 
Coosawhatchie]  for  field  operations  Heyward's,  De 
Saussure's,  Dunovant's,  Jones',  and  Edwards'  regi 
ments  from  South  Carolina  and  Martin's  cavalry. 
General  Ripley  writes  that  Elford's  and  Means' 
regiments  are  poorly  armed  and  equipped,  and  at 
present  ineffective,  and  that  the  organization  of  the 
troops  thrown  forward  on  James  Island  is  so  brittle 
that  he  fears  it  will  break.  The  garrisons  at 
Moultrie,  Sumter,  Johnson,  and  the  fixed  batteries— 
the  best  and  most  stable  of  our  forces — cannot  be 
removed  from  them;  neither  can  those  at  George- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        73 

town,  and  should  not  be  counted  among  those  for 
operations  in  the  field.  You  must  not  understand 
that  this  is  written  in  a  complaining  spirit.  I  know 
the  difficulties  in  the  way,  and  wish  you  to  under 
stand  them,  explain  them  to  the  Governor,  and,  if 
possible,  remove  them.  Our  enemy  increases  in 
strength  faster  than  we  do.  Where  he  will  strike 
I  do  not  know,  but  the  blow,  when  it  does  fall,  will 
be  hard." 

To  General  Ripley  he  writes:  "Unless  more  field 
artillery  can  be  obtained,  it  will  be  almost  impossible 
to  make  head  against  the  enemy  should  he  land  in 
any  force." 

The  scarcity  of  arms  which  existed  from  the  be 
ginning  to  the  close  of  the  war  was  manifested  by 
the  urgent  and  repeated  appeals  of  the  Governors 
of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida  to  General 
Lee,  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  President,  for 
ten  thousand  Enfield  rifles  brought  by  the  blockade 
runner  Fingal,  Major  Anderson  commanding,  which 
succeeded  in  running  into  Savannah  on  November  13. 


CHAPTER  V 

Confederate  defense  centered  on  Charleston — Military  districts — 
Sherman's  broad  opportunities — Capture  of  Savannah 
planned — Delays — Fernandina  occupied — Jacksonville  and 
St.  Augustine  abandoned — Reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski 
planned — Difficulties  of  approval — Fort  Pulaski — Siege  of 
Pulaski — Reduction  and  surrender. 

At  Port  Royal — a  central  position  as  regards  this 
long  and  insecurely  guarded  Confederate  line — 
General  Sherman  had  in  hand  a  compact  and  thor 
oughly  equipped  body  of  about  13,000  men,  and 
there  was  present,  besides,  a  fine  battalion  of  600 
marines.  The  co-operating  fleet  in  the  harbor  could 
cover  a  landing  within  five  or  six  mites  of  Coosaw- 
hatchie,  or  at  almost  any  other  desirable  point  on 
the  coast.  Luckily, — or  unluckily  as  it  may  be  re 
garded, — for  the  Confederates  the  Union  general 
seems  to  have  regarded  his  position  as  one  in  which 
it  behooved  him  to  move  with  great  deliberation  and 
caution. 

After  inspecting  the  batteries  and  posts  from 
Charleston  to  Fernandina,  Fla.,  General  Lee  directed 
all  guns  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  less  important 
points  and  employed  in  the  defense  of  Charleston, 
Savannah,  and  the  entrance  to  Cumberland  Sound 
and  Brunswick,  Ga.  The  attempt  to  hold  the  en 
trance  to  Cumberland  Sound  was  soon  abandoned, 

74 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        75 

and  the  general's  plan  of  defense  was  restricted  to 
holding  the  two  most  important  points,  Charleston 
and  Savannah,  the  line  of  the  railroad  between  those 
two  cities,  and  the  country  between  it  and  the  sea 
islands.  Other  points,  such  as  Georgetown,  S.  C., 
Fernandina,  Jacksonville,  and  Saint  Augustine  were 
held,  but  not  in  force  or  with  any  expectation  of  suc 
cessfully  defending  them  against  a  formidable  and 
persistent  attack.,  For  the  better  administration  of 
his  extensive  department,  the  coast  of  South  Caro 
lina  was  divided  into  five  military  districts,  as  fol 
lows: 

The  First,  extending  from  Little  River  Inlet  to 
South  Santee  River,  under  command  of  Colonel 
Arthur  Middleton  Manigault;  headquarters,  George 
town. 

The  Second,  from  the  South  Santee  to  the  Stono 
River  and  up  Rantowles  Creek,  embracing  Charles 
ton  and  its  harbor,  under  command  of  Brigadier 
General  Roswell  S.  Ripley;  headquarters,  Charles 
ton. 

The  Third  composed  the  country  between  the 
Stono  and  Ashepoo  rivers,  under  command  of  Briga 
dier  General  N.  G.  Evans;  headquarters,  Adams 
Run. 

The  Fourth  extended  from  the  Ashepoo  to  Port 
Royal  entrance,  thence  through  Colliton  River  and 
Ocala  Creek,  Ferebeville,  under  command  of  Briga 
dier  General  John  C.  Pemberton;  headquarters,  Coo- 
sawhatchie. 

The  Fifth  embraced  the  country  between  the  last 
named  boundary  and  the  Savannah  River,  under 


76        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

command  of  Brigadier  General  Thomas  F.  Dray- 
ton;  headquarters,  Hardeeville. 

Brigadier  General  A.  R.  Lawton  remained  in 
command  in  Georgia,  and  Brigadier  General  James 
H.  Trapier  commanded  in  middle  and  east  Georgia. 
On  Generals  Lawton  and  Ripley  devolved  the  re 
sponsibility  of  defending  Savannah  and  Charleston, 
and  under  direction  of  the  department  commander 
they  pushed  forward  the  several  defensive  works 
with  all  possible  haste. 

The  field  for  military  operations  opened  to  Gen 
eral  Sherman  was  so  extensive  and  its  possibilities  so 
many  that  he  seems  to  have  been  bewildered.  He 
could  not  decide  definitely  at  what  point  to  strike, 
and  his  perplexity  was  heightened  by  the  exaggerated 
reports  he  received,  and  believed,  of  the  number  of 
troops  he  would  have  to  encounter  whenever  he 
should  move  against  the  enemy.  Thus  he  writes  in 
November  that  the  main  body  of  the  Confederate 
force  was  at  Pocotaligo,  another  large  body  collect 
ing  at  Grahamville,  and  still  others  between  the 
latter  place  and  the  Savannah  River,  with  their  ad 
vance  post  at  Bluffton,  whereas,  as  has  been  stated, 
there  were  not  more  than  4000  troops  between 
Charleston  and  the  Savannah  River;  again  that  his 
latest  news  confirmed  what  he  had  previously  ascer 
tained,  that  there  were  20,000  troops  in  and  about 
Savannah,  among  them  two  regiments  of  cavalry 
and  four  field  batteries;  and  later  he  writes  to  Gen 
eral  McClellan  that  he  had  information  that  there 
were  "about  65,000  in  and  about  that  city,  which  is 
well  fortified  both  on  the  land  and  river  sides.  They 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        77 

are  moving  heaven  and  earth  for  a  secure  defense." 
His  own  judgment  was  that  upon  the  whole  it  would 
be  best  to  attack  and  capture  Savannah.  Recon- 
noissances  made  by  engineer  officers  had  early  de 
veloped  the  fact  that  it  was  practicable  to  pass  gun 
boats  by  inland  navigation  into  the  Savannah  River 
by  the  left  bank  at  two  points,  one  being  two,  and  the 
other  six  miles  above  Fort  Pulaski,  and  that  the 
river  might  also  be  entered  above  the  fort  from  the 
south  by  Wilmington  River  and  St.  Augustine 
Creek.  General  Sherman  desired  to  utilize  these 
inland  passages  to  move  a  combined  land  and  naval 
force  up  the  river  and  take  the  city  by  a  coup-de- 
main.  Admiral  DuPont  was,  however,  unwilling  to 
risk  his  gunboats  through  the  intricate  passages  into 
the  river  without  a  more  thorough  examination. 
Then  the  General  proposed  to  capture  the  city  by 
siege,  if  necessary,  but  before  he  could  make  any 
aggressive  move  he  needed  additional  troops  and 
transportation.  First  he  asked  for  a  regiment  of 
cavalry,  one  of  regular  artillery,  ten  regiments  of 
infantry,  and  a  pontoon  train;  and  later  asked  for 
twenty  regiments  of  infantry.  Reinforcements  were 
sent  to  him  from  time  to  time,  until  at  the  end  of 
February  he  had  an  aggregate  force  present  of 
17,875  men.  The  most  favorable  season  for  opera 
tions  in  that  locality  passed,  however,  without  any 
important  move,  and  in  the  meantime  the  Confed 
erates  profited  by  the  delay  to  strengthen  their  lines 
and  increase  their  force.  Every  day's  delay  made 
the  capture  of  Savannah  more  difficult,  until  Gen 
eral  McClellan,  general-in-chtef  of  the  army,  wrote 


78        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

to  General  Sherman  discouraging  a  siege  of  the 
city,  and  advising  that  the  preparations  for  the 
reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski  be  pushed  forward  to 
completion. 

"I  am  forced  to  the  conclusion,"  he  says,  "that 
under  present  circumstances  the  siege  and  capture 
of  Savannah  do  not  promise  results  commensurate 
with  the  sacrifices  necessary.  I  do  not  consider  the 
possession  of  Savannah  worth  a  siege  after  Pulaski 
is  in  our  hands.  But  the  possession  of  Pulaski  is  of 
the  first  importance.  But,  after  all,  the  greatest 
moral  effect  would  be  produced  by  the  reduction  of 
Charleston  and  its  defenses.  There  the  rebellion 
had  its  birth;  there  the  unnatural  hatred  of  our 
Government  is  most  intense;  there  is  the  center  of 
the  boasted  power  and  courage  of  the  rebels." 

The  capture  and  occupation  of  Fernandina,  Fla., 
had  long  been  one  of  the  purposes  which  the  Expe 
ditionary  Corps  should  accomplish,  but  had  been 
delayed  from  time  to  time  awaiting,  it  would  seem, 
naval  co-operation.  About  March  i  Brigadier 
General  H.  G.  Wright's  brigade  sailed  for  that 
place,  accompanied  by  Admiral  DuPont  and  his 
fleet.  In  the  meantime  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson 
and  retreat  southward  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston's 
army  made  it  necessary  to  reinforce  him  with  troops 
from  other  departments,  among  them  the  Depart 
ment  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida, 
which  obliged  General  Lee  to  contract  his  lines.  He 
had  therefore  ordered  Fort  Clinch  and  other  bat 
teries  on  Amelia  Island  to  be  dismantled  and  aban 
doned.  In  consequence  General  Wright  took  pos- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        79 

session  of  Fernandina  without  opposition.  In  a 
few  days  the  fleet  proceeded  up  the  St.  Johns  River 
and  near  the  end  of  the  month  was  followed  by 
General  Wright,  who  occupied  Jacksonville  and  St. 
Augustine,  which  had  also  been  abandoned.  Hence 
by  the  end  of  March  the  Union  troops  held  the  im 
portant  points  on  the  coast  from  North  Edisto  Inlet 
to  St.  Augustine,  a  distance  of  about  250  miles,  and 
with  the  exception  of  the  bombardment  of  the  works 
in  Port  Royal  Harbor,  all  of  these  points  had  been 
occupied  without  opposition. 

Early  in  December  Captain  Q.  A.  Gillmore, 
chief  engineer  on  General  Sherman's  staff,  having 
made  under  instructions  an  examination  of  Tybee 
Island  and  Fort  Pulaski  for  the  purpose  of  ascer 
taining  the  practicability  of  reducing  the  fort,  re 
ported  it  practicable,  and  submitted  a  plan  of  opera 
tions.  His  plan,  with  some  slight  modifications, 
was  approved  both  by  his  chief  and  the  War  De 
partment,  and  preparations  were  promptly  com 
menced  for  carrying  it  into  execution.  As  a  pre 
liminary  step  the  Forty-sixth  New  York  Regiment 
of  Volunteers,  Colonel  R.  Rosa,  commanding,  was 
sent  to  occupy  Big  Tybee  Island. 

Fort  Pulaski  was  built  on  Cockspur  Island,  Ga., 
at  the  head  of  Tybee  Roads,  and  commanded  both 
channels  of  the  Savannah  River.  The  island  was 
simply  a  deposit  of  mud  about  a  mile  long  and  half 
mile  wide,  and  was  about  fourteen  miles  from  Sa 
vannah. 

The  river  is  but  little  if  any  more  than  an  average 
of  a  mile  and  a  quarter  in  width  and  between  the 


8o        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

fort  and  city  are  several  islands  similar  in  formation 
to  Cockspur,  stretching  in  the  direction  of  the  cur 
rent.  The  first  and  most  obvious  step  in  proceeding 
to  reduce  the  fort  was  to  cut  it  off  from  the  city 
by  batteries,  to  be  erected  on  the  banks  or  the 
middle  islands.  But  the  islands  and  banks, — if  de 
posits  of  soft  mud  scarcely  above  the  water  level  at 
ordinary  high  tide,  and  submerged  by  high  spring 
tides  or  when  the  wind  is  in  a  certain  quarter,  may 
be  called  banks, — are  exceedingly  ill  adapted  to  the 
construction  of  batteries.  On  both  sides  of  the 
river  these  deposits  of  mud  extend  for  many  miles 
and  are  thickly  covered  with  tall  reeds  and  coarse 
grass,  giving  to  the  country  the  appearance  sug 
gestive  of  the  appropriate  name  of  the  river.  They 
are  intersected  by  numerous  tortuous  bayous,  divid 
ing  the  shore  up  into  islands,  making  it  practicable 
for  passage  between  the  fort  and  city  in  small  row- 
boats  when  the  river  itself  is  closed. 

Captain  Gillmore  was  given  the  rank  of  Brigadier 
General  of  Volunteers,  and  charged  with  the  task 
of  reducing  Fort  Pulaski. 

With  incredible  labor  a  battery  of  six  guns 
(twenty-  and  thirty-pounder  Parrott  rifles  and  an 
eight-inch  siege  howitzer)  was  constructed  by  troops 
of  General  Viele's  Brigade,  at  Venus  Point  on 
Jones'  Island,  about  five  miles  above  the  fort.  The 
guns  and  material  were  carried  from  Daufuskie 
Island,  four  miles  distant,  the  nearest  point  of  firm 
ground  on  which  troops  could  camp.  The  guns  were 
carried  in  the  night  by  hand  about  three-fourths  of 
a  mile  over  a  marsh  of  unctuous  mud,  on  a  tramway 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        Si 

of  shifting  planks,  in  which  the  wheels,  when  they 
slipped,  would  sink  to  the  hubs  and  the  men  nearly 
to  the  waists.  There  was  a  drenching  rain  during 
the  night,  and  for  the  greater  part  of  twenty-four 
hours  the  men  at  work  were  up  to  their  waists  in 
mud  and  water.  The  battery  was  in  condition  for 
service. 

Three  days  later  a  similar  battery  was  constructed 
on  Birds  Island  directly  opposite  Venus  Point.  Ad 
miral  Tattnall's  little  fleet  of  river  steamers,  which 
had  escaped  on  the  morning  of  February  1 1  from 
Port  Royal,  steamed  down  the  river  and  engaged 
the  Venus  Point  battery,  but  was  driven  off.  Before 
the  end  of  February  two  companies  of  the  Forty- 
sixth  New  York  Volunteers,  with  a  battery  of  two 
field  pieces  and  a  thirty  pounder  Parrott  gun — sta 
tioned  first  on  Decent  Island,  and  subsequently  on 
an  old  hulk  in  Lazaretto  Creek,  about  2^  miles 
from  Pulaski — and  a  small  gunboat  in  the  same 
creek,  in  conjunction  with  the  batteries  on  Venus 
Point  and  Bird  Island,  effectually  isolated  Pulaski. 
It  would  necessarily  have  had  to  surrender  through 
starvation  when  the  supply  of  provisions  should  be 
consumed;  nevertheless  the  work  for  its  bombard 
ment  and  reduction  went  on. 

It  was  not  until  February  21  that  the  first  vessel 
having  the  necessary  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores 
and  engineering  supplies  arrived  off  the  entrance 
to  Savannah  River.  Tybee,  like  the  other  islands 
bordering  the  lower  river,  is  mainly  a  deposit  of 
mud,  but  it  is  somewhat  better  adapted  to  siege 
operations  than  the  others,  in  that  there  are  on  it  a 


82        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

few  ridges  and  hummocks  of  firm  ground,  and  the 
shore  on  Tybee  Roads,  where  it  was  proposed  to 
construct  the  batteries,  is  particularly  skirted  by  low 
sandbanks.  The  distance  from  the  landing-place 
on  the  island  to  the  most  advanced  batteries  was 
about  2^  miles,  the  last  mile  presenting  the  same 
obstacles  to  the  transportation  of  heavy  ordnance  as 
had  been  encountered  and  surmounted  on  Jones 
Island,  and  was,  besides,  within  range  of  Pulaski's 
guns.  A  causeway  was  constructed  on  fascines  and 
brushwood  over  the  marshy  ground,  which  trembled 
like  jelly  under  the  tramp  and  mallets  of  the  labor 
ers,  and  when  the  thin  upper  crust  was  broken 
through  a  pole  or  oar  could  be  thrust  ten  or  twelve 
feet  in  the  soft  mud.  The  herculean  labor  of  trans 
porting  thirty-six  of  the  heaviest  guns  then  in  use,— 
some  of  them  weighting  8^2  tons, — with  the  neces 
sary  ammunition  and  the  appliances  was  performed 
by  the  soldiers,  nearly  all  of  it  in  the  night,  often 
in  thick  darkness  and  drenching  rain,  regardless  of 
weather  and  the  miasma  of  the  marshes  spread  out 
for  many  miles  around  them.  Two  hundred  and 
fifty  men  could  with  difficulty  drag  a  single  piece. 

On  the  evening  of  April  9  the  batteries  were  com 
pleted  and  all  was  in  readiness  for  the  bombard 
ment.  There  were  eleven  batteries  mounting  thirty- 
six  guns,  viz.:  twelve  1 3-inch  and  four  lo-inch 
mortars,  six  lo-inch  and  four  8-inch  columbiads, 
five  3O-pounder  Parrott  rifles,  and  five  James  rifles, 
48-,  64-,  and  84-pounders.  The  breaching  batteries 
were  at  an  average  distance  of  1700  yards  from  the 
fort;  the  four  lo-inch  siege  mortars  were  1650 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        83 

yards  distant;  the  1 3-inch  mortars  at  distances  vary 
ing  from  2400  to  3400  yards. 

Fort  Pulaski,  on  which  these  batteries  were  in 
readiness  to  open,  was  built  of  brick;  was  pentago 
nal  in  shape  and  casemated  on  all  sides.  Its  walls 
were  ^y2  feet  thick  and  in  height  25  feet  above 
high  water.  It  was  arranged  for  one  tier  of  guns 
in  embrasure  and  one  in  barbette.  The  gorge  was 
covered  by  an  earthen  outwork  or  demi-lune  of  bold 
relief.  The  main  work  and  demi-lune  were  sur 
rounded  by  wet  ditches — the  one  around  the  main 
work  48  feet  and  that  around  the  demi-lune  32  feet 
wide.  Communication  with  the  exterior  was  through 
the  gorge,  over  a  drawbridge  into  the  demi-lune, 
through  a  face  of  which  was  a  passage  by  another 
drawbridge  over  the  ditch  of  the  demi-lune.  A  full 
armament  for  the  fort  would  have  been  140  guns. 
At  the  time  of  the  bombardment  it  mounted  46 
guns,  varying  in  class  from  12-pounder  howitzers  to 
lo-inch  columbiads.  Twenty  of  the  heaviest  of 
the  guns  bore  on  the  Tybee  Island  batteries.  The 
fort  was  garrisoned  by  five  companies  of  the  First 
Georgia  Regiment, — aggregate  strength  385 — Col 
onel  Charles  H.  Olmstead  commanding. 

At  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  April  10  a  summons 
to  surrender  was  sent  under  flag  of  truce,  Lieutenant 
James  H.  Wilson  of  the  engineers  bearing  it  to  Col 
onel  Olmstead.  The  summons  was  refused.  Fire 
was  immediately  opened,  and  soon  the  thirty-six 
guns  on  Tybee  and  those  of  the  fort  which  could  be 
brought  to  bear  on  them  were  in  full  and  active 
play.  The  bombardment  continued  without  inter- 


84        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

ruption  for  ioJ/2  hours,  and  till  it  was  too  dark  to 
see  distinctly.  It  then  ceased.  Throughout  the 
night  two  heavy  mortars  and  a  3<D-pounder  Parrott 
maintained  a  slow  fire,  throwing  a  shell  about  every 
five  minutes,  to  interrupt  any  repairs  that  might  be 
attempted.  At  sunrise  on  the  nth  the  bombard 
ment  was  renewed,  with  greater  accuracy  than  on 
the  previous  day.  The  breach  which  had  commenced 
under  the  first  day's  fire  rapidly  extended,  and  by 
12  M.  two  casemates  had  been  battered  wide  open. 
A  third  was  rapidly  crumbling  under  the  concen 
trated  fire  when,  at  2  P.  M.,  the  white  flag  was  run 
up  over  the  fort,  which,  with  its  armament  and 
garrison,  was  surrendered  to  the  Union  forces. 

The  reduction  of  Pnlaski  reflected  great  credit 
on  the  officers  and  men  engaged,  especially  on  Gen 
eral  Gillrnore,  under  whose  personal  direction  it 
was  commenced  and  continued  to  a  successful  issue* 
The  troops  who  participated  in  all  of  the  heavy 
labor  of  the  preparation  and  bombardment  were  the 
Seventh  Connecticut  Volunteer  Infanry,  Colonel 
Alfred  H.  Terry,  commanding;  the  Forty-sixth 
New  York,  Colonel  Randolph  Rosa;  two  companies 
of  the  New  York  Engineers,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
James  F.  Hall;  two  companies  of  the  Third  Rhode 
Island  Artillery,  and  a  small  detachment  of  engineer 
troops  of  the  regular  army. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  as  illustrative  of  the  readi 
ness  with  which  the  volunteers  adapted  themselves 
to  any  service  demanded  of  them,  that  with  the 
exception  of  a  detachment  of  sailors  from  the  frig 
ate  Wabash,  who  served  four  light  siege  guns  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        85 

second  day,  the  labor  of  mounting  and  serving  the 
guns  was  performed  by  men  who  had  no  experience 
whatever  as  artillerists.  They  were  directed  by 
well-trained  officers. 

In  the  reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski  the  superior 
capacity  of  rifled  cannon  over  smooth  bores  was 
very  clearly  exemplified,  and  marks  a  new  era  in 
siege  operations.  Up  to  that  time  from  five  hun 
dred  to  seven  hundred  yards  was  regarded  as  the 
extreme  distances  at  which  an  exposed  wall  of  a 
well-constructed  fort  could  be  breached.  By  the 
use  of  fifty-eight  per  cent,  only  of  rifled  guns  a  wide 
and  practicable  breach  was  made  in  the  walls  of 
Pulaski,  under  18  hours  of  continuous  fire,  at  an 
average  distance  of  1700  yards. 

Extensive  as  was  the  territory  over  which  the 
combined  land  and  naval  forces  under  General  Sher 
man  and  Admiral  DuPont  had  hoisted  the  Union 
flag,  the  editors  of  the  most  influential  Northern 
papers  had  not  been  slow  to  discover  that  all  had 
not  been  accomplished  which  might,  in  their  judg 
ments,  have  been  expected  and  demanded  of  so 
large  a  force  fitted  out  and  maintained  at  such  vast 
cost  to  the  Government.  Adverse  criticism  had 
commenced  early,  and  continued  until  a  change  was 
effected  in  the  command  of  the  land  force.  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  under  whose  command  the  reduction 
of  Fort  Pulaski  had  been  planned  and  pressed  for 
ward  under  great  difficulties  to  within  a  few  days 
of  its  actual  accomplishment,  was  not  permitted  to 
witness  the  only  triumph  in  arms  of  his  corps,  and 
receive  the  surrender  of  the  fort.  On  March  15 


86        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

an  order  from  the  War  Department  in  Washing 
ton  created  a  new  military  department,  composed  of 
the  States  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida, 
designated  as  the  Department  of  the  South,  and 
Major  General  David  Hunter  was  assigned  to  the 
command.  Brigadier  General  H.  W.  Benham  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  troops  of  the  Expe 
ditionary  Corps,  designated  as  the  Northern  Divis 
ion  of  the  Department  of  the  South.  General 
Hunter  assumed  command  on  March  31,  and  was 
on  Tybee  Island  in  time  to  demand  the  surrender 
of  Fort  Pulaski,  and  report  its  reduction  to  his 
Government. 

On  March  2  President  Davis  had  called  General 
Lee  to  Richmond,  and  Major  General  John  C. 
Pemberton  succeeded  him  in  command. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Blockade — Lack  of  Confederate  resources — Inferiority  of  equip 
ment — Charleston's  strategic  value — Investment  of  Charles 
ton — Charleston  and  Savannah  Railroad — Defenses  of  rail 
road — James  Island — Unsuccessful  Assault — Vigor  of  Con 
federate  fire — Confederate  position  again  assaulted — En 
gagement  at  Secessionville — Federal  Reports  of  Action — 
Federal  Republic — Within  the  Confederate  lines. 

Cotton  being  the  basis  of  financial  credit  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy,  it  was  manifestly  of  the 
first  importance  that  the  government  should  hold 
some  seaports  from  which  the  cotton  could  be 
shipped  and  into  which  the  return  cargoes  could  be 
entered.  Charleston  and  Savannah  were  the  most 
important  ports  of  entry  on  the  South  Atlantic 
coast.  These  two  cities  were  connected  by  a  rail 
road  of  about  one  hundred  and  fifteen  miles  in 
length,  lying  broadside  to  the  coast,  which  is  inter 
sected  by  numerous  bays,  inlets,  rivers,  and  creeks, 
forming  a  network  of  watercourses  navigable  to 
within  easy  striking  distance  of  this  railroad  at 
several  points. 

Before  the  close  of  the  first  year  of  the  war  the 
Federal  land  and  naval  forces  were  in  secure  pos 
session  of  important  points  on  the  coast  of  South 
Carolina  and  of  the  navigable  waters  that  border  it 

87 


88        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

and  extend  far  into  the  interior.  Wherever  their 
fleets  could  be  brought  the  Confederates  could  offer 
no  effective  opposition  to  the  landing  of  troops, 
except  at  points  within  range  of  fixed  batteries, 
which  at  that  early  period  of  the  war  were  few  and 
very  incomplete.  The  Confederates  had  nothing 
to  oppose  effectively  to  the  heavy  guns  of  the  Fed 
eral  fleet,  which  could  sweep  over  the  low  banks  of 
the  rivers  of  that  country  with  irresistible  force. 
Skillful  engineers  had  selected  with  admirable  judg 
ment  the  most  important  and  vital  points  for  the 
defense  of  the  cities  and  the  coast  generally,  and  the 
construction  of  the  necessary  earthworks  under  the 
direction  and  superintendence  of  competent  engineers 
was  a  mere  question  of  tools  and  manual  labor. 
But  the  arming  of  the  works  when  constructed  with 
suitable  guns  and  ammunition  was  a  far  more  difficult 
task. 

The  Confederacy  labored  under  far  greater  dif 
ficulties  as  to  the  supply  of  suitable  arms  and  ammu 
nition  than  is  generally  supposed.  While  some  of 
the  guns,  both  of  heavy  ordnance  and  small  arms, 
that  were  found  in  the  forts  and  arsenals  within  the 
limits  of  the  Confederacy  were  among  the  best  then 
known  to  the  military  profession  in  this  country, 
much  the  greater  part  of  them  were  of  old  and 
antiquated  pattern,  and  even  the  best  of  them  were 
soon  rendered  comparatively  ineffective  when  op 
posed  to  the  new  and  improved  arms  of  all  kinds 
that  the  exigencies  of  the  war  and  the  inventive 
genius  of  the  country  soon  supplied  and  brought  into 
use.  There  were  no  great  manufactories  of  arms, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        89 

ammunition,  and  the  various  munitions  of  war  in 
the  Confederacy.  The  South  was  essentially  an  agri 
cultural  country,  and  manufacturing  generally 
formed  but  a  small  part  of  its  productive  industry. 
The  manufacture  of  arms,  gunpowder,  and  the  vari 
ous  munitions  of  war  generally  were  especially  but 
little  practiced  or  known;  and  the  rigid  blockade  of 
the  Southern  coast,  which  was  soon  established  and 
maintained,  while  it  by  no  means  sealed  the  Southern 
ports,  greatly  obstructed  the  introduction  into  the 
country  of  all  manner  of  arms  and  munitions  of 
war  and  the  materials  necessary  for  their  manu 
facture. 

In  the  beginning  the  Confederate  Government  se 
lected  a  most  accomplished  and  efficient  officer  as 
the  head  of  the  Ordnance  Department  in  the  person 
of  the  late  General  J.  Gorgas,  who  may  be  said  to 
have  inaugurated  new  industries  in  the  country,  all 
directed  to  the  production  of  arms  and  their  various 
accessories  absolutely  essential  to  the  prosecution  of 
war.  With  efficient  aids,  such  as  General  George  W. 
Raines  and  Major  Garesche,  who  established 
powder  mills,  and  Captain  Brook,  who  introduced 
an  admirable  rifled  cannon  (which  bore  his  name), 
and  others  in  other  branches,  he  very  soon  had  the 
Ordnance  Department  in  wonderfully  successful  and 
efficient  operation. 

But  in  the  first  year  of  the  war  the  government 
was  wholly  unable  to  supply  suitable  siege,  garrison, 
and  field  guns  for  the  various  forts  and  batteries  or 
small  arms  to  put  into  the  hands  of  the  volunteers. 
Hence  it  was  that  all  along  the  coast  and  in  the  inte- 


9o        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

rior  Confederate  artillerists  manned  and  used  many 
antiquated  guns,  mounted  on  clumsy  carriages,  and 
in  the  field  Southern  infantry  and  cavalry,  armed 
with  old-pattern  muskets,  sometimes  with  flint-locks, 
shot-guns,  sporting  rifles,  and  pistols,  encountered 
foemen  armed  with  the  best  weapons  of  modern 
warfare.  And  while  new  and  improved  arms  were 
constantly  introduced  in  the  North,  this  inferiority 
of  armament  continued  in  the  South  throughout  the 
war.1  Generally  the  best  arms  in  the  Confederate 
army  were  gathered  on  the  battlefield.  It  is  not 
probable  that  much  use  was  made  in  the  Federal 
army  of  the  Confederate  arms  gathered  in  the  same 
way. 

With  land  forces  securely  established  on  the  coast 
and  the  navy  in  undisputed  possession  of  the  sea, 
and  with  ample  transportation  at  command,  the 
Federal  commanders  on  the  Southern  coast  pos 
sessed  a  base  of  operations  which  threatened  at  once 
Charleston  on  their  right,  Savannah  on  the  left,  and 
the  connecting  railroad  and  intermediate  country. 
The  Confederate  authorities  very  naturally  appre 
hended  that  so  soon  as  the  Federal  forces  were  thus 
in  possession  of  the  coast  the  commanders  would 
avail  themselves  of  their  resources  to  seize  upon  the 

1General  La  Grange,  a  distinguished  Federal  cavalry  com 
mander,  recently  told  the  writer  that  in  the  winter  cam 
paign  in  east  Tennessee  of  1863-64  it  seemed  to  him  almost 
unfair  and  cruel  to  meet  in  battle  with  Spencer  repeating 
rifles  Confederates  generally  armed  with  muzzle-loading  arms, 
pne  of  the  former  being  equivalent  in  a  fight  to  six  or  eight 
of  the  latter. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        91 

Charleston  &  Savannah  Railroad  near  the  head  of 
Broad  River,  sever  the  connection  between  those  two 
cities,  and  with  the  combined  land  and  naval  forces 
envelop  alternately  each  of  those  important  places. 
That,  it  was  plainly  seen,  would  be  a  combination 
difficult  to  resist  successfully. 

The  capture  of  Charleston  especially  would  have 
been  disastrous  to  the  Confederacy  in  every  point 
of  view — commercial,  military,  and  political.  The 
city  would  not  only  have  been  lost  as  a  shipping  port, 
but  the  railroad  communication  with  Virginia,  North 
Carolina,  and  eastern  Georgia  would  have  been  cut 
off  and  the  upper  roads  by  Branchville  would  have 
been  placed  in  jeopardy  by  the  presence  of  a  hostile 
force  so  near  as  Charleston.  It  is  fair,  too,  to  pre 
sume  that  the  capture  of  Charleston  would  have 
caused  as  general  satisfaction  throughout  the  North 
as  the  capture  of  Richmond,  and  the  political  effect 
would  have  been  as  encouraging  and  stimulating 
there  as  it  would  have  been  depressing  and  discour 
aging  in  the  South.  Yet  notwithstanding  the  im 
portance  of  the  two  cities  mentioned,  and  their  con 
necting  railroads,  their  vulnerability  and  the  ample 
resources  both  on  land  and  sea  at  the  command  of 
the  Federal  Government,  they  were  defended  and 
firmly  held  for  nearly  four  years  against  every  attack 
made  against  them,  and  were  only  abandoned  when 
the  march  of  the  great  army  under  General  Sherman 
from  the  west  to  the  sea  rendered  them  no  longer 
tenable.  It  is  proposed  to  sketch  here  only  the  prin 
cipal  operations  against  Charleston  and  to  tell  how 
they  were  met  and  brought  to  naught. 


92        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

In  the  spring  of  1862  Major  General  David 
Hunter,  United  States  Army,  commanded  the  De 
partment  of  the  South,  with  headquarters  at  Hilton 
Head,  and  Admiral  DuPont  commanded  the  South 
Atlantic  Squadron.  Major  General  John  C.  Pem- 
berton,  Confederate  States  Army,  commanded  the 
Department  of  South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  head 
quarters  in  Charleston.  Soon  after  the  capture  of 
Fort  Pulaski  Brigadier  General  H.  W.  Benham, 
commanding  a  division  and  second  in  rank  to  Gen 
eral  Hunter,  submitted  to  the  latter  and  to  Admiral 
DuPont  a  plan  for  the  capture  of  Charleston. 
Though  favorably  considered,  it  was  not  at  once 
adopted.  On  April  28  Admiral  DuPont  sent  to 
General  Hunter  reports  from  Captains  Marchand 
and  Mullany,  of  the  navy,  giving  information,  which 
they  had  derived  from  sources  deemed  reliable,  as 
to  the  force  present  for  the  defense  of  Charleston. 
The  information  was  to  the  effect  that  the  force  in 
Charleston  and  within  ten  miles  of  it  was  from  2650 
to  2860.  Of  this  force  between  1500  and  1600 
were  on  James  Island,  between  the  mouth  of  the 
Stono  and  Charleston,  and  about  600  at  Fort  John 
son. 

About  the  middle  of  May  a  crew  of  negroes,  who 
escaped  from  Charleston  with  the  steamer  Planter, 
carried  to  Hilton  Head  the  additional  news  that  the 
Confederate  troops  and  guns  had  withdrawn  from 
Coles'  and  Battery  islands,  thus  leaving  the  entrance 
to  the  Stono  unguarded.  Gunboats  sent  by  Ad 
miral  DuPont  to  reconnoiter  entered  the  river  with 
out  opposition,  and  Captain  Percival  Drayton  re- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        93 

ported  to  the  Admiral :  "We  are  in  as  complete  pos 
session  of  the  river  [Stono]  as  of  Port  Royal  and 
can  land  and  protect  the  army  whenever  it  wants. " 
Finding  this  gateway  to  Charleston  thrown  wide 
open,  General  Hunter  decided  to  adopt  General  Ben- 
ham's  plan  and  make  a  dash  to  take  the  city  by  a 
coup-de-main.  Preparations  to  carry  the  plan  into 
execution  were  pressed  forward  rapidly. 

James  Island  was  generally  regarded  as  the  key 
to  Charleston.  It  was  the  opinion  of  the  most  com 
petent  military  engineers  that  if  the  Union  army 
could  once  secure  footing  on  that  island  the  fall  of 
Charleston  would  be  inevitable  and  only  a  question 
of  time.  The  plan  of  attack,  briefly  stated,  was  to 
land  a  force  of  10,000  men  of  all  arms  on  the  lower 
end  of  James  Island  and  by  rapid  movement  over 
take,  engage,  and  defeat  the  Confederate  force  on 
the  island  before  it  could  be  reinforced.  That  ac 
complished,  a  securely  entrenched  camp  would  be 
established  beyond  the  range  of  the  guns  of  Fort 
Sumter  and  in  easy  shelling  range  of  the  city.  From 
that  position,  strengthened  by  reinforcements  which 
were  expected,  it  would  require  a  much  larger  force 
to  dislodge  them  than  the  Confederate  Government 
could  assemble  while  all  of  the  available  force  in 
the  eastern  States  of  the  Confederacy  was  in  front 
of  Richmond,  to  meet  General  McClellan,  then 
marching  on  that  city,  and  in  Mississippi,  confront 
ing  General  Halleck.  All  these  conditions  of  the 
military  problem  seemed  favorable  for  the  success  of 
the  proposed  plan  of  operations. 

This  plan  embraced,  first,  a  preliminary  expedi- 


94        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

tion  to  cut  the  Charleston  &  Savannah  Railroad  and 
destroy  it  from  Salkehatchie  to  Coosawhatchie,  a  pre 
cautionary  measure  to  prevent  the  passage  of  rein 
forcements  from  the  latter  to  the  former  city.  Briga 
dier  General  I.  J.  Stephens,  who  commanded  a  divis 
ion  at  Beaufort,  was  directed  to  execute  that  part 
of  the  plan.  General  Stephens  ordered  Colonel  B. 
C.  Christ,  of  the  Fiftieth  Pennsylvania  Infantry,  to 
take  his  own  regiment,  one  company  each  of  the 
Eighth  Michigan  and  Seventy-ninth  New  York 
Highlanders,  a  battalion  of  the  First  Massachusetts 
Cavalry  and  one  section  of  Rockwell's  light  battery 
of  Connecticut  Artillery,  in  all  about  nine  hundred 
men,  and  to  proceed  to  the  execution  of  the  plan. 
This  force  crossed  at  Port  Royal  Ferry  in  the  night 
of  May  28,  was  on  the  mainland  by  daylight  the 
next  morning,  and  marched  immediately  for  Poco- 
taligo,  via  Garden's  Corner  and  the  Shelden  Road, 
and  was  considerably  delayed,  says  Colonel  Christ, 
by  the  Confederate  pickets  before  reaching  Old  Po- 
cotaligo,  about  ten  miles  from  Port  Royal  Ferry. 
General  Stephens  regarded  the  force  under  Colonel 
Christ  as  ample  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  object 
of  the  expedition;  nevertheless,  "out  of  abundant 
caution,"  he  sent  the  Eighth  Michigan  and  Seventy- 
ninth  Highlanders  to  Garden's  Corner  and  the  One 
Hundredth  Pennsylvania  to  the  Ferry  as  reserves. 

The  approach  to  Old  Pocotaligo  by  the  road  the 
Federal  troops  were  marching  is  over  a  causeway 
partly  flanked  on  either  side  by  a  marsh,  through 
which  runs  a  narrow  stream,  spanned  by  a  bridge 
about  fifteen  feet  in  length.  The  flooring  of  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        95 

bridge  had  been  torn  off,  leaving  the  string-pieces. 
The  marsh  was  bordered  by  a  skirt  of  woods.  In 
the  woods,  and  partly  sheltered  by  the  banks  of 
ditches,  were  parts  of  three  companies  of  Confed 
erate  cavalry,  viz. :  Captain  Trenholm's  company  of 
the  Rutledge  Mounted  Rifles  and  Companies  A  and 
D  of  the  First  Battalion  South  Carolina  Cavalry. 
Some  were  armed  with  rifles,  others  with  shotguns. 
They  were  all  dismounted  and  numbered  only  76 
men.  Their  horses  were  about  half  a  mile  in  the 
rear,  where  the  other  two  companies  of  the  First 
Battalion  and  Captain  D.  B.  Haywood's  company 
were  held  in  reserve.  Many  of  these  men  were 
armed  only  with  sabers.  They  numbered  in  all  no 
and  were  commanded  by  Major  I.  H.  Morgan. 
Colonel  W.  S.  Walker  commanded  the  whole. 

At  this  point  the  Federal  advance  was  disputed; 
the  seventy-six  dismounted  cavalrymen  held  their 
position  with  admirable  tenacity,  keeping  the  enemy 
at  bay  for  more  than  two  hours  and  a  half,  from 
half-past  ten  until  after  one  o'clock,  and  until  Cap 
tain  Parker,  of  the  Fiftieth  Pennsylvania,  passed 
over  the  bridge  at  the  head  of  his  company  and  was 
followed  by  the  remaining  companies,  which,  de 
ploying  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  road,  flanked  the 
Confederates,  obliging  them  to  fall  back  to  their  sup 
port,  which  they  did  in  good  order  and  with  little 
loss.  In  this  affair  the  gallant  Captain  Parker  was 
killed.  The  bridge  was  so  repaired  as  to  enable 
the  cavalry  and  artillery  to  pass,  and  Colonel  Christ 
and  his  command  pressed  forward  in  pursuit  and 
continued  to  advance  until  they  came  in  full  view 


96        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

and  within  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  the  railroad  the 
destruction  of  which  was  the  object  of  the  expedition. 

In  the  meantime  the  artillery  had  come  up  with 
the  infantry  and  cavalry,  not  in  time,  however,  to 
take  part  in  the  affair  at  Old  Pocotaligo,  because 
the  officer  in  command,  Lieutenant  Cannon,  had 
halted  two  hours  on  the  march  to  feed  and  water 
his  horses.  But  the  weather  was  warm,  the  men 
were  fatigued  and  had  expended  nearly  all  of  their 
ammunition.  Some  negroes  had  told  Colonel  Christ 
that  "the  desperate  stand  by  the  enemy"  at  Old  Po 
cotaligo  was  made  because  they  confidently  looked 
for  reinforcements.  As  the  Colonel  says: 

"In  view  of  the  positive  orders  I  received  to  return 
to  Port  Royal  Island  during  the  night,  and  to  avoid, 
if  possible,  bringing  on  a  general  engagement  with 
reduced  ammunition,  I  deemed  it  prudent  to  retire, 
and  accordingly  arrived  at  Port  Royal  Ferry  at  n 
o'clock  P.  M." 

Colonel  Walker,  having  been  reinforced  by  two 
companies  of  infantry  and  three  pieces  of  field  artil 
lery,  under  Captain  Stephen  Elliott,  followed  in 
pursuit  to  Garden's  Corner,  where  a  few  shots  were 
exchanged.  The  night  was  too  intensely  dark  to 
attack,  and  when  morning  dawned  the  Federal  force 
had  crossed  the  ferry  and  was  out  of  reach.  General 
Stephens  says: 

"In  short,  the  operation  was  most  successful  as  a 
reconnoissance  or  demonstration,  and  it  is  very  cer 
tain  that  could  the  original  programme  have  been 
carried  out  the  whole  line  would  have  been  destroyed 
from  Salkehatchie  to  Coosawhatchie.  It  proves  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        97 

correctness  of  the  information  which  I  had  previ 
ously  gained,  that  the  enemy  was  not  in  any  consid 
erable  force  at  the  railroad." 

The  expedition  which  General  Stephens  reported 
as  "most  successful,"  his  commanding  officer,  Gen 
eral  Benham,  characterized  as  "a  miserable  failure." 

The  failure  of  this  expedition  to  destroy  the  rail 
road  did  not  retard  or  interfere  with  the  main  expe 
dition  to  James  Island.  On  the  morning  of  June  2 
General  Stephens'  command  steamed  out  of  Port 
Royal  Harbor,  and  that  evening  entered  the  Stono 
and  landed  a  little  above  Coles'  Island,  on  Legare's 
plantation,  on  James  Island,  and  brisk  skirmishing 
immediately  began.  A  deiachrr-ent  occupied  Legare- 
ville  on  the  left  bank.  Brigadier  General  H.  G. 
Wright  commanded  a  division  on  Edisto  Island.  At 
that  point  about  seven  thousand  men  of  all  arms 
had  been  concentrated.  General  Wright  was  or 
dered  to  pass  this  force  over  to  Seabrook's  Island 
and  thence  over  Haulver  Creek  to  John's  Island, 
and  from  there  to  march  directly  to  Legareville,  on 
the  Stono,  and  cross  that  river  to  take  part  with 
Stephens'  Division  in  the  coup-de-main.  The  mass 
of  General  Wright's  command  (it  was  designated 
as  the  First  Division,  but  a  part  of  General  Steph 
ens'  Division — the  Second — was  with  him)  was  on 
John's  Island,  near  the  Haulver,  the  night  of  the 
2d.  The  distance  from  that  point  to  Legareville,  on 
the  Stono,  is  about  ten  miles,  and  the  road  good. 
Captain  Percival  Drayton,  of  the  navy,  was  in  the 
Stono  prepared  to  cross  the  troops  over  to  James 
Island  immediately  on  their  arrival. 


98        THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

Some  delay  occurred  in  the  movement  of  General 
Wright's  command,  attributed  to  the  lack  of  trans 
portation  and  a  damaged  wharf  at  Seabrook's 
Island.  His  command  did  not  reach  Legareville 
until  the  evening  of  the  5th.  This  delay,  occurring 
after  the  arrival  of  Stephens'  troops  had  given  warn 
ing  of  the  approaching  storm,  had  given  General 
Pemberton  time,  which  it  was  believed  he  had  pro 
fited  by,  to  throw  reinforcements  on  James  Island. 
The  purpose,  therefore,  of  taking  the  island  by  a 
coup-de-main  was  abandoned  and  it  was  determined 
to  hold  the  position  already  secured,  provide  a  se 
curely  entrenched  camp  and  await  reinforcements. 
General  Wright's  division  crossed  the  Stono  on  the 
9th  and  took  position  on  Mr.  Thomas  Grimble's 
plantation,  two  miles  above  General  Stephens'  com 
mand.  The  Confederates  immediately  opened  fire 
of  solid  shot  and  shell,  which  fell  into,  around,  and 
over  General  Wright's  camp  and  among  the  gun 
boats  in  the  Stono.  General  Stephens'  camp  was 
also  under  fire.  This  at  once  convinced  General 
Benham  that  the  main  camps  and  landings  were  un 
tenable  while  exposed  to  the  Confederate  fire,  and 
as  there  was  not  dry  land  enough  on  the  island  above 
high  water  for  a  secure  camp  out  of  range  of  the 
Confederate  guns,  it  seemed  evident  that  he  would 
be  obliged  to  abandon  the  island, — the  key  to 
Charleston, — or  silence  the  advanced  Confederate 
batteries.  On  the  loth  General  Hunter,  having  de 
termined  to  return  to  Hilton  Head,  gave  to  General 
Benham  written  instructions,  in  which  he  says: 

"In  leaving  the  Stono  to  return  to  Hilton  Head, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON        99 

I  desire  in  any  arrangement  that  you  may  make  for 
the  disposition  of  your  forces  now  in  this  vicinity, 
you  will  make  no  attempt  to  advance  on  Charleston 
or  attack  Fort  Johnson  until  largely  reinforced,  or 
until  you  receive  specific  instructions  from  these  head 
quarters  to  that  effect.  You  will,  however,  provide 
for  a  secure,  entrenched  encampment,  where  your 
front  can  be  covered  by  the  fire  of  our  gunboats  from 
the  Stono  on  the  left  and  the  creek  from  Folly  River 
on  the  right." 

The  fire  from  the  Confederate  batteries  continued 
to  be  very  annoying  on  the  loth,  so  much  so  as  to 
induce  General  Benham  to  make  a  move  to  put  an 
end  to  it.  He  ordered  a  reconnoissance  in  force  to 
be  made  on  the  Confederate  works  at  the  earliest 
dawn  of  day  on  the  morning  of  the  nth.  Picked 
regiments  of  General  Stephens'  division  were  to  lead 
and  "make  a  rush  on  the  Confederate  position,"  the 
remainder  of  Stephens'  division  being  held  close  in 
hand  to  support  the  advance  or  follow  up  closely 
any  advantage  that  might  be  gained.  General 
Wright  and  Colonel  Williams  were  to  support 
Stephens  on  the  left.  The  whole  remaining  force 
was  to  be  held  in  readiness  to  give  such  strong  and 
prompt  support  as  to  change  the  reconnoissance  in 
force  into  a  general  engagement,  if  fortune  favored 
and  it  should  be  found  expedient.  In  that  case  Colo 
nel  Robert  Williams  was  to  lead  the  assaulting  col 
umns.  Written  instructions  were  prepared  for  Gene 
rals  Wright  and  Stephens  and  Colonel  Williams. 

It  seems  that  Generals  Hunter  and  Benham  had 
their  headquarters  temporarily  on  the  same  steamer, 


ioo      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  Delaware,  in  the  Stono.  Before  issuing  his  in 
structions  for  the  dash  of  the  next  day  General  Ben- 
ham  showed  them  to  General  Hunter,  impressing 
upon  him  at  the  same  time  the  imperative  necessity 
of  capturing  or  silencing  the  batteries  at  Secession- 
ville.  He  also  pointed  out  to  General  Hunter  a  line 
traced  on  a  map  from  Secessionville  obliquely  to 
ward  Charleston  as  the  line  which  the  Federal 
troops  should  occupy  to  render  their  hold  on  James 
Island  secure,  to  all  of  which  Benham  says  General 
Hunter  cordially  assented,  and  on  Benham's  solicita 
tion  Hunter  agreed  to  defer  his  departure  for  Hilton 
Head  to  await  the  result  of  the  demonstration  on 
Secessionville.  The  line  traced  out  as  being  the 
proper  one  for  the  Union  forces  to  occupy  was  al 
ready  occupied  by  the  Confederates,  and  it  was 
plainly  necessary  that  the  Federal  troops  must  first 
capture  Secessionville  and  drive  off  the  Confederates 
before  occupying  it  themselves.  This  contemplated 
movement  for  the  morning  of  the  nth  was,  how 
ever,  deferred,  because  General  Wright  represented 
that  his  troops  were  not  in  condition  for  action.  Gen 
eral  Hunter  left  the  field  of  operations  on  the  even 
ing  of  the  iith,  leaving  General  Benham  in  com 
mand,  with  the  instructions  already  quoted. 

Skirmishing  had  been  brisk  from  the  time  of  the 
landing  of  the  advance  troops  of  the  expedition. 
From  five  to  eight  gunboats  in  the  Stono  and  in  a 
creek  flowing  into  Folly  River  had  kept  up  a  well- 
sustained  fire  on  the  Confederate  position.  The 
Federal  commander  had  caused  a  battery  of  siege 
guns  to  be  constructed  in  front  of  General  Stephens1 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      101 

__p..:«;_j3 

camp,  to  play  upon  the  Confederate  batteries  in 
front  of  Secessionville.  The  skirmishing  and  the 
combined  fire  of  the  land  and  naval  batteries  were 
particularly  spirited  on  Sunday,  the  I5th,  but  no 
perceptible  effect  was  produced  on  the  Confederate 
batteries.  The  enemy  were  known  to  be  busily  at 
work  night  and  day,  strengthening  their  positions, 
and  it  had  been  reported  to  General  Benham  some 
days  before  that  from  the  masthead  of  a  naval  vessel 
in  the  Stono  several  long  trains  of  cars  loaded  with 
troops  had  been  seen  pouring  into  Charleston  over 
the  road  which  Colonel  Christ's  expedition  had  failed 
to  break.  It  therefore  seemed  manifest  to  General 
Benham  that  whatever  he  proposed  to  do  to  "pro 
vide  a  securely  entrenched  encampment"  on  James 
Island,  as  ordered  by  General  Hunter,  he  should  do 
quickly,  without  longer  delay.  He  therefore  deter 
mined  to  assault  the  Confederate  position  at  the 
earliest  dawn  of  day  the  next  morning. 

The  plan  of  attack  was  substantially  the  same  as 
that  proposed  to  be  made  on  the  loth,  but  on  a 
larger  scale.  Generals  Wright  and  Stephens,  com 
manding  divisions,  and  Colonel  Robert  Williams, 
commanding  a  brigade,  were  called  in  to  confer  with 
General  Benham,  and  Captain  Percival  Drayton,  of 
the  navy,  was  invited  to  be  present  at  the  conference. 
The  reports  of  what  occurred  in  that  conference  are 
so  conflicting  that  it  is  impossible  to  reconcile  them. 

This  much  seems  certain,  that  General  Stephens, 
whose  division  was  designated  to  make  the  assault, 
strongly  objected  to  the  time  of  making  it.  He  pre 
ferred  to  make  it  in  the  light  of  day,  that  his  men 


102      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

might  see  where  they  were  required  to  go  and  what 
was  before  them  to  be  done.  He  advised  that  fire 
be  continued  on  the  Confederate  works,  keep 
ing  the  enemy  constantly  disturbed  and  uncertain  as 
to  when  and  where  the  attack  would  be  made,  thus 
wearying  them  out  with  watching,  while  the  Federal 
troops,  their  officers  knowing  exactly  when  the  attack 
would  be  made,  could  take  their  usual  rest  and  regu 
lar  meals  and,  when  needed  for  action,  would  go 
fresh  to  their  work.  Whatever  objections  were 
raised  were  overruled  by  General  Benham,  who 
ordered  the  assault  to  be  made. 

The  consolidated  morning  reports  of  June  9 
showed  the  Federal  force  in  hand  on  James  Island 
to  be:  Wright's  Division,  3232;  Stephens'  Division, 
4313;  Williams'  Headquarters  Brigade,  1927 — 
total,  9472.  It  was  believed  that  the  Confederate 
force  defending  the  works  to  be  attacked  was  less 
than  500  men.  It  was  proposed  to  surprise  that 
force  and  capture  the  works. 

General  Stephens  was  ordered  to  form  his  entire 
division  before  day  dawn,  secretly  and  in  silence,  at 
the  advanced  picket  line,  and  at  day  dawn,  or  about 
four  o'clock,  to  move  rapidly  upon  the  enemy's 
works  at  and  about  Secessionville  and  carry  them  by 
a  coup-de-main.  General  Wright's  Division,  with 
Williams'  Brigade  temporarily  attached,  was  or 
dered  to  move  at  the  same  time  from  their  camp  at 
Thomas  Grimble's,  to  support  Stephens  and  protect 
his  left  and  rear  from  any  attack  that  might  be  made 
by  the  Confederates  from  that  direction.  This  pre 
caution  to  guard  against  a  flank  and  rear  attack  was 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      103 

deemed  so  important  that  General  Wright  was  or 
dered,  in  the  event  of  Stephens  being  repulsed,  not  to 
renew  the  assault. 

The  Confederate  works  in  front  of  Secessionville 
occupied  the  most  contracted  part  of  a  narrow  neck 
of  land,  with  marshes  fringed  with  brushwood  on 
both  sides.  The  route  from  General  Stephens'  camp 
to  this  position,  after  passing  a  causeway,  was  over 
cultivated  fields,  bordered  with  thorny  hedges,  the 
most  advanced  hedge  being  about  five  hundred  yards 
from  the  Confederate  batteries.  The  field  in  front 
of  this  hedge  converged  rapidly  to  the  Confederate 
works,  where  the  front  of  attack  was  about  one 
hundred  yards  in  length,  flanked  on  either  side  by  the 
before-mentioned  marshes. 

Stephens'  Division  was  composed  of  two  brigades 
of  infantry,  of  three  regiments  each.  The  First 
Brigade,  Colonel  Fenton,  Eighth  Michigan,  com 
manding,  made  up  of  the  Eighth  Michigan,  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  F.  Graves;  the  Seventh  Connecticut, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  R.  Hawley,  and  the  Twenty- 
eighth  Massachusetts,  Lieutenant  Colonel  More, 
led  the  assault  and  was  closely  followed  by  the 
Second  Brigade,  Colonel  Leasure,  of  the  One  Hun 
dredth  Pennsylvania,  consisting  of  the  Seventy-ninth 
New  York  Highlanders,  Lieutenant  Colonel  David 
Morrison;  the  One  Hundredth  Pennsylvania,  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  D.  A.  Lecky,  and  the  Forty-sixth 
New  York,  Colonel  Rudolph  Rosa,  commanding. 
A  storming  party,  consisting  of  Companies  C  and  H 
of  the  Eighth  Michigan,  Captains  Ralph  Ely  and 
R.  N.  Doyle,  led  the  assault,  conducted  by  Lieuten- 


io4      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

ant  Lyons,  aide-de-camp  on  General  Stephens'  staff, 
and  followed  by  Captain  Sears'  company  of  New 
York  Engineers.  Rockwell's  Battery  of  Connecti 
cut  Light  Artillery  followed  the  First  Brigade  and 
Captain  Sargent's  company  of  the  First  Massachu 
setts  cavalry  followed  in  the  rear. 

About  four  o'clock  on  a  dark  cloudy  morning 
Stephens'  whole  command  was  in  motion  and,  press 
ing  forward  rapidly  and  in  silence,  surprised  the 
Confederate  picket  in  the  house  they  occupied,  cap 
tured  two  or  three  of  the  men  and,  debouching 
through  the  advanced  hedge,  advancing  at  double- 
quick  time,  deployed,  or  attempted  to  deploy,  into* 
line  of  battle,  the  Seventh  Connecticut,  the  center 
regiment,  following  close  on  the  Eighth  Michigan, 
to  form  on  its  left.  It  seems  that  the  mistake,  or 
blunder,  had  been  made  of  attempting  to  charge 
with  brigade  front  over  a  space  scarcely  wide  enough 
for  a  regiment  in  line.  While  the  regiments  of  the 
leading  brigade  were  forming  forward  into  line  in 
double-quick  time  a  storm  of  grape  and  canister 
from  the  Confederate  guns  crashed  through  the 
center  of  the  line  and  continued  tearing  through  the 
ranks  with  great  rapidity,  severing  the  line,  one  part 
crowding  toward  the  right,  the  other  to  the  left. 
Says  Lieutenant  Colonel  Graves: 

"Still  the  regiment  moved  rapidly  on,  preserving 
their  order  and  leaving  the  ground  in  their  rear 
strewn  with  their  dead  and  wounded,  and  did  not 
stop  until  they  gained  the  parapet  and  delivered  their 
fire  upon  the  enemy  in  his  works.  But  they  were 
unable  to  contend  against  such  great  odds,  and,  being 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       105 

entirely  unsupported  for  a  considerable  time,  they 
fell  back  slowly,  contesting  every  inch  of  ground  a 
short  distance,  where  they  maintained  ground  until 
ordered  to  retreat,  which  they  did  in  good  order, 
although  under  fire.  The  regiment,  however,  had 
become  much  scattered,  owing  to  the  great  number 
of  officers  who  had  fallen." 

The  inevitable  result  of  attempting  to  advance 
with  brigade  front  over  space  hardly  wide  enough 
for  a  single  regiment  in  line  followed.  The  regi 
ments  became  somewhat  entangled  with  each  other 
and  the  brushwood-fringed  marshes  on  the  flanks. 
When  within  two  or  three  hundred  yards  of  the  Con 
federate  works  the  Seventh  Connecticut  "came 
obliquely  upon  an  unforeseen  ditch  and  morass," 
crowding  and  doubling  up  the  regiment  toward  the 
center.  At  this  moment  a  terrific  fire  of  grape  and 
musketry  swept  through  the  ranks.  "The  line  was 
inevitably  broken,"  says  Colonel  Hawley,  "and 
though  the  men  stood  bravely  to  their  work  the  line 
could  not  be  re-formed  until  the  colors  were  brought 
into  the  open  field.  When  re-formed  it  started  again 
under  a  heavy  fire  toward  the  earthworks,  but  had 
proceeded  but  a  little  distance  when  an  order  came 
from  General  Stephens,  brought  by  his  son,  who  was 
then  'receiving  his  baptism  of  fire,'  to  call  the  men 
off,  and  the  regiment  fell  back  to  the  cover  of  the 
hedge  in  front  of  their  hospital.  The  Twenty-eighth 
Massachusetts  had  been  unavoidably  pushed  far  to 
the  left,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  formed  into  line,  ad 
vancing,  one  regiment  that  was  in  front  fell  back 


io6      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

and  broke  through  our  regiment,  throwing  it  into 
confusion. 

"Forward  again,"  he  continues,  "marched  by  the 
flank  through  a  dense  brush  on  our  left  and  followed 
the  edge  of  the  bushes,  which  formed  one  side  of  a 
marsh  to  within  forty  yards  of  the  enemy's  work. 
Here  our  progress  was  interrupted  by  a  large  fallen 
tree,  between  which  and  the  enemy's  work  was  an 
impassable  marsh.  On  our  right  was  an  abattis  of 
dense  brush  and  on  our  left  and  front  marsh.  Here 
we  lost  many  of  the  men  who  were  killed  and  wound 
ed  in  the  regiment.  Seeing  that  we  could  be  of  no 
possible  use  in  this  place  with  less  than  platoon  front 
to  retaliate  by  fire  on  the  enemy,  and  this  position 
being  raked  by  the  fire  of  the  gun  on  the  corner  of 
the  enemy's  work  nearest  the  observatory,  I  ordered 
the  regiment  to  retire,2  and  it,  too,  found  shelter 
behind  the  hedge." 

While  the  First  Brigade  was  being  thus  cut  up  the 
Seventy-ninth  Highlanders,  leading  the  Second  Bri 
gade,  was  ordered  by  General  Stephens  to  the  right 
to  assail  the  work  a  little  to  the  right  of  the  point 
from  which  the  Eighth  Michigan  had  been  driven. 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Morrison  led  the  right  wing  of 
his  regiment  to  the  parapet. 

"As  I  mounted  the  parapet,"  says  the  Lieutenant 
Colonel,  "I  received  a  wound  in  the  head,  which, 
though  slight,  stunned  me  for  the  time  being;  but 
still  I  was  able  to  retain  command.  With  me  many 
mounted  the  works,  but  only  to  fall  or  to  receive 
"Lieutenant  Colonel  Moore's  report. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      107 

their  wounds  from  the  enemy,  posted  in  rifle-pits  in 
rear  of  the  fort.  .  .  .  From  the  ramparts  I  had 
a  full  view  of  their  works.  They  were  entrenched 
in  a  position  well  selected  for  defensive  purposes  and 
upon  which  our  artillery  seemed  to  have  little  effect, 
save  driving  them  into  their  retreats,  and  in  attempt 
ing  to  dislodge  them  we  were  met  with  a  fierce  and 
determined  opposition,  but  with  equal  if  not  superior 
determination  and  courage  were  they  met  by  our 
forces,  and  had  I  been  supported  could  have  carried 
their  works,  .  .  .  for  we  virtually  had  it  in  our 
possession.  After  remaining  in  this  position  some 
considerable  time  and  not  being  supported  by  the 
other  regiments,  I  received  orders  to  fall  back,  which 
I  did  in  good  order,  leaving  behind  about  forty  killed 
or  badly  wounded,  many  of  whom  fell  on  the  ram 
parts,  and  brought  back  with  me  six  killed  and  about 
sixty  wounded,"  while  the  right  companies  of  the 
regiment — "the  left  having  encountered  a  perfect 
storm  of  grape  and  canister — were  obliged  to  seek 
shelter  either  by  obliquing  to  the  left,  under  cover  of 
a  small  ravine,  or  by  dropping  among  the  cotton 
ridges  in  front  of  the  fort,  where  they  kept  up  a 
steady  fire  on  the  enemy's  gunners."5 

Of  the  other  two  regiments  of  this  brigade  the 
One  Hundredth  Pennsylvania  was  formed  in  line  of 
battle  supporting  the  left  of  the  Seventy-ninth  High 
landers,  and  the  Forty-sixth  New  York  the  left  of 
the  One  Hundredth  Pennsylvania.  The  brigade  was 
thus  formed  in  three  lines  of  battle  in  echelon. 

"Report   of   Colonel   Leasure,    commanding   the   brigade. 


io8      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

While  the  two  latter  regiments  were  coming  into 
line,  Colonel  Leasure,  the  Brigade  Commander,  with 
his  staff,  hastened  forward  to  hurry  up  the  left  of 
the  Seventy-ninth,  intending  to  lead  the  assault  in 
person.  When  about  three  hundred  yards  from  the 
Confederate  works  he  reached  the  storm.  He  says: 

"We  entered  the  range  of  a  perfect  storm  of 
grape,  canister,  nails,  broken  glass,  and  pieces  of 
chains,  fired  from  three  very  large  pieces  on  the  fort, 
which  completely  swept  every  foot  of  ground  within 
the  range,  and  either  cut  the  men  down  or  drove 
them  to  the  shelter  of  the  ravine  on  the  left.  I  now 
turned  to  look  after  and  lead  up  the  One  Hundredth 
Pennsylvania  Regiment  and  found  its  center  just 
entering  the  fatal  line  of  fire,  which  completely  cut  it 
in  two,  and  the  right  under  Major  Lecky  obliqued  to 
the  right  and  advanced  to  support  the  right  of  the 
Seventy-ninth  New  York,  and  many  of  the  men 
reached  the  foot  of  the  embankment  and  some  suc 
ceeded  in  mounting  it,  with  a  few  brave  men  of  the 
Seventy-ninth,  who  were  there  with  a  portion  of  the 
Eighth  Michigan.  .  .  . 

"I  may  be  permitted  to  report  further  that  at  the 
time  I  arrived  in  front  of  the  hedge  near  the  fort  I 
saw  nothing  of  any  part  of  the  supporting  regiments 
of  the  First  Brigade ,  and  between  the  advancing 
Highlanders  and  the  fort  only  a  portion  of  the 
Eighth  Michigan,  who  led  the  attack  in  front  of  the 
fort,  that  regiment  having  already  been  decimated 
by  the  murderous  fire  through  which  we  all  had  to 
pass." 

While  the  Forty-sixth  New  York  was  advancing 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       109 

to  the  attack  it  was  run  into  by  parts  of  the  Seventh 
Connecticut  and  Twenty-eighth  Massachusetts, 
which  were  retreating,  and  swept  along  with  them 
in  their  retreat  a  part  of  the  Forty-sixth  New  York. 

"During  all  of  this  time  our  own  artillery  fired 
over  our  heads  from  enormous  distances  and  burst 
several  shells  right  over  our  heads.  The  fire  of  our 
gunboats  was  also  very  disagreeable  until  they  fin 
ally  succeeded  in  getting  a  better  range." 

The  First  Brigade  having  utterly  failed  and  fallen 
back  terribly  shattered,  the  Second  Brigade  was  re 
called  and  the  whole  division  formed  in  two  lines 
near  the  points  from  which  it  had  started.  "My 
men,"  says  General  Stephens,  "were  at  the  enemy's 
works  about  4:30  o'clock  and  the  conflict  of  twenty- 
five  minutes,  so  dreadful  in  its  casualties,  was  over 
and  the  men  returned."  Rockwell's  battery,  or  a 
part  of  it,  was  pushed  forward  to  the  advanced 
hedge  and  kept  up  a  brisk  fire  on  the  fort,  but  the 
assault  had  been  made  and  failed  disastrously. 

General  Wright's  Division  had  moved  promptly 
at  the  appointed  time  and  had  well  performed  the 
part  assigned  it.  General  Benham  had  joined 
Wright  about  the  time  his  division  moved  forward 
and  commanded  in  person.  Receiving  an  urgent 
request  from  General  Stephens  for  support,  Colonel 
Williams  was  ordered  to  hasten  forward  with  his 
brigade  and  report  to  Stephens.  His  brigade  ap 
proached  the  Confederate  works  to  the  left  of  the 
marsh  which  had  so  cramped  General  Stephens'  Di 
vision.  It  did  not  reach  the  point  on  which  it  was 
directed  until  Stephens'  attack  had  failed  and  his 


no      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

division  driven,  or  had  fallen  back,  under  cover. 
The  Ninety-seventh  Pennsylvania  joined  the  left  of 
Stephens'  Division  on  the  line  to  which  it  had  fallen 
back.  The  Third  New  Hampshire  and  Third 
Rhode  Island  were  pushed  well  to  the  front.  The 
Third  New  Hampshire  approached  to  within  forty 
yards  of  the  Confederate  works  and  opened  fire. 
Colonel  Jackson,  commanding  the  regiment,  reports 
that  he  found  no  artillery  on  that  part  of  the  Con 
federate  works  and  that  he  could  easily  have  gone 
into  the  fort. 

"If,"  he  adds,  "I  could  have  crossed  a  stream 
between  me  and  the  earthworks  about  twenty  yards 
in  width,  with  apparently  four  or  five  feet  of  water, 
and  the  mud  very  soft;  the  men  therefore  could  not 
cross.  The  enemy  soon  opened  on  me  from  a  bat 
tery  about  two  hundred  yards  in  our  rear,  throwing 
grape  into  the  ranks,  from  which  we  suffered  se 
verely.  In  a  short  time  they  opened  fire  with  rifles 
and  infantry.  At  the  same  time  a  battery  about  a 
mile  north  of  us  opened  on  us  with  shot  and  shell. 

He  seems  to  have  been  well  enveloped  in  fire  and 
the  regiment  suffered  severely.  He  saw  reinforce 
ments  passing  into  the  Confederate  works,  which  he 
was  powerless  to  prevent.  A  section  of  Hamilton's 
battery — regular  artillery — succeeded  in  silencing 
the  battery  in  the  rear  and  a  battalion  of  the  Third 
Rhode  Island  penetrated  the  brushwood  to  dislodge 
the  Confederate  sharpshooters,  but  did  not  succeed. 
The  assault  was  already  essentially  over  and  it  was 
a  mere  waste  of  life  and  limb  to  keep  these  troops 
where  they  were.  They  were  therefore  withdrawn. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      in 

General  Stephens  was  holding  his  division,  awaiting 
orders  and  ready  to  renew  the  assault,  but  no  orders 
came  and  soon  the  whole  Federal  force  on  the  island 
had  returned  to  the  camps  from  which  they  started. 

The  aggregate  Federal  loss  was  683.  The 
Eighth  Michigan  had  lost  most  heavily.  It  lost 
more  than  a  third  of  the  number  engaged.  Of 
twenty-two  commissioned  officers  who  went  into 
action  thirteen  were  killed  or  wounded.  The  Sev 
enty-ninth  Highlanders,  Third  New  Hampshire,  and 
Seventh  Connecticut  had  also  suffered  severely.  All 
the  regiments  actively  engaged  had  lost  seriously. 
Among  the  killed  were:  Captain  Edwin  S.  Hitch 
cock  and  Lieutenant  Thomas  Hooton,  Seventh  Con 
necticut;  Captains  Benjamin  B.  Church  and  Simon 
Guild,  Eighth  Michigan;  Captain  Ralph  Carlton, 
Third  New  Hampshire;  Lieutenant  Ferdinand  Se- 
hert,  Forty-sixth  New  York;  Lieutenant  James  Kin- 
ner,  Seventy-ninth  New  York  Highlanders,  died  on 
the  1 8th  of  wounds  received;  Lieutenant  Samuel  J. 
Moore,  One  Hundredth  Pennsylvania,  and  Lieuten 
ant  Erasmus  S.  Bartholomew,  Third  Rhode  Island 
Heavy  Artillery. 

The  assault  which  had  resulted  so  disastrously 
narrowly  missed  brilliant  success.  The  works  about 
Secessionville  were  occupied  by  two  companies  of 
the  First  (afterwards  Second)  South  Carolina  Ar 
tillery,  and  two  battalions  of  infantry,  the  Charles 
ton  Battalion,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Gaillard,  and  the 
Pee  Dee  Battalion,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smith  com 
manding,  in  all  less  than  five  hundred  men.  Colonel 
T.  G.  Lamar,  of  the  South  Carolina  Artillerv,  com- 


ii2      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

manded  the  post.  From  the  landing  of  the  Fed 
eral  force  on  the  2d  to  the  morning  of  the  i6th  the 
Confederate  troops  had  been  subjected,  day  and 
night,  to  the  most  arduous  duties.  On  the  I5th 
there  had  been  sharp  skirmishing  and  the  combined 
fire  from  the  land  and  naval  batteries  had  been  un 
usually  heavy.  Notwithstanding  the  secrecy  ob 
served  in  the  Federal  camps,  Colonel  Lamar  had 
observed  enough  to  convince  him  that  an  attack 
would  be  made  in  the  night  of  the  I5th  or  early  the 
following  morning,  and  so  reported  to  General 
Evans,  commanding  on  the  island,  who  ordered 
Colonel  Johnson  Hagood  to  reinforce  Secessionville 
up  to  2000  men,  but  the  reinforcements  had  not 
arrived  when  the  assault  was  made.  Colonel  Ha 
good  carried  the  reinforcements  without  orders 
from  General  Evans.  Colonel  Lamar  and  his  men 
had  been  busily  at  work  all  night  of  the  I5th  and 
until  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  constructing  a  new 
land  battery  and  transferring  guns  to  it  from  an 
old  gunboat.  About  three  o'clock  in  the  morning 
the  men,  exhausted  by  the  skirmishing  of  the  day 
before  and  the  labor  of  the  night,  were  allowed  to 
lie  down  to  rest. 

It  was  the  first  time  since  Colonel  Lamar  had 
been  in  command  that  his  men  had  been  allowed  to 
sleep  without  arms  in  their  hands  and  at  the  point 
where  they  would  have  to  use  them  in  the  event  of 
an  attack.  The  men  had  scarcely  fallen  asleep  when 
the  storm  of  battle  burst  on  them.  Sending  a  courier 
to  Colonels  Gaillard  and  Smith,  to  hurry  forward 
with  their  battalions,  Colonel  Lamar  hastened  to  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       113 

batteries,  where  the  gunners  were  found  at  their 
guns  and  alert.  He  was  just  in  time  to  see  in  the 
gray  light  of  a  cloudy  morning  the  enemy's  line  ad 
vancing  at  the  double-quick  to  the  assault. 

Mounting  the  chasee  of  the  ten-inch  columbiad, 
he  aimed  it  himself  at  the  center  of  the  advancing 
line,  to  break  and  delay  it  until  the  infantry  support 
could  come  up.  Immediately  all  of  the  guns  were 
firing,  the  columbiad  and  eighteen-pounders  firing 
grape  and  canister,  the  twenty-four-pounders  firing 
solid  shot  and  shells.  The  fire  on  the  center  of  the 
line  had,  as  we  have  seen,  the  desired  effect  of  break 
ing  it  and  causing  a  little  delay,  and  when  the  lead 
ing  regiment,  the  Eighth  Michigan,  reached  the 
ditch  and  mounted  to  the  parapet  it  encountered  a 
storm  of  fire  from  Colonel  Smith's  Pee  Dee  Bat 
talion,  and  after  a  brief  and  fierce  struggle  the 
Eighth  Michigan,  as  has  been  seen,  was  driven  back, 
badly  shattered.  The  Charleston  Battalion,  under 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Gaillard,  followed  closely  on  the 
heels  of  the  Pee  Dee  Battalion  and  was  put  into 
action  on  the  right  of  the  battery.  When  the  Michi 
gan  regiment  fell  back  Colonel  Smith  sallied  out  and 
gathered  up  the  arms  (they  were  better  than  his 
own)  which  had  fallen  from  the  hands  of  the  killed 
and  wounded,  and  put  them  in  the  hands  of  his  own 
men  in  time  to  use  them  in  repelling  the  assault  of 
the  Seventy-ninth  Highlanders.  Early  in  the  assault 
a  detachment  of  one  hundred  men  of  the  Twenty- 
second  South  Carolina,  sent  to  reinforce  the  garri 
son,  arrived  and  took  an  active  part  in  the  defense. 
A  little  later  Lieutenant  Colonel  McEnery  arrived 


ii4      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

with  his  Louisiana  Battalion  and  also  took  an  active 
part  in  repelling  the  last  assault. 

That  night  Colonel  Stevens,  of  the  Twenty-fourth 
South  Carolina  Regiment,  commanded  the  picket 
line  of  Hagood's  Brigade.  It  consisted  of  seven 
companies  of  the  Twenty-fourth  and  six  of  the  First 
South  Carolina  Regiment  and  one  of  the  Forty- 
seventh  Georgia  Regiment.  The  picket  line,  con 
necting  on  the  left  with  the  picket  in  front  of  Se- 
cessionville,  covered  the  whole  Confederate  front  to 
Newtown  Cut.  As  soon  as  the  Federal  advance 
was  made  known  to  Colonel  Hagood  he  sent  Mc- 
Enery's  Louisiana  Battalion  to  Secessionville  and 
carried  the  remainder  of  his  brigade  not  already  on 
outpost  duty  to  the  picket  line,  to  the  felled  timber 
near  the  Battery  Island  road.  One  of  Captain 
Boyce's  six-pounder  guns  was  placed  in  battery  on 
the  left  of  the  felled  timber,  which  made  good  abat- 
tis.  About  one  hundred  of  Colonel  Stevens'  pickets 
already  occupied  a  thicket  extending  from  the  felled 
timber  to  the  morass  on  the  left  near  the  Secession 
ville  batteries.  The  Twenty-fifth  South  Carolina, 
Colonel  Simonton,  was  in  rear  of  the  felled  timber 
and  to  the  right  of  the  field  piece. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Capers  commanded  the  bat 
tery  at  Clark's  House,  which,  though  at  a  greater 
distance  than  the  other  batteries,  was  most  effectively 
served.  These  were  the  troops  (Hagood's  Bri 
gade)  that  almost  enveloped  the  Third  New  Hamp 
shire  and  repulsed  a  very  gallant  and  determined 
dash  made  by  a  battalion  of  the  Third  Rhode  Island 
Heavy  Artillery  to  dislodge  the  troops  in  the  felled 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       115 

timber  and  capture  the  gun  which  was  galling  the 
rear  of  the  Third  New  Hampshire.  Colonel  Wil 
liams'  Brigade  was  plainly  seen  by  Colonel  Hagood 
in  line  of  battle  about  Hill's  Houses.  He  immedi 
ately  dispatched  an  officer  to  General  Evans,  com 
manding  on  the  island,  asking  to  be  supported  in 
making  an  attack  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  Williams' 
Brigade.  But  before  permission  to  attack  and  as 
surance  of  support  were  received  Colonel  Williams' 
Brigade  was  withdrawn,  the  whole  Federal  force 
on  the  island  returned  to  the  camp  from  which  it 
had  started  before  the  first  dawn  of  day,  and  the 
assault  of  Secessionville  was  ended. 

The  aggregate  Confederate  loss  was  204,  nearly 
the  whole  of  it  falling  on  the  troops  who  defended 
the  Secessionville  batteries.  The  struggle  for  the 
parapet  had  been  especially  stubborn  and  fierce. 
Muskets  were  clubbed  and  Lieutenant  Campbell  and 
Mr.  Tennant,  of  the  Charleston  Battalion,  in  de 
fault  of  better  weapons,  seized  handspikes  and 
wielded  them  with  effect.  Among  the  killed  were 
Captain  Samuel  T.  Reed,  First  South  Carolina  Ar 
tillery;  Captain  Henry  C.  King  and  Lieutenant  John 
T.  Edwards,  of  the  Charleston  Battalion;  Lieutenant 
B.  A.  Graham,  of  the  Forty-seventh  Georgia,  and 
Richard  W.  Greer,  of  the  Twenty-fifth  South  Caro 
lina. 

As  soon  as  the  result  of  the  assault  was  made 
known  to  General  Hunter,  then  at  Hilton  Head,  he 
relieved  General  Benham  from  command  and 
ordered  him  to  Washington  in  arrest,  charged  with 
disobedience  of  orders  and  instructions  in  making 


n6      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  assault.  General  Wright,  who  succeeded  Gen 
eral  Benham  in  command,  was  ordered  to  abandon 
James  Island,  which  was  soon  done,  leisurely  and  in 
perfect  order.  The  Federal  troops  returned  to  the 
points  from  which  they  had  started  on  the  expe 
dition  and  the  Confederates  were  left  undisturbed 
to  complete  the  strong  lines  of  earthworks  on  James 
Island  from  Fort  Johnson,  on  the  harbor,  to  Prin- 
gle,  on  the  Stono,  which  were  never  captured. 


CHAPTER  VII 

Operations  on  the  South  Atlantic  Coast — General  Hunter's  policy 
— Expedition  up  the  St.  John's — Capture  of  St.  John's 
Bluff — General  Hunter  is  succeeded  by  Major  General 
Ormesby  Mitchell — Expedition  toward  Pocotaligo — Engage 
ment  at  Frampton's  plantation  and  Pocotaligo — Negro 
troops — General  Saxton's  activities — Contraband. 

While  the  Union  troops  under  the  command  of 
Brigadier  General  H.  G.  Wright  were  withdrawing 
from  James  Island  after  the  failure  of  the  assault 
of  June  1 6  on  Secessionville,  there  was  urgent  need 
for  reinforcements  in  both  the  Union  and  Confed 
erate  armies  in  other  quarters. 

In  Virginia  the  battles  of  Fair  Oaks  and  Seven 
Pines  had  been  followed  by  the  seven  days'  battles 
around  Richmond;  General  McClellan's  army  had 
been  pressed  back  to  Harrison's  Landing  on  the 
James,  and  General  Lee  was  preparing  to  throw  his 
army  against  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and 
by  threatening  Washington  recall  General  McClel- 
lan  from  the  prosecution  of  operations  against  the 
Confederates,  to  the  defense  of  the  Union  capital. 
West  of  the  Mississippi  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge  had 
been  fought,  and  to  the  east  of  it  the  sanguinary  and 
indecisive  battle  of  Shiloh  had  been  followed  by  the 
slow  but  steady  advance  of  the  army  under  General 
Halleck  toward  Corinth,  until  General  Beauregard 

117 


n8      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

was  forced  to  face  back  to  Tupelo.  General  Buell, 
commanding  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  detached  from 
General  Halleck's  army,  was  marching  eastward  to 
seize  the  important  strategic  point  of  Chattanooga, 
while  General  Bragg,  who  had  succeeded  General 
Beauregard  in  command,  was  preparing  to  transfer 
his  army  to  the  same  point,  anticipate  General  Buell 
in  its  occupation,  and  to  march  thence  into  Ken 
tucky.  These  military  operations  had  been  attended 
with  fearfully  heavy  losses  in  the  various  armies 
engaged. 

In  response  to  a  call  from  the  War  Department 
for  reinforcements,  General  Hunter  sent  seven  regi 
ments  of  infantry  and  a  few  companies  of  the  First 
Massachusetts  Cavalry  to  Virginia,  under  Brigadier 
General  I.  I.  Stearns.  So  large  a  draft  on  his  force 
reduced  it  to  that  degree  that  General  Hunter  was 
not  only  unable  to  renew  offensive  operations  against 
Charleston,  but  could  not  make  any  formidable 
demonstration  at  any  point  on  the  mainland.  Opera 
tions  along  the  coast  were  therefore  reduced  to 
predatory  excursions  by  small  parties  and  surprises 
and  skirmishes  between  the  advanced  pickets. 

General  Hunter  availed  himself  of  this  enforced 
lull  in  active  military  operations  in  his  own  depart 
ment  to  inaugurate  a  favorite  plan  of  his,  from  which 
he  anticipated  the  happiest  results.  His  predecessor, 
General  W.  T.  Sherman,  had  been  embarrassed, 
rather  than  aided,  by  the  number  of  negroes  who 
had  been  brought  under  his  care  and  control  by  the 
occupation  of  some,  and  the  exposed  condition  of 
all  of  the  sea  islands  and  the  adjacent  mainland. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      119 

General  Hunter  had,  on  May  9,  without  authority 
from  his  Government,  issued  a  General  Order  eman 
cipating  all  of  the  slaves  in  the  States  of  South  Caro 
lina,  Georgia,  and  Florida,  and  proceeded  to  arm, 
equip,  and  organize  into  companies  and  regiments 
the  able-bodied  negro  men  under  his  control,  to  be 
used  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war  in  those  States. 
His  method  of  recruiting  was  most  arbitrary  and 
summary.  He  ordered  all  able-bodied  negro  men 
capable  of  bearing  arms,  and  within  the  limits  of  his 
command,  to  be  sent  under  guard  to  his  headquar 
ters.  The  soldiers  were  employed  to  enforce  the 
order,  and  marched  to  different  plantations,  took 
charge  of  the  negroes,  at  work  in  the  fields  or  when 
ever  they  could  be  found,  and  hurried  them  off  to 
headquarters,  without  giving  them  time  to  go  to 
their  cabins  for  necessary  clothing  or  to  make  any 
preparation  for  their  sudden  transition  from  the 
cotton  field  to  the  ranks  of  the  army.  The  order 
produced  the  wildest  consternation  and  panic  among 
the  negroes.  Many  of  them  fled  from  their  homes 
and  concealed  themselves  in  the  woods,  where  they 
were  pursued  by  the  soldiers,  and  those  of  them 
who  could  be  found  were  forcibly  brought  in  and 
hurried  off  to  Hilton  Head,  "sighing  for  the  old 
fetters  as  being  better  than  the  new  liberty,"  says 
Mr.  Wells,  one  of  the  Northern  overseers  in  charge 
of  a  plantation. 

The  time,  however,  had  not  yet  arrived  for  resort 
ing  to  that  measure  for  crippling  the  South  and  swell 
ing  the  ranks  of  the  Union  armies.  President  Lin 
coln  repudiated  and  revoked  General  Hunter's 


120      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

orders,  not,  however,  until  the  latter  had  organized 
one  regiment  of  negroes, — the  first  of  some  forty- 
eight  thousand  or  fifty  thousand  of  such  troops  that 
he  expected  to  organize  during  the  summer  and 
autumn. 

It  was  plainly  desirable  that  the  negroes  left  by 
their  owners  on  the  abandoned  plantations  should 
be  organized  and  brought  under  some  control,  and 
direction  made  for  the  cultivation  of  those  produc 
tive  islands.  Brigadier  General  Rufus  Saxton,  an 
ardent  advocate  of  the  plan  for  giving  arms  and 
military  organization  to  the  slaves,  and  using  them 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  war  in  that  quarter,  had 
been  assigned  to  the  special  duty  of  organizing  and 
directing  the  negroes  in  the  cultivation  of  the  aban 
doned  plantations.  He  was  clothed  with  full  au 
thority  over  all  the  inhabitants — who  were  not  in  the 
military  service  of  the  United  States — of  that  part 
of  the  country  within  the  Union  lines,  or  that  might 
be  brought  within  them  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
war.  In  ordering  courts-martial  for  the  trial  of  all 
offenders,  and  taking  final  action  on  the  cases  tried, 
his  authority  was  the  same  as  that  vested  in  generals 
commanding  armies  or  military  departments.  He 
was  further  authorized  to  organize  and  arm  five 
thousand  negro  men,  and  muster  them  in  for  the 
war  for  service  in  the  Quartermaster  General's  De 
partment,  and  five  thousand  to  be  organized  into 
companies,  regiments,  and  brigades.  They  were  to 
be  officered  by  white  men  selected  from  the  regi 
ments  then  in  service,  and  were  to  be  armed  and  uni 
formed  and  received  into  the  service  with  the  same 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      121 

pay  and  allowances  as  other  troops  of  the  line.  They 
were  to  be  employed  in  guarding  and  protecting 
negroes  who  were  engaged  in  the  cultivation  of  the 
plantations,  to  make  forays  into  the  country  and 
bring  away  all  negroes  of  what  condition  soever, 
and  to  destroy  all  property  which  might  be  useful 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  war  that  could  not  be 
brought  within  the  Union  lines.  Thus  provision  was 
made  for  raising  a  quasi-army  of  ten  thousand  men, 
in  addition  to  the  force  already  in  the  department, 
and  to  be  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General 
Saxton. 

On  September  5  General  Hunter  left  the  depart 
ment  on  a  long  leave  of  absence,  and  was  succeeded 
in  command  on  September  17  by  Major  General 
Ormesby  M.  Mitchell,  Brigadier  General  J.  M. 
Brannan  commanding  in  the  interim. 

During  the  brief  period  of  his  command  General 
Mitchell  infused  some  new  life  and  activity  into  the 
military  operations  of  his  department. 

In  the  preceding  May  General  H.  G.  Wright, 
whose  brigade  had  occupied  St.  Augustine  and  parts 
of  Florida  bordering  on  the  St.  John's  River,  was 
withdrawn,  with  his  command,  to  take  part  in  the 
general  movements  for  the  capture  of  Charleston. 
On  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  the  Floridians  re 
turned  to  their  homes  in  Jacksonville  and  other 
points.  Some  Confederate  troops  also  occupied  that 
part  of  the  country  and  were  engaged  in  placing  it 
in  condition  of  defense.  A  battery  of  some  strength 
had  been  constructed  in  and  armed  at  St.  John's 
Bluff,  on  the  river  of  that  name. 


122      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

On  September  30  General  Mitchell  dispatched 
General  Brannan  to  the  St.  John's  River  with  the 
Forty-seventh  Pennsylvania  and  Seventh  Connecti 
cut  Infantry,  a  section  of  the  First  Connecticut  Ar 
tillery,  and  a  detachment  of  the  First  Massachusetts 
Cavalry,  in  all  1568  men.  On  the  way  he  was  joined 
by  a  fleet  of  six  gunboats,  Captain  Charles  Steed- 
man  commanding.  The  expedition  entered  the  St. 
John's  in  the  afternoon  of  the  next  day.  Three  gun 
boats  proceeded  to  reconnoiter  the  battery  on  the 
bluff,  and  after  a  brisk  engagement  retired  out  of 
range.  Under  cover  of  the  naval  vessels  the  troops 
landed  at  Mayport  Mills,  but  ascertaining  there 
that,  owing  to  intervening  creeks  and  marshes,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  march  about  forty  miles  to 
reach  the  rear  of  St.  John's  Bluff,  General  Brannan 
moved  his  command  in  boats,  furnished  from  the 
fleet,  higher  up  and  landed  the  infantry  at  Burkbone 
Creek,  between  Publo  and  Mount  Pleasant.  Early 
on  the  morning  of  the  2d  Colonel  Good  of  the 
Forty-seventh  Pennsylvania  moved  with  the  infantry 
of  the  command  and  the  naval  howitzers  to  the  head 
of  Mount  Pleasant  Creek,  drove  from  their  camp 
a  Confederate  picket,  and  occupied  a  position  about 
two  miles  from  St.  John's  Bluff,  to  cover  the  landing 
of  the  detachments  of  artillery  and  cavalry.  Receiv 
ing  information  which  he  regarded  as  reliable,  that 
there  were  1200  Confederate  infantry  and  cavalry 
between  him  and  the  Bluff,  General  Brannan,  after 
consultation  with  Captain  Steedman,  called  upon 
Colonel  Rice,  commanding  the  Ninth  Maine  at  Fer- 
nandina,  for  reinforcement,  and  300  men  were 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      123 

promptly  dispatched  to  him.  Late  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  3d  Captain  Steedman,  at  General  Brannan's 
request,  sent  three  gunboats  to  feel  the  battery  at 
the  Bluff.  Finding,  to  his  surprise,  that  it  was  not 
occupied,  he  sent  a  boat  party  ashore,  which  hoisted 
the  Union  flag  over  the  Confederate  battery. 

While  General  Brannan  was  waiting  within  two 
miles  of  the  Bluff  for  the  arrival  of  reinforcements, 
the  battery  had  been  for  eighteen  or  twenty  hours 
wide  open  to  receive  him.  As  so  often  happened 
during  the  war,  each  commander  had  greatly  over 
estimated  his  adversary's  force. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Charles  F.  Hopkins  had  been 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Bluff  a  few  days 
(September  26)  before  the  appearances  of  the 
Union  force  in  the  river.  In  addition  to  the  gunners 
who  manned  the  battery,  he  had  outside  for  its  de 
fense  on  the  land  front  a  mixed  force  of  about  500, 
instead  of  1200.  Colonel  Hopkins,  who  from  his 
position  in  the  battery  had  watched  the  landing  of  a 
part  of  the  force,  judging  from  what  he  had  himself 
seen  and  from  information  brought  him  by  the  picket 
that  had  been  driven  in,  estimated  the  Union  land 
force  at  3000  men,  whereas  it  was  but  little  more 
than  half  that  number.  Feeling  his  inability  to  de 
fend  his  post  against  a  combined  attack  of  the  troops 
which  he  estimated  outnumbered  him  by  six  to  one, 
and  the  six  gunboats  in  the  river  in  his  front,  Col 
onel  Hopkins,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  officers 
of  his  command  whom  he  consulted,  abandoned  the 
battery  about  nine  o'clock  on  the  night  of  the  2d; 
and  not  having  the  means  of  removing  his  heavy 


124      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

guns  and  ammunition,  and  fearing  that  any  attempt 
to  burst  or  otherwise  disable  them  would  apprise  the 
enemy  of  his  intended  retreat,  left  them  all  unin 
jured.  While  General  Brannan  was  surprised  at  his 
good  fortune  in  gaining  possession,  without  striking 
a  blow,  of  a  post  strong  by  nature  and  strengthened 
by  well-planned  and  constructed  works,  Colonel 
Hopkins  congratulated  himself  on  having  saved  his 
small  force  from  capture.1 

After  moving  the  guns  and  ammunition  to  a  trans 
port,  blowing  up  the  magazine,  and  destroying  the 
entire  work,  General  Brannan  proceeded  up  the 
river  to  Jacksonville,  which  he  found  deserted,  the 
inhabitants,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  old  men, 
women,  and  children,  having  abandoned  their  homes 
on  the  approach  of  the  enemy  and  moved  back  in 
the  interior.  While  at  Jacksonville  a  small  party 
was  sent  in  a  transport,  escorted  by  a  gunboat,  about 
230  miles  up  the  river,  and  took  possession  of  a 
small  abandoned  steamer,  the  Governor  Milton.  On 
October  13  the  whole  expedition  had  returned  to 
Hilton  Head.  The  return  had  been  hastened  by 
General  Mitchell,  who  proposed  himself  to  lead  a 
more  extensive  expedition  against  the  Charleston 
&  Savannah  Railroad. 

The  force  designated  for  this  expedition  was  parts 
of  the  First  Brigade,  Brigadier  General  J.  M.  Bran- 
nan's,  and  of  the  Second  Brigade,  Brigadier  General 
A.  H.  Terrie's,  augmented  by  detachments  of  other 
organizations,  making  a  total  land  force  of  4450 

*A  court  of  inquiry  which  he  demanded  exonerated  him  from 
all  blame. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      125 

men.2  Several  boat  howitzers  manned  by  officers 
and  men  of  the  navy  were  added  to  the  land  force. 

The  gunboats  and  transports  of  the  expedition 
were  under  command  of  Captain  Charles  Steedman, 
United  States  Navy. 

The  organization  of  the  command  and  all  of  the 
details  as  to  transportation,  supplies,  and  ammuni 
tion  had  been  made  entirely  by  Major  General  Mit 
chell,  who  had  intended  to  command  it  in  person. 
A  few  hours  before  it  sailed,  however,  Brigadier 
General  Brannan  was  assigned  to  the  command, 
Colonel  Chatfield  of  the  Sixth  Connecticut  succeed 
ing  to  the  command  of  his  brigade.  The  object  of 
the  expedition  was  to  destroy  the  railroad  and 
bridges  on  the  Charleston  &  Savannah  Road,  and 
the  points  of  attack  were  Coosawhatchie  and  Poco- 

2The  troops  composing  the  expedition  were  the  following: 
Forty-seventh  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  600  men,  Colonel 
Tolghman  H.  Good;  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  400 
men,  Colonel  Richard  White;  Fourth  New  Hampshire  Volun 
teers,  500  men  (Colonel  Chatfield)  Lieutenant  Colonel  Spidel; 
Seventh  Connecticut  Volunteers,  500  men,  Colonel  Joseph  R. 
Hawley;  Third  New  Hampshire  Volunteers,  480  men,  Colonel 
John  H.  Jackson;  Seventy-sixth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  430 
men,  Colonel  DeWitt  C.  Strawbridge;  Forty-eighth  New  York 
Volunteers,  200  men,  Colonel  William  B.  Barton;  First  New 
York  Mechanics  and  Engineers,  250  men,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
James  F.  Hall;  a  section  of  Battery  M,  First  United  States 
Artillery,  40  men,  Lieutenant  Guy  V.  Henry;  a  section  of  Ham 
ilton's  Battery  E,  Second  United  States  Artillery,  Lieutenant 
E.  Gittings ;  detachment  of  the  First  Massachussetts  Cavalry, 
roo  men,  Captain  L.  Richmond.  A  total  force  of  4500.  Colonel 
Edward  W.  Serrgie,  First  New  York  Engineers,  served  on 
General  Brannan's  staff. 


126      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

taligo,  two  stations  on  the  road  about  ten  miles 
apart.  Scouts  and  spies  had  been  sent  by  General 
Mitchell  to  the  most  important  points  on  the  line 
of  the  railroad,  from  the  Savannah  to  the  Salke- 
hatchie  rivers,  a  distance  of  sixty  miles.  Small  parties 
were  also  sent  in  boats  up  the  Coosawhatchie,  Tulli- 
finnie,  and  Pocotaligo,  to  ascertain  and  report  the 
depth  of  water  and  condition  of  the  different  land 
ings.  A  party  was  sent  in  advance  to  cut  the  tele 
graph  wires,  and  every  precaution  taken  to  insure 
success.  Mackey's  Point,  a  narrow  neck  of  land  be 
tween  the  Pocotaligo  and  Broad  rivers,  was  selected 
as  the  place  for  landing — a  judicious  selection,  as 
gunboats  in  the  two  streams  could  thoroughly  sweep 
the  ground  some  miles  in  front  and  securely  cover 
the  landing. 

The  expedition  started  from  Hilton  Head  in  the 
night  of  the  2ist,  in  fourteen  gunboats  and  armed 
transports,  and  the  leading  vessel  reached  Mackey's 
Point  about  half-past  four  o'clock  the  next  morning. 
It  was  eight  o'clock  before  the  other  vessels  arrived. 
Colonel  Barton,  with  fifty  men  of  the  New  York 
Engineers  and  fifty  of  the  Third  Rhode  Island  Vol 
unteers  was  immediately  sent  up  the  Coosawhatchie 
in  the  steamer  Planter,  which  had  been  converted 
into  a  heavily  armed  gunboat,  accompanied  by  two 
other  gunboats,  to  destroy  the  railroad  and  bridges 
at  and  near  the  village  of  Coosawhatchie.  The  main 
body,  under  cover  of  the  batteries  of  the  gunboats, 
landed  without  opposition  at  Mackey's  Point,  seven 
or  eight  miles  from  Old  Pocotaligo,  and  marched 
forward  over  a  good  road  up  the  narrow  neck  of 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      127 

land  between  the  Tullifinnie  and  Pocotaligo,  which 
securely  protected  the  flanks,  while  the  gunboats 
covered  the  rear  of  the  column. 

Brigadier  General  W.  S.  Walker,  C.  S.  A.,3  com 
manded  in  the  military  district  invaded,  with  head 
quarters  at  McPhersonville,  via  the  railroad  about 
ten  miles  from  Coosawhatchie  toward  Charleston. 
It  was  not  until  9  A.  M.  that  his  pickets  informed  him 
of  the  landing  of  the  expedition  at  Mackey's  Point 
and  the  passage  of  gunboats  up  the  Coosawhatchie. 
His  small  force  was  distributed  over  a  distance  of 
sixty  miles  along  and  near  the  railroad.  The  general 
plan  for  the  protection  of  the  road  and  that  part  of 
the  country  was  to  occupy  the  most  vulnerable  points 
by  as  large  detachments  as  the  small  available  force 
could  supply;  these  detachments  to  be  quickly  con 
centrated  at  the  menaced  point,  and  hold  the  enemy 
in  check  until  reinforcements  could  arrive  from 
Charleston  and  Savannah,  and  any  other  point  from 
which  they  could  be  spared.  General  Walker's  meas 
ures  for  defense  were  taken  with  the  promptness 
which  characterized  him.  The  troops  nearest  Mc 
Phersonville  were  ordered  to  Old  Pocotaligo,  about 
five  miles  from  Coosawhatchie.  The  Lafayette  Ar 
tillery,  four  pieces;  Lieutenant  L.  F.  LeBeau's,  and 
a  section  of  the  Beaufort  Artillery,  Lieutenant  H.  M. 
Stuart  commanding,  were  ordered  to  Coosawhatchie. 
Captain  Wyman's  company,  Eleventh  South  Caro 
lina,  which  was  near  the  village,  and  five  other  com 
panies  of  the  same  regiment  at  Hardieville  were 

alie  was  a  colonel  at  the  time,  but  was  promoted  a  few  days 
later. 


128      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

ordered  up  to  support  the  artillery.  Colonel  Col- 
cock's  command  of  five  companies  of  cavalry  and 
two  of  sharpshooters,  in  front  of  Grahamville,  was 
ordered  to  Coosawhatchie.  Major  J.  R.  Jefford's 
battalion  of  cavalry  (Seventh  South  Carolina)  was 
ordered  from  Green  Pond  to  the  Salkehatchie  Bridge, 
and  calls  were  made  on  Savannah,  Charleston,  and 
Adams  Run  for  reinforcements ;  those  from  Charles 
ton  and  Adams  Run  to  stop  at  Pocotaligo  Station, 
those  from  Savannah  at  Coosawhatchie.  Captain 
W.  L.  Trenholm,  who  commanded  the  outpost  near 
est  Mackey's  Point,  was  ordered  to  fall  back  with 
his  command  of  two  mounted  companies,  his  own 
(the  Rutledge  Mounted  Riflemen)  and  Captain  M. 
J.  Kirk's  company  of  Partisan  Rangers  toward  Old 
Pocotaligo. 

When  these  dispositions  were  made  General 
Walker  had  with  him  to  meet  the  advancing  enemy 
two  sections  of  Beaufort  Light  Artillery  and  the  Nel 
son  (Virginia)  Light  Battery,  eight  pieces,  Captain 
Stephen  Elliott  commanding;  Captain  Trenholm's 
two  companies;  the  Charleston  Light  Dragoons, 
Captain  B.  H.  Rutledge;  the  First  Battalion  South 
Carolina  Cavalry,  Major  J.  H.  Morgan;  Captain 
D.  B.  Heywood's  company  of  cavalry;  Captain  J.  B. 
Allston's  company  of  sharpshooters,  and  Captain 
A.  C.  Izard's  company  of  the  Eleventh  South  Caro 
lina  Infantry,  numbering  in  all  475  men,  and  as  a 
fourth  of  the  mounted  men  were  horse-holders,  his 
effective  force  was  but  405  men.  Of  this  force  a 
section  of  the  Beaufort  Artillery,  supported  by  two 
companies  of  cavalry  under  Major  Morgan  and  All- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      129 

ston's  company  of  sharpshooters,  was  sent  forward 
to  Caston's  plantation  to  skirmish  with  and  retard 
the  enemy,  while  the  remaining  troops  took  a  strong 
position  on  the  Mackey's  Point  road  at  a  salt  marsh 
skirted  on  both  sides  by  woods  traversed  by  a  small 
stream  and  crossed  by  a  causeway  near  Dr.  Hutson's 
residence  on  the  Frampton  plantation. 

Colonel  Barton  ascended  the  river  in  the  Planter, 
followed  by  the  gunboats,  to  within  about  two  miles 
of  Coosawhatchie,  where  he  landed  and  marched 
forward,  driving  the  enemy's  pickets  before  him. 
When  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  village  a 
train  of  cars  was  heard  approaching,  and  he  quickly 
placed  his  little  command  in  ambush.  It  was  the 
train  which  was  bringing  the  troops  ordered  up  from 
Hardeeville  for  the  defense  of  Coosawhatchie. 
When  it  came  within  easy  range  Colonel  Barton's 
command  poured  into  it  a  destructive  fire  of  mus 
ketry  and  canister  from  the  boat  howitzers,  inflicting 
serious  loss  among  the  men  crowded  together  on  the 
platform  cars.  Among  the  killed  were  the  com 
mander  of  the  party,  Major  J.  J.  Harrison,  and  the 
fireman  of  the  train.  The  engineer  was  badly 
wounded,  but  stood  to  his  post  and  dashed  his  train 
at  full  speed  through  the  fire. 

Leaving  Captain  Eaton  of  the  New  York  Engi 
neers  with  a  party  of  his  men  to  tear  up  the  road 
and  cut  down  and  destroy  the  telegraph  line,  Colonel 
Barton  hastened  forward  to  the  village  to  attack 
the  troops  while  in  the  confusion  of  leaving  the  train. 
But  when  he  came  in  sight  of  the  village  he  saw  the 
artillery  advantageously  posted  and  supported  by 


130      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

a  company  of  infantry  on  the  further  side  of  the 
stream,  between  the  railroad  and  public  bridges, 
their  flanks  protected  on  their  left  by  the  river  and 
right  by  a  swamp.  The  artillery  immediately  opened 
fire,  to  which  Colonel  Barton  replied  by  a  few 
rounds.  But  night  was  coming  on,  the  reinforce 
ments  in  the  ambushed  train  had  arrived,  and  find 
ing  himself  in  front  of  a  much  superior  force  Colonel 
Barton  drew  off  his  men  and  returned  to  his  gun 
boats.  Captain  Eaton  had  succeeded  in  cutting  the 
telegraph  line  in  several  places  and  tearing  up  two 
rails,  and  while  toiling  at  others  some  cavalry 
videttes  appeared  at  a  little  distance,  and  he  too 
drew  off,  joining  the  rest  of  the  command,  and  re 
turned  to  the  gunboats,  destroying  on  the  way  four 
bridges  to  retard  pursuit. 

Colonel  Colcock,  who  was  so  prostrated  by  a  pro 
tracted  fever  that  he  could  not  take  the  field,  ordered 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Johnson  to  take  the  command 
with  the  utmost  dispatch  to  Coosawhatchie.  On 
the  way  Lieutenant  Colonel  Johnson  was  deceived 
first  by  a  report  that  reached  him  that  the  enemy 
had  landed  at  Seabrook's  Island,  indicating  that  the 
attack  was  to  be  made  at  Grahamville;  then  by  an 
other  that  they  were  marching  on  Bees  Creek  Hill. 
His  movements  to  meet  the  altered  conditions  of 
affairs  as  indicated  by  these  erroneous  reports  so 
delayed  him  that,  when  he  ascertained  that  the  Union 
force  was  really  marching  on  Coosawhatchie,  he  was 
obliged  to  make  a  detour  of  five  miles  to  reach  that 
place.  When  he  arrived  the  little  party  under  Colo 
nel  Barton  had  retreated  and,  the  bridges  having 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       131 

been  torn  up,  Colonel  Johnson  did  not  come  up  with 
them  until  they  were  embarking,  when  a  brisk  fire 
was  exchanged  with  some  effect,  Lieutenant  J.  B. 
Blanding,  Third  Rhode  Island  Artillery,  who  was 
in  charge  of  the  Planter,  being  among  the  severely 
wounded.  But  the  batteries  of  the  gunboat  kept  the 
Confederate  cavalry  at  too  great  a  distance  for 
effective  fire,  and  Colonel  Barton  dropped  down  the 
river  to  the  point  from  which  he  had  started. 

While  Colonel  Barton  was  carrying  out  his  part 
of  the  general  plan,  General  Brannan's  column 
moved  forward  on  the  Mackey's  Point  road,  and 
after  marching  about  ^/2  miles  and  debouching  upon 
an  open,  rolling  country,  it  was  fired  upon  by  the 
section  of  the  Beaufort  Artillery  and  its  support  in 
position,  as  has  been  said,  at  Caston's  plantation. 
The  First  Brigade,  in  advance,  was  promptly  de 
ployed,  the  artillery  hastened  to  the  front,  and  after 
a  brisk  artillery  duel,  in  which  Major  Morgan,  com 
manding  the  Confederate  support,  was  severely 
wounded,  the  First  Brigade  advanced  and  the  Con 
federate  advance  guard  fell  back  to  the  position 
occupied  by  General  Walker  at  the  Frampton  plan 
tation,  closely  followed  by  the  Union  column.  The 
Confederate  position  was  naturally  strong.  The 
ground  was  firmer  and  somewhat  more  elevated  than 
that  on  the  other  side  that  the  Union  column  soon 
reached.  Thick  woods  screened  it  and  concealed  the 
Confederate  weakness  in  numbers.  The  swamp  in 
front  was  broad  and  deep,  traversed  by  a  small 
stream,  and  passable  only  by  a  narrow  causeway,  as 
the  bridge  over  the  little  stream  had  been  broken. 


132      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

On  the  Union  side  the  marsh  was  fringed  with  timber 
and  covered  by  a  dense  thicket.  The  eight  Confed 
erate  field  pieces  were  in  batteries  on  an  arc  of  a 
curve  giving  them  a  concentric  fire  on  the  causeway 
and  the  woods  on  either  side  of  it. 

When  the  head  of  the  first  brigade  came  within 
range  a  rapid  artillery  fire  opened  upon  it;  the  two 
sections  of  United  States  artillery  and  the  naval  bat 
tery  were  hurried  forward  into  position,  and  a  rapid 
and  well  directed  fire  was  maintained  on  both  sides, 
until  the  Union  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted. 
In  the  meantime  the  infantry  of  the  first  brigade 
struggled  with  steady  courage  and  determination  to 
penetrate  the  woods  and  thicket,  cross  the  marsh, 
and  reach  the  Confederate  position  on  the  further 
side,  but  in  vain.  Twice  it  was  driven  out  of  the 
woods  with  heavy  loss.  The  Forty-seventh  Penn 
sylvania  and  Sixth  Connecticut,  which  were  in  ad 
vance,  suffered  most  severely,  the  former  losing 
nearly  a  fifth  of  its  men.  Colonel  Chatfield,  com 
manding  the  brigade,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Spei- 
del,  commanding  the  Sixth  Connecticut,  were  among 
the  severely  wounded,  the  command  of  the  brigade 
devolving  on  Colonel  Good  of  the  Forty-seventh 
Pennsylvania. 

At  the  first  sound  of  the  artillery  fire  General 
Terry  led  his  brigade  at  the  double  quick  to  the 
support  of  the  first.  The  Seventy-sixth  Pennsylvania 
of  this  brigade  was  thrown  into  the  woods  on  the 
left  of  the  road  to  support  the  left  of  the  first  bri 
gade,  which  was  still  striving  to  force  its  way  through 
the  marsh.  Knowing  no  way  by  which  the  Confed- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      133 

erate  position  could  be  turned,  General  Brannan 
placed  Lieutenant  Henry's  section  of  the  First  Artil 
lery,  well  supported,  in  a  position  on  the  left  of  the 
causeway,  from  which  a  more  effective  fire  could  be 
delivered,  and  again  pressed  his  infantry  through 
the  woods,  so  far  that  the  infantry  fire  was  having 
a  most  destructive  effect  on  the  men  and  horses  of 
the  Confederate  artillery.  That  arm  seems  to  have 
been  General  Walker's  main  reliance,  and  was  al 
ready  so  badly  cut  up  that  he  deemed  it  advisable  to 
withdraw  to  another  strong  position  at  the  crossing 
of  the  Pocotaligo,  about  2^2  miles  in  his  rear.  This 
was  done  in  good  order,  Captain  Allston's  company 
of  sharpshooters  and  Lieutenant  Campell's,  of  the 
Eleventh  South  Carolina,  covering  the  retreat.  The 
infantry  of  Brannan's  first  brigade  promptly  plunged 
through  the  marsh,  "up  to  the  men's  arm-pits"  in 
mud  and  water,  and  pressed  forward  in  pursuit.  The 
little  bridge  was  quickly  so  repaired  by  the  engineers 
as  to  permit  the  passage  of  the  artillery,  when  the 
remaining  force  passed  over  and  followed  in  pursuit. 
It  was  all-important  to  General  Walker  to  hold 
his  enemy  in  check  until  reinforcements  which  he 
was  expecting  could  arrive.  The  object  of  General 
Brannan's  expedition  was  to  reach  the  railroad  and 
destroy  as  much  of  it  as  possible.  When  he  reached 
the  juncture  of  the  Mackey's  Point  with  the  Coo- 
sawhatchie  road,  it  would  seem  that  if,  instead  of 
following  and  attacking  General  Walker  in  his  new 
position,  he  had  marched  directly  forward  a  mile  or 
so  over  a  comparatively  open  and  practicable 
country,  he  could  have  struck  the  bridge  and  trestle 


i34      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

work  about  the  Tullifinnie,  where  his  engineer  troops 
could  have  accomplished  much  destruction  in  a  very 
short  time.  He,  however,  left  a  regiment  and  how 
itzer  to  guard  his  flank  and  rear  from  that  direction, 
and  followed  the  retreating  Confederates  to  their 
new  position  on  the  further  side  of  the  Pocotaligo, 
where  the  men  were  sheltered  by  the  houses  and  scat 
tered  trees  of  the  little  hamlet.  The  bridge  over 
the  stream,  which  was  approached  by  a  causeway 
over  another  marsh,  was  torn  up  and  the  artillery, 
now  much  reduced,  was  in  position  to  command  the 
causeway  and  crossing.  Two  pieces  of  the  Beau 
fort  artillery  had  been  silenced  by  the  killing  and 
wounding  of  the  gunners,  and  but  two  of  the  guns 
were  serviceable.  The  Nelson  Battery  had  suffered 
even  more  severely  in  killed  and  wounded,  the  two 
Lieutenants,  E.  E.  Jefferson  and  F.  T.  Massey,  being 
among  the  wounded;  it  had  but  seventeen  service 
able  horses;  one  caisson  had  been  broken  by  the 
running  away  of  the  team  early  in  the  action  at 
Frampton's,  and  was  left  on  the  field.  The  ammu 
nition  happened  to  fit  the  naval  howitzers,  and  was 
returned  to  the  Confederates  at  Pocotaligo  from  the 
muzzles  of  those  guns.  Other  pieces  had  been  dis 
abled,  and  only  one  could  be  brought  into  action  in 
the  new  position.  General  Walker  had  scarcely 
made  his  dispositions  for  defense  when  the  Union 
column  came  in  sight  and  the  fighting  was  renewed 
with  spirit. 

As  at  Frampton's,  the  Union  troops  endeavored, 
but  in  vain,  to  cross  the  marsh.  On  a  call  for  vol 
unteers  to  find  a  way  through,  a  party  of  men  stepped 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       135 

forward,  and  between  the  two  fires  scattered  through 
the  marsh  seeking  a  practicable  passage  through  it, 
but  were  unsuccessful.  On  another  call  a  lieutenant 
and  sergeant  penetrated  to  the  little  river  and,  re 
turning,  reported  that,  like  other  streams  of  the 
country,  though  narrow,  it  was  deep  and  the  banks 
steep  and  muddy. 

The  Union  batteries  had  exhausted  their  ammuni 
tion,  and  the  caissons  not  having  accompanied  the 
guns,  the  latter  were  sent  back  to  Mackey's  Point, 
seven  or  eight  miles,  to  replenish  their  ammunition 
chests.  In  the  absence  of  the  artillery  the  Sharps' 
breech-loading  rifles  were  used  with  great  rapidity 
and  effect.  General  Walker  had  been  notified  by 
telegraph  that  reinforcements  were  on  the  way  to 
him  from  Charleston,  Savannah,  and  Adams  Run. 
The  Nelson  Battalion  (Seventh  South  Carolina)  of 
200  men,  Captain  W.  H.  Sleigh,  commanding,  ar 
rived  between  four  and  five  o'clock,  but  scarcely 
more  than  filled  the  gaps  already  made  in  the  ranks. 
It  was  the  only  reinforcements  that  arrived  in  time 
to  take  part  in  the  engagement.  Its  arrival  encour 
aged  and  in  a  measure  relieved  the  men  who  had 
been  fighting  and  retreating  for  six  hours.  They 
were  received  with  hearty  cheers  as  they  double- 
quicked  into  position.  About  the  same  time  the 
Charleston  Light  Dragoons,  which  had  been  held  in 
reserve,  were  ordered  up,  and  came  into  position 
on  the  left  with  an  inspiring  shout.  The  cheering 
produced  the  impression  that  reinforcements  in  con 
siderable  number  were  arriving.  A  piece  of  the 
Beaufort  artillery,  with  a  small  support,  was  moved 


136      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

by  a  concealed  route  to  a  position  which  suggested 
to  General  Brannan  that  it  was  a  movement  to  turn 
his  left  flank.  His  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted, 
and  there  was  none  nearer  than  Mackey's  Point, 
and  night  was  coming  on.  Recognizing  the  hope 
lessness  of  attempting  anything  further  against  a 
force  which  he  believed  (erroneously)  was  much 
larger  than  his  own,  and  in  a  strong  position,  Gen 
eral  Brannan  ordered  a  retreat  to  Mackey's  Point, 
which  was  made  deliberately  and  in  good  order.  He 
was  unprovided  with  "sufficient  transportation  to 
remove  the  wounded,  who  were  lying  writhing  along 
our  entire  route,"  he  says.  Nevertheless  the  killed 
were  generally  buried  and  the  wounded  removed  on 
improvised  stretchers.  The  bridges  which  had  been 
torn  up  by  the  retreating  and  repaired  by  the  advanc 
ing  troops  earlier  in  the  day  were  again  destroyed 
to  retard  pursuit.  But  the  Confederates  were  in  no 
condition  for  vigorous  pursuit.  They  had  lost  163 
of  the  475  men  present  when  the  fighting  began,  and 
had  received  but  200  men  as  reinforcements.  The 
Union  loss  was  340.  The  following  day  the  troops 
of  the  expedition  re-embarked  at  Mackey's  Point 
and  returned  to  their  respective  stations. 

General  Brannan  was  under  the  impression  that 
in  these  engagements  he  had  encountered  superior 
numbers,  and  two  weeks  later  on,  November  6,  in  a 
General  Order  complimenting  his  troops  for  their 
gallantry  and  good  conduct  on  the  expedition  to 
Pocotaligo,  he  tells  them  that  "though  laboring 
under  many  disadvantages,  yet  by  superior  courage 
and  determination  was  a  greater  force  of  the  rebels 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       137 

driven  from  their  strong  and  well  studied  positions 
at  Caston's  and  Frampton's,  and  pursued  flying  and 
in  confusion  to  their  intrenchments  on  the  Poco- 
taligo" ;  whereas,  as  has  been  seen,  from  the  firing 
of  the  first  to  the  last  shot  of  the  day  he  had  out 
numbered  his  adversary  from  nine  to  ten  to  one. 

This  was  the  last  expedition  of  any  magnitude 
undertaken  in  the  Department  of  the  South  until  the 
next  spring.  On  October  30  Major  General  Mitchell 
died  of  fever  at  Beaufort,  and  General  Brannan  suc 
ceeded  by  seniority  to  the  command  of  the  depart 
ment.  His  aggregate  force  present  when  he  assumed 
command  was  but  12,838. 

General  Saxton,  who  as  superintendent  of  aban 
doned  plantations  and  director  of  the  negroes  within 
the  Union  lines,  exercised  an  independent  command 
within  a  command,  reporting  directly  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  seems  to  have  been  thoroughly  imbued 
with  the  belief  that  the  heaviest  blow  against  the 
South  could  be  struck  by  negroes  armed  and  organ 
ized  into  a  military  force.  And  there  were  officers 
about  him  who  shared  that  belief.  His  plan  was 
to  haul  a  number  of  light-draught  steamers  well 
armed  and  protected  against  rifle  shots.  Each 
steamer  was  to  have  on  hand  a  company  of  one  hun 
dred  negro  soldiers,  whom  he  regarded  as  better 
fitted  for  the  particular  service  required  of  them 
than  white  soldiers.  An  abundant  supply  of  muskets 
and  ammunition  was  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of 
the  negroes  who  might  be  gathered  and  found 
capable  of  bearing  arms.  These  boats  should  be 
sent  up  the  bays,  lagoons,  and  streams  intersecting 


138      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  Southern  coast,  some  of  which  were  navigable 
for  more  than  a  hundred  miles  into  the  heart  of  the 
richest  part  of  the  Southern  country.  They  should 
land  at  the  various  plantations,  drive  off  the  owners 
or  any  pickets  that  might  be  found,  and  bring  away 
the  negroes.  Those  who  were  capable  of  bearing 
arms  were  to  be  placed  in  the  ranks.  This  species 
of  warfare  he  thought  would  carry  terror  to  the 
hearts  of  the  Southerners.  "In  this  way,"  he  writes 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  "we  could  very  soon  have 
complete  occupation  of  the  whole  country.  Indeed, 
I  can  see  no  limit  to  which  our  success  might  not  be 
pushed — up  to  the  entire  occupation  of  States,  or 
their  occupation  by  a  large  portion  of  the  rebel 
army." 

The  organization  of  a  negro  regiment  called  the 
First  South  Carolina  Union  Infantry  had  been  com 
menced,  the  officers  being  white  men  selected  from 
the  volunteer  regiments.  With  these  troops  General 
Saxton  undertook  on  a  small  scale  to  carry  his  plan 
into  execution. 

On  November  3  he  dispatched  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Oliver  T.  Beard,  of  the  Forty-eighth  New  York 
Volunteers,  in  command  of  a  detachment  of  the 
First  South  Carolina  Regiment  on  an  expedition 
along  the  coast  of  Georgia  and  east  Florida,  be 
tween  Saint  Simon's  Island  and  Fernandina;  and 
again  on  November  13  to  the  Doboy  River,  Georgia: 
On  both  expeditions  he  was  accompanied  by  a  naval 
gunboat.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Beard's  official  reports 
are  brief  and  to  the  point,  and  will  illustrate  the 
species  of  warfare  carried  on  by  General  Saxton 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      139 

on  the  Southern  coast  in  the  autumn  and  winter  of 
1862-3. 

Reporting  to  General  Saxton,  Colonel  Beard  says : 
"  .  .  .  On  Monday,  November  3,  with  the 
steamer  Darlington,  having  on  board  Captain  Tro- 
bridge's  company  of  colored  troops  (Sixty-second), 
I  proceeded  up  Bell  River,  Florida,  drove  in  the 
rebel  pickets  below  Cooper's  and  destroyed  their 
place  of  rendezvous;  thence  proceeded  and  destroyed 
the  salt  works  and  all  the  salt,  corn,  and  wagons 
which  we  could  not  carry  away,  besides  killing  the 
horses;  thence  we  proceeded  to  Jolly  River  and  de 
stroyed  two  salt  works,  with  a  large  amount  of  salt 
and  corn;  thence  proceeded  to  Saint  Mary's  and 
brought  off  two  families  of  contrabands,  after  driv 
ing  in  the  enemy's  pickets. 

"On  Tuesday,  November  4,  I  proceeded  to  Kings 
Bay,  Georgia,  and  destroyed  a  large  salt  work  on 
a  creek  about  a  mile  from  the  landing,  together  with 
all  the  property  on  the  place.  Here  we  were  at 
tacked  by  about  eighty  of  the  enemy,  of  whom  we 
killed  two. 

"On  Thursday,  November  6,  landed  on  Butler 
Island  and  brought  off  eighty  bushels  of  rice;  also 
landed  at  Darien  and  captured  three  prisoners  and 
some  arms. 

"Friday,  November  7,  accompanied  by  the  gun 
boat  Potemska,  Lieutenant  Budd  commanding,  pro 
ceeded  up  Sapello  River.  The  gunboat  could  pro 
ceed  no  further  than  Kings.  Lieutenant  Budd  came 
on  board  the  Darlington  and  proceeded  up  the  river 


140      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

with  us  to  Fairhope.  At  Spauldings  we  were  at 
tacked  by  eighty  or  ninety  of  the  enemy,  who  were 
well  posted  on  a  bluff  behind  trees.  At  this  point 
the  channel  runs  within  fifty  yards  of  the  bluff.  We 
killed  two  of  the  enemy  and  had  one  colored  man 
wounded.  At  Fairhope  we  destroyed  the  salt  works, 
some  ten  vats,  corn,  and  other  things  that  might  be 
of  use  to  the  enemy. 

uOn  return  past  Spaulding's  we  were  again  at 
tacked  by  the  enemy  in  greater  force.  We  effected 
a  landing  and  burned  all  the  buildings  on  the  place 
and  captured  some  arms,  etc.  Five  of  the  enemy 
were  killed;  we  lost  three  wounded.  We  were 
greatly  aided  here  by  the  Potemska,  which  from  a 
bend  below  shelled  the  woods.  Under  the  guns  of 
the  Potemska  we  landed  at  Colonel  Brailsford's, 
drove  in  a  company  of  pickets  from  his  regiment, 
and  destroyed  all  the  property  on  the  place,  together 
with  the  most  important  buildings. 

I  started  from  Saint  Simons  with  sixty-two  fighting 
men  and  returned  to  Beaufort  with  156  fighting  men 
(all  colored)  .  .  . 

"We  destroyed  nine  large  salt  works,  together 
with  twenty  thousand  dollars'  worth  of  horses,  salt, 
rice,  corn,  etc.,  which  we  could  not  carry  away." 

Again  reporting  the  result  of  his  expedition  to 
Doboy  River,  Georgia,  he  says:  "I  succeeded  in 
loading  the  steamers  Ben  DeFord  and  Darlington 
with  from  200,000  to  300,000  feet  of  superior 
boards  and  planks,  besides  securing  a  number  of- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      141 

circular  and  other  saws,  belting,  corn  mills,  and 
other  property  which  I  was  directed  to  obtain  for 
your  department." 

In  the  following  January  Colonel  T.  W.  Higgin- 
son  (of  Massachusetts),  commanding  the  First  South 
Carolina  Colored  Infantry,  carried  his  regiment  on 
a  similar  expedition  up  the  Saint  Mary's  River  in 
Georgia  and  Florida,  in  three  steamers,  the  result 
of  which  he  reported  to  General  Saxton  as  success 
ful  beyond  his  most  sanguine  expectations.  He  dis 
covered  and  brought  away  much  valuable  property, 
and  left  undisturbed  much  valuable  household  fur 
niture,  which  he  forbade  his  officers  and  men  to  take. 
"No  wanton  destruction  was  permitted,  nor  were 
any  buildings  burned,  unless  in  retaliation  for  being 
fired  upon,  according  to  the  usages  of  war. 

Nothing  was  taken  for  public  use  save  articles  strictly 
contraband  of  war." 

Among  the  articles  which  he  seems  to  regard  as 
belonging  to  that  class,  and  which  he  brought  away, 
were  "40,000  large-sized  bricks,  four  horses,  four 
steers,  and  a  quantity  of  agricultural  implements 
suitable  for  Mr.  Helper's  operations  at  this  local 
ity."  He  also  found  great  quantities  "of  choice 
Southern  lumber,"  and  brought  away  as  much  of  it 
as  he  could;  but  he  left  behind  more  than  1,000,000 
feet  of  choice  lumber,  "for  want  of  transportation," 
the  three  steamboats  under  his  control  being  laden 
to  their  full  capacity  with  other  freight.  The  con 
duct  of  his  negro  troops  greatly  surprised  and  filled 
him  with  the  most  enthusiastic  admiration  for  their 


142      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

gallantry  and  peculiar  adaptability  to  the  kind  of 
service  in  which  he  had  employed  them,  and  for 
which  he  regarded  them  as  far  better  than  the  best 
white  troops.  "It  would  have  been  madness,"  he 
said,  "to  attempt  with  the  bravest  white  troops  what 
I  have  successfully  accomplished  with  black  ones." 
Their  bearing  "in  battle,"  especially  won  his  highest 
admiration.  Then  they  exhibited,  according  to  his 
account,  a  fiery  energy  beyond  anything  of  which 
he  had  ever  read,  except  of  the  French  Zouaves.  It 
required  the  strictest  discipline  to  hold  them  in  hand. 
They  were  ascending  the  river  in  steamers  so  con 
structed  as  to  protect  those  within  from  the  fire  of 
small  arms.  In  the  first  attack,  and  before  Colonel 
Higginson  could  get  "them  all  penned  below,"  they 
crowded  at  the  open  ends  of  the  steamers,  loading 
and  firing  with  unconceivable  rapidity,  and  shouting 
to  each  other,  "Never  give  it  up."  When  collected 
into  the  hold  they  actually  fought  each  other  for 
places  at  the  few  portholes  from  which  they  could 
fire  on  the  enemy.  Their  conduct  generally  on  the 
expedition  thoroughly  convinced  Colonel  Higginson 
and  all  of  his  officers  "that  the  key  to  the  successful 
prosecution  of  this  war  lies  in  the  unlimited  employ 
ment  of  black  troops." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Strengthening  the  blockade — Palmetto  State  and  Chicora — 
Blockading  fleet  attacked — Result  of  engagement — Federal 
Reports — Blockade  raised — Foreign  consuls'  report — Diver 
sity  of  statements — Capture  of  the  Isaac  Smith. 

At  no  time  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  the 
spring  of  1863  was  the  naval  force  of  the  South 
Atlantic  squadron  deemed  strong  enough  to  encoun 
ter  the  land  batteries  defending  Charleston  harbor. 
The  duties  of  the  fleet  were  therefore  restricted  so 
far  as  concerned  Charleston  to  the  tedious  and  mo 
notonous  task  of  blockading  the  port,  enlivened  oc 
casionally  by  a  chase,  sometimes  succesful,  of  a 
blockade  runner. 

More  effectually  to  seal  the  port  than  the  block 
ading  fleet  had  been  able  to  accomplish,  an  experi 
ment  was  made  to  close  it  permanently  by  obstruct 
ing  the  channel.  On  December  20,  1861,  the  first 
anniversary  of  the  secession  of  South  Carolina,  a 
fleet  of  seventeen  old  merchant  vessels  laden  with 
stone  was  anchored  at  regular  and  short  intervals 
in  a  line  across  the  main  channel,  and  having  been 
stripped  were  scuttled  and  sunk.  On  January  20 
following  another  fleet  of  similar  vessels  was  sunk 
in  like  manner,  four  of  them  on  the  western  end  of 
Rattlesnake  Shoals,  the  others  in  the  track  of  ves 
sels  entering  Charleston  harbor  by  Moffitt's  Chan- 

143 


144      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

nel.  The  question  naturally  arose  as  to  whether 
this  method  of  blockading  a  port  by  destroying  the 
entrance  to  it  was  admissible  under  the  laws  of  na 
tions,  and  it  was  thought  it  might  lead  to  some  in 
ternational  complications.  But  the  experiment  ut 
terly  failed.  The  irresistible  waters  of  the  Atlantic 
could  not  be  stayed  in  their  natural  ebb  and  flow;  the 
currents  edging  around  the  obstructions  washed  the 
sand  from  under  them,  speedily  making  as  good 
a  channel  as  ever  by  sinking  the  vessels  deeper  than 
had  been  intended;  so  deep  that  they  offered  no  ob 
stacle  to  ingress  and  egress. 

After  the  failure  of  the  assault  on  Secessionville 
and  the  abandonment  by  the  Federal  troops  of  the 
foothold  they  had  secured  on  James  Island  in  June, 
more  than  a  year  elapsed  before  any  demonstration 
of  note  was  made  on  Charleston  by  the  land  forces. 
In  the  meantime  the  operations  against  that  city  and 
its  harbor  were  left  to  the  navy,  the  land  forces  be 
ing  in  readiness  to  co-operate  with  it  when  occasion 
offered.  Admiral  DuPont  remained  in  command  of 
the  South  Atlantic  squadron  until  July,  1863.  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  had  been  assigned  to  the  important 
and  difficult  command  of  the  Department  of  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia,  succeeding  General  Pember- 
ton  in  that  command  on  September  24,  1862. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  January  31,  1863,  the 
blockading  fleet  off  Charleston  was  surprised  by  a 
raid.  There  were  two  ironclad  steamers  or  rams  in 
Charleston  harbor,  which  had  been  built  at  private 
shipyards  in  that  city,  the  Palmetto  State  and  Chi- 
cora.  They  were  admirable  vessels  of  their  class, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      145 

each  armed  with  four  heavy  guns  and  well  officered 
and  manned.  Captain  John  Rutledge  commanded 
the  Palmetto  State  and  Captain  John  R.  Tucker  the 
Chicora.  Commodore  Duncan  N.  Ingraham  com 
manded  the  station,  with  his  flag  on  the  Palmetto 
State.  About  a  quarter  past  eleven  o'clock  on  the 
night  of  the  3Oth  the  two  steamers  left  their  wharves 
and  steamed  slowly  down  to  the  bar,  where  they 
awaited  the  high  tide  to  pass  over.  About  four 
o'clock  in  the  morning  they  crossed  the  bar  and 
made  directly  for  the  blockading  fleet.  The  Pal 
metto  State  went  under  full  steam  directly  for  the 
nearest  vessel  seen  at  anchor,  which  proved  to  be 
the  United  States  steamer  Mercedita,  Captain  Still- 
wagen  commanding. 

The  Commodore  ordered  Captain  Rutledge  to 
strike  with  his  prow  and  fire  into  her.  As  soon  as 
the  officer  of  the  deck  of  the  Mercedita  saw  the 
strange  steamer  approaching  all  hands  were  piped 
to  quarters  and  the  guns  manned  for  action.  Com 
mander  Stillwagen,  who  had  just  turned  in,  quickly 
sprang  to  his  deck  and,  seeing  the  stranger  close  on 
him,  hailed:  "What  steamer  is  that?  Drop  your 
anchor  or  you  will  be  into  us,"  and  hearing  the 
answer,  "The  Confederate  steamer  Palmetto 
State"  he  immediately  ordered,  "Fire!  fire!" 
These  brief  and  hurried  calls  and  answers,  orders  to 
quarters  and  to  fire,  were  scarcely  uttered  when  the 
Palmetto  State  struck  the  Mercedita  on  the  quarter 
abaft  the  aftermost  thirty-pounder,  and  at  the  same 
time  fired  a  seven-inch  shell,  which  crushed  through 
her  starboard  side  diagonally  across,  passing 


146      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

through  the  Normandy  condenser  and  the  steam 
drum,  killing  the  gunner  in  his  room  and,  exploding 
against  the  port  side  of  the  ship,  tore  a  hole  through 
it  four  or  five  feet  square. 

The  vessel  was  instantly  filled  and  enveloped  with 
steam;  outcries  were  heard  that  the  shot  had  passed 
through  both  boilers,  that  the  fires  were  extinguished 
by  steam  and  water,  that  a  number  of  men  were 
killed  and  others  scalded,  and  that  the  vessel  was 
sinking  rapidly.  The  Confederate  commander 
called  out:  "Surrender  or  I  will  sink  you.  Do  you 
surrender?"  To  which  Captain  Stillwagen  replied: 
"I  can  make  no  resistance;  my  boiler  is  destroyed." 
"Then  do  you  surrender?"  "Yes,"  replied  the  cap 
tain  of  the  Mercedita,  and  quickly  sent  Lieutenant 
Commander  Abbott  in  a  boat  to  the  Palmetto  State 
to  make  known  the  condition  of  his  vessel  and  ascer 
tain  what  the  Confederate  commander  demanded. 
Lieutenant  Abbott  stated  that  he  came  in  the  name 
of  Captain  Stillwagen  to  surrender  the  United  States 
steamer  Mercedita,  she  being  then  in  a  sinking  and 
perfectly  defenseless  condition,  that  she  had  a  crew 
of  158,  all  told,  that  her  boats  were  not  large 
enough  to  save  the  crew,  and  had  besides  been  low 
ered  without  the  plugs  being  put  in  and  had  filled 
with  water.  He  was  informed  that  the  officers  and 
crew  would  be  paroled,  provided  he  would  pledge 
his  word  of  honor  that  neither  he  nor  any  of  the 
officers  or  crew  of  the  Mercedita  would  again  take 
up  arms  against  the  Confederate  States  during  the 
war,  unless  legally  and  regularly  exchanged  as  pris 
oners  of  war.  "Believing  it  to  be  the  proper  course 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       147 

to  pursue  at  the  time,  I  consented,"  says  Lieutenant 
Abbott.  The  Merc  edit  a  did  not  fire  a  gun,  the  Pal 
metto  State  being  so  low  in  the  water  and  so  near 
that  the  guns  of  the  former  could  not  be  turned 
on  her. 

In  the  meantime  the  Chicora  fired  into  a  schooner- 
rigged  propeller  and  it  was  believed  set  her  on  fire; 
then  engaged  a  large  side-wheel  steamer  at  close 
quarters,  firing  three  shots  into  her  with  telling  effect, 
which  then  put  on  all  steam  and  ran  off,  escaping  in 
the  dark.  She  then  engaged  a  schooner-rigged  pro 
peller  and  the  Keystone  State.  The  latter  was  com 
manded  by  Captain  Le  Roy,  United  States  Navy. 
The  first  shot  from  the  Chicora  set  her  on  fire  in 
her  forward  hold,  when  she  kept  off  seaward  to 
gain  time  to  extinguish  the  fire  and  prepare  the  ship 
for  action.  About  daylight  she  made  for  the  Chi 
cora  for  the  purpose,  if  possible,  of  running  her 
down,  exchanging  shots  with  and  "striking  her  re 
peatedly,  but  making  no  impression  on  her,  while 
every  shot  from  her  struck  the  Keystone  State  with 
telling  effect."  About  a  quarter  past  six  o'clock  a 
shell  crashed  through  the  Keystone  State's  port  side 
forward  guard  and  destroyed  the  steam  chimneys, 
filling  the  forward  part  of  the  ship  with  steam.  The 
port  boiler,  emptied  of  its  contents,  so  lightened  her 
on  that  side  that  the  ship  gave  a  heel  to  starboard 
nearly  down  to  the  guard.  The  water  from  the 
boiler,  which  was  rapidly  pouring  through  two 
shot  holes  under  water,  produced  the  impression  that 
the  ship  was  filling  rapidly  and  sinking.  A  foot  and 
a  half  of  water  was  reported  in  the  hold. 


148      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

To  add  to  the  embarrassment  the  fire,  which  it 
was  supposed  had  been  extinguished,  broke  out 
again,  while  the  steam  forward  prevented  the  men 
from  getting  up  ammunition,  even  if  the  ship  and 
crew  had  been  in  condition  to  use  it.  The  signal 
books  and  some  arms  were  thrown  overboard  and 
all  the  boats  were  made  ready  for  lowering.  "The 
ram  being  so  near,"  says  Captain  Le  Roy,  "the  ship 
helpless  and  the  men  being  slaughtered  by  almost 
every  discharge  of  the  enemy's  guns,  I  ordered  the 
colors  to  be  hauled  down;  but  finding  the  enemy 
were  still  firing  upon  us  directed  the  colors  to  be 
rehoisted  and  returned  fire  from  the  after  battery." 
In  his  official  report  Captain  Le  Roy  makes  no  men 
tion  whatever  of  having  struck  his  colors.  His  log 
book,  over  his  own  signature,  is  much  fuller  in  de 
tail  than  his  official  report,  and  has  been  followed  in 
the  foregoing  narrative. 

Captain  Tucker  states  in  his  report  that  when  the 
Keystone  State  struck  her  colors  she  was  completely 
at  his  mercy,  as  the  Chicora  had  a  raking  position 
astern  of  her  and  distant  about  two  hundred  yards. 
A  large  number  of  the  crew  were  seen  rushing  to 
the  after  part  of  the  deck  of  the  Keystone  State,  ex 
tending  their  arms  towards  the  Chicora  in  an  im 
ploring  manner.  He  immediately  ceased  firing  upon 
her  and  ordered  First  Lieutenant  Bier  to  man  a 
boat  and  take  charge  of  the  prize  and,  if  possible,  to 
save  her.  If  that  were  not  possible,  then  to  rescue 
the  crew.  While  the  lieutenant  and  men  were  in  the 
act  of  manning  the  boat  he  discovered  that  the  Key 
stone  State  was  endeavoring  to  make  her  escape  by 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       149 

working  her  starboard  wheel,  the  other  being  dis 
abled.  Her  colors  being  down,  he  at  once  started 
in  pursuit  and  renewed  the  engagement,  but  owing 
to  her  superior  steaming  power  she  soon  widened 
the  distance  to  about  two  thousand  yards,  when  she 
rehoisted  her  colors  and  commenced  firing  her  rifle 
gun.  She  was  soon  taken  in  tow  by  the  United 
States  steamer  Memphis  and  carried  off  to  Port 
Royal. 

The  Chicora  next  engaged  a  brig  and  a  bark- 
rigged  propeller.  Not  having  the  requisite  speed, 
she  was  unable  to  bring  them  to  close  quarters,  but 
pursued  them  six  or  seven  miles  seaward.  Toward 
the  end  of  the  engagement  and  in  broad  daylight  she 
was  engaged  at  long  range  with  a  large  bark-rigged 
steamer.  It  was  doubtless  the  Housatonic,  as  no 
other  vessel  appears  to  have  been  within  range  at 
that  time.  If  so,  the  reports  of  the  respective  cap 
tains  differ  materially.  Captain  Tucker  says  that 
in  spite  of  all  his  efforts  he  was  unable  to  bring  the 
steamer  with  which  he  was  exchanging  shots  at  long 
range  to  close  quarters,  owing  to  her  superior  steam 
ing  qualities. 

The  report  of  Captain  Taylor,  of  the  Housatonic, 
produces  the  impression  that  the  Chicora  was  mak 
ing  for  the  harbor  and  desirous  of  avoiding  an  en 
gagement  with  her  adversary.  She  and  the  Pal 
metto  State  were  heading  toward  the  harbor,  and 
the  captain  says  he  opened  fire  upon  the  ram  as  soon 
as  he  got  within  range  (which  was  returned  deliber 
ately)  ,  and  kept  it  up  "as  long  as  she  remained  within 
range.  At  no  time  did  she  (the  Chicora)  deviate 


1 50      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

from  the  course  she  was  steering  when  we  first  saw 
her,  except  that  she  turned  twice  to  bring  her  stern 
gun  to  bear  on  us."  Admiral  DuPont  says:  "The 
Housatonic,  Captain  Taylor,  gave  chase.  .  .  .  The 
Confederate  vessels  then  passed  to  the  northward, 
receiving  the  fire  of  our  ships  and  took  refuge  in  the 
swash  channel  behind  the  shoals."  The  Admiral 
was  at  Port  Royal  at  the  time  and,  of  course,  made 
his  report  on  the  faith  of  those  made  to  him. 

It  is  difficult  to  imagine  why  the  commanders  of 
the  ironclads  should  have  wished  to  avoid  the  com 
bat  and  take  shelter  anywhere.  They  knew  that  all 
of  the  blockading  vessels  were  of  wood  and  most 
of  them  merchant  steamers  armed.  They  had  the 
utmost  confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  ironclads  to 
destroy  any  and  every  one  of  those  wooden  steamers 
with  which  they  might  come  into  conflict,  if  the  latter 
did  not  profit  by  superior  speed  to  escape.  They 
had  gone  into  the  midst  of  the  fleet  with  no  other 
purpose  than  to  engage  it.  They  had  engaged  sev 
eral  steamers  successfully,  crippling  them  greatly, 
while  they  (the  ironclads)  had  received  no  injury, 
and  there  had  not  been  a  casualty  in  either  vessel. 

If,  as  Captain  Taylor's  report  plainly  implies,  he 
was  anxious  to  engage  the  ironclads  with  his  wooden 
ship,  why  he  did  not  do  so  seems  inexplicable.  The 
speed  of  the  Housatonic  was  probably  double  that 
of  the  ironclads,  which  was  but  six  or  seven  knots  an 
hour.  They  had  been  in  the  midst  of  his  fleet  about 
four  hours,  and  if  from  any  cause  he  was  prevented 
from  following  and  engaging  them  at  that  time,  he 
could  have  approached  them  at  any  time  during  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       151 

day,  as  they  lay  at  anchor  in  four  fathoms  of  water 
outside  of  the  entrance  to  Beech  Channel  for  about 
eight  hours.  They  could  not  have  gone  inside 
sooner  had  Commodore  Ingraham  desired  it,  as 
there  was  not  water  enough  on  the  bar  to  take  them 
over  except  at  high  tide.  An  examination  of  the 
chart  will  show  that  while  anchored  in  four  fathoms 
they  were  very  far  beyond  the  range  of  any  land 
battery. 

Having  disposed  of  the  Mercedita,  the  Palmetto 
State  stood  to  the  northward  and  eastward  and  soon 
found  another  steamer  getting  under  way,  stood  for 
her  and  fired  several  shots,  but  as  the  ram  had  to  be 
fought  in  a  circle  to  bring  her  different  guns  to  bear 
the  steamer  was  soon  out  of  range.  Just  as  day 
dawned  a  large  steamer  with  a  smaller  one  in  com 
pany  was  seen  under  way  on  the  starboard  bow  and 
standing  to  the  southward  under  full  steam.  They 
opened  their  batteries  on  the  Chicora,  which  was 
some  distance  astern  of  the  Palmetto  State.  The 
latter  turned  and  stood  to  the  southward  to  support 
the  Chicora,  if  necessary,  but  the  two  steamers  kept 
on  their  course  to  the  southward.  The  superior 
speed  of  the  blockading  steamers  made  pursuit  of 
them  hopeless.  Commodore  Ingraham  therefore 
signaled  Captain  Tucker  to  come  to  anchor  and  lead 
the  way  to  the  entrance  to  Beech  Channel.  Captain 
Tucker  accordingly  stood  in  shore,  "leaving,"  he 
says,  "the  partially  crippled  and  fleeing  enemy  about 
seven  miles  clear  of  the  bar,  standing  to  the  south 
ward  and  eastward." 

About  half  past  eight  o'clock  the  two  Confederate 


152      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

steamers  were  at  anchor  off  Beech  Channel  in  four 
fathoms  water,  where  they  remained  until  after  four 
o'clock  in  the  evening.  They  were  not  injured,  had 
not  even  been  struck,  and  there  were  no  casualties. 
The  Federal  loss  in  the  engagement  was  four  killed 
and  three  wounded  on  the  Mercedita,  and  on  the 
Keystone  State  twenty  killed  and  twenty  wounded; 
total,  forty-seven.  The  Mercedita  had  surrendered 
and  the  Keystone  State  struck  her  colors  to  escape 
destruction,  thus  virtually  surrendering;  but  both 
escaped  to  Port  Royal.  The  raid  was  over  and  soon 
the  nearest  of  the  blockading  steamers  was  hull 
down  off  to  sea,  the  masts  visible  to  those  on  the 
Confederate  steamers  only  with  the  aid  of  power 
ful  glasses. 

As  soon  as  the  result,  or  supposed  result,  of  the 
raid  on  the  blockading  squadron  was  reported  to 
General  Beauregard,  he  telegraphed  to  the  Adjutant 
General  in  Richmond  that  the  Confederate  States 
steam  rams  Palmetto  State  and  Chicora  had  sunk 
the  United  States  steamer  Mercedita  of  the  block 
ading  squadron,  that  Captain  Turner  had  set  fire  to 
one  vessel,  which  struck  her  colors,  and  thought  he 
sunk  another.  "Our  loss  and  damage  none.  Ene 
my's  whole  fleet  has  disappeared  north  and  south. 
I  am  going  to  proclaim  the  blockade  raised."  He 
and  Commodore  Ingraham  united  in  issuing  a  proc 
lamation  setting  forth  that  the  Confederate  States 
naval  force  had  that  morning  attacked  the  United 
States  blockading  fleet  off  the  harbor  of  Charleston, 
"and  sunk,  dispersed,  or  drove  off  and  out  of  sight 
for  the  time  the  entire  hostile  fleet,"  and  they 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       153 

formally  declared  the  blockade  raised  by  force  of 
arms. 

Copies  of  the  proclamation  were  sent  to  the  for 
eign  consuls,  and  General  Beauregard  placed  a 
steamer  at  their  disposal  to  see  for  themselves  that 
no  blockade  existed.  The  French  and  Spanish  con 
suls  accepted  the  invitation.1  The  Spanish  consul, 
Serior  Munez  de  Monceeda,  replying  to  the  offer, 
says:  "Having  gone  out  in  company  with  the 
French  consul  and  arrived  at  the  point  where  the 
Confederate  naval  forces  were,  we  discovered  three 
steamers  and  a  pilot  boat  returning.  I  must  also 
mention  that  the  British  consul  at  this  port  mani 
fested  to  me  verbally,  that  some  time  subsequent 
to  this  naval  combat  not  a  single  blockading  vessel 
was  in  sight."  That  evening  or  night  General 
Beauregard  telegraphed  the  Adjutant  General: 
"Some  of  the  enemy's  vessels  have  returned,  but  for 
several  hours  (three  or  four)  none  were  in  sight. 
Was  blockade  raised  or  not?  What  says  the  Attor 
ney  General?  Shall  I  publish  my  proclamation, 
written  meanwhile?" 

The  truth  of  the  statements  contained  in  the  proc 
lamation  and  made  by  the  foreign  consuls  and  the 
Charleston  papers  was  vehemently  denied  by  Cap 
tain  William  Rodgers  Taylor  and  Commander  J. 

The  visit  of  the  Spanish  and  French  consuls  was  in  the 
afternoon.  The  Charleston  papers  of  about  that  date  stated 
that  the  British  consul,  with  the  commander  of  the  British 
war  steamer  Petrel,  had  previously  gone  five  miles  beyond  the 
usual  anchorage  of  the  blockaders  and  could  see  nothing  of 
them  with  their  glasses. 


154      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

H.  Strong,  James  Madison  Frailey,  E.  G.  Parrott, 
Pend.  G.  Watmough  and  C.  J.  Van  Alstine,  all  of 
them  commanding  vessels  of  the  blockading  fleet  in 
an  official  joint  certificate  of  February  10,  1863,  ad 
dressed  to  Admiral  DuPont.  Their  denial  is  ex 
pressed  in  very  emphatic  and  harsh  terms.  It  hap 
pened  also  that  the  One  Hundred  and  Seventy-sixth 
Regiment  Pennsylvania  Militia  was  passing 
Charleston  harbor  that  morning  in  the  transport 
steamer  Cossack,  en  route  from  Morehead  City, 
N.  C.,  to  Port  Royal,  S.  C.  Colonel  A.  A.  Leckler 
and  Surgeon  W.  F.  Funderburg,  of  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Seventy-sixth  Pennsylvania,  and  Captain 
T.  C.  Newberry,  commanding  the  Cossack,  united  in 
a  letter  of  February  21,  1863,  to  Admiral  DuPont, 
in  which  they  deny  the  truth  of  the  foregoing  Con 
federate  statements  in  terms  quite  as  strong  and 
harsh  as  did  the  naval  officers.  In  the  very  early 
morning  they  heard  some  firing,  but  that  was  not  un 
usual.  They  arrived  off  Charleston  harbor  about 
half  past  eight  o'clock  and  found  the  blockaciing  ves 
sels  at  their  usual  stations  at  an  estimated  distance 
of  from  four  to  five  miles  from  land.  Some  of  the 
vessels  were  at  anchor.  They  were  in  the  midst  of 
the  fleet  little  less  than  an  hour,  and  communicated 
with  the  officers,  some  of  whom  came  on  board  their 
ship.  The  weather  was  a  little  hazy,  but  they  saw 
land  very  clearly  on  both  sides  of  the  harbor.  They 
denounce  the  statements  from  Confederate  sources 
and  the  foreign  consuls  "as  utterly  false  in  every 
particular." 

Statements  so  diametrically  opposed  when  made 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       155 

by  men  of  high  official  and  social  positions  ought  to 
admit  of  some  satisfactory  explanation  without  the 
imputation  of  deliberate  falsehood.  It  may  be  that 
the  denial  was  leveled  mainly  at  the  statements  of 
the  sinking  of  any  vessel  and  of  raising  the  blockade, 
but  was  made  more  sweeping  and  comprehensive 
than  the  officers  intended.  It  is  true  that  the  Merce- 
dha  had  not  been  sunk,  nor  did  the  proclamation 
state  that  it  had  been.  -It  simply  declared  the  block 
ade  raised  in  a  way  recognized  as  valid  under  the 
law  of  nations,  namely,  that  the  blockading  fleet  had 
been  "sunk,  dispersed,  or  driven  off  and  out  of 
sight"  for  the  time  by  force  of  arms.  A  simple 
statement  of  the  facts  as  they  are  set  forth  in  the 
official  reports  of  the  Federal  officers  themselves 
W7ill  show  the  grounds  on  which  General  Beauregard 
and  Commodore  Ingraham  based  the  statement. 

Commodore  Turner,  of  the  United  States  steam 
frigate  New  Ironsides,  states  that  there  wrere  nine 
blockading  vessels  lying  off  Charleston  bar  on  the 
morning  of  the  attack.  It  would  seem  from  the 
statements  of  the  Federal  reports  that  the  weather 
was  thick  and  hazy,  so  much  so  that  the  Palmetto 
State  was  nearly  upon  the  Mercedita  before  she  was 
seen  by  the  officer  of  the  deck  of  the  latter,  who  was 
on  the  alert.  The  Mercedita  after  being  fired  into 
was  surrendered  with  her  crew,  because,  as  her  com 
mander  and  executive  officer  stated,  she  was  in  a 
sinking  and  perfectly  helpless  condition.  When  day 
dawned  she  was  nowhere  to  be  seen,  either  by  the 
Confederate  or  Federal  commanders.  The  latter, 
Captain  Taylor,  was  apprehensive  that  she  had  been 


156      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

destroyed.  It  was  therefore  very  natural  that  Com 
modore  Ingraham  and  Captain  Tucker  should  have 
believed  she  had  sunk.  She  had,  in  fact,  started 
about  five  o'clock  for  Port  Royal,  and  when  day 
dawned  had  been  about  an  hour  on  that  course  and 
was  out  of  sight. 

The  Keystone  State  had  lost  about  a  fourth  of 
her  crew  and  was  so  badly  crippled  that  she  struck 
her  colors,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  light  was  taken  in 
tow  by  the  Memphis  and  carried  directly  off  to  Port 
Royal.  As  soon  as  the  raid  was  over,  about  eight 
o'clock,  Captain  Taylor  dispatched  the  Augusta, 
Parrott  commanding,  to  Port  Royal  to  carry  the 
news  of  the  disaster  to  Admiral  DuPont.  Thus  four 
of  the  nine  blockading  vessels  of  the  fleet  reached 
Port  Royal  after  3  o'clock  P.  M.  that  day. 
About  8  o'clock  A.  M.  Captain  Parrott  reported 
to  Captain  Taylor  what  he  had  himself  observed, 
that  the  United  States  steamers  Mercedita,  Flag, 
Stellin,  and  Ottawa  could  nowhere  be  seen,  and 
search  was  made  for  them.  Between  9  and  10 
o'clock  A.  M.,  therefore,  seven  of  the  nine  block- 
aders  were  out  of  sight,  not  only  of  the  Confed 
erate,  but  of  the  Federal  commanders,  leaving  only 
two — the  H ous atonic  and  Quaker  City — that  could 
by  any  chance  have  been  seen.  Of  these  two  Cap 
tain  Taylor  says:  "The  Keystone  State  was  at  this 
time  in  tow  of  the  Memphis  and  distant  (from  him) 
two  or  three  miles;  the  weather  was  unfavorable  for 
signaling  and  I  was  steaming  toward  her  when  the 
Quaker  City  came  up  and  expressed  a  desire  to  com 
municate.  Commander  Frailey  reported  having  re- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      157 

ceived  a  shell  in  his  engine-room  and  required  sev 
eral  articles  to  repair  the  damage."  Between  8 
and  9  o'clock  A.  M.,  therefore,  the  Housatonic 
was  steaming  southward  to  overtake  two  other  ves 
sels  which  were  two  or  three  miles  off,  when  it  fell 
in  with  the  Quaker  City  in  a  crippled  condition.  It 
is  not  therefore  marvelous  that  at  about  that  time 
Captain  Tucker,  Confederate  States  Navy,  should 
have  reported  that  he  left  "the  partially  crippled 
and  fleeing  enemy  about  seven  miles  clear  of  the  bar 
steaming  to  the  southward  and  eastward." 

Just  where  the  Housatonic  and  Quaker  City  were 
when  they  came  together  between  8  and  9  o'clock 
A.  M.  does  not  appear;  but  it  does  appear  from 
Captain  Taylor's  own  statement  that  from  day 
dawn  to  3  o'clock  P.  M.  the  weather  was  so  thick 
and  hazy  that  at  no  time  was  the  land  distinctly 
visible,  and  that  he  did  not  start  back  to  pick  up  his 
anchor,  where  he  had  left  it  when  the  raid  began, 
until  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The 
Ottawa  did  not  appear  on  the  scene  during  the  en 
gagement,  and  nothing  is  said  of  her  in  the  official 
reports  except  that  she  was  out  of  sight,  but  re 
ported  safe.  She  was  probably  in  Stono  River.  Her 
station  was  nearer  the  Stono  Inlet  than  the  other 
vessels,  and  the  morning  of  the  3ist  her  commander 
sent  word  to  Captain  Taylor  that  the  steamer 
Isaac  Smith  had  been  captured  and  that  the  Com 
modore  McDonough,  the  only  other  gunboat  in  that 
river,  was  in  danger.  Early  that  morning  a  gunboat 
came  into  the  river,  steamed  up  it  and  shelled  Le- 
gareville  and  then  fell  down  the  river,  but  returned 


158      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

in  the  evening  and  resumed  fire.  As  the  commander 
knew  or  had  been  informed  that  the  gunboat  Mc- 
Donough  was  in  danger,  and  was  himself  so  near 
at  hand,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  his  was  the 
gunboat  that  came  into  the  river  to  assist  the  Me- 
Donongh.  If  so,  she  was  clearly  out  of  sight  of  the 
bar,  leaving  the  Housatonic  and  Quaker  City  the 
only  two  of  the  nine  blockading  steamers  mentioned 
by  Commodore  Turner  as  present  that  morning 
which  could  by  any  possibility  have  been  seen. 

Under  all  of  these  circumstances  it  is  surely  not 
wonderful  or  improbable  that  for  three  or  four 
hours  during  that  day  the  blockading  fleet  could  not 
be  seen  by  the  Confederates  who  were  near  the  bar, 
and  that  is  all  the  proclamation  stated  as  to  its  posi 
tion.  To  everyone  who  knew  General  Beaureguard 
and  Commodore  Ingraham  their  statement  of  facts 
will  be  received  as  absolutely  true,  and  needs  no 
argument  to  prove  them.  Whether  the  facts  as  they 
existed  constituted  a  technical  raising  of  the  block 
ade  is  a  question  of  law  on  which  there  may  be  hon 
est  difference  of  opinion. 

Again,  the  six  naval  officers  in  their  letter  above 
mentioned  say  among  other  things:  "These  are  the 
facts,  and  we  do  not  hesitate  to  state  that  no  vessel 
did  come  out  beyond  the  bar  after  the  return  of 
the  rams  at  between  7  and  8  A.  M.  to  the  cover 
of  the  forts.  We  believe  the  statement  that  any 
vessel  came  anywhere  near  the  usual  anchorage  of 
any  of  the  blockaders,  or  up  to  the  bar  after  the 
withdrawal  of  the  rams,  to  be  deliberately  and 
knowingly  false."  These  statements,  so  unhesitat- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       159 

ingly  made  and  so  harshly  expressed,  must  in  the 
case  of  at  least  three  of  those  officers  have  been 
based  on  other  evidence  than  their  own  observation. 
They  could  not  have  known  personally  whereof 
they  spoke. 

Two  of  them,  Commanders  Parrott  and  Wat- 
mough,  started  early  in  the  morning  for  Port  Royal 
and  arrived  there  after  3  o'clock  p.  M.  They  there 
fore  could  not  have  had  personal  knowledge  of  what 
vessels  came  up  to  or  over  the  Charleston  harbor 
bar  that  day.  Another,  Commander  Strong,  was 
out  of  sight  of  his  own  commanding  officer  from 
day  dawn  until  half-past  ten  o'clock,  when  he  came 
up  and  brought  news  to  Captain  Taylor  of  the  safety 
of  the  Stettin  and  Ottawa.  The  Stettin  came  up 
about  eleven  o'clock;  her  commander,  Van  Alstine, 
brought  a  message  from  Lieutenant  Commander 
Whitney,  of  the  Ottawa,  that  the  United  States 
steamer  Isaac  Smith  had  been  captured  in  the  Stono 
the  previous  evening  and  that  the  Commodore  Mc- 
Donough  was  in  danger.  Captain  Strong  was  im 
mediately  sent  into  the  Stono  to  assist  the  McDon- 
ongh.  The  weather  was  so  hazy  all  day  that  Cap 
tain  Taylor  could  scarcely  see  land  anywhere,  and 
he  was  much  nearer  the  bar  than  Captain  Strong. 
How,  then,  could  Captain  Strong  have  spoken  with 
such  absolute  certainty  and  from  personal  observa 
tion  of  what  vessels  were  near  the  bar?  How,  in 
deed,  could  Captain  Taylor  himself,  or  the  two 
other  officers,  Commanders  Frailey  and  Van  Alstine, 
have  known  what  steamer  came  over  the  bar?  Their 
vessels,  according  to  the  Confederate  accounts,  were 


160      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

hull  down  out  to  sea  and  only  their  masts  could  be 
seen  by  persons  outside  of  the  bar,  and  according  to 
his  own  official  report  Taylor  was  so  far  out  to  sea 
and  the  weather  so  hazy  that  he  could  scarcely  see 
land  anywhere.  It  seems  hopeless  to  attempt  to 
reconcile  the  statements  made  by  the  landsmen  of 
the  One  Hundred  and  Seventy-sixth  Pennsylvania 
Regiment  and  the  captain  of  the  transport  steamer 
Cossack  with  the  concurrent  official  reports  both 
Federal  and  Confederate. 

The  report  brought  to  Captain  Taylor  on  the 
morning  of  the  3ist  by  Commander  Van  Alstine, 
of  the  capture  the  previous  evening  of  a  steamer  in 
the  Stono,  proved  true.  The  United  States  steamers 
Commodore  McDonough  and  Isaac  Smith  had  been 
in  the  habit  for  some  time  of  running  up  and  down 
the  Stono  reconnoitering  and  occasionally  exchang 
ing  shots  at  long  range  with  the  land  batteries.  Gen 
erals  Beauregard  and  Ripley  planned  an  ambush 
which  it  was  hoped  would  result  in  the  capture  of 
one,  and  perhaps  both,  of  the  steamers.  The  execu 
tion  of  the  plan  was  intrusted  to  Lieutenant  Colonel 
J.  A.  Yates,  of  the  First  South  Carolina  Artillery,  a 
gentleman  in  every  way  admirably  fitted  for  the  suc 
cessful  performance  of  the  duty. 

On  the  night  of  January  29  two  batteries  of  siege 
and  field  guns  were  placed  in  ambush  near  the  right 
bank  of  the  Stono,  one  of  them  at  Trimble's  place 
on  John's  Island,  and  one  lower  down  at  Legare 
Point  Place.  A  third  battery  of  three  twenty-four 
pounder  rifle  guns  was  placed  in  ambush  near 
Thomas  Gimble's,  higher  up  on  the  river  and  on  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       161 

•A 

James  Island  side.  Major  J.  W.  Brown,  Second 
South  Carolina;  Major  Charles  Alston  and  Captain 
F.  H.  Harleston,  of  the  South  Carolina  siege  train, 
commanded  the  batteries  on  the  John's  Island  side. 
The  battery  at  Thomas  Gimble's  was  commanded 
by  Captain  John  H.  Geary,  Fifteenth  South  Caro 
lina  Heavy  Artillery.  Captain  John  C.  Mitchell,2 
son  of  the  Irish  patriot,  John  Mitchell,  commanded 
a  battalion  of  two  companies  (Twentieth  South 
Carolina  Volunteers)  of  sharpshooters. 

About  4  P.  M.  on  the  3Oth  the  steamer  Isaac  Smith, 
Lieutenant  Conover  commanding,  steamed  up  the 
Stono  and  anchored  off  Thomas  Gimble's,  about  five 
hundred  yards  from  Captain  Geary's  guns.  The 
batteries  had  been  so  well  screened  from  view  that 
they  were  not  seen  by  anyone  on  the  steamer.  Cap 
tain  Geary  waited  about  twenty  minutes,  hoping  the 
crew  would  land,  but  discovering  no  signs  of  landing 
he  opened,  firing  rapidly  and  with  effect.  The  fire 
was  quickly  returned  with  shell,  canister,  and  grape 
from  the  steamer,  which  at  the  same  time  slipped 
her  anchor  and  started  down  the  river.  Then  the 
upper  battery  on  John's  Island  opened,  and  Lieuten 
ant  Connor  discovered,  as  he  says,  that  he  was  "en 
trapped,"  and  that  his  only  way  of  escape  was  to 
get  below  the  batteries.  To  do  that  he  would  have 
to  run  the  gauntlet  of  the  land  batteries  and  sharp 
shooters,  fighting  his  way  out. 

2He  was  a  handsome,  gallant  young  Irish  gentleman,  and 
while  commanding  Fort  Sumter  in  the  summer  of  1864  was 
killed  on  the  parapet  by  a  shell  from  Cutnming's  Point. 


1 62      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

Owing  to  a  bend  in  the  river  the  steamer,  while 
running  more  than  a  mile,  was  exposed  to  raking 
fires  from  batteries  on  both  banks  of  the  river,  to 
which  he  could  reply  only  with  his  pivot  gun.  As 
soon  as  he  reached  a  part  of  the  river  where  his 
broadsides  could  be  brought  to  bear  he  opened  with 
shell  and  grape  at  from  two  to  four  hundred  yards' 
distance.  But  a  shot  through  the  steam  chimney 
effectually  stopped  the  engine,  and  with  but  little  tide 
and  no  wind  to  carry  him  down  the  river  and  his 
boats  riddled  with  shots  he  was  entirely  at  the  mercy 
of  the  enemy.  Exposed  to  the  concentrated  fire 
from  the  batteries  on  both  sides  and  the  rifles  of 
Captain  Mitchell's  sharpshooters,  "the  shot  tearing 
through  the  vessel  in  every  direction  and  with  no 
hope  of  being  able  to  silence  such  a  fire,"  Lieutenant 
Conover  thought  it  his  duty  to  surrender,  and  accord 
ingly  hauled  down  his  colors  and  ran  up  the  white 
flag. 

"Had  it  not  been  for  the  wounded  men,"  he  says, 
"with  which  the  berth  deck  was  covered,  I  might 
have  blown  up  or  sunk  the  ship,  letting  the  crew 
take  the  chance  of  getting  on  shore  by  swimming; 
but  under  the  circumstances  I  had  no  alternative  left 
me."  The  steamer  and  entire  crew,  consisting  of  1 1 
officers  and  108  men,  were  surrendered.  The  loss 
on  the  steamer  was  9  killed  and  16  wounded,  among 
the  latter  the  lieutenant  commanding.  The  Con 
federate  loss  was  i  man  mortally  wounded  and  i  gun 
disabled.  The  steamer  was  armed  with  one  30- 
pounder  Parrot  rifle  and  eight  8-inch  columbiads. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       163 

She  was  but  little  injured,  was  soon  repaired,  and 
passed  into  the  Confederate  service  under  the  name 
of  the  Stono. 

Commander  Bacon,  of  the  McDonough,  which 
was  in  Stono  Inlet,  hearing  the  firing  up  the  river, 
got  under  way  and  steamed  up  to  assist  the  Smith, 
but  soon  discovered  the  white  flag  flying  over  her  and 
her  crew  in  boats  going  ashore  as  prisoners.  He  con 
tinued  to  move  on  up  with  the  intention  of  towing 
her  off  or  blowing  her  up.  Before  getting  sufficiently 
near  to  accomplish  anything  the  guns  at  Point  Place, 
which  had  taken  no  part  in  the  fire  on  the  Smith, 
and  whose  presence  then  was  unknown,  opened  on 
the  McDonough  and  were  followed  quickly  by  other 
guns.  The  steamer  moved  back  down  the  river,  re 
turning  the  fire  of  the  land  batteries  and  keeping  in 
motion  to  prevent  her  range  being  ascertained  until 
dark,  when  she  was  beyond  effective  range.  Com 
mander  Bacon  then  turned  his  guns  upon  the  pretty 
little  town  of  Legareville,  throwing  shells  into  it,  "in 
the  hope,"  he  says,  "of  setting  fire  to  the  place." 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Merrimac — The  monitors — Fort  McAlister — Advance  on 
Charleston — Fort  Sumter  again  assailed — Ironclads  in  ac 
tion — Result  of  Confederate  fire  to  ironclads — Report  of 
action — Confederate  loss — Review  of  the  engagement — Lin 
coln's  dispatch — Feeling  in  the  North — Investment  of  Char 
leston  postponed. 

Among  the  United  States  war  vessels  which  were 
destroyed  or  partially  destroyed  by  the  Federal  offi 
cers  on  the  eve  of  their  evacuation  of  Norfolk  and 
the  Gosport  Navy  Yard,  April  20,  1861,  was  the 
United  States  steam  frigate  Merrimac,  which  was 
burned  to  her  copper  line  and  berth-deck,  scuttled, 
and  sunk.  Subsequently  she  was  raised  by  Confed 
erate  naval  officers,  reconstructed  on  a  novel  model, 
encased  in  iron  plates,  armed  with  heavy  guns  and 
an  iron  prow,  and  soon  became  famous  as  the  Con 
federate  States  steam  ram  Merrimac.  The  report 
went  abroad  that  she  was  invulnerable  to  any  guns 
then  in  use,  and  could  readily  overcome  and  destroy 
any  vessels  then  in  the  navy  with  which  she  might 
come  in  collision. 

The  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  this  novel 
engine  of  war  caused  no  little  apprehension  in  the 
North,  which  was  greatly  heightened  by  the  ease 
with  which  she  and  her  consorts  sunk  the  United 
States  ship  Cumberland  and  destroyed  the  Congress 

164 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       165 

••  ".--"'-  -'* 
in  Hampton  Roads  on  March  8,   1862.     Excitable 

and  imaginative  people  even  apprehended  that  New 
York  city  and  Philadelphia  would  soon  be  under  the 
fire  of  her  guns.  It  became  therefore  a  grave  ques 
tion  how  the  steam  ram  could  be  destroyed. 

To  that  end  an  ironclad  steamer  designed  by  Cap 
tain  John  Ericsson  on  a  new  model  was  speedily  con 
structed,  and  was  the  first  of  the  class  of  war  vessels 
since  known  as  monitors.  Seven  of  them  were  hastily 
constructed,  armed  with  heavier  guns  than  ever 
before  used,  and  sent  to  Port  Royal,  S.  C.,  to  oper 
ate  against  Charleston.  Early  in  January,  1863, 
several  of  them  were  on  their  way  to  Port  Royal. 
(The  original  Monitor  foundered  at  sea  off  Cape 
Hatteras,  and  two  others,  the  Montauk  and  Passaic, 
narrowly  escaped  the  same  fate.) 

While  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  full  number, 
Admiral  DuPont  deemed  it  prudent  to  test  the  power 
of  those  that  had  arrived,  and  selected  as  the  object 
on  which  to  make  the  experiment  Fort  McAlister, 
an  earthwork  at  Genesis  Point,  on  the  Ogeechee 
River,  near  Savannah,  and  if  possible  destroy  or  cap 
ture  it.  On  January  27,  and  again  on  February  i, 
the  Montauk,  aided  by  several  other  less  formidable 
vessels,  engaged  the  fort.  On  March  3  the  Mon- 
tauk,  having  been  joined  by  three  other  monitors,  the 
Passaic,  Patapsco,  and  Nahant,  and  aided  by  other 
vessels,  again  engaged  the  earthwork.  The  attack 
and  defense  of  Fort  McAlister  do  not  come  within 
the  proposed  limits  of  this  narration.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  after  a  bombardment  of  eight  hours,  in  which 


1 66      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  fire  of  the  fort  was  directed  exclusively  on  the 
Passaic,  the  monitors  withdrew. 

No  injury  was  done  to  the  fort  that  could  not 
readily  be  repaired  during  the  night,  says  Admiral 
Ammen,  who  commanded  the  Patapsco.  The  gun 
boats  and  mortar  schooners,  which  fired  at  the  dis 
tance  of  about  four  hundred  yards,  did  neither  good 
nor  harm.  On  March  6  the  monitors  were  taken  in 
tow  to  Port  Royal.  The  Passaic  had  been  so  dam 
aged  in  the  bombardment  that  she  required  three 
weeks  of  repairs,  to  be  put  in  serviceable  condition 
again. 

By  April  i  the  whole  monitor  fleet  was  in  North 
Edisto  Inlet — an  admirable  harbor,  about  twenty 
miles  from  Charleston  bar — and  as  thoroughly  pro 
vided  as  they  could  be  for  the  attack  on  Charleston. 
Such  a  fleet  had  never  before  been  seen.  Its  capacity 
for  destruction  and  resistance  was  unknown.  In  the 
North  it  was  looked  to  with  confidence,  hope,  and 
expectation  for  the  accomplishment  of  an  object  so 
ardently  desired, — the  reduction  of  Charleston,— 
while  in  the  South  it  unquestionably  excited  grave 
apprehension. 

Major  General  Hunter,  commanding  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  South,  with  an  aggregate  land  force 
present  of  a  little  over  twenty-three  thousand  men, 
moved  up  a  large  part  of  his  force  and  occupied 
Folly  and  Seabrook's  islands  and  other  points  on  or 
near  the  Stono,  and  prepared  to  follow  up  the  ex 
pected  success  of  the  fleet  and  occupy  Charleston. 

The  concentration  of  such  formidable  land  and 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      167 

naval  forces  at  Port  Royal,  Hilton  Head,  and  North 
Edisto  had  warned  General  Beauregard,  then  com 
manding  the  Department  of  South  Carolina  and 
Georgia,  that  the  long  expected  attack  on  Charleston 
was  immediately  impending,  and  he  prepared  to  meet 
it.  The  troops  nearest  the  city  were  distributed  as 
seemed  best  to  meet  the  coming  storm,  and  arrange 
ments  made  to  draw  reinforcements  quickly,  if  re 
quired,  from  other  points  in  his  department. 

The  first  military  district  of  the  department,  which 
embraced  the  defenses  of  Charleston,  was  com 
manded  by  Brigadier  General  Roswell  S.  Ripley,  an 
officer  of  distinguished  ability,  great  energy,  and 
fertile  in  resource;  no  more  accomplished  artillery 
officer  could  have  been  found  in  either  army.  He 
was  especially  charged  with  the  defenses  of  the 
harbor,  and  the  completeness  of  the  preparations 
was  in  a  great  measure  due  to  his  skill  and  energy. 
Brigadier  General  James  H.  Trapier  commanded 
the  second  subdivision  of  the  district,  which  em 
braced  Sullivan's  Island.  The  defensive  works  on 
that  island — Fort  Moultrie  and  Batteries  Beaure 
gard  and  Bee — were  under  the  general  direction  of 
Colonel  Lawrence  M.  Keitt. 

Fort  Sumter,  the  chief  object  of  attack,  was  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Alfred  Rhett,  of  the  First  South 
Carolina  Regular  Artillery,  and  was  garrisoned  by 
seven  companies  of  that  regiment.  Lieutenant  Colo 
nel  J.  A.  Yates  and  Major  Ormsby  Blanding,  of  the 
same  regiment,  had  general  charge,  the  first  of  the 
barbette,  the  latter  of  the  casemate  batteries. 

Brigadier  General  S.  R.  Gist  commanded  the  first 


1 68      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

subdivision  of  the  district,  which  embraced  James' 
Island  and  St.  Andrew's.  It  was  known  that  General 
Hunter  had  concentrated  the  mass  of  his  force  on 
Folly  Island  and  its  vicinity,  and  it  was  supposed 
would  co-operate  with  the  fleet  by  an  attack  either 
on  James  or  Morris  Island.  The  responsible  duty 
of  meeting  the  enemy  in  that  quarter  was  confided 
to  General  Gist. 

Colonel  R.  F.  Graham  commanded  the  small  force 
on  Morris  Island,  on  which  were  the  very  important 
works,  Batteries  Gregg  and  Wagner. 

On  the  morning  of  April  5  Admiral  DuPont,  on 
his  flagship,  the  New  Ironsides,  having  joined  the 
"ironclads,"  as  they  were  generally  called,  at  South 
Edisto,  the  whole  fleet  steamed  toward  Charleston 
harbor,  the  monitors  in  tow  of  suitable  steamers. 
That  evening,  having  sounded  and  buoyed  the  bar 
of  the  main  channel,  the  Keokuk,  the  Patapsco,  and 
Kaatskill  passed  the  bar  and  anchored  within.  The 
next  morning  the  Admiral,  his  flag  flying  on  the  New 
Ironsides,  crossed  the  bar,  followed  by  the  other 
ironclads.  It  was  his  intention  to  proceed  the  same 
day  to  Charleston,  attacking  Fort  Sumter  on  the 
way,  but  the  weather  was  unfavorable  and  the  pilots 
refused  to  proceed  further. 

At  midday  on  the  yth  signal  was  made  for  the 
whole  fleet  to  move  forward  to  the  attack.  The 
order  of  battle  was  "line  ahead,"  the  vessels  moving 
in  the  following  order:  The  Weehawken,  Captain 
John  Rodgers;  the  Passaic,  Captain  Percival  Dray- 
ton;  the  Montauk,  Captain  John  L.  Worden;  the 
Patapsco,  Commander  Daniel  Ammen;  the  New 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       169 

Ironsides  (flagship),  Commodore  Thomas  Turner; 
the  Kaatskill,  Commander  George  W.  Rodgers;  the 
Nantucket,  Commander  Donald  McN.  Fairfax;  the 
Nahant,  Commander  John  Downs,  and  the  Keokuk, 
Commander  A.  C.  Rhind. 

The  New  Ironsides  carried  fourteen  n-inch  guns 
and  two  i5O-pounder  Parrott  rifles;  the  Patapsco, 
one  15-inch  and  one  i5O-pounder  Parrot  rifle.  The 
Keokuk,  two  n-inch  guns;  the  others  one  1 5-inch 
and  one  ii-inch  gun  each. 

Commanders  were  ordered  to  pass  the  Morris 
Island  batteries,  Wagner  and  Gregg,  without  re 
turning  their  fire,  unless  specially  signaled  to  do  so 
by  the  Admiral.  They  were  directed  to  take  posi 
tions  to  the  north  and  west  of  Sumter,  within  about 
eight  hundred  yards,  and  open,  firing  low  with  great 
care,  and  aiming  at  the  center  embrasures.  The  Ad 
miral's  order  of  battle  adds:  "After  the  reduction 
of  Fort  Sumter  it  is  probable  that  the  next  point  of 
attack  will  be  the  batteries  on  Morris  Island."  A 
squadron  of  vessels,  consisting  of  the  Canandalgua, 
Housatonic,  Huron,  Unadilla,  and  Wlssahlckon, 
Captain  J.  F.  Green  commanding,  was  held  in  re 
serve  outside  the  bar  and  near  the  entrance  buoy,  in 
readiness  to  support  the  ironclads  in  the  proposed 
attack  on  the  Morris  Island  batteries. 

The  Weehawken  was  handicapped  and  incum- 
bered  by  a  raft  attached  to  its  bow  to  explode  tor 
pedoes.1  In  weighing  anchor  her  chain  became  en- 

*It   was   called   the   "Devil"    and   was    cut    adrift   and   floated 
ashore  on  Morris  Island. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 


tangled  in  the  grapnels  of  the  raft,  delaying  the  line 
nearly  two  hours.  About  1  115  the  whole  fleet  was 
under  way,  but  the  raft  attached  to  the  W  'eehawken 
delayed  her  and  the  ironclads  that  were  following, 
causing  wild  steering  along  the  whole  line  ;  the  moni 
tors  "sheering  every  way"  when  their  engines 
stopped,  so  that  it  was  impossible  to  preserve  the 
ordered  interval  of  one  hundred  yards  between  the 
vessels. 

The  weather  was  as  calm  and  the  water  as 
smooth  as  could  have  been  desired  for  naval  firing. 
Reports  had  gone  abroad  of  the  extent  of  the  ob 
structions  and  number  of  torpedoes  in  the  harbor. 
While  moving  into  action  a  number  of  buoys  were 
observed,  unpleasantly  suggestive  of  the  presence  of 
torpedoes,  one  of  which  exploded  near  the  Wee- 
hawken,  lifting  her  somewhat,  but  without  disabling 
her. 

Just  before  the  leading  vessel  came  within  range 
the  long  roll  was  beat  in  Fort  Sumter,  "the  garrison, 
regimental  and  palmetto  flags  were  hoisted  and 
saluted  by  thirteen  guns,  the  band  playing  the 
national  air,  'Dixie.'  '  A  few  minutes  before  3 
o'clock  P.  M.,  the  leading  monitor  having  approached 
to  within  about  two  thousand  yards  of  Fort  Moultrie, 
the  action  was  opened  by  a  shot  from  that  fort,  fired 
by  its  commander,  Colonel  William  Butler.  Three 
minutes  later  the  leading  monitor,  when  about  fif 
teen  hundred  yards  from  Sumter,  fired  two  guns 
simultaneously.  Then  Sumter  opened,  firing  by  bat 
tery.  The  action  became  general  and  for  more  than 
two  hours  nearly  a  hundred  guns  on  land  and  water, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       171 

many  of  them  of  the  heaviest  caliber  yet  ever  used, 
were  in  rapid  action. 

It  was  a  calm  and  balmy  day  in  spring — the  season 
of  greatest  natural  beauty  and  luxuriance  in  that 
mild  region.  It  was  the  season  at  which  Charleston 
had  been  wont  to  present  its  most  attractive  phase, 
when  the  wealthy  planters  and  their  families  had  not 
yet  been  driven  by  the  heat  from  their  city  houses 
and  when  the  hotels  were  most  crowded  with  visitors 
from  the  North.  In  strong  contrast  to  the  picture 
of  tranquil  pleasure  and  enjoyment,  in  a  mild,  deli 
cious  climate,  which  the  city  had  formerly  presented 
at  this  season,  was  the  scene  of  strained  excitement 
and  anxiety  on  this  day  of  the  attack  on  the  harbor 
defenses  of  Charleston.  From  every  point  of  view 
in  the  city  the  eyes  of  the  many  thousands  of  specta 
tors  were  riveted  on  the  grand  and  imposing  spec 
tacle.  The  church  steeples,  roofs,  windows,  and 
piazzas  of  houses  on  the  "Battery"  were  crowded 
with  eager,  breathless  witnesses  of  this  bombard 
ment,  the  precursor  of  a  siege  which  was  to  arouse 
in  the  people  there  assembled  and  those  whom  they 
represented  every  high  and  patriotic  hope,  every 
reserve  of  courage  and  endurance,  the  sublimest  exer 
cise  of  patience  and  submission. 

From  the  blockading  fleet  and  transports  off  the 
bar  this  trial  of  strength  and  endurance  between 
forts  and  ships,  the  latter  brought  to  the  highest 
point  of  precision  and  destructive  power,  was  wit 
nessed  by  other  anxious  spectators,  who  confidently 
anticipated  a  brilliant  victory  for  the  fleet,  with  feel 
ings  scarcely  less  intense  than  those  of  the  people  in 


172      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  city  who  fully  realized  the  importance  to  them  of 
the  events  which  hung  upon  the  issue. 

Through  the  thunder  of  artillery  ran  the  heavy 
thud  of  the  huge  shells  as  they  pounded  the  brick 
walls  of  Sumter  and  the  sharp  metallic  ring  and 
crash  of  the  shot  and  shells  as  they  struck  the  iron 
turrets  and  casings  of  the  monitors,  tearing  away 
the  iron  plates,  crashing  through  the  sides  and  decks, 
or  shivering  into  fragments  by  the  concussion  and 
falling  then  in  showers  about  the  deck  or  into  the 
water. 

The  ironclads  came  into  action  in  succession,  and 
though  the  engagement  lasted  about  two  hours  and 
twenty  minutes,  from  thirty  to  forty-five  minutes7 
exposure  to  the  fire  of  the  forts  and  batteries  sufficed 
to  put  the  vessels  hors  de  combat. 

The  Weehawken  fired  twenty-six  shots  and  was 
struck  fifty-three  times.  A  part  of  her  side  armor 
was  so  shattered  that  it  hung  in  splintered  fragments, 
which  could  be  pulled  off  with  the  hand,  thus  expos 
ing  the  woodwork.  Her  deck  was  pierced,  making 
a  hole  through  which  the  water  poured,  and  her 
turret  was  so  shaken  by  the  pounding  to  which  it 
was  subjected  that  it  revolved  with  difficulty,  thus 
greatly  retarding  her  fire. 

The  Passaic,  Captain  Percival  Drayton,  was  even 
more  roughly  handled  than  the  Weehawken.  She 
succeeded  in  firing  only  thirteen  shots  and  was  struck 
thirty-five  times.  At  the  fourth  discharge  of  her 
n-inch  gun  the  turret  was  struck  twice  in  quick 
succession,  bulging  in  its  plates  and  beams  and  forc 
ing  together  the  rails  on  which  the  gun-carriage 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      173 

worked,  rendering  the  gun  wholly  useless  for  the  re 
mainder  of  the  action.  An  instant  later  the  turret 
was  so  jammed  that  it  could  not  be  moved,  thus 
effectually  ending  its  fire.  The  turret  was  again 
struck  by  a  heavy  rifle  shot,  which  shattered  all  of 
the  eleven  plates  on  the  upper  edge,  then  glancing 
upward  struck  the  pilot  house  with  such  force  as  to 
mash  it  in,  bend  it  over,  open  the  plates  and  press 
them  out  and,  lifting  the  top,  exposing  the  inside  to 
such  a  degree  that  another  shot  would,  it  was 
thought,  knock  the  top  entirely  off.  Under  the  ter 
rific  fire  to  which  his  vessel  was  exposed  Captain 
Drayton  could  not  examine  it  to  ascertain  the  extent 
of  the  injury.  He  could  not  fire  a  shot,  and  signaled 
the  Admiral  for  permission  to  withdraw;  but  receiv 
ing  no  answer,  he  did  not  stand  on  the  order  of  his 
going,  but  went  at  once  out  of  range.  He  could 
not  discover  then,  nor  the  next  morning  when  he 
had  a  good  view  of  the  exposed  face  of  the  fort, 
that  it  was  in  the  least  injured,  and  he  was  satisfied 
that  under  the  circumstances  then  existing,  "the  moni 
tors  were  no  match  for  the  forts." 

The  Montauk  suffered  less  than  her  predecessors, 
but  the  brief  engagement  convinced  her  commander, 
Captain  Worden,  "that  Charleston  cannot  be  taken 
by  the  naval  force  now  present,  and  that  had  the 
attack  continued  it  could  not  have  failed  to  result  in 
disaster." 

The  Patapsco  opened  fire  on  Sumter  with  her  150- 
pounder  rifle  at  fifteen  hundred  yards,  and  with  her 
15-inch  gun  at  twelve  hundred  yards.  At  the  fifth 
discharge  the  i5O-pounder  was  disabled  for  the  re- 


174      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

mainder  of  the  action.  The  commanders  of  the 
leading  vessels,  apprehending  entanglement  by  drift 
ing  within  the  rope  obstructions  which  could  be  seen 
ahead,  turned  their  prows  seaward.  The  Patapsco, 
endeavoring  to  follow  their  lead,  refused  to  obey  her 
helm,  and  was  detained  sufficiently  long  to  receive  the 
concentrated  fire  of  Sumter  and  the  Sullivan  Island 
batteries.  She  was  struck  forty-seven  times  and  her 
turret  was  so  battered  as  to  prevent  or  greatly  retard 
its  turning,  thus  rendering  her  only  remaining  gun 
next  to  useless,  when  she  retired  out  of  range. 

The  turning  back  of  the  four  leading  monitors 
and  their  moving  seaward  threw  the  line  into  much 
confusion,  the  vessels  becoming  somewhat  entangled, 
so  much  so  that  the  flagship  came  into  collision  with 
two  of  the  monitors  and  was  obliged  to  anchor  twice 
to  prevent  running  ashore.  She  could  not  fire  on 
Fort  Sumter  without  great  risk  of  firing  into  the 
monitors,  but  was  detained  at  the  distance  of  about 
a  mile  from  Fort  Sumter,  subjected  to  a  heavy  fire, 
all  the  more  galling  because  it  could  not  be  returned. 
She  only  fired  eight  shots  at  Fort  Moultrie. 

The  Confederate  account  says  she  was  struck 
sixty-three  times  at  the  distance  of  between  seven 
teen  hundred  and  eighteen  hundred  yards,  and  then 
moved  to  the  distance  of  two  thousand  yards — out  of 
effective  range.  She  was  less  injured  than  the  moni 
tors,  probably  because  she  was,  for  want  of  sufficient 
depth  of  water,  at  a  greater  distance  than  they.  One 
of  her  port  shutters  was  shot  away  and  Commander 
Turner,  in  his  official  report  to  the  Admiral,  says: 

"My  impression  is,  had  you  been  able  to  get  this 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       175 

ship  into  close  position,  where  her  broadsides  would 
have  been  brought  to  bear,  that  not  one  port  shutter 
would  have  been  left  under  the  fire  of  such  enormous 
projectiles  as  were  thrown  from  the  enemy's  works 
multiplied  on  every  side  of  us." 

For  several  minutes  she  was  in  greater  peril  than 
any  on  board  perhaps  knew.  She  was  directly  over 
a  torpedo,  which  from  some  unknown  cause  failed 
to  explode. 

Finding  his  own  ship  blocking  the  way,  the  Ad 
miral  signaled:  "Disregard  the  movements  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief" ;  and  the  rear  vessels  passed 
ahead,  and  coming  under  fire  shared  substantially 
the  same  fate  as  those  that  preceded  them.  Com 
mander  Fairfax,  of  the  Nantucket,  says  that  having 
approached  close  to  the  obstructions  thrown  across 
the  channel  he  opened  fire  on  Sumter: 

"We  were  then  under  the  fire  of  three  forts,  and 
most  terrible  was  it  for  forty-five  or  fifty  minutes. 
Our  fire  was  very  slow,  necessarily,  and  not  half  so 
observable  upon  the  walls  of  the  forts  as  the  rain  of 
the  rifle  shots  and  heavy  shells  was  upon  this  vessel. 
.  .  .  Certainly  their  [the  Confederate]  firing  was 
excellent  throughout;  fortunately,  it  was  directed  to 
some  half  dozen  ironclads  at  once.  .  .  .  Our  ves 
sels  could  not  long  have  withstood  the  concentrated 
fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries.  ...  I  must  say  that 
I  am  disappointed  beyond  measure  at  this  experi 
ment  of  monitors  overcoming  strong  forts.  It  was 
a  fair  trial." 

His  fifteen-inch  gun  fired  but  three  shots  when  it 


1 76      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

was  disabled  for  the  remainder  of  the  action  and  his 
eleven-inch  rifle  fired  twelve  times. 

Commander  Downs  gives  a  lamentable  account 
of  the  experience  of  his  monitor,  the  Nahant,  under 
a  fire  "of  one  hundred  guns,"  as  he  erroneously  sup 
posed,  which  he  describes  as  terrific,  and  he  believed 
almost  unprecedented.  The  blows  from  heavy  shot 
very  soon  so  jammed  the  turret  that  it  could  not  be 
turned,  which  effectually  stopped  his  fire.  The  con 
cussion  of  a  heavy  shot  on  the  pilot  house  forced  oft 
on  the  inside  a  piece  of  iron  weighing  seventy-eight 
pounds,  and  drove  it  with  such  violence  that  in  its 
course  to  the  other  side  it  came  in  contact  with  the 
steering-gear,  bending  and  disarranging  it  so  that  it 
could  not  be  worked. 

Bolt-heads  were  forced  off  and  driven  in  showers 
about  the  pilot  house  and  turret,  one  of  them  mor 
tally  wounding  the  quartermaster,  Edward  Cobbf 
and  others  knocking  the  pilot,  Mr.  Sofield,  senseless, 
leaving  the  commander  himself  alone  in  the  pilot 
house.  His  vessel  was  struck  thirty-six  times,  the 
iron  plating  was  broken  in  several  places,  and  in 
some  stripped  from  the  wood  backing,  which  was 
broken.  He  describes  the  effects  of  the  shot  more 
minutely  than  the  other  commanders,  to  draw  atten 
tion  to  the  weak  points  of  the  monitors  for  the  bene 
fit  of  future  builders  of  such  vessels.  After  repeated 
and  futile  efforts  to  train  his  guns  on  the  fort  and 
renew  the  action,  he  abandoned  the  effort  and  with 
drew. 

The  Keokuk  was  the  rear  vessel  of  the  line.    Her 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      177 

commander,  A.  C.  Rhind,  becoming  impatient  of  the 
long  delay,  passed  not  only  the  Ironsides,  but  the 
vessels  ahead  of  him  and,  defiantly  directing  his  prow 
toward  Sumter,  approached  nearer  than  any  other 
vessel  had  done,  firing  as  he  advanced,  and  drawing 
on  the  Keokuk  the  concentrated  fire  of  Sumter, 
Moultrie,  Bee,  and  the  battery  on  Cumming's  Point. 
But  he  was  permitted  to  fire  only  three  shots.  Com 
mander  Rhind's  daring  gallantry  in  carrying  his  ves 
sel  into  action  was  equaled  only  by  the  frankness  and 
brevity  with  which  he  officially  reported  the  result. 
He  says : 

"The  position  taken  by  the  Keokuk  was  main 
tained  for  about  thirty  minutes,  during  which  period 
she  was  struck  ninety  times  in  the  hull  and  turrets. 
Nineteen  shots  pierced  through  at  and  just  below 
the  water  line.  The  turrets  were  pierced  in  many 
places;  one  of  the  forward  port  shutters  shot  away; 
in  short,  the  vessel  was  completely  riddled.  Finding 
it  impossible  to  keep  her  afloat  many  minutes  more 
under  such  an  extraordinary  fire,  during  which  rifle 
projectiles  of  every  species  and  the  largest  caliber, 
as  also  hot  shot,  were  poured  into  us,  I  reluctantly 
withdrew  from  action  at  4:40  p.  M.,  with  the  gun- 
carriage  of  the  forward  turret  disabled  and  so  many 
of  the  crews  of  the  after  gun  wounded  as  to  prevent 
a  possibility  of  remaining  under  fire.  I  succeeded 
in  getting  the  Keokuk  to  an  anchor  out  of  range  of 
fire  and  kept  her  afloat  during  the  night  in  the  smooth 
water,  though  the  water  was  pouring  into  her  in 
many  places." 

In  the  morning  the  water  becoming  a  little  ruffled, 


178      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

she  sank,  leaving  only  her  smoke-stack  out  to  show 
her  position.  Her  crew,  with  the  killed  and  wounded, 
were  taken  off. 

About  half-past  four  Admiral  DuPont  signaled 
the  fleet  to  withdraw,  intending  to  renew  the  attack 
the  next  day.  By  five  o'clock  the  monitors  were 
under  way,  following  the  flagship  seaward,  and  soon 
anchored  out  of  range,  but  within  the  bar,  the  fire 
of  the  forts  gradually  ceasing  as  the  fleet  receded. 

The  fire  of  the  fleet  had  been  directed  mainly 
against  Fort  Sumter,  but  little  attention  being  given 
to  the  other  batteries.  The  flagstaff  of  Fort  Moultrie 
was  shot  down,  killing  in  its  fall  Private  Lusby,  of 
the  First  South  Carolina  Infantry.  There  was  no 
other  casualty  on  Sullivan's  Island.  When  the  flagstaff 
fell,  Captains  Wigg  and  Wardlaw  and  Lieutenants 
King  and  Calhoun  quickly  sprang  to  the  top  of  a 
traverse  and  on  the  parapet  and  displayed  the  regi 
mental,  garrison,  and  battle  flags  in  conspicuous 
positions. 

Fort  Sumter,  though  not  seriously  damaged,  was 
more  injured  than  the  Federals  seem  to  have  thought, 
but  not  as  much  as  might  have  been  expected  from 
the  impact  on  brick  walls  of  the  heaviest  shot  ever 
yet  used  in  war.  The  walls  were  struck  by  about 
thirty-six  of  those  heavy  shot.2  Two  1 5-inch  shells 

2Admiral  Ammen,  in  his  book,  says  the  fort  was  struck 
fifty-five  times,  and  it  appears  from  the  report  of  the  Confed 
erate  engineer  who  examined  the  fort  immediately  after  the 
action  that  there  were  that  number  of  marks  or  scars  on  the 
walls,  but  he  says  that  many  of  those  scars  were  made  by 
fragments  of  shells  that  exploded  in  front  of  the  walls. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      179 

penetrated  the  eastern  face  near  an  embrasure  of 
the  second  tier,  one  exploding  in  the  casemate,  the 
other  in  the  middle  of  the  fort.  One  i  i-inch  shot 
also  penetrated  the  wall.  The  carriage  of  a  lo-inch 
columbiad  was  demolished  and  a  42-pounder  was 
dismounted,  both  of  which  were  promptly  remounted 
and  made  ready  for  action.  Five  men  were  wounded 
by  fragments  of  masonry  and  wood  in  Fort  Sumter; 
three  were  killed  and  five  wounded  in  Fort  Wagner 
by  an  accidental  explosion  of  an  ammunition  chest. 

The  Confederates  had  sixty-nine  guns  of  various 
caliber  in  action,  but  only  forty-one  of  them  (ex 
clusive  of  mortars)  were  above  the  caliber  of  thirty- 
two  pounders.  The  armament  of  the  fleet  was  thirty- 
two  guns  (eight  of  which,  it  seems,  were  not  fired), 
of  8-,  II-,  and  1 8-inch  caliber,  which  at  a  single  dis 
charge  could  throw  nearly  as  great  a  weight  of  metal 
as  could  the  land  batteries. 

The  Confederates  fired  in  all  2229  shots  and  con 
sumed  21,093  pounds  of  powder.  The  fleet  fired 
142  (the  Confederates  say  151)  shots  and  consumed 
nearly  5000  pounds  of  powder.  The  two  combined 
fired  upon  an  average  of  seventeen  shots,  varying  in 
weight  from  30  to  400  pounds  (or  about  1300 
pounds  of  iron),  and  consumed  about  185  pounds  of 
powder  per  minute,  during  140  consecutive  minutes, 
the  heaviest  fire  ever  yet  delivered  in  so  brief  a  bom 
bardment. 

The  Confederate  fire  seems  to  have  been  much 
more  accurate  than  the  Federal.  About  an  equal 
proportion  of  the  shots  fired  on  each  side  struck  the 
objects  at  which  they  were  aimed,  but  there  was  a 


i8o      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

very  wide  difference  in  the  sizes  of  those  objects. 
A  monitor  afloat  is  "in  appearance  not  inaptly  lik 
ened  to  a  cheese  box  on  a  plank,"  the  "plank"  repre 
senting  the  deck  and  the  "cheese  box"  the  revolving 
turret  in  which  are  the  guns.  Its  apparent  length  is 
200  feet  and  beam  45  feet.  The  hull,  however,  is 
but  159  feet  in  length.  The  turret  is  21  feet  and 
10  inches  in  diameter  and  9  feet  high.  It  is  sur 
mounted  by  a  pilot  house  9  feet  4  inches  in  diameter 
and  7  feet  high.  From  bow  to  stern  the  deck  varies 
from  2^4  to  iV2  feet  above  the  water.  An  exceed 
ingly  small  part,  therefore,  of  the  hull  was  exposed 
above  water  to  fire.  They  were  in  motion  also  dur 
ing  the  action. 

Such  an  object  in  motion  presented  but  a  small 
mark  at  which  to  fire  at  the  distance  of  from  one 
thousand  to  fifteen  hundred  yards.  Fort  Sumter  on 
the  contrary  was  a  very  large  and  stationary  object, 
presenting  fronts  of  three  tiers  of  guns  at  which  to 
aim.  The  accuracy  of  the  Confederate  fire  was  due 
in  a  great  measure  to  an  ingenious  contrivance  of 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Yates,  which  enabled  five  men 
to  hold  the  heaviest  guns  trained  on  the  ironclads 
when  in  motion. 

The  little  damage  that  Fort  Sumter  suffered  was 
promptly  repaired  during  the  night  and  the  weak 
points  in  the  walls  which  the  fire  had  disclosed  were 
reinforced  by  sand-bags.  The  Confederates  confi 
dently  expected  the  engagement  to  be  renewed  the 
next  day,  and  the  forts  and  batteries  were  as  well 
prepared  to  receive  an  attack  on  the  morning  of 
the  8th  as  they  had  been  on  the  morning  of  the  yth. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      181 

But  it  was  not  renewed.  "The  enemy  was  beaten," 
says  General  Ripley,  "before  their  adversaries 
thought  the  action  had  well  commenced." 

During  the  evening  of  the  7th  the  commanders 
of  the  ironclads  went  on  board  the  flagship  and  ver 
bally  reported  to  the  Admiral  the  incidents  of  the 
engagement  and  the  condition  of  their  respective  ves 
sels.  Their  reports  decided  him  not  to  renew  the 
attack,  and  he  promptly  forwarded  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  a  dispatch,  in  which  he  says: 

"I  yesterday  moved  up  with  eight  ironclads  and 
this  ship  and  attacked  Fort  Sumter,  intending  to  pass 
it  and  commence  action  on  its  northwest  face,  in 
accordance  with  my  order  of  battle.  The  heavy 
fire  received  from  it  and  Fort  Moultrie  and  the 
nature  of  the  obstructions  compelled  the  attack  from 
the  outside.  It  was  fierce  and  obstinate,  and  the 
gallantry  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  vessels  en 
gaged  was  conspicuous.  This  vessel  could  not  be 
brought  into  such  close  action  as  I  endeavored  to 
get  her.  Owing  to  the  narrow  channel  and  rapid 
current  she  became  partly  unmanageable,  and  was 
twice  forced  to  anchor  to  prevent  her  going  ashore, 
once  owing  to  her  having  come  into  collison  with 
two  of  the  monitors.  She  could  not  get  nearer  than 
one  thousand  yards.  Owing  to  the  condition  of  the 
tide  and  an  unavoidable  accident,  I  had  been  com 
pelled  to  delay  action  until  in  the  afternoon,  and 
toward  evening,  finding  no  impression  made  upon 
the  fort,  I  made  a  signal  to  withdraw  the  ships,  in 
tending  to  renew  the  attack  this  morning. 

"But  the  commanders  of  the  monitors  came  on 


1 82      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

board  and  reported  verbally  the  injuries  of  their 
vessels,  when  without  hesitation  or  consultation  (for 
I  never  hold  councils  of  war)  I  determined  not  to 
renew  the  attack,  for  in  my  judgment  it  would  have 
converted  a  failure  into  a  disaster,  and  I  will  only 
add  that  Charleston  cannot  be  taken  by  a  purely 
naval  attack,  and  the  army  could  give  me  no  co 
operation." 

In  reply  to  a  complimentary  letter  from  General 
Hunter,  who  had  witnessed  the  action  in  a  transport 
steamer,  the  Admiral  says: 

"I  feel  very  comfortable,  General,  for  the  reason 
that  a  merciful  Providence  permitted  me  to  have  a 
failure,  instead  of  a  disaster." 

Admiral  Ammen,  who  commanded  the  Patapsco, 
says  in  his  recently  published  book,  "The  Atlantic 
Coast" : 

"The  result  of  the  attack  was  mortifying  to  all 
of  the  officers  and  men  engaged  in  it.  Had  any  loss 
of  life  been  regarded  as  likely  to  render  another 
attempt  successful,  there  would  have  been  few  indeed 
who  would  not  have  desired  it.  The  opinion  before 
the  attack  was  general,  and  was  fully  shared  in  by 
the  writer,  that  whatever  might  be  the  loss  in  men 
and  vessels  blown  up  by  torpedoes  or  otherwise  de 
stroyed  (and  such  losses  were  supposed  probable), 
at  all  events  Fort  Sumter  would  be  reduced  to  a 
pile  of  ruins  before  the  sun  went  down." 

General  Beauregard  had  confidently  expected 
every  man  of  his  command  to  do  his  duty,  and  he 
was  not  disappointed,  for  their  hearts  were  thor 
oughly  in  their  work.  Confederate  and  Federal 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      183 

officers  alike  bear  testimony  to  the  accuracy  of  the 
Confederate  fire,  while  the  monitors  themselves 
bore  mute  but  more  expressive  evidence  of  its 
effects. 

All  that  professional  skill  and  gallantry  could  do 
had  been  done  by  the  officers  and  crews  of  the  vessels 
to  achieve  success.  They  had  fought  the  united  iron 
clads  to  their  utmost  capacity.  The  result  had 
proved  that  these  novel  engines  of  naval  warfare  on 
which  such  high  hopes  were  built  had  not  materially 
changed  the  military  relations  between  forts  and 
ships.  It  had  also  given  another  striking  proof  of 
the  fallacy  of  the  belief  that,  caeteris  paribus,  ships 
can  reduce  forts.  Just  two  years  previously,  less  one 
week,  Confederate  land  batteries  had  opened  fire  on 
Fort  Sumter,  newly  constructed  by  United  States  en 
gineers,  at  greater  distance  than  that  which  the  moni 
tors  had  attacked,  and  with  greatly  inferior  guns  had 
compelled  its  surrender.  A  few  months  later  Fede 
ral  land  batteries  on  Morris  Island,  at  more  than 
double  the  monitors'  distance,  had  demolished  the 
exposed  walls  of  Fort  Sumter. 

This  attack  also  illustrated  what  was  conspicuous 
throughout  the  war,  the  great  difference  in  the  rela 
tive  numbers  of  killed  and  wounded  in  battles  on 
land  and  those  between  forts  and  ships.  In  this  en 
gagement  between  the  Federal  ironclad  fleet  and 
the  forts  and  batteries  at  the  entrance  to  Charleston, 
the  casualties  on  the  Confederate  side  were  one  killed 
and  five  wounded.  On  the  Federal,  one  killed  and 
twenty  wounded.  Little  less  than  a  year  before  in 
a  battle  on  James'  Island  in  sight  of  Fort  Sumter 


1 84      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

nearly  nine  hundred  men  had  been  killed  or  wounded 
in  less  than  half  an  hour. 

The  fleet  remained  within  the  bar  but  out  of 
range,  repairing  and  refitting,  until  high  tide  on  the 
evening  of  the  I2th,  when  it  passed  out,  the  New 
Ironsides  taking  her  place  with  the  blockading  fleet, 
and  the  monitors  were  towed  southward  to  Port 
Royal  for  repairs,  leaving  only  the  Keokuk  sunk  with 
her  smokestack  out  of  water  marking  her  position. 
In  a  few  days  the  Confederates  dived  into  her  and 
lifted  out  her  heavy  guns,  flags,  swords,  and  smaller 
articles.  Her  guns  were  soon  mounted  in  the  Con 
federate  batteries. 

When  the  news  of  the  failure  reached  Washing 
ton  President  Lincoln  dispatched  Admiral  DuPont: 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  April   13,   1863. 

Hold  your  position  inside  the  bar  near  Charleston,  or,  if  you 
have  left  it,  return  to  it  and  hold  it  until  further  orders.  Do 
not  allow  the  enemy  to  erect  new  batteries  or  defenses  on 
Morris  Island.  If  he  has  begun  it,  drive  him  out.  I  do  not 
herein  order  you  to  renew  the  general  attack.  That  is  to 
depend  on  your  discretion  or  further  orders. 

A.   LINCOLN. 

The  following  day,  April  14,  he  dispatched  to  the 
Admiral  and  General  Hunter  jointly: 

This  is  intended  to  clear  up  any  inconsistency  between  the 
recent  order  to  continue  operations  before  Charleston  and  the 
former  one  to  remove  to  another  point  in  a  certain  contin 
gency.  No  censure  upon  you,  or  either  of  you,  is  intended; 
we  still  hope  by  cordial  and  judicious  co-operation  you  can 
take  the  batteries  on  Morris  Island  and  Sullivan's  Island  and 
Fort  Sumter.  But  whether  you  can  or  not,  we  wish  the  demon- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      185 

gtration  kept  up  for  a  time  for  a  collateral  and  very  important 
object;  we  wish  the  attempt  to  be  a  real  one  (though  not  a 
desperate  one)  if  it  affords  any  considerable  chance  of  success. 
But  if  prosecuted  for  a  demonstration  only,  this  must  not  be 
rnade  public,  or  the  whole  effect  will  be  lost.  Once  again 
before  Charleston,  do  not  leave  till  further  orders  from  here. 
Of  course  this  is  not  intended  to  force  you  to  leave  unduly 
exposed  Hilton  Head  or  other  near  points  in  your  charge. 

A.   LINCOLN. 

Replying  through  the  Navy  Department,  the  Ad 
miral  assured  the  Secretary  that  he  would  urge  for 
ward  the  repairs  of  the  serious  injuries  sustained  by 
the  monitors  and  return  within  the  bar  as  soon  as 
possible ;  he  thought,  however,  that  the  move  would 
be  attended  with  great  risk  to  the  monitors  from 
gales  and  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  which 
"they  could  neither  silence  nor  prevent  the  erection 
of  new  ones."  He  would,  of  course,  obey  with  fidelity 
all  orders  he  might  receive,  even  when  entirely  at 
variance  with  his  own  judgment,  such  as  the  order 
to  reoccupy  the  unsafe  anchorage  off  Morris  Island, 
"and  an  intimation  that  a  renewal  of  the  attack  on 
Charleston  may  be  ordered,  which  in  my  judgment 
would  be  attended  with  disastrous  results,  involving 
the  loss  of  this  coast."  He  was  painfully  struck  by 
the  tenor  and  tone  of  the  President's  orders,  which, 
he  thought,  implied  censure,  and  requested  the  Secre 
tary  not  to  hesitate  to  relieve  him  by  an  officer  who 
might  be  thought  "more  able  to  execute  that  service 
in  which  I  have  had  the  misfortune  to  fail- -the  cap 
ture  of  Charleston." 

In  Washington,  and  in  the  North  generally,  it 
had  been  confidently  believed  that  the  attack  would 


1 86      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

result  in  the  fall  of  Charleston.  So  confident  was 
the  Navy  Department  of  a  successful  result,  that  on 
the  2d  of  April  orders  were  issued  and  dispatched 
to  Admiral  DuPont  to  send  a  number  of  the  iron 
clads,  which  the  fall  of  Charleston  would  render 
available,  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  for  service  in  that 
quarter  and  in  the  Mississippi.  The  failure  was  a 
grievous  disappointment  in  the  North,  while  in  the 
South  the  vague  but  serious  apprehension  of  danger 
from  the  ironclads  was  dispelled,  and  in  Charleston 
especially  it  was  felt  that  the  city  had  nothing  to 
apprehend  from  the  fleet  alone. 

Of  course  the  failure  was  sharply  criticised  in  the 
Northern  press.  Whoever  relies  on  the  newspapers 
of  the  period  for  correct  information  in  regard  to 
the  battles  of  that  war  will  inevitably  be  led  into 
grave  errors.  In  regard  to  this  naval  attack,  some 
of  the  papers  severely  censured  the  Administration 
for  ordering  or  permitting  it  without  providing 
ample  means  to  insure  success,  and  the  causes  of 
the  failure  were  fully  explained.  The  ironclads,  it 
was  said,  while  moving  up  to  the  attack  had  become 
entangled  in  the  rope  obstructions  which  were  well 
known  to  be  in  the  channel  and,  while  so  hampered, 
had  been  exposed  to  the  fire  of  three  hundred  guns, 
many  of  them  supplied  from  England  and  of  the 
heaviest  caliber  ever  used  in  war,  and  at  short  range, 
in  some  instances  three  hundred  yards. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward,  seems  to 
have  obtained  some  of  his  information  on  the  subject 
from  the  newspapers  rather  than  from  the  official 
reports.  In  a  printed  circular  letter  signed  by  him 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       187 

and  addressed  to  the  diplomatic  agents  of  the  gov 
ernment  abroad  he  says: 

"An  attack  by  the  fleet  on  the  yth  of  April  last 
upon  the  forts  and  batteries  which  defend  the  harbor 
of  Charleston  failed,  because  the  rope  obstructions 
in  the  channel  fouled  the  screws  of  the  ironclads 
and  compelled  them  to  return,  after  passing  through 
the  fire  of  the  batteries.  These  bore  the  fire  of  the 
forts,  although  some  defects  of  construction  were 
revealed  by  the  injuries  they  received.  The  crews 
passed  through  the  unexampled  cannonade  with 
singular  impunity.  Not  a  life  was  lost  on  board  a 
monitor." 

None  of  the  ironclads  approached  the  rope  ob 
structions  nearer  than  six  hundred  yards,  except  the 
Keokuk,  which,  after  being  disabled,  drifted  within 
about  three  hundred  yards  of  them  before  she 
could  be  got  under  way  again.  The  rope  obstruc 
tions  were  therefore  not  encountered  by  any  of  the 
vessels.  They  had  not  passed  through  the  fire  of 
the  forts,  for  some  of  the  heaviest  batteries  had  not 
been  brought  into  action.  The  Keokuk,  as  has  been 
stated,  was  not  nearer  Fort  Sumter  than  nine  hun 
dred  yards,  and  none  of  the  other  vessels  was  so 
near  any  of  the  forts  or  the  batteries.  The  ranges 
varied  from  nine  hundred  to  about  two  thousand 
yards. 

Instead  of  three  hundred,  there  were  but  seventy- 
six  Confederate  guns  of  all  kinds  in  action.  Some 
of  these  were  mortars,  the  fire  of  which  on  so  small 
a  target  as  a  monitor  and  at  such  long  range  is  so 
inaccurate  as  to  be  practically  ineffective.  Of  the 


1 88      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

other  guns  only  forty-one  were  above  the  caliber  of 
32-pounders,  and  guns  of  this  latter  caliber  were  of 
little  avail  against  the  ironclads.  The  most  effective 
fire  was  from  ten  lo-inch  and  nineteen  8-inch  colum- 
biads,  three  9-inch  Dahlgrens  and  two  y-inch  Brook 
guns,  and  they  were  American,  not  English  guns, 
judging  by  the  effects  of  the  fire  from  the  guns  ac 
tually  engaged,  and  at  such  long  range,  it  is  hardly 
extravagant  to  suppose  that  if,  during  the  two  hours 
and  twenty-five  minutes  the  action  lasted,  the  iron 
clads  had  been  exposed  to  the  fire  of  three  hundred 
guns,  at  distances  of  from  three  to  nine  hundred 
yards,  every  one  of  them  would  have  been  sunk  or 
irreparably  disabled. 

General  Hunter  had  held  his  troops  on  Folly, 
Cole's,  and  Seabrook's  islands  in  readiness  to  follow 
up  the  expected  naval  success.  On  the  morning  after 
the  attack  all  was  in  readiness  to  cross  Lighthouse 
Inlet  to  Morris  Island  uwhere,"  says  the  General, 
uonce  established,  the  fall  of  Sumter  would  have 
been  as  certain  as  the  demonstration  of  a  problem  in 
mathematics."  But  the  active  co-operation  of  the 
navy  was  deemed  necessary  to  insure  the  success  of 
the  movement.  The  crossing,  however,  was  sus 
pended  because  of  the  announcement  of  the  Admiral 
that  he  had  resolved  to  retire.  The  General  sent  an 
officer  of  his  staff  to  represent  to  the  Admiral  his 
readiness  to  make  the  movement,  the  great  impor 
tance  of  making  it  promptly  when  the  enemy  was 
unprepared  to  dispute  it  successfully,  and  to  urge 
him  to  co-operate  actively  with  the  fire  of  his  fleet. 
But  to  all  of  these  considerations,  says  the  General, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      189 

"earnestly  and  elaborately  urged,  the  Admiral's 
answer  was  that  he  'would  not  fire  another  shot.' ' 
The  intended  movement  was  therefore  abandoned 
or  indefinitely  suspended.  The  land  as  well  as  the 
naval  expedition  had  come  to  naught  and  further 
movements  for  the  capture  of  Charleston  were  de 
ferred.3 

sln  this  narrative  I  have  followed  substantially  the  official 
reports  of  the  commanders  of  the  ironclads,  especially  on  all 
points  of  which  their  knowledge  may  reasonably  be  supposed 
more  accurate  than  that  of  the  Confederate  officers.  The  only 
material  differences  between  the  Federal  and  Confederate 
reports  are  as  to  the  distances  of  the  vessels  from  the  forts, 
batteries,  and  obstructions.  As  to  them,  I  have  followed  the 
Confederate  reports,  because  the  officers  making  them  had 
been  on  duty  in  the  harbor  defenses  for  many  months — some 
of  them  for  two  years.  They  had  made  the  harbor  a  military 
study,  had  placed  obstructions,  planted  torpedoes,  anchored 
buoys,  and  carefully  measured  the  distances  that  it  was  de 
sirable  to  know.  They  therefore  of  necessity  had  more  accu 
rate  knowledge  on  those  points  than  the  naval  officers  could 
have  gathered  in  the  brief  period  of  the  action,  when  they 
were  in  strange  waters,  under  a  terrific  fire,  their  attention 
riveted  to  the  work  in  hand,  with  such  limited  view  of  the 
harbor  as  they  could  catch  through  the  small  circular  holes  in 
the  pilot-houses  and  the  two  port-holes  in  the  revolving  tur 
rets,  while  the  smoke  was  so  dense  that  as  Commodore  Turner 
says,  often  he  could  not  see  distinctly  fifty  yards  ahead.  Under 
such  circumstances  they  could  scarcely  be  expected  to  judge 
distances  accurately.  Colonel  Rhett,  the  commander  of  Sum- 
ter,  had  waited  deliberately  until  the  leading  monitor  had 
reached  a  buoy  the  distance  of  which  was  well  known,  and  on 
which  his  guns  were  trained,  before  opening  fire.  Both  Col 
onel  Rhett  and  his  adjutant  made  careful  observations  during 
the  whole  action. 


CHAPTER  X 

Federal  lack  of  co-operation — Army  and  navy  at  odds — Hunter 
and  DuPont  relieved  of  commands — Gillmore  in  command 
of  army — Dahlgren  commands  navy — Topography  of  Char 
leston  harbor  and  city — Gillmore's  plan  of  operations — 
Strength  of  the  defense — Attack  on  Morris  Island — Success 
of  movement — Confederate  loss — Assault  of  Battery  Wag 
ner — Repulse — Loss  on  both  sides. 

In  order  to  reap  all  the  advantages  the  combined 
Federal  land  and  naval  forces  could  gain  on  the 
South  Atlantic  coast,  it  was  obviously  necessary  that 
there  should  be  very  earnest  and  hearty  co-operation 
between  those  arms  of  service,  and  instructions  to 
that  effect  were  given  to  the  respective  commanders 
by  their  superior.  It  does  not  appear,  however, 
that  there  was  uniformly  such  co-operation. 

While  the  ironclad  fleet  on  April  7,  1863,  was 
attacking  the  forts  and  batteries  which  defended 
Charleston  harbor,  General  Hunter,  commanding 
the  Department  of  the  South,  who  witnessed  that 
memorable  bombardment  from  the  deck  of  a  trans 
port  steamer  off  the  bar,  on  which  he  had  his  head 
quarters,  held  all  of  his  available  force  in  close  prox 
imity,  but  made  no  aggressive  movement  with  it. 

Admiral  DuPont,  commanding  the  South  Atlantic 
squadron,  in  his  reports  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
of  the  ironclad  attack  and  its  failure  on  April  7, 

190 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      191 

admits  very  frankly  that  the  result  had  convinced 
him  that  Charleston  could  not  be  taken  by  a  purely 
naval  attack,  and  he  adds :  "The  army  could  give  no 
co-operation." 

On  May  22  General  Hunter  wrote  a  long  letter 
directly  to  President  Lincoln  and  sent  it  by  the  hands 
of  one  of  his  staff  officers,  reminding  the  President 
that  six  weeks  had  elapsed  since  the  naval  attack  on 
Charleston,  an  attack  of  which  he  says:  "From  the 
nature  of  the  Admiral's  plans  the  army  could  take 
no  active  part" ;  that  he  had  himself  been  extremely 
anxious  to  take  advantage  of  the  manifest  weakness 
of  the  Confederates  on  Morris  Island,  to  seize  that 
important  point,  which  he  was  very  sure  could  have 
been  done  with  great  ease;  that  his  troops,  which 
were,  he  says,  "unquestionably  the  best  drilled  sol 
diers  in  the  country,"  were  in  readiness  and  eager 
to  cross  Lighthouse  Inlet,  which  was  only  a  few  hun 
dred  yards  wide,  and  make  a  descent  on  Morris 
Island,  and  that  a  foothold  secured  on  that  strategic 
point  would  make  the  fall  of  Fort  Sumter  as  certain 
as  the  demonstration  of  a  problem  in  mathematics. 
An  attempt,  however,  to  seize  that  island  without  the 
co-operation  of  the  navy  would  be  wholly  futile  and 
only  result  in  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life.  He  had 
therefore  on  the  day  after  the  naval  attack  urged 
the  Admiral  to  co-operate  with  him  in  making  that 
important  move.  He  had  sent  an  officer  of  his  staff 
to  lay  his  views  before  Admiral  DuPont,  but  not 
withstanding  the  clearly  and  elaborately  urged  ad 
vantages  of  the  proposed  move  the  Admiral  laconi 
cally  replied  that  he  "would  not  fire  another  shot." 


1 92      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

Since  then,  says  General  Hunter  to  the  President, 
he  had  exercised  patience  with  the  Admiral,  until 
he  had  become  "painfully  but  finally  convinced  that 
no  aid  could  be  expected  from  the  navy."  He  feared 
that  Admiral  DuPont  distrusted  the  ironclads  so 
much  that  he  was  resolved  to  do  nothing  with  them 
during  the  summer.  General  Hunter  therefore 
urgently  begged  the  President  to  liberate  him  from 
the  orders  to  co-operate  with  the  navy,  "which  now 
tie  me  down  to  the  Admiral's  inactivity."  And  he 
goes  on  to  develop  a  plan  of  operations  which  he  was 
exceedingly  anxious  to  undertake,  if  only  released 
from  co-operation  with  the  navy,  which  plan,  though 
interesting,  need  not  be  here  detailed. 

President  Lincoln  seems  to  have  manifested  his 
disapproval  of  the  proposed  plan  of  campaign,  and 
settled,  as  he  supposed,  the  question  of  co-operation 
between  the  land  and  naval  forces  by  relieving  both 
General  Hunter  and  Admiral  DuPont  from  their 
respective  commands. 

The  selection  of  a  new  commander  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  South  was  indicative  of  the  campaign  the 
Federal  Government  proposed  to  make  in  that  de 
partment. 

General  Hunter,  in  his  published  report  of  his 
own  services  in  the  war,  says  Mr.  Lincoln  told  him 
that  his  "temporary  suspension"  from  the  command 
"was  due  in  a  great  measure  to  the  influence  of  the 
Hon.  Horace  Greeley,"  who,  it  seems,  as  Mr.  Lin 
coln  expressed  it,  "had  found  the  man  to  do  the  job" 
—meaning  the  capture  of  Charleston.  Moved  by 
this  information,  General  Hunter  addressed  an  angry 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      193 

letter  to  the  distinguished  editor,  in  which  he  ex 
pressed  ironically  the  hope  that  since  Mr.  Greeley 
had  taken  it  upon  himself  to  direct  the  attack  on 
Charleston,  he  would  be  more  successful  than  in  his 
first  advance  on  Richmond,  "in  which  you  wasted 
much  ink  and  other  men  shed  some  blood." 

But  it  is  not  difficult  to  find  other  considerations 
which  no  doubt  had  weight  in  the  selection  of  the 
new  commander.  The  General-in-Chief  of  the  Army, 
Halleck,  had  been  an  officer  of  the  United  States 
Engineer  Corps;  so  also  was  his  chief  of  staff,  Gen 
eral  George  W.  Cullum.  There  was  naturally  and 
most  justly  great  esprit  de  corps  among  the  officers 
of  that  distinguished  branch  of  the  military  service. 
The  General-in-Chief  and  his  chief  of  staff,  no  doubt, 
believed  that  an  officer  of  the  Engineer  Corps  was 
better  qualified  than  an  officer  of  any  other  arm  of 
the  service  to  direct  the  operations  for  the  reduction 
of  Charleston,  a  task  requiring  military  engineering 
skill  of  a  high  order.  Under  those  circumstances, 
perhaps  the  following  letter  from  the  officer  whom 
Mr.  Greeley  had  found  "to  do  the  job"  had  its 
weight  in  the  selection  of  General  Hunter's  succes 
sor,  and  is  given  in  full  as  indicative  of  the  plan  of 
campaign  to  be  followed  in  the  Department  of  the 
South. 

NEW  YORK,  May  23,   1863. 

GENERAL  G.  W.  CULLUM,  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  General-in-Chief, 

General:     It  has  come  to   my  knowledge  that  my  name   has 

been   mentioned   to   the   Secretary  of   War  in   connection   with 

the   reduction   of   the    forts   in    Charleston   harbor,    and   it   has 


i94      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

been  urgently  suggested  to  place  me  in  a  position  where  I 
could  direct  and  control  the  operations  of  the  land  forces 
against  that  place.  Two  or  three  communications  from  promi 
nent  men  here  have  been  sent  to  the  Secretary. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  inform  you,  who  are  so  well  acquainted 
with  me,  that  I  am  not  in  the  habit  of  pushing  myself  forward 
or  thrusting  my  professional  opinion  unasked  upon  the  notice 
of  those  in  authority.  In  my  daily  intercourse  with  gentlemen 
of  my  acquaintance  I  am,  however,  always  free  to  answer 
questions,  and  I  have  at  sundry  times  and  in  sundry  places 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  forts  in  Charleston  harbor  could 
be  reduced  by  the  means  (naval  and  military  combined)  now 
available  in  the  Department  of  the  South,  increased  by  a  suit 
able  number  of  the  best  heavy  rifled  guns,  provided  these  have 
not  been  sent  there  since  I  left  the  department  one  year  ago. 

I  have  also  said  that  I  am  willing  to  risk  my  own  reputation 
upon  an  attempt,  as  I  did  at  Pulaski,  provided  I  could  be 
allowed  the  untrammeled  execution  of  my  own  plans  (as  at 
Pulaski),  except  so  far  as  they  iim^ve  co-operation  from  the 
navy. 

You  are  at  liberty  to  show  this  letter  to  the  General-in-Chief 
or  anyone  else. 

I  expect  to  remain  here  until  the  evening  of  the  27th  instant 
and  then  go  directly  to  Cincinnati. 

Very    respectfully,   your   obedient    servant, 

Q.  A.  GILL  MORE,  Brigadier  General. 

-  General  Gillmore,  of  the  Volunteers,  had  served 
with  distinction  as  a  captain  of  Engineers  in  the 
Regular  army  under  Generals  Hunter  and  Benham 
in  the  reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski,  Georgia,  in  April, 
1862.  A  few  days  after  the  date  of  the  foregoing 
letter  he  was  ordered  to  Washington  for  consulta 
tion  with  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  General-in-Chief 
of  the  Army,  and  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON       195 

Navy,  on  the  plan  of  operations  for  the  reduction  of 
Charleston.  He  seems  to  have  reiterated  the  opin 
ions  already  expressed  in  his  letter  and  to  have  fully 
developed  his  plan  of  operations. 

He  urged  that  there  should  be  cordial  and  ener 
getic  co-operation  between  the  land  and  naval  forces. 
The  part  which  the  latter  would  be  called  on  to  per 
form  in  the  execution  of  the  proposed  plan  was 
represented  as  one  in  which  "audacity  should  enter 
as  an  important  element  of  success."  The  com 
mander  of  the  fleet,  therefore,  should  be  an  officer 
who  had  sufficient  confidence  in  the  efficiency  of  the 
turret  ironclads  to  be  "willing  to  risk  his  reputation 
in  the  development  of  their  new  and  comparatively 
untried  powers  against  the  harbor  defenses  of 
Charleston."  Admiral  DuPont  and  his  officers  com 
manding  the  ironclads  seem  to  have  been  under  the 
impression  that  the  powers  of  the  ironclads  had  been 
subjected  to  very  fair  and  severe  test  in  the  attack 
on  the  harbor  defenses  of  Charleston  on  April  7, 
and  the  result  had  not  been  encouraging. 

On  June  3  General  Gillmore  was  ordered  to  relieve 
General  Hunter  in  command  of  the  Department  of 
the  South,  and  a  few  days  later  Admiral  Foote,  who 
had  distinguished  himself  in  command  of  gunboats 
on  the  Western  water,  especially  in  the  operations 
against  Fort  Donelson,  was  ordered  to  relieve  Ad 
miral  DuPont.  Admiral  Foote,  however,  died  a 
few  days  later,  and  Admiral  Dahlgren  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  South  Atlantic  squadron. 

The  Confederate  Government  still  retained  Gen- 


196      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

eral  Beauregard  in  the  important  command  of  the 
Department  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and 
Florida,  to  which  he  had  been  assigned  in  September 
of  the  previous  year.  With  the  exception  of  the 
ironclad  attack  of  April  7  and  the  concentration  of 
the  land  forces  on  that  occasion  to  follow  up  the 
expected  naval  success,  no  demonstration  of  moment 
was  made  against  Charleston  from  the  unsuccessful 
assault  on  Secessionville  on  June  16,  1862,  to  July 
10,  1863.  General  Beauregard  and  his  predecessor, 
General  Pembertori,  had  therefore  something  more 
than  a  year  in  which  to  complete  and  enlarge  the 
defensive  works  which  had  been  planned,  and  in 
great  measure  completed,  and  to  construct  others 
which  close  examination  suggested  and  the  progress 
of  the  war  had  made  necessary  for  the  defense  of  the 
city. 

An  important  change  in  the  original  plan  of  de 
fense  had  been  made  by  General  Pemberton,  in  the 
abandonment  of  Cole's  Island  at  the  southwestern 
extremity  of  James  Island,  an  important  strategic 
point  of  the  outer  defenses  commanding  the  entrance 
to  the  Stono  River.  General  Beauregard  regarded 
the  abandonment  of  Cole's  Island  as  a  fatal  mistake; 
so  did  General  Ripley,  to  whom,  perhaps,  more  than 
to  any  other  officer,  Charleston  was  indebted  for 
the  system  of  defensive  works  which,  together  with 
the  works  which  had  been  constructed  before  the 
war,  enabled  a  comparatively  small  force  to  hold  the 
enemy  at  bay  and  keep  them  away  from  the  city  dur 
ing  the  war.  The  abandonment  of  Cole's  Island 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      197 

had  made  necessary  the  construction  of  a  long  line 
of  works  for  the  defense  of  James  Island,  which  was 
justly  regarded  as  the  key  by  land  to  Charleston. 

More  than  a  year  had  elapsed  during  which,  with 
the  exception  of  April  7,  the  active  war  which  was 
devastating  other  parts  of  the  country  had  not  come 
nigh  Charleston.  The  time  had  now  arrived,  and 
was  to  continue  for  about  twenty  months,  when  the 
thunder  of  artillery — the  sound,  which  no  words  can 
describe,  of  the  heavy  rifle  shots  as  they  flew  through 
the  air,  day  and  night,  bursting  over  and  in  their 
city  and  crashing  through  their  houses — was  to  be 
come  as  familiar  to  her  inhabitants  as  are  the  noises 
of  passing  vehicles  over  the  streets  to  the  dwellers 
in  more  fortunate  cities.  History  may  perhaps  record 
the  military  skill,  steadfast  fidelity,  and  gallantry 
with  which  the  city  was  defended,  but  the  heroic  for 
titude,  cheerful  courage,  and  patient  endurance  with 
which  her  non-combatant  population  bore  the  hard 
ships  of  the  siege  and  the  adversity  of  the  more  try 
ing  period  which  followed  it  will  probably  never  be 
fully  told. 

It  is  as  difficult  to  follow  understandingly  a  nar 
rative  of  military  operations  without  the  aid  of  a 
good  map  as  it  is  to  comprehend  the  demonstration 
of  a  complicated  proposition  in  geometry  without 
the  aid  of  a  diagram.  No  description  of  the  country 
will  adequately  supply  the  place  of  a  good  map.  A 
brief  description,  however,  of  the  limited  scene  of 
the  impending  operations  may  aid  those  not  familiar 
with  the  locality  to  a  better  understanding  of  them, 


198      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

The  city  of  Charleston  is  at  the  extremity  of  the 
narrow  peninsula  between  the  Cooper  and  Ashley 
rivers.  James  Island,  to  the  south  and  east,  is  sepa 
rated  from  the  city  by  Ashley  River,  and  from  St. 
John's  Island,  to  the  south  and  west,  by  the  Stono 
River.  In  greatest  extent  from  north  to  south  it  is 
about  9  miles  and  from  east  to  west  about  7  miles. 
On  its  sea  front  it  is  bordered  by  a  narrow  sandbank 
extending  from  the  entrance  to  Charleston  harbor  to 
Stono  Inlet,  about  n  miles  in  length.  About  3% 
miles  from  the  northern  extremity  this  bank  has  been 
cut  through  by  the  waters  of  the  ocean,  thus  dividing 
it  into  two  islands.  The  northern  part  is  Morris 
Island,  the  southern  Folly  Island.  The  channel  be 
tween  them  is  called  Lighthouse  Inlet.  These  islands 
are  separated  from  the  firm  land  of  James  Island 
by  Folly  River  and  Creek,  Vincent's  Creek,  and  im 
passable  marshes  which  are  subject  to  overflow  by 
very  high  tides  and  are  intersected  by  numerous,  tor 
tuous,  narrow,  but  deep,  streams. 

The  northern  extremity  of  Morris  Island,  which 
is  called  Cumming's  Point,  and  Sullivan's  Island  to 
the  northeast,  border  the  entrance  to  Charleston 
harbor.  Fort  Moultrie  is  near  the  western  end  of 
Sullivan's  Island  and  distant  2700  yards  from  Cum 
ming's  Point,  on  which  the  Confederates  had  con 
structed  a  work  called  Battery  Gregg.  Fort  Sumter 
was  a  brick  work  of  three  tiers  of  guns,  built  on  an 
artificial  island  or  foundation  south  of  the  channel, 
nearly  midway  between  Sullivan's  and  James'  islands, 
about  1760  yards  from  Fort  Moultrie  on  the  former, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      199 

1980  yards  from  Fort  Johnson  on  the  latter,  1390 
yards  from  Cumming's  Point  and  3^  miles  from 
the  city  of  Charleston. 

About  1300  yards  from  Cumming's  Point,  at  a 
very  narrow  part  of  Morris  Island,  was  an  earth 
work  of  considerable  development  and  strength 
called  Battery  Wagner,  which  extended  from  the 
beach  on  the  east  to  Vincent  Creek  on  the  west,  pre 
senting  to  the  southwest  a  front  of  about  275  yards. 

The  island  is  wider  in  its  southern  than  in  its 
northern  part,  the  southern  extremity  on  Lighthouse 
Inlet  being  about  1000  yards  in  width.  Its  surface 
is  irregular  and  broken  by  sand  ridges,  forming  at 
many  points  secure  shelter  for  troops.  It  has  an  area 
of  about  400  acres,  its  middle  point  is  5^  of  a  mile 
from  the  nearest  point  of  Charleston,  and  the  main 
channel  into  the  harbor  is  parallel  to  and  at  about 
an  average  distance  of  1200  yards  from  it. 

This  small  sand  island  has  been  thus  minutely  and 
tediously  described  because  it  was  destined  to  be  the 
camp  home  for  nearly  two  years  of  many  thousands 
of  men;  it  was  to  become  famous  as  the  scene  of  a 
siege  which  will  be  memorable  in  military  history 
and  one  of  the  most  formidable  bombardments  of 
which  there  is  any  record,  the  scene  of  great  labor 
and  exposure,  much  desperate  fighting,  of  sickness 
and  death  in  all  the  frightful  forms  incident  to  war 
and  to  wasting  fevers. 

General  Gillmore  assumed  command  of  the  depart 
ment  on  June  12,  1863,  with  his  headquarters  at 
Hilton  Head.  His  troops  held  the  coast  from  Light- 


200      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

house  Inlet  to  St.  Augustine,  a  distance  of  about  250 
miles,  but  the  great  mass  of  the  force  was  in  South 
Carolina  and  near  Charleston.  He  had  ample  steam 
boat  transportation  at  his  command  and  could  read 
ily  and  rapidly  concentrate  his  forces  whenever  and 
wherever  on  the  coast  he  desired  to  have  them.  He 
entered  on  the  duty  assigned  him  untrammeled  by 
instructions,  free  to  carry  out  his  own  plans,  assured 
of  the  liberal  support  of  his  government  in  supply 
ing  him  with  all  requisite  material  for  the  successful, 
accomplishment  of  the  plan  he  had  proposed,  and 
which  had  been  approved  after  full  and  free  discus 
sion  by  a  mixed  board  of  officers  of  the  army  and 
navy. 

Of  the  several  plans  of  operation  against  Charles 
ton  which  naturally  suggest  themselves,  that  by  way 
of  James  Island,  which  it  was  generally  believed 
offered  the  surest  and  speediest  avenue  to  success, 
had  been  attempted  and  abandoned  after  the  unsuc 
cessful  assault  on  Secessionville  in  June,  1862.  So, 
too,  the  plan  of  a  forcible  entrance  of  the  fleet  into 
the  harbor  had  been  attempted  and  failed  on  April  7. 

Of  all  the  plans  that  by  way  of  Morris  Island 
was  regarded  as  the  easiest  of  accomplishment  in  its 
first  steps.  The  land  force  was  already  in  posses 
sion  of  Folly  Island.  To  cross  over  the  narrow 
channel  of  Lighthouse  Inlet  and  secure  a  foothold 
on  Morris  Island  with  the  aid  of  the  navy  would  be 
very  easily  accomplished,  and  in  the  succeeding 
operations  on  that  island  the  navy  could  render  ready 
and  efficient  aid,  having  always  close  at  hand  in 
North  Edisto  Inlet  a  secure  harbor  of  refuge  in  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      201 

event  of  stormy  weather;  an  important  considera 
tion,  because  the  monitors  were  not  suitable  to  ride 
in  safety  in  stormy  waters. 

But  possession  of  Morris  Island  would  be  very 
far  from  decisive  of  the  fate  of  Charleston.  Secure 
possession  of  James  Island,  the  forces  remaining 
relatively  the  same,  would,  it  was  believed,  dead 
inevitably  to  the  reduction  of  Charleston,  whereas 
possession  of  Morris  Island  would  be  only  a  means 
to  the  probable  but  remote  accomplishment  of  the 
same  end. 

Fort  Sumter  was  regarded  as  the  chief  obstacle  in 
the  way  of  the  navy  in  any  attempt  which  it  might 
make  to  enter  the  harbor.  If  that  fort  could  be  re 
duced,  or  its  defensive  power  destroyed,  the  fleet,  it 
was  argued,  could  readily  remove  the  obstructions, 
force  an  entrance  into  the  harbor,  and  compel  the 
surrender  of  the  city,  when  the  evacuation  of  the 
harbor  defenses  would  necessarily  follow.  It  was 
admitted  that  the  navy  alone  could  not  capture 
Sumter,  or  even  so  cripple  it  as  to  render  it  harm 
less.  That  must  be  done  by  the  combined  land  and 
naval  forces,  and  General  Gillmore  had  been  selected 
to  command  the  Department  of  the  South  and  Ad 
miral  Dahlgren  the  South  Atlantic  squadron,  for  the 
express  purpose  of  carrying  into  execution  the  plan 
of  operations  which  the  former  had  proposed  for 
the  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter  and  then  the  capture 
of  Charleston. 

General  Gillmore's  plan  of  operations  briefly 
stated  was: 


202      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

First.  Make  a  descent  upon  and  take  possession 
of  the  south  end  of  Morris  Island. 

Second.  To  lay  siege  to  and  reduce  Battery  Wag 
ner,  a  strong  earthwork  near  the  north  end  of  the 
island  and  about  twenty-six  hundred  yards  from  Fort 
Sumter.  The  reduction  of  Battery  Wagner  would 
necessitate  the  fall  of  Battery  Gregg  on  Cumming's 
Point. 

Third.  From  the  positions  thus  secured  to  demol 
ish  Fort  Sumter  and  co-operate  with  the  navy  in  a 
heavy  artillery  fire  when  it  should  be  ready  to  move 
forward. 

Fourth.  The  ironclad  fleet  to  remove  the  chan 
nel  obstructions,  run  by  the  batteries  on  Sullivan's 
and  James  islands,  reach  the  city  and  compel  its  sur 
render. 

The  army  was  to  take  the  lead  in  all  but  the  fourth 
of  these  distinct  operations.  Admiral  Dahlgren  says 
there  had  been  no  understanding  between  him  and 
General  Gillmore  as  to  the  fourth  of  these  distinct 
operations. 

When  General  Gillmore  assumed  command  of  the 
department  preparations  for  entering  on  the  execu 
tion  of  his  plan  of  operations  were  already  well 
advanced.  Early  in  the  preceding  April  General 
Vogdes  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
troops  on  Folly  Island.  His  aggregate  force  for  the 
three  months  of  April,  May,  and  June  varied  from 
about  4700  to  6000,  or  an  average  of  about  5350. 
It  was  actively  employed  in  preparing  the  island  as  a 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      203 

land  base  of  operations  against  Charleston,  for 
which  it  possessed  many  advantages. 

The  woods  and  dense  undergrowth,  chiefly  of  pal 
metto,  together  with  the  sand  hills,  screened  the 
General's  operations  from  view  and  shielded  his 
troops  from  fire.  It  had,  besides  this,  further  ad 
vantage  in  that  it  served  as  a  base  of  operations 
either  by  way  of  James  or  Morris  Island.  By  the 
3d  of  July,  under  the  immediate  direction  of  the 
accomplished  officers,  Lieutenants  Suter  and  Michie, 
of  the  United  States  Engineers,  not  only  had  the 
necessary  defensive  batteries  been  constructed  for 
the  security  of  the  islands,  but  others  for  the  special 
purpose  of  covering  the  descent  on  Morris  Island. 
These  last  mentioned  batteries  were  constructed  on 
the  northern  end  of  the  island  called  Little  Folly 
Island.  The  thick  growth  and  sand  hills  of  that 
locality  thoroughly  screened  the  workmen  from  view. 

The  movements  of  troops  were  made  and  the 
labor  performed  mainly  in  the  night  and  every  pre 
caution  was  taken  to  conceal  the  operations  from  the 
Confederates.  So  important  was  secrecy  in  the  matter 
regarded,  that  a  blockade-runner,  the  Dart,  which 
to  escape  pursuit  had  been  run  ashore  a  little  south 
of  Lighthouse  Inlet,  was  permitted  to  be  wrecked  by 
the  Confederates  and  the  cargo  carried  off,  when  it 
could  easily  have  been  prevented  by  guns  already  in 
position.  The  troops  did  not  even  return  the  brisk 
Confederate  fire  which  was  kept  on  that  end  of  the 
island  while  the  wrecking  of  the  Dart  was  in  prog 
ress,  though  several  men  who  were  at  work  on  the 
batteries  were  killed  and  wounded. 


204      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

In  this  way  batteries  were  carefully  constructed, 
renetted,  and  embrasured,  magazines  and  splinter- 
proofs  made,  thirty-two  rifled  guns,  varying  from 
10-  to  30-pounders,  twelve  lo-inch  and  four  8-inch 
mortars  were  mounted,  and  under  the  energetic  man 
agement  of  the  ordnance  officer,  Captain  Mordecai, 
each  gun  was  supplied  with  two  hundred  rounds  of 
ammunition.  All  this  was  done  within  from  six  hun 
dred  to  eight  hundred  yards  of  the  Confederate 
pickets  on  the  south  end  of  Morris  Island. 

General  Vogdes  claims,  as  does  General  Gillmore, 
that  the  existence  of  the  batteries  was  not  known  to 
the  Confederates  until  they  were  unmasked  and  had 
opened  fire.  General  Beauregard  says  "the  attack 
was  not  a  surprise,  neither  was  the  erection  of  the 
enemy's  works  on  Little  Folly  Island  unknown  to  the 
local  commanders  or  these  headquarters."  That  the 
enemy  was  in  large  force  and  very  busily  at  work  on 
the  island  was  unquestionably  known  to  the  local 
commanders,  and  to  General  Beauregard,  but  they 
could  scarcely  have  known  the  positions  and  extent 
of  the  works  constructed  against  them.  General 
Ripley,  in  whose  district  Morris  Island  was,  says  in 
his  official  report  to  General  Beauregard:  "On  the 
morning  of  the  loth  the  enemy  opened  a  heavy  fire 
upon  our  positions  from  Little  Folly  with  from 
twenty  to  thirty  long-range  guns,  which  he  had  placed 
in  position  during  the  night,"  whereas  the  fire  had 
been  from  forty-seven  guns  in  batteries,  which  had 
been  in  course  of  construction  nearly  a  month,  and 
had  been  ready  for  action  a  week  before  they  were 
unmasked  and  opened. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      205 

On  the  other  side  of  Lighthouse  Inlet,  on  the  south 
end  of  Morris  Island,  the  Confederates  had  partially 
constructed  eight  one-gun  batteries  and  two  mortar 
batteries,  one  for  two,  the  other  for  one  mortar.  All 
were  detached  and  stretched  along  the  sand  ridge, 
designed  to  protect  the  beach,  and  they  were  very 
incomplete.  Rifle-pits  or  infantry  epaulments  were 
also  made,  extending  westward  toward  Oyster 
Point. 

While  General  Beauregard  knew  perfectly  well 
that  Folly  Island  was  occupied  in  large  force  and 
was  in  course  of  preparation  for  both  defensive  and 
offensive  operations,  and  was  confident  that  a  blow 
from  it  was  impending,  he  could  not  know  with  cer 
tainty  where  it  would  be  directed.  Regarding  James 
Island  as  unquestionably  the  vital  point  in  the  land 
defenses  of  Charleston,  and  not  having  sufficient 
force,  labor,  and  heavy  guns  for  the  thorough 
defense  of  both  James  and  Morris  islands,  he  had 
employed  his  inadequate  force  and  means  chiefly  in 
putting  the  former  (James  Island)  in  a  secure  de 
fensive  state.  Hence  the  comparatively  defenseless 
state  of  the  south  end  of  Morris  Island. 

On  July  6  Admiral  Dahlgren  assumed  command 
of  the  South  Atlantic  squadron  at  Port  Royal.  A 
day  or  two  later,  after  a  conference  between  the 
commanders  of  the  land  and  naval  forces,  General 
Gillmore  transferred  his  headquarters  from  Hilton 
Head  to  Folly  Island,  and  about*  the  same  time 
Brigadier  General  Truman  Seymour  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  a  division  embracing  the  troops 
serving  on  that  island. 


206      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

On  entering  upon  the  execution  of  his  plan  of 
operations,  General  Gillmore  assumed  erroneously 
that  his  adversary  greatly  outnumbered  him.  His 
tri-monthly  report  for  July  10  shows  his  aggregate 
force  present  in  the  department,  exclusive  of  the 
sick,  to  have  been  20,837.  ^n  h*s  official  report  he 
states  his  effective  force  to  have  been  at  that  time 
17,463.  He  was  untrammeled  with  instructions,  and 
it  was  therefore  left  to  his  own  discretion  to  employ 
such  part  of  his  force  as  he  thought  proper  in  the 
execution  of  the  plans  on  which  he  was  about  to 
enter. 

At  that  time  General  Beauregard's  force  had  been 
reduced  by  detachments  sent  to  other  armies.  The 
battle  of  Gettysburg  had  been  fought  and  lost  by  the 
Confederates,  and  General  Lee  was  calmly  and  defi 
antly  confronting  his  victorious  enemy,  with  his  back 
to  the  flooded  Potomac,  waiting  for  it  to  fall  suffi 
ciently  for  him  to  cross  and  continue  his  march  into 
Virginia ;  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  had  fallen, 
and  General  Rosecrans,  by  skillful  maneuvering,  had 
pressed  General  Bragg's  army  across  the  Tennessee. 
General  Beauregard  therefore,  like  other  depart 
ment  commanders,  had  been  called  on  to  detach 
troops  and  send  them  to  Virginia  and  the  West.  On 
July  10  the  "grand  total"  of  his  force  of  all  arms  in 
South  Carolina  and  Georgia  was  15,318,  being 
28,000  less  than  he  had  estimated  as  necessary  when 
he  assumed  command. 

Of  that  force  5841  were  in  the  First  Military  Di 
vision,  which  embraced  James,  Morris,  and  Sulli 
van's  islands  and  the  city  of  Charleston,  Brigadier 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      207 

General  Ripley  commanding.  There  were  but  2906 
men  on  James  Island  and  927  on  Morris  Island,  in 
cluding  the  garrisons  of  Batteries  Wagner  and 
Gregg.1 

No  plan  of  operations  by  land  against  Charleston 
seems  to  have  been  regarded  as  complete  which  did 
not  embrace  an  expedition  to  cut  the  Charleston  & 
Savannah  Railroad.  On  this  occasion  the  execution 
of  that  part  of  the  plan  was  entrusted  to  Colonel 
Higginson,  who  on  the  9th  started  from  Beaufort 
with  a  regiment  in  two  armed  steamboats,,  accom 
panied  by  a  small  gunboat,  the  object  being  to  go  up 
the  Edisto  River  to  Jacksborough,  and  destroy  the 
railroad  bridge  and  as  much  of  the  road  as  practi 
cable.  Under  cover  of  a  dense  fog  the  party  reached 
Willstown  Bluff  unperceived  and  moved  up  toward 
the  village. 

The  line  of  railroad  had  been  nearly  stripped  of 
troops  for  the  defense  of  Charleston.  A  section  of 
the  Chestnut  field  artillery,  Lieutenant  T.  G.  White, 
and  a  few  cavalrymen,  under  Colonel  Aiken,  near 
Willstown,  not  being  in  condition  to  offer  effective 
resistance,  fell  back  after  some  skirmishing.  The 
Federal  troops  delayed  there  long  enough  to  plunder 
the  place,  burn  Mr.  Morris'  mill  and  barns,  and 
carry  off  about  one  hundred  and  thirty  negroes, 
chiefly  women  and  children. 

The  expedition  then  proceeded  up  the  river,  but 

'General  Beauregard's  report  shows  that  on  July  10  he  had 
in  South  Carolina  3461  infantry,  3664  artillery,  and  2651  cav 
alry.  Total,  9776.  In  Georgia,  1745  infantry,  2130  artillery, 
and  1667  cavalry.  Total,  5542. 


208      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  delay  at  Willstown  had  given  time  for  a  section 
of  the  Washington  Artillery,  of  Charleston,  Lieu 
tenant  I.  R.  Horsey  commanding,  supported  by  a 
platoon  of  cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  John  Banskett, 
to  reach  the  river;  when  the  steamers  were  within 
three  miles  of  Jacksborough,  opposite  Dr.  Glov 
er's  plantation,  the  field  guns  opened  upon  them;  the 
boats  stopped,  hesitated,  and  turned  back,  followed 
by  the  section  of  the  Washington  Artillery  and  also 
a  section  of  the  Marion  Artillery,  Lieutenant  Robert 
Murdoch  commanding,  which  kept  up  the  fire  until 
one  steamer  was  so  crippled  as  to  become  unmanage 
able  and  ran  aground,  when  it  was  set  on  fire  and 
burned.  The  other  two  steamed  out  of  range  and 
returned  to  Beaufort. 

The  two  field  guns  of  the  steamer  were  taken  un 
injured  from  the  burned  vessel  and  were  soon  in 
Confederate  service.  General  Gillmore  in  his  official 
report  dismisses  this  expedition  with  the  brief  re 
mark:  "It  signally  failed,  with  a  loss  to  us  of  two 
pieces  of  field  artillery  and  a  small  steamer,  which 
was  burned  to  prevent  its  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy." 

Colonel  H.  K.  Aiken,  commanding  the  Confeder 
ates,  claims  that  it  was  burned  by  the  fire  of  the  Con 
federate  field  guns  of  the  Macon  Artillery.  But  for 
the  delay  at  Willstown  Colonel  Higginson  might 
have  destroyed  the  bridge  and  damaged  the  road, 
or  at  least  have  retarded  the  reinforcements  which 
soon  passed  over  from  Savannah. 

To  draw  attention,  and  perhaps  troops,  from  Mor 
ris  to  James  Island  and  produce  the  impression  that  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      209 

latter  was  to  be  the  point  of  attack,  General  Gillmore 
sent  General  A.  H.  Terry,  with  3800  men  in  armed 
transports,  up  the  Stono,  conveyed  by  the  gunboats 
Pawnee,  Marblehead,  and  McDonough,  Captain 
Balch  commanding.  Under  cover  of  the  naval  guns 
from  the  steamers  in  the  Stono  and  Little  Folly 
rivers,  which  thoroughly  swept  the  ground  in  front, 
the  troops  landed  on  Battery  Island  and  Grimble's 
place,  moved  forward  in  a  threatening  manner  and 
brisk  skirmishing  commenced  between  the  pickets. 
General  Terry's  force  outnumbered  by  several  hun 
dred  men  all  the  infantry  General  Beauregard  had 
in  South  Carolina  and  by  more  than  a  thousand  all 
the  infantry  and  artillery  combined  on  James  Island. 

General  Gillmore  believed  that  his  feint  on  James 
Island  had  produced  at  least  one  of  the  effects  de 
sired,  in  drawing  troops  from  Morris  Island;  but 
he  was  mistaken.  In  truth,  there  were  no  troops 
that  could  have  been  drawn  from  that  island  with 
out  abandoning  at  least  the  south  end  and  leaving 
the  whole  island  in  great  jeopardy. 

It  had  been  General  Gillmore's  intention  to  make 
the  descent  on  Morris  Island  about  midnight  be 
tween  the  8th  and  Qth.  He  had  given  detailed  in 
structions  to  that  effect,  which  were  so  far  carried 
out  that  obstructions  in  Little  Folly  Creek  were  re 
moved  by  a  party  of  the  First  New  York  Engineer 
Regiment  and  the  batteries  were  so  far  unmasked 
as  to  disclose  their  presence  to  the  Confederates. 
That  same  night  Captain  Charles  T.  Haskell,  of  the 
First  South  Carolina  Infantry,  visited  Little  Folly 
Island  with  a  scouting  party,  and  discovered  the 


210      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

company's  barges  or  launches  collected  in  the  creeks 
approaching  the  inlet.  During  the  whole  of  the 
9th,  therefore,  there  were  abundant  indications  that 
an  attack  was  immediately  impending. 

General  George  C.  Strong  was  selected  to  lead 
in  the  attack  with  his  brigade.  He  was  a  young 
officer  of  the  Ordnance  Corps,  who  had  graduated 
with  high  honors  at  West  Point  in  the  class  of  1858 
and  had  distinguished  himself  in  the  war  both  in 
Virginia  and  Louisiana.  His  brigade  was  com 
posed  of  the  Sixth  Connecticut  Regiment,  Colonel 
John  L.  Chatfield;  Forty-eighth  New  York,  Colonel 
Barton;  Third  New  Hampshire,  Colonel  Jackson; 
Ninth  Maine,  Colonel  Emory;  Seventy-sixth  Penn 
sylvania,  Colonel  Strawbridge;  battalion  of  four 
companies  Seventh  Connecticut,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Rodman;  Company  C,  Third  Rhode  Island 
Artillery;  detachment  Third  United  States  Artillery; 
detachment  First  New  York  Engineers. 

A  battalion  of  the  Forty-eighth  New  York,  the 
colonel  commanding,  and  the  detachments  of 
artillery  were  left  on  the  island  with  General  Vogdes. 

The  brigade  was  embarked  on  launches  near  the 
south  end  of  Folly  Island  early  in  the  night  of  the 
9th,  and,  conveyed  four  naval  howitzer  launches, 
Lieutenant  Bunce  commanding,  moved  up  Folly 
River  and  Creek  and  halted  near  the  entrance  to 
Lighthouse  Inlet,  where  they  were  screened  from 
view  by  tall  marsh  grass,  and  there  awaited  the 
signal  to  advance. 

The  remaining  force  on  Folly  Island  was  held 
in  reserve  under  General  Vogdes.  The  Sixty- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      211 

second  Ohio,  Colonel  Pond;  Sixty-seventh  Ohio, 
Colonel  Voorhees,  and  Eighty-fifth  Pennsylvania, 
Colonel  Howell,  were  near  the  signal  station.  The 
Seventh  New  Hampshire,  Colonel  H.  S.  Putnam; 
One  Hundredth  New  York,  Colonel  Dandy;  a  bat 
talion  of  six  companies  of  the  Forty-eighth  New 
York,  Colonel  Barker,  and  Battery  B,  First  United 
States  Artillery,  Captain  G.  V.  Henry  commanding, 
were  at  the  northern  end  of  Little  Folly  Island,  in 
readiness  to  follow  General  Strong's  Brigade.  The 
formidable  batteries  which  were  to  perform  so  im 
portant  a  part  were  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Jackson  and  Major  L.  L.  Langton,  First 
United  States  Artillery. 

Just  across  Lighthouse  Inlet  and  within  easy 
range  were  the  detached  Confederate  battery  of 
eight  guns  and  three  mortars,  manned  by  two  com 
panies  of  the  First  South  Carolina  Artillery,  Cap 
tains  J.  C.  Mitchell  and  J.  R.  Macbeth  commanding, 
supported  by  the  Twenty-first  South  Carolina  In 
fantry,  about  four  hundred  men,  Major  Mclver 
commanding,  and  a  detachment  of  the  First  South 
Carolina  Infantry,  under  Captain  Charles  T.  Has- 
kell  (in  all  about  seven  hundred).  The  garrison  of 
Battery  Wagner,  about  three  miles  distant  on  the 
island,  was  two  companies  of  artillery,  Captains  C. 
E.  Chichester  and  J.  R.  Mathews  commanding,  and 
of  Battery  Gregg,  Captain  Henry  R.  Lesesne's  com 
pany  of  artillery.  All  of  the  artillery  on  the  island 
was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  A.  Yates, 
First  South  Carolina  Artillery.  The  whole  force 


212      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

was  commanded  by  Colonel  R.  F.  Graham,  Twenty- 
first  South  Carolina  Infantry. 

As  the  sun  rose  on  the  morning  of  July  10  the 
Federal  batteries  were  unmasked  and  thirty-two 
guns  and  fifteen  mortars  opened  fire,  to  which  the 
Confederates  promptly  replied.  A  few  minutes 
later  four  monitors,  the  Weehawken)  Commander 
E.  R.  Calhoun,  the  Nahant,  Commander  John 
Downs,  the  Kaatskill,  Commander  George  H. 
Rodgers,  and  the  Montauk,  Commander  D.  McN. 
Fairfax,  which  had  crossed  the  bar  and  taken  posi 
tions  from  which  some  of  the  Confederate  batteries 
could  be  enfiladed  and  others  taken  in  reverse, 
opened  fire  with  fifteen-  and  eleven-inch  guns  on 
the  Confederate  left;  the  four  howitzer  launches 
pulled  into  position  and  opened  on  the  right,  and 
for  nearly  three  hours  about  sixty  guns,  some  of 
them  of  the  heaviest  caliber,  concentrated  a  rapid 
and  accurate  fire  on  the  Confederate  position,  to 
which  the  Confederates  as  rapidly  replied. 

A  little  after  seven  o'clock  the  signal  was  given  to 
General  Strong  to  cross  the  inlet,  land,  and  assail 
the  batteries,  and  he  pulled  with  the  greater  part  of 
his  brigade  directly  and  rapidly  for  Oyster  Point, 
the  extreme  left  of  the  Confederate  position.  As 
soon  as  the  launches  came  into  view  some  of  the 
Confederate  guns  were  turned  on  them  with  effect, 
destroying  one  of  them,  while  the  infantry  hastened 
to  the  Point  to  dispute  the  landing. 

Colonel  Chatfield,  with  his  regiment,  the  Sixth 
Connecticut,  had  pulled  rapidly  to  the  right,  or 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      213 

southeastern,  extremity  of  the  island,  and  the  tide 
being  low  the  bank  sheltered  him  from  the  fire  of 
the  guns  on  the  sand  hills,  which  were  about  thirty 
feet  high — so  high  that  the  guns  could  not  be  trained 
on  the  boats. 

Both  parties  landed  successfully  and  with  little 
loss.  The  battalion  of  four  companies  of  the 
Seventh  Connecticut,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Rodman, 
was  the  first  to  land  at  Oyster  Point,  quickly  fol 
lowed  by  the  battalions  of  the  Forty-eighth  New 
York,  Ninth  Maine,  Third  New  Hampshire,  and 
Seventy-sixth  Pennsylvania. 

The  launches  immediately  crossed  to  Little  Folly 
Island,  and  in  twenty  minutes  from  the  time  they 
touched  the  beach  the  Seventh  New  Hampshire,  One 
Hundredth  New  York,  the  battalion  of  the  Forty- 
eighth  New  York,  and  Captain  Henry's  battery  of 
the  First  Artillery  were  transported  to  and  landed 
on  the  south  end  of  Morris  Island. 

In  the  meantime  the  main  column  at  Oyster  Point 
had  formed  in  line  and  advanced  against  the  Twenty- 
first  South  Carolina,  while  Colonel  Chatfield  ad 
vanced  directly  against  the  batteries,  throwing  out 
strong  skirmishing  parties  on  the  right  and  left, 
which  soon  flanked  the  batteries,  taking  them  in  re 
verse.  After  an  obstinate  resistance,  what  was  left 
of  the  artillery  had  to  abandon  their  guns  and  retire. 
In  truth,  the  batteries  had  been  for  nearly  three 
hours  enveloped  in  fire  and  overwhelmed  by  the 
weight  of  metal  thrown  on  them. 

Colonel  Graham,  finding  his  little  band  of  in 
fantry,  which  had  lost  heavily,  in  danger  of  being 


214      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

cut  off  by  Colonel  Chatfield's  column  and  captured 
by  General  Strong's,  ordered  it  to  fall  back  to  Bat 
tery  Wagner. 

The  two  Federal  columns,  converging  upon  the 
batteries,  captured  them  all,  one  after  the  other, 
and  pursued  the  retreating  Confederates,  while  the 
monitors,  steaming  slowly  parallel  to  the  beach,  con 
tinued  their  fire  upon  the  shattered  Confederates. 

The  Seventh  Battalion  South  Carolina  Infantry, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Nelson,  had  been  ordered  to 
reinforce  Morris  Island,  but  did  not  arrive  in  time 
to  take  part  in  the  battle.  Two  companies  of  it, 
which  arrived  first,  had  been  ordered  forward  to 
support  the  batteries,  but  met  the  retreating  Con 
federates  and  were  warmly  engaged  in  endeavoring 
to  cover  the  retreat. 

The  Federals  continued  the  pursuit  until  they 
came  within  range  of  the  guns  of  Battery  Wagner, 
which  opened  rapidly  and  the  pursuit  ceased. 

The  weather  was  excessively  hot,  so,  too,  was  the 
fire  from  Wagner,  say  the  Federal  reports,  "rid 
dling"  the  colors  of  the  Sixth  Connecticut.  The 
men  were  too  much  exhausted  to  storm  Battery 
Wagner.  They  were  therefore  halted  a  few  hun 
dred  yards  from  it,  where  the  sand  hills  sheltered 
them  from  its  fire,  and  threw  up  breastworks  for 
better  protection. 

The  monitors  took  position  abreast  of  Wagner 
and  kept  up  a  brisk  fire  on  it  for  the  remainder  of 
the  day,  except   (and  this  appears  to  have  been  a 
custom  in  the  navy  which  seems  strange  to  soldiers) 
that  "at  noon  we  hauled  out  of  fire  to  give  the  men 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      215 

dinner  and  about  two  o'clock  went  back  and  resumed 
work,"  says  the  Admiral.  Wagner  returned  the 
fire  with  spirit  from  a  ten-inch  columbiad,  her  only 
effective  gun  against  the  monitors.  The  Kaatskill, 
against  which  the  fire  was  mainly  directed,  was 
struck  sixty  times,  her  deck  crashed  through  and 
pierced  in  several  places,  letting  in  water  very  freely. 

By  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  affair  on  land 
was  over  and  two-thirds  of  Morris  Island  was  in  pos 
session  of  the  Federal  troops.  The  descent  had 
been  made  with  complete  success  and  little  loss 
(General  Strong  reports  fifteen  killed  and  ninety-two 
wounded).  Among  the  killed  was  Captain  Lent, 
of  the  Forty-eighth  New  York.  They  had  captured 
three  8-inch  navy  shell  guns,  two  8-inch  seacoast 
howitzers,  one  rifled  24-pounder,  one  3O-pounder, 
one  i2-pounder  Whitworth  and  three  lo-inch  sea- 
coast  mortars — in  all  eleven  pieces — the  camp 
equipage,  and  127  prisoners. 

The  little  band  of  Confederates  had  made  a 
gallant  stand  for  three  hours  against  great  odds, 
and  had  not  retreated  until  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  escape  capture  and  until,  out  of  a  total 
force  not  exceeding  700,  they  had  lost  294  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  uamong  whom,"  says  Gen 
eral  Ripley,  "I  mention  with  especial  regret  the  fol 
lowing  officers:  Captains  John  R.  Chevers  and  Has- 
kell  and  Lieutenant  J.  S.  Bee,  who  had  rendered  im 
portant  service  previous  to  and  behaved  with  dis 
tinguished  gallantry  in  the  engagement." 

General  Seymour  commended  very  highly  the  con 
duct  of  his  troops  on  the  occasion: 


216      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

"For  the  brilliant  vigor,"  he  says,  "with  which  the 
movements  of  his  brigade  were  conducted  the  great 
est  credit  is  due  to  Brigadier  General  Strong,  whose 
personal  example  was  heroism  itself.  His  report 
justly  praises  his  subordinate  commanders,  and  to 
those  I  must  refer,  but  I  must  mention  particularly 
the  excellent  conduct  of  Colonel  Chatfield,  Sixth 
Connecticut,  who  led  his  regiment  in  the  advance  up 
Morris  Island  until  its  colors  were  riddled  by  the 
close  fire  from  Battery  Wagner.  But  to  the  hearty 
devotion  and  the  cheerful  courage  of  the  soldiers  of 
this  division,  in  the  patient  labors  in  preparing  for 
the  battle  and  the  ready  courage  with  which  they 
fought  it,  must,  after  all,  be  given  the  highest  honors, 
and  their  gallant  conduct  in  this  brilliant  action  will 
always  be  to  their  commanders  and  their  country  the 
source  of  just  pride." 

The  assault  of  Battery  Wagner,  which  the  troops 
were  too  much  exhausted  to  attempt  on  the  loth, 
was  made  about  day  dawn  the  next  morning  by 
General  Strong. 

The  garrison  of  Wagner  at  that  time  consisted  of 
the  shattered  remainder  of  the  troops  which  had 
contested  the  landing  the  previous  morning,  namely, 
the  Twenty-first  South  Carolina  Regiment,  about 
two  hundred  men,  under  Major  J.  G.  W.  Mclver; 
twenty  men  of  Company  D,  First  South  Carolina 
Infantry,  Lieutenant  Horlbeck  commanding,  and 
seventy  men  of  Companies  E,  H,  and  I,  First  South 
Carolina  Artillery,  under  Captain  John  C.  Mitchell; 
also  the  Gist  Guard,  Captain  C.  E.  Chichester; 
Mathews'  Artillery,  Captain  J.  R.  Mathews,  which 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      217 

had  occupied  the  battery  on  the  loth;  the  Seventh 
South  Carolina  Battalion,  about  three  hundred  men, 
Major  J.  H.  Rion  commanding;  four  companies 
each  of  the  First  Georgia  Regiment,  Colonel  C.  H. 
Olmstead;  the  Twelfth  Georgia  Battalion,  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  H.  D.  Capers,  and  three  companies 
of  the  Eighteenth  Georgia  Battalion,  Major  W.  S. 
Basinger;  in  all  about  five  hundred  men,  Colonel 
Olmstead  commanding.  The  aggregate  force  was 
about  twelve  hundred  men. 

The  South  Carolinians  manned  the  guns  and  the 
right  and  right  center  of  the  ramparts.  The 
Georgians,  who  arrived  in  the  night  of  the  loth, 
guarded  the  left  and  left  center  of  the  work.  The 
Eighteenth  Battalion  occupied  the  southeast  bastion, 
the  First  Georgia  along  the  sea  front  to  the  left,  the 
Twelfth  Georgia  Battalion  to  the  right,  connecting 
with  the  Carolinians.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Yates 
commanded  the  artillery  and  Colonel  R.  F.  Graham 
(Twenty-first  South  Carolina)  the  whole. 

General  Strong  formed  his  brigade  before  day- 
dawn.  The  assaulting  column  consisted  of  the  bat 
talion  of  the  Seventh  Connecticut,  the  Seventy-sixth 
Pennsylvania,  and  the  Ninth  Maine.  As  on  the 
previous  morning,  the  Seventh  Connecticut  led  the 
advance,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Rodman  commanding. 
The  Third  and  Seventh  New  Hampshire  were  held 
in  reserve.  The  battalion  of  the  Seventh  Con 
necticut  was  deployed  in  line  in  front,  followed 
closely  in  the  order  named  by  the  Seventy-sixth 
Pennsylvania  and  Ninth  Maine,  each  formed  in 
close  divisions.  They  were  ordered  to  carefully 


2i8      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

preserve  their  intervals  and  when  the  Confederates 
should  open  fire  to  rush  forward  with  a  cheer, 
mount  the  parapet  and  carry  the  battery  by  storm. 

General  Strong  commanded  in  person.  His  in 
structions  were  most  faithfully  carried  out  by  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  Rodman,  who  led  his  Seventh  Con 
necticut  men  under  a  brisk  fire  of  cannon  and 
musketry  to  the  ditch  and  some  of  them  to  the  top 
of  the  parapet,  where,  it  is  reported,  they  bayoneted 
two  Confederate  gunners. 

"But  unfortunately,"  says  General  Strong  in  his 
report,  "when  the  enemy  opened  fire  simultaneously 
along  the  whole  line,  and  with  a  range  of  two  hun 
dred  yards,  the  Seventy-sixth  Pennsylvania  halted 
and  lay  down  upon  the  ground.  Though  they  re 
mained  in  this  position  but  a  few  moments  and  after 
wards  moved  gallantly  forward,  some  of  them  even 
to  the  ditch,  that  halt  lost  the  battle,  for  the  interval 
was  lost  and  the  Seventh  Connecticut,  unsupported, 
were  driven  from  the  parapet.  The  whole  column, 
including  the  Ninth  Maine,  which  had  reached  the 
ditch  on  the  left,  gave  way  and  retreated  from  the 
field." 

The  garrison  of  Wagner  had  of  course  expected 
an  attack  and  was  on  the  alert  all  night.  When 
the  column  was  seen  advancing  in  the  dim  light  of 
early  dawn  Colonel  Graham  deliberately  held  his 
fire  until  his  enemy  was  within  close  range,  then 
opened  simultaneously  along  his  whole  line,  firing 
rapidly  and  continuously  until  the  last  man  of  the 
fast  retreating  column  was  under  cover  of  the  sand 
hills. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      219 

The  Seventh  Connecticut  was  particularly  dis 
tinguished  on  this  occasion.  Unsupported  and 
when  there  seemed  no  hope  of  success,  some  of  the 
men  persisted  with  great  daring  in  their  efforts  to 
force  an  entrance  into  the  work.  One  brave  man 
sprang  to  the  parapet  in  front  of  a  thirty-two- 
pounder,  double-charged  with  grape  shot.  Lieu 
tenant  Gilchrist,  of  South  Carolina,  in  command  of 
the  gun,  struck  by  the  man's  fearless  bearing,  called 
to  him  to  come  in  before  the  gun  was  fired.  As 
quick  as  thought  the  man's  rifle  was  leveled  and  a 
ball  whizzed  by  Gilchrist's  head.  The  discharge 
of  the  gun  followed  and  the  man  was  hurled  across 
the  ditch  a  mangled  corpse.  This  regiment  had 
been  the  first  to  enter  Fort  Pulaski  when  it  was 
captured  the  year  before  and  the  officers  and  men 
had  behaved  with  much  kindness  toward  Colonel 
Olmstead  and  his  men  who  were  captured  on  that 
occasion.  Among  the  prisoners  captured  at  this 
time  were  many  of  this  regiment,  who  recognized 
their  former  prisoners,  calling  them  by  name,  and 
were  received  by  them  with  as  much  kind  considera 
tion  as  the  circumstances  permitted. 

General  Strong  in  his  official  report  to  General 
Gillmore,  made  on  the  day  of  the  assault,  states 
that  his  loss  that  morning  was  8  officers  and  322  non 
commissioned  officers  and  privates.  Among  the 
severely  wounded  was  Lieutenant  Colonel  Rodman 
of  the  Seventh  Connecticut.  Captain  Gray,  who 
succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  battalion  of  the 
Seventh  Connecticut,  reports  that  191  men  of  the 
battalion  went  to  the  assault  and  that  103  of  them 


220      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

were  killed,  woui.Jed,  and  missing,  and  he  adds  that 
their  mess  contained  1 1  officers  that  morning  before 
the  assault  and  but  4  after  it. 

The  Confederate  loss  in  the  assault  was  i  officer 
and  5  enlisted  men  killed  and  i  officer  and  5  enlisted 
men  wounded.  Captain  Werner,  First  Georgia, 
and  Edward  Postelle,  of  the  Eighteenth  Georgia, 
were  killed,  Lieutenant  Frederick  Tupper, 
Eighteenth  Georgia  Battalion,  severely  wounded. 
Colonel  Graham  reports  that  he  captured  130  and 
buried  over  100  of  the  Federal  troops. 

The  Federal  losses  on  the  mornings  of  the  loth 
and  nth,  as  officially  reported  by  General  Strong, 
who  commanded  in  person  on  both  occasions,  aggre 
gated  436.  In  an  official  letter  from  General  Gill- 
more  to  General  Halleck  reporting  the  success  of  his 
descent  on  Morris  Island,  he  says,  speaking  of  the 
assault  on  the  morning  of  the  iith:  "The  parapet 
was  gained,  but  the  support  recoiled  under  the  fire 
to  which  they  were  exposed  and  could  not  be  got 
up.  Our  loss  in  both  actions  (the  mornings  of  the 
loth  and  i  ith)  will  not  vary  much  from  150." 

A  more  substantial  and  obvious  reason  for  the 
failure  of  the  assault  will  naturally  suggest  itself  to 
the  most  causal  reader  than  that  assigned  by  Gen 
eral  Strong,  namely,  the  brief  halt  of  the  Seventy- 
sixth  Pennsylvania.  The  probable  cause  of  the  fail 
ure  was  that  the  assaulting  column  was  too  weak 
numerically.  It  scarcely  outnumbered  the  garrison, 
which  had  all  the  advantages  of  position  within  a 
strong  field  work. 

There    seems   to   have   been   some   difference   of 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      221 

opinion  between  Generals  Gillmore  and  Seymour  as 
to  this  point — on  which  of  them  did  the  responsibil 
ity  of  the  assault,  as  it  was  made,  rest.  The  former 
commanded  the  department,  the  latter  a  division  of 
the  troops  on  the  island,  and  the  assault  was  made 
by  a  part  only  of  one  of  his  brigades.  General  Gill- 
more,  in  an  elaborate  report  of  his  operations,  makes 
but  brief  mention  of  the  assault,  saying  merely: 
''General  Seymour  was  ordered  to  carry  Fort 
Wagner  by  assault  by  daybreak  on  the  following 
morning.  The  attempt  failed." 

General  Seymour  says:  "Before  daylight  on  the 
i  ith  an  assault  had  been  made  by  Brigadier  General 
Strong,  with  his  brigade,  in  accordance  with  instruc 
tions  given  to  him  directly  by  Brigadier  General  Gill- 
more,  which  attack  failed  from  the  complete  prepa 
ration  of  the  enemy,  due  to  his  pickets  having  been 
driven  in  an  hour  before  the  attempted  surprise." 
General  Strong  reports  officially  that  the  assault  was 
made  "pursuant  to  instructions  from  department 
headquarters." 

Immediately  after  the  assault,  in  a  conference  be 
tween  General  Gillmore  and  Admiral  Dahlgren,  it 
was  decided  that  the  parapets  of  Wagner  should  be 
battered  down  and  its  guns  silenced  by  a  combined 
fire  from  land  and  naval  batteries  before  making 
the  next  assault. 


CHAPTER  XL 

Battery  Wagner's  armament  increased — Its  importance  in  the 
defense  of  Charleston — Attack  on  Federal  position — Suc 
cess — Wagner  again  bombarded — Whole  Confederate  de 
fenses  engaged — Terrific  fire — Scenes  in  Charleston — Suf 
fering  of  the  besieged — Bayonet  assault — Repulse — Con 
federate  loss — Federal  loss — Bombardment  continues. 

The  failure  of  the  Federal  assault  on  Battery 
Wagner  on  the  morning  of  July  n,  1863,  convinced 
General  Gillmore  that  before  making  another  at 
tempt  to  carry  that  work  by  storm  it  would  be  ex 
pedient,  at  least,  if  not  absolutely  necessary,  to 
silence  its  guns  and  cut  down  its  parapets,  scarp  and 
counterscarp,  by  a  combined  and  heavy  artillery  fire 
from  the  land  and  naval  batteries. 

Admiral  Dahlgren  concurred  in  this  opinion  and 
was  quite  ready  to  perform  his  part  of  the  bombard 
ment.  The  naval  batteries  were  ready  and  could 
be  placed  in  and  taken  out  of  position  at  pleasure. 
The  mortar  vessels,  at  a  secure  distance  beyond  the 
range  of  the  Confederate  guns,  having  ascertained 
the  range,  could  drop  their  shells  into  Battery  Wag 
ner  without  danger  from  the  return  fire,  while  the 
monitors,  with  their  batteries  securely  encased  within 
iron  plating  of  eleven  inches  thickness,  could  steam 
into  position  and  maintain  their  fire  as  long  as  it 
suited  the  Admiral,  steaming  out  of  range  again 

222 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      223 

with  great  regularity  at  stated  intervals,  that  the 
men  might  take  their  meals  and  accustomed  rest  un 
disturbed  by  the  Confederate  guns,  and  return  to 
their  work  with  the  regularity  of  gangs  of  laborers 
engaged  in  other  and  more  productive  industry. 

But  it  was  not  so  with  the  land  batteries.  It  was 
necessary  to  construct  and  arm  them  under  the  fires 
of  several  Confederate  batteries  on  Morris  and 
James  islands  and  Fort  Sumter.  The  daily  fire  of 
the  ironclads  generally  suppressed  in  a  great  meas 
ure  the  fire  of  Wagner  while  the  land  forces  were 
contructing  their  batteries.  But  this  daily  firing  of 
the  ironclads  was  not  always  made  with  impunity. 
Though  there  was  but  one  gun  in  Wagner  that 
could  reach  them  with  much  effect, — a  ro-inch  colum- 
biad, — that  one  gun  under  the  cool  and  skillful 
management  of  Captain  Frazer  Matthews  was  fired 
with  accuracy,  doing  much  damage  to  the  monitors, 
one  of  which  was  seen  on  the  evening  of  the  I2th 
going  southward  without  a  smokestack  and  ap 
parently  much  crippled.  But  in  spite  of  the  Con 
federate  fire  the  work  on  the  land  batteries  was 
pressed  forward  rapidly  night  and  day  and  com 
pleted  in  the  course  of  a  week. 

In  the  meantime  the  Confederates  were  making 
every  possible  exertion  to  strengthen  and  increase 
the  armament  of  works  already  constructed,  and  to 
construct  others  which  the  Federal  operations  on 
Morris  Island  and  the  safety  of  Charleston  sug 
gested  as  necessary.  The  armament  of  Wagner 
was  increased  by  four  12-pounder  howitzers  and 
two  32-pounder  carronades.  In  response  to  Gen- 


224      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

eral  Beauregard's  earnest  call  for  reinforcements, 
General  Clingman  had  been  sent  to  him  with  his 
brigade  from  North  Carolina,  and  General  A.  H. 
Colquitt  had  arrived  with  two  regiments  of  his 
Georgia  brigade.  The  Eleventh  South  Carolina 
Regiment  and  Marion  Light  Artillery  had  been 
brought  to  Charleston  from  the  line  of  the  Charles 
ton  &  Savannah  Railroad,  but  the  importance  of 
guarding  that  road  very  soon  made  it  necessary  to 
return  them  to  that  duty. 

The  arrival  of  these  reinforcements  naturally  sug 
gested  the  question  whether  or  not  it  was  practicable 
to  drive  the  Federal  force  from  Morris  Island.  In 
a  consultation  with  his  general  officers,  Ripley, 
Taliaferro,  Hagood,  and  Jordan  (chief  of  staff), 
and  Colonel  E.  B.  Harris,  chief  of  engineers,  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  presented  that  question  for  con 
sideration.  The  number  of  troops  deemed  neces 
sary  to  attack  the  enemy  on  Morris  Island  with 
reasonable  prospect  of  success  was  estimated  at 
four  thousand,  the  area  and  the  general  shape  of 
the  island  making  it  impracticable  to  employ  a 
larger  force  to  advantage.  To  carry  out  this  plan 
it  would  be  necessary  to  throw  the  four  thousand 
troops  on  the  island  during  the  night  and  attack  and 
defeat  the  enemy  before  daylight.  To  make  the 
movement  and  attack  in  daylight  would  expose  the 
Confederates  to  the  flank  fire  of  the  naval  guns. 
Seeing  that  the  Federal  force  was  about  seven  thou 
sand,  covered  by  defensive  works,  to  attack  it  in 
front  and  in  the  light  of  day,  with  the  ironclads 
pouring  in  a  destructive  fire  on  the  flank,  could 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      225 

scarcely  be  hoped  to  prove  successful.  With  the 
very  insufficient  means  of  transportation  at  General 
Beauregard's  command,  it  was  deemed  impracticable 
to  throw  a  sufficient  force  on  the  island,  move  upon 
the  enemy,  and  make  the  attack  during  a  single 
night.  The  idea  was  therefore  abandoned  and  a 
purely  defensive  plan  of  operations  was  then  deter 
mined  on. 

The  presence  of  General  Terry  at  Legare's  and 
Grimble's,  on  James  Island,  with  a  larger  force  than 
the  Confederates  had  on  the  same  island  was  a 
standing  menace  to  the  latter,  which  it  was  im 
portant  to  suppress.  General  Johnson  Hagood 
commanded  the  Confederates  on  that  island,  and 
General  Colquitt,  having  arrived  on  the  I4th  with 
two  regiments  o  his  Georgia  brigade,  was  sent  to 
reinforce  him.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th 
a  reconnoissance  in  force  was  made  on  the  enemy, 
Generals  Hagood  and  Colquitt  commanding  in  per 
son.  The  enemy  occupied  Battery  Island  and  parts 
of  Legare's  and  Grimble's  plantations.  The  naval 
gunboats  were  in  the  Stono  and  other  armed 
steamers  were  in  Folly  River,  giving  a  cross  fire 
which  could  sweep  the  ground  in  front  as  far  as  the 
Confederate  pickets.  The  object  of  the  movement 
was  limited  to  driving  in  the  pickets  on  the  left, 
making  a  reconnoissance  of  that  part  of  their  posi 
tion,  capturing  or  destroying  the  part  of  the  force 
nearest  Grimble's,  and  driving  off  and,  if  possible, 
crippling  the  gunboats  Pawnee  and  Marblehead, 
which  were  anchored  highest  up  the  Stono. 

General  Colquitt,  with    the    Twenty-fifth    South 


226      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

Carolina,  Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  G.  Presley  com 
manding;  Sixth  Georgia,  Colonel  J.  T.  Lofton  com 
manding;  Nineteenth  Georgia,  Colonel  A.  J. 
Hutchins;  four  companies  of  the  Thirty-second 
Georgia,  Lieutenant  Colonel  W.  H.  Pruden  com 
manding,  and  Captain  E.  L.  Parker's  Battery  of 
Artillery,  in  all  about  fourteen  hundred  men,  were 
ordered  to  cross  the  marsh  dividing  Legare's  from 
Grimble's  plantation  at  the  crossing  nearest  Seces- 
sionville,  driving  the  enemy  as  far  as  the  lower 
crossing  near  the  Stono,  recross  the  marsh  by  a  flank 
movement  and  cut  off  and  capture  the  force  at 
Grimble's.  Colonel  C.  H.  Way,  of  the  Fifty- 
fourth  Georgia,  with  about  eight  hundred  infantry 
of  his  own  and  the  Thirty-first  North  Carolina  Regi 
ment,  followed  in  echelon  on  the  Grimble  side  of 
the  marsh  to  co-operate  with  Colquitt.  A  reserve 
of  a  section  of  artillery,  supported  by  a  company 
of  infantry  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  under  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  R.  J.  Jeffords,  Fifth  South  Carolina 
Cavalry,  was  held  in  hand  near  Rivers'  house.  On 
the  right  Lieutenant  Colonel  Del.  Kemper,  with 
four  rifled  12-pounders  and  four  Napoleon  guns, 
supported  by  Colonel  James  D.  Radcliffe,  of  the 
Sixty-first  North  Carolina,  with  about  four  hun 
dred  men  of  his  own  regiment,  was  ordered  to  at 
tack  the  gunboats  in  the  Stono. 

The  movement  was  made  at  day  dawn.  Six  com 
panies  of  the  Twenty-fifth  South  Carolina  deployed 
as  skirmishers  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  road 
leading  from  Secessionville  to  Legare's  house, 
pressed  forward,  rapidly  crossed  Rivers'  causeway, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      227 

where  the  Federal  picket  line  (Fifty-fourth  Massa 
chusetts)  was  encountered  and  driven  back  hastily 
on  the  main  line,  which  retired  to  Battery  Island, 
"leaving  their  camp  strewn  with  muskets,  accouter- 
ments,  blankets,  overcoats,  prisoners/'  etc.,  says 
Colonel  Way.  As  soon  as  the  picket  firing  com 
menced  the  party  at  Grimble's,  which  was  smaller 
than  had  been  supposed,  fled  to  Battery  Island  and  so 
escaped  capture.  There  was  some  brisk  firing  of 
field  guns  on  both  sides.  A  company  of  the  Nine 
teenth  Georgia  pursued  a  party  of  the  Fifty-fourth 
Massachusetts,  which  had  been  cut  off  by  the  left  of 
the  advancing  skirmish  line,  killing  and  wounding  a 
number  of  them,  the  others  escaping  through  the 
marsh. 

Colonel  Radcliffe  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Kem- 
per  surprised  the  Pawnee,  (Captain  Balch  com 
manding),  and  Marblehead  at  early  dawn  by  a 
rapid  and  accurate  fire,  striking  the  Pawnee  forty- 
two  times  with  considerable  effect.  From  the  na 
ture  of  their  position  in  the  Stono  the  gunboats  could 
not  bring  their  guns  to  bear  with  effect  on  the  troops, 
but  fell  down  the  river  out  of  range  of  the  field 
guns  and  in  positions  where  their  own  batteries 
could  be  used,  and  in  response  to  a  signal  from 
General  Terry  the  gunboats  swept  the  ground  in  the 
Federal  front,  rendering  valuable  service,  for  which 
General  Terry  was  quick  to  acknowledge  his  in 
debtedness  to  the  naval  commander. 

The  object  of  the  reconnoissance  having  been  ac 
complished,  the  Confederates  retired,  and  that  night 
General  Terry  abandoned  the  island,  carrying  his 


228      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

force  to  Folly  Island,  and  the  Confederates  occupied 
the  positions  from  which  the  Federals  had  retired. 
The  loss  in  the  affair  had  been  slight — about  fifty  on 
the  Federal  and  eighteen  on  the  Confederate  side. 
The  desired  result  was  accomplished  when  the 
Federal  force  withdrew  from  the  island. 

Service  in  Battery  Wagner  was  necessarily  one 
of  ceaseless  vigilance,  entailing  on  officers  and  men 
such  continued  mental  and  physical  strain  that  it  was 
necessary  to  relieve  the  garrison  by  fresh  troops  at 
short  intervals.  It  was  General  Beauregard's  wish 
that  it  should  be  relieved  every  forty-eight  hours, 
but  the  change  had  to  be  made  in  boats  during  the 
night  and  soon  became  so  difficult  that  the  tour  of 
duty  was  extended.  Brigadier  General  William  B. 
Taliaferro,  who  was  on  duty  at  Savannah  when  the 
descent  was  made  on  Morris  Island,  hastened  to 
Charleston  on  leave  of  absence  for  a  few  hours  and 
solicited  service  in  the  defense  of  the  city.  His 
offer  was  accepted  and  he  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  Battery  Wagner  on  the  I3th. 

To  guard  against  surprise  a  line  of  rifle-pits  was 
made  across  the  island,  about  two  hundred  yards  in 
front  of  the  work.  The  Federal  advance  picket  line 
was  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  distant  and  could 
be  seen  from  the  parapet  of  Wagner.  Beyond  that 
point  the  enemy  was  concealed  by  sand  hills  and 
neither  their  numbers  nor  the  extent  of  the  prepara 
tions  they  were  making  were  known. 

To  gain  information  on  those  points,  cover  the 
men  who  were  digging  the  rifle-pits,  and  inspirit  the 
garrison  by  an  aggressive  movement,  General  Talia- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      229 

ferro  ordered  a  sortie  to  be  made  on  the  night  ot 
the  I4th,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  detailed 
from  the  infantry  of  the  garrison,  namely,  the  Fifty- 
first  North  Carolina,  Twelfth  and  Eighteenth 
Georgia  Battalions,  Twentieth  Regiment  and 
Seventh  Battalion  South  Carolina,  Major  James  H. 
Rion  commanding.  The  sortie  was  made  about 
midnight,  driving  in  the  advance  picket  to  the  first 
trench,  from  which  the  enemy  was  drawn;  but  a 
heavy  fire  from  a  much  larger  force  a  hundred  or 
two  hundreds  yards  further  on  arrested  the  advance 
of  the  assailants,  and  it  was  believed  killed  and 
wounded  a  number  of  the  Federal  soldiers  who 
were  retreating.  From  prisoners  taken  it  was  as 
certained  that  batteries  were  in  course  of  construc 
tion  and  many  guns  already  mounted.  The  Con 
federates  lost  eleven  wounded,  one  mortally,  and 
three  missing.  Major  Rion  estimated  the  Federal 
loss  at  not  less  than  forty. 

Battery  Wagner  was  a  field  work  made  of  sand 
and  riveted  with  turf  and  palmetto  logs.  It  extended 
across  the  islands  from  the  beach  on  the  east  to 
Vincent's  Creek  on  the  west,  and  presented  toward 
the  south  a  bastioned  front  of  about  275  yards. 
The  parapets  were  very  thick  and  the  ditch  of  mod 
erate  depth.  The  space  within  the  work  was  from 
east  to  west  about  200  yards  and  from  north  to 
south  varied  from  20  to  75  yards.  On  this  space 
to  the  west  were  quarters  for  officers  and  men,  built 
of  wood,  a  bomb-proof  (capable  of  sheltering  from 
eight  hundred  to  a  thousand  men),  bomb-proof 
magazines  and  heavy  traverses. 


230      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

On  July  1 8  the  armament  was  one  lo-inch  colum- 
biad,  one  32-pounder  rifle,  one  42-pounder,  and  two 
32-pounder  carronades,  two  naval  shell  guns  and 
one  8-inch  seacoast  howitzer,  four  smooth-bore  32- 
pounders  and  one  lo-inch  sea-coast  mortar — in  all 
thirteen — and  one  light  battery.  Of  those  guns  only, 
the  single  lo-inch  columbiad  was  of  much  effect 
against  the  monitors.  The  Federal  land  batteries 
were  beyond  the  range  of  nearly  all  of  the  other 
guns  in  Wagner. 

On  the  morning  of  the  iSth  the  infantry  of  the 
garrison  consisted  of  the  Thirty-first  North  Caro 
lina,  Lieutenant  Colonel  C.  W.  Knight  command 
ing;  Fifty-first  North  Carolina,  Colonel  McKethen; 
and  the  Charleston  Battalion,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
P.  C.  Gaillard.  The  artillery  was  Captains  W.  T. 
Tatam's  and  Warren  Adams'  companies  of  the 
First  South  Carolina  regular  infantry,  acting  as 
artillery;  Captains  J.  T.  Buckner's  and  W.  J- 
Dixon's  companies  of  the  Sixty-third  Georgia  Heavy 
Artillery,  and  Captain  De  Pass'  Light  Battery — in 
all  an  aggregate  of  about  seventeen  hundred  men. 
The  Charleston  Battalion  and  Fifty-first  North 
Carolina  were  assigned  to  the  defense  of  the  parapet 
in  the  order  named  from  the  right  along  the  south 
front  to  the  gun  chamber  opposite  the  door  of  the 
bomb-proof,  which  was  on  the  left  or  sea  front.  The 
Thirty-first  North  Carolina  extended  along  the  sea 
face  from  the  left  of  the  Fifty-first  to  the  sallyport 
toward  Battery  Gregg.  A  part  of  this  regiment 
(the  Thirty-first)  was  held  in  reserve  on  the  parade. 

Two  companies  of  the  Charleston  Battalion,  Cap- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      231 

tain  Julius  A.  Blake  commanding,  were  outside  of 
the  work  guarding  the  left  gorge  and  sallyport.  Two 
of  Captain  De  Pass'  field  pieces  were  also  outside 
of  the  work  on  the  traverse  near  the  sallyport. 
Colonel  E.  B.  Harris,  chief  of  engineers,  had  that 
day  placed  a  howitzer  on  the  right  of  the  sallyport, 
outside  of  the  beach,  to  co-operate  with  the  guns  on 
the  left.  To  avoid  the  delay,  which  in  a  sudden  as 
sault  might  prove  fatal,  of  assembling  the  men  and 
marching  them  in  military  order  to  their  respective 
posts,  every  man  was  instructed  individually  as  to  the 
exact  point  which  he  should  occupy,  and  which,  on 
an  order  to  man  the  parapets,  he  would  be  required 
to  gain  and  hold.  All  of  the  artillery  was  undpr  the 
general  command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  C.  Sim- 
kins,  Chief  of  Artillery. 

On  the  1 6th  General  Gillmore  had  completed  his 
preparations  and  was  in  readiness  for  the  bombard 
ment  and  assault,  but  heavy  rains  deluged  his  bat 
teries,  damaging  the  ammunition,  and  obliged  him 
to  defer  it  until  the  iSth.  He  had  constructed  four 
batteries,  and  the  long  list  of  officers  killed  in  the 
then  recent  battle  of  Gettysburg  furnished  names 
for  three  of  them — Reynolds,  Weed,  and  O'Rorke; 
the  other  was  Battery  Hays.  They  were  at  dis 
tances  from  Wagner  ranging  from  1330  to  1920 
yards,  and  mounted  thirty-one  rifled  guns,  varying  in 
caliber  from  lo-pounders  to  3O-pounders,  nine  10- 
inch  and  four  8-inch  mortars,  in  all  forty-four  pieces. 
Lieutenant  Colonel  R.  W.  Jackson,  First  United 
States  Artillery,  commanded  Batteries  Hays  and 


232      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

O'Rorke;  Captain  L.  L.  Langon,  of  the  same  regi 
ment,  commanded  Batteries  Reynolds  and  Weed. 

The  naval  vessels  in  readiness  to  take  part  in 
the  bombardment  were  the  New  Ironsides,  Cap 
tain  Rowan,  and  five  monitors,  namely  the  Kaats- 
kill,  Captain  G.  W.  Rodgers;  Montauk,  Captain 
D.  McN.  Fairfax;  Nantucket,  Captain  Beaumont; 
Weehawken,  Captain  Colhoun,  and  Patapsco,  Cap 
tain  Badger.  The  Ironsides  carried  fourteen  and 
the  monitors  two  guns  each,  all  of  1 5-inch  and  n- 
inch  caliber — the  heaviest  guns  in  use.  There  were 
besides  five  gunboats,  the  Paul  Jones,  Commander 
Rhind;  Ottawa,  Commander  Whiting;  Seneca,  Com 
mander  Gibson;  Chippewa,  Commander  Harris, 
and  Wissahickon,  Commander  Davis. 

General  Gillmore  had  ordered  the  firing  to  com 
mence  at  day  dawn  on  the  i8th,  but  another  heavy 
rain  on  the  night  of  the  iyth  delayed  it  a  few  hours. 
About  8  130  A.  M.  fire  was  opened,  which,  until  mid 
day,  Gillmore  says,  was  merely  to  obtain  the  proper 
range,  but  the  Confederate  generals  represent  it  as 
rapid  and  heavy  from  the  commencement.  About 
mid-day  the  land  and  naval  batteries,  about  ninety 
guns,  were  in  rapid  action  and  were  replied  to  from 
batteries  on  Morris,  James,  and  Sullivan's  island  and 
Fort  Sumter.  The  bombardment — rarely,  if  ever, 
exceeded  in  the  history  of  war  for  the  number  and 
caliber  of  the  guns  and  the  rapidity  and  accuracy  of 
fire — continued  until  nearly  eight  o'clock. 

Words  fail  to  convey  an  adequate  idea  of  that 
bombardment  when  uthe  whole  island  smoked  like 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      233 

a  furnace  and  trembled  as  from  an  earthquake." 
None  but  those  who  witnessed  can  appreciate  it.  To 
those  who  directed  the  storm  "the  spectacle  pre 
sented  was  of  surpassing  sublimity  and  grandeur," 
as  described  by  General  Gillmore.  But  only  the 
men  who  were  in  Wagner  on  that  memorable  day 
can  form  an  idea  of  its  diabolical  power  as  it  ap 
peared  to  them,  which  seemed  capable  of  blasting 
and  destroying  everything  before  it  save  the  in 
domitable  will  and  resolution  of  those  who  defended 
the  work. 

For  eleven  hours  the  air  seemed  filled  with  every 
description  of  shot  and  shell  that  the  magazines  of 
war  could  supply.  Huge  clouds  of  sand  were  blown 
into  the  air  from  the  craters  formed  by  the  bursting 
shells;  the  water  of  the  bay  was  lashed  into  foam 
and  thrown  high  in  jets  of  spray  by  the  ricocheting 
shots  from  the  ironclads  bounding  from  the  water 
over  the  parapets  and  bursting  within  the  work, 
while  a  dense  cloud  of  sulphurous  smoke  hung  like  a 
pall  over  the  scene.  Of  the  garrison  only  the  gun 
detachments  and  a  few  sentinels  were  at  their  posts. 
The  troops  generally  were  ordered  to  shelter  them 
selves  in  the  bomb-proofs  and  behind  the  para 
pets,  traverses,  and  sand  hills.  The  Charleston 
battalion  preferred  the  open  air  to  the  stifling  heat 
and  vitiated. atmosphere  of  the  bomb-proof,  and 
during  the  whole  of  that  terrible  day  sheltered  them 
selves  as  they  best  could  outside.  It  was  necessary 
to  husband  their  strength  to  repel  the  expected  as 
sault.  In  the  meantime  their  strength  was  to  sit 
still. 


234      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

The  lo-inch  columbiad,  the  only  gun  which  could 
reach  the  ironclads  with  effect,  and  several  other 
guns  were  soon  dismounted  and  the  32-pounder  rifle 
was  rendered  useless  by  bursting.  In  truth,  the 
armament  of  Wagner  was  so  inferior  to  those  which 
opposed  it  that  it  was  inappreciable.  The  field  and 
shell  guns  were  dismounted  and  protected  by  sand 
bags  until  they  should  be  needed  to  repel  the  assault. 
Comparatively  passive  endurance  alone  remained 
for  the  garrison  while  the  storm  continued.  Since 
the  assault  of  the  nth  Wagner  had  been  much 
strengthened  under  the  skillful  direction  of  the  Chief 
Engineer,  Colonel  D.  B.  Harris,  and  his  able  as 
sistant,  Captain  Barnwell,  and  had  stood  the  severe 
test  of  the  heavy  fire  to  which  it  had  been  subjected 
so  well  as  to  inspire  the  troops  with  confidence  in 
the  efficacy  of  sand  batteries. 

Charleston  was  wild  with  excitement.  From 
church  steeples,  house-tops,  and  the  wharves,  from 
boats  in  the  harbor  and  the  parapets  of  the  sur 
rounding  forts  and  batteries,  thousands  of  eager 
spectators  gazed  anxiously  on  the  work  which  held 
its  gallant  defenders,  whom  they  were  powerless  to 
assist.  Wagner  itself  exhibited  scarcely  any  sign 
of  life. 

The  Confederate  flag  floated  defiantly  over  it, 
and  when  the  halyards  were  cut  by  a  shot  and  the 
flag  was  blown  into  the  fort  Captain  Barnwell,  of  the 
Engineers,  instantly  sprang  to  the  ramparts  with  a 
battle-flag  and  drove  the  staff  into  the  sand,  while 
others  of  the  garrison  leaped  forward  in  a  race 
through  the  storm  of  shot  and  shell  for  the  garrison 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      235 

flag — Major  Ramsey,  Sergeant  Shelton,  and  Pro 
vost  Flinn,  of  the  Charleston  Battalion,  and  Lieu 
tenant  Riddic,  of  the  Sixty-third  Georgia,  dividing 
the  honor  of  flying  it  again  from  its  staff.  It  was 
again  shot  away  and  again  restored  to  its  place,  this 
time  by  Private  Gaillard,  of  the  Charleston  Bat 
talion.  "These  intrepid  actions,"  says  Genera] 
Taliaferro,  "emulating  in  a  higher  degree  the  con 
duct  of  Sergeant  Jasper  at  Moultrie,  during  the 
Revolution,  were  loudly  cheered  by  the  command 
and  inspired  them  with  renewed  courage." 

While  the  bombardment  was  at  its  height  the 
Chief  of  Engineers,  Colonel  D.  B.  Harris,  a  grad 
uate  of  West  Point,  of  the  class  of  1833,  landed  at 
Cumming's  Point,  passed  through  the  tempest  of 
shot  to  Wagner  to  inspect  its  condition  and  to  give 
his  personal  attention  to  whatever  might  be  done  to 
repair  the  ravages  of  the  bombardment.  The  per 
fectly  cool  courage  which  characterized  him  and  was 
the  admiration  of  all  who  saw  him  under  the 
heaviest  fire  inspirited  the  garrison  and  gave  con 
fidence  in  its  capacity  to  withstand  the  terrible  fire  it 
was  undergoing. 

A  little  more  than  a  year  later  General  Harris 
died  at  Summerville  of  yellow  fever,  contracted 
while  inspecting  the  defenses  of  Charleston,  leaving 
an  enviable  reputation  for  skill,  patriotism,  and  in 
trepid  bravery,  tempered  by  a  kindly,  gentle,  and 
modest  bearing. 

The  long  midsummer  day  seemed  endless  and 
the  storm  of  fire  increased  as  the  hours  wore  on. 
The  fierce  July  sun  seemed  to  stand  still.  Would 


236      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

it  never  set?  Water  was  scarce  and  men  slaked 
their  thirst  from  the  temporary  wells  opened  by  ex 
ploding  shells  into  which  water  oozed.  Men  were 
found  dead  without  wounds  from  the  concussion  of 
bursting  shells.  A  staff  officer,  Captain  Tuiggs,  in 
the  execution  of  an  order  was  knocked  down  by  an 
exploding  shell  and  found  apparently  lifeless,  with 
no  wound.  He  was  with  difficulty  restored.  Men 
were  half  buried  in  sand  thrown  up  by  bursting 
shells;  the  commanding  general  himself  was  buried 
knee  deep  and  dug  out  with  spades. 

Much  anxiety  was  felt  for  the  safety  of  the  mag 
azine.  The  works  might  be  battered  out  of  shape, 
the  parapet,  traverses,  scarp,  and  counterscarp 
might  be  cut  down,  but  the  sand  could  not  be 
wholly  removed  and  would  still  afford  some  shelter; 
but  if  the  covering  of  the  magazine  were  swept 
away,  a  shell  bursting  would  blow  the  whole  garri 
son  skyward.  The  closest  watch  was  kept  upon  it 
and  its  condition  reported  at  short  intervals  during 
the  day. 

Later  in  the  day  General  Gillmore  signaled  Ad 
miral  Dahlgren  to  redouble  his  fire  and  cease  a  little 
after  sunset,  when  the  assault  would  be  made. 
Colonel  Olmstead,  of  the  First  Georgia,  who  had 
been  relieved  from  duty  in  Wagner  in  the  night  of 
the  1 7th  and  witnessed  the  bombardment  from  Fort 
Johnson,  says  the  General's  signal  to  the  Admiral 
was  intercepted  by  a  Confederate  signal  officer,  who 
knew  the  Federal  signals,  and  that  the  dispatch  was 
known  by  General  Beauregard  almost  as  soon  as  by 
the  Admiral;  but  General  Taliaferro  has  no  recollec- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      237 

tion  that  it  was  communicated  to  him.  No  signal 
was  needed  to  warn  him  of  the  approaching  as 
sault.  When  the  storm  of  fire  culminated  about 
sunset  and  gradually  subsided,  it  was  evident  that 
the  supreme  hour  of  the  day  had  come  and  that  the 
assault  was  at  hand.  Orders  were  given  to  man  the 
ramparts;  the  field  guns  and  howitzers  were  un 
earthed  and  mounted,  and  all  preparations  made  to 
meet  and  repel  the  assault. 

General  Gillmore  had  selected  the  time  between 
sunset  and  dark  to  make  the  assault,  in  order  that 
there  might  be  light  enough  for  his  troops  to  see 
their  way,  but  not  enough  to  enable  the  gunners  in 
the  distant  Confederate  batteries  to  see  distinctly  the 
advancing  column.  General  Seymour  commanded 
in  person  the  division  of  troops  available  for  the 
assault.  It  had  been  suggested  to  him — he  does  not 
say  by  whom — that  one  brigade  would  be  sufficient 
for  the  work  in  hand,  but  Seymour  thought  dif 
ferently.  On  close  personal  observation  of  Wagner 
he  could  not  discover  that  it  had  been  materially 
damaged  by  the  unprecedentedly  heavy  bombard 
ment  to  which  it  had  been  subjected,  but  he  pre 
sumed  that  so  heavy  a  fire  must  have  in  a  great 
measure  demoralized  the  garrison. 

The  First  Brigade — General  G.  C.  Strong's— 
was  selected  to  lead  the  assault.  It  was  composed 
of  the  Fifty-fourth  Massachusetts  Regiment, 
Colonel  Shaw;  the  Sixth  Connecticut,  Colonel  Chat- 
field;  a  battalion  of  the  Seventh  Connecticut,  Cap 
tain  Gray;  the  Forty-eighth  New  York,  Colonel 
Barton;  the  Third  New  Hampshire,  Colonel  Jack- 


238      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

son;  Ninth  Maine,  Colonel  Emery,  and  Seventy- 
sixth  Pennsylvania,  Captain  J.  S.  Little  command 
ing.  It  was  supported  by  Colonel  H.  S.  Putnam's 
Brigade,  composed  of  his  own  regiment,  the  Seventh 
New  Hampshire,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Abbott;  One 
Hundredth  New  York,  Colonel  Dandy;  Sixty- 
second  Ohio,  Colonel  Pond,  and  Sixty-seventh  Ohio, 
Colonel  Voris.  General  Stevenson's  Brigade  of 
four  excellent  regiments  was  held  in  reserve. 

The  First  Brigade  was  formed  in  column  by 
regiments,  except  the  Fifty-fourth  Massachusetts, 
which  being  much  larger  than  the  others,  number 
ing  nearly  a  thousand  men,  was  in  column  by  bat 
talion.  It  was  a  negro  regiment,  recruited  in 
Massachusetts,  and  was  regarded  as  an  admirable 
and  reliable  body  of  men.  Half  the  ground  to  be 
traversed  before  reaching  Wagner  was  undulating 
with  sand  hills,  which  afforded  some  shelter,  but 
not  so  much  as  to  prevent  free  and  easy  movement; 
the  other  half  smooth  and  unobstructed  up  to  the 
ditch.  Within  easy  range  of  Wagner  the  marsh 
encroached  so  much  on  the  firm  sand  of  the  island 
as  to  leave  but  a  narrow  way  between  it  and  the 
water.  A  few  stirring  words  were  addressed  by  the 
officers  to  their  troops  and  the  men  responded  with 
cheers. 

About  half-past  seven  the  assaulting  column  was 
hurled  against  Wagner,  with  orders  to  use  the 
bayonet  only,  the  Federal  artillery  continuing  their 
fire  over  their  heads  as  long  as  it  could  be  done 
without  risk  to  their  own  men.  The  Confederates 
at  their  posts  were  straining  their  eyes  to  catch 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      239 

through  the  deepening  twilight  the  first  glimpse  of 
the  enemy.  When  the  head  of  the  column  came  in 
view  a  rapid  fire  of  grape  and  canister  was  opened, 
and  the  fire  from  James'  Island  batteries  was  poured 
in  on  the  flank.  Sumter  and  Gregg,  firing  over 
Wagner,  plunged  their  shot  into  the  advancing 
column  and  the  parapets  of  Wagner  were  lit  up  by  a 
line  of  infantry  fire. 

The  advancing  column  pressed  defiantly  forward, 
breasting  the  storm  of  iron  and  lead  which  was 
rapidly  thinning  their  ranks.  The  leading  regi 
ment,  the  Fifty-fourth  Massachusetts,  was  soon 
thrown  into  a  state  of  disorder,  which  reacted  in 
juriously  on  those  which  followed.  The  wounded 
"and  many  unhurt"  were  hastening  in  crowds  from 
the  front  along  the  beach.  So  heavy  was  the  fire 
and  so  great  the  disorder  that  General  Seymour  saw 
the  necessity  of  immediate  support,  and  accordingly 
dispatched  his  Assistant  Inspector  General,  Major 
Plympton,  of  the  Third  New  Hampshire,  to  order 
up  Colonel  Putnam  with  his  supporting  brigade.  To 
his  amazement  Colonel  Putnam  positively  refused 
to  advance,  because,  as  he  explained,  he  had  been 
ordered  by  General  Gillmore  to  remain  where  he 
was. 

In  the  meantime  the  First  Brigade  was  urged  on 
with  admirable  spirit  and  gallantry  by  General 
Strong,  who  had  been  assured  of  prompt  support. 
But  the  destructive  fire  from  Wagner  was  more  than 
his  men  could  stand.  The  Fifty-fourth  Massa 
chusetts  broke  and  fled,  large  bodies  of  it  falling 
upon  and  with  violence  forcing  their  way  through 


240      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  ranks  of  the  advancing  column,  greatly  heighten 
ing  the  general  confusion.  The  First  Brigade  had, 
indeed,  ceased  for  the  time  to  be  an  organized  body 
and  came  surging  back  to  the  rear  in  confusion. 

General  Strong  had  urged  his  command  on  with 
great  spirit  and  gallantry,  but  his  losses  had  been  so 
severe  that  his  regiments  were  much  shaken,  and 
the  consequent  confusion  was  much  heightened  by 
the  yielding  of  the  leading  regiment,  portions  of 
which  fell  harshly  upon  those  in  the  rear.  Frag 
ments  of  each  regiment,  however,  brave  men  bravely 
led,  went  eagerly  over  the  ditch,  mounted  the  para 
pet,  and  struggled  with  the  foe  inside.  But  their 
efforts  were  too  feeble  to  affect  the  contest  ma 
terially. 

The  storm  of  fire  from  Wagner  had  strewn  the 
ditch  and  glacis  with  killed  and  wounded.  A  few 
of  the  bravest  of  the  different  regiments,  notably 
the  Forty-eighth  New  York  and  Sixth  Connecticut, 
continued  to  press  forward,  bearing  their  colors  and 
striving  to  reach  the  ditch  and  mount  the  parapet; 
but  the  brigade  had  been  hopelessly  repulsed,  its  gal 
lant  commander,  General  Strong,  was  mortally 
wounded,  as  was  Colonel  Chatfield.  Colonel  Shaw, 
of  the  Fifty-fourth  Massachusettes,  was  killed,  and 
many  other  officers  killed  and  wounded.  The  mass 
of  the  brigade  was  hastening  in  disorder  to  the 
shelter  of  the  sand  hills  and  trenches. 

What  were  Colonel  Putnam's  feelings  in  the 
meantime  perhaps  will  never  be  known,  but  may 
with  much  certainty  be  conjectured.  He  was  a  gal 
lant  young  officer  and  could  not  stand  idly  by  at  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      241 

head  of  a  fine  brigade  and  see  the  command  of  his 
classmates  and  intimate  friends  cut  to  pieces. 
uAfter  a  disastrous  delay  and  without  orders," 
says  General  Seymour,  "he  led  his  brigade  forward 
and  pressed  on  to  the  assault  of  the  southeast  angle 
through  a  destructive  fire,  for,  the  first  brigade  hav 
ing  been  repulsed,  the  fire  from  the  center  and  both 
flanks  of  Wagner  were  crossed  in  front  of  that 
angle,  sweeping  the  glacis  and  ditch  with  fatal 
effect." 

It  seems  that  the  terrible  bombardment  of  eleven 
hours  had  demoralized  the  Thirty-first  North  Caro 
lina  Regiment.  It  did  not  respond  to  the  call  to 
man  the  ramparts.  The  southeast  bastion  and  sea 
front,  to  the  defense  of  which  it  had  been  assigned, 
was  therefore  unguarded.  Colonel  Putnam  and  a 
part  of  his  brigade  crossed  the  ditch,  which  had  been 
nearly  filled  with  sand  by  the  long  bombardment, 
mounted  the  parapet,  and  a  hundred  or  more  men 
gained  possession  of  the  southeast  bastion. 

Seeing  the  advantage  gained  by  Colonel  Putnam, 
General  Seymour  had  just  dispatched  an  order  by 
Major  Plympton  to  General  Stevenson  to  advance 
with  his  brigade  to  Colonel  Putnam's  support,  when 
he,  too,  was  severely  wounded.  Before  he  was 
carried  from  the  field  he  repeated  the  order  to  Gen 
eral  Stevenson  to  advance,  but  the  order  was  not 
obeyed.  Why  does  not  appear. 

Colonel  Putnam,  surrounded  by  his  chief  officers 
—Colonel  Dandy,  One  Hundredth  New  York; 
Major  Butler,  Sixty-seventh  Ohio;  Major  Coan, 
Forty-eighth  New  York;  Captain  Klein,  Sixth  Con- 


242      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

necticut,  and  others — was  encouraging  his  men  to 
hold  the  ground  they  had  gained,  assuring  them  that 
they  would  soon  be  reinforced,  when  he  was  shot 
dead,  "as  brave  a  soldier,  as  courteous  a  gentleman, 
as  true  a  man  as  ever  walked  beneath  the  Stars  and 
Stripes,"  says  his  division  commander.  An  officer 
of  his  staff — Lieutenant  Gate,  Seventh  New  Hamp 
shire — seeing  the  Colonel  fall,  sprang  to  his  side  to 
aid  him,  when  he,  too,  was  struck  by  a  shot  and  fell 
dead  across  the  body  of  his  chief. 

The  Federal  loss  had  been  heavy,  especially  in 
officers  of  rank.  When  General  Seymour  was  taken 
from  the  field  wounded,  General  Gillmore  sent  for 
ward  his  chief  of  staff,  General  Turner,  to  assume 
command  and  draw  off  the  troops.  Those  not  al 
ready  within  the  work,  despairing  of  support,  re 
treated  as  rapidly  as  they  could  through  a  destruc 
tive  fire  until  they  gained  the  shelter  of  the  sand  hills 
and  trenches. 

Those  who  had  effected  an  entrance  could  not 
escape  through  the  cross  fire  in  their  rear  and  would 
not  surrender.  The  assailants  had  become  the  as 
sailed.  Volunteers  were  called  for  from  the  gar 
rison  to  overcome  and  capture  them.  Major  Mc 
Donald,  of  the  Fifty-first  North  Carolina,  and 
Captain  Ryan,  of  the  Charleston  Battalion,  quickly 
sprang  forward  for  the  service.  The  latter  with 
his  company  was  selected;  the  captain  was  shot  dead 
at  the  moment  of  the  charge,  his  men  faltered  and 
the  opportunity  was  lost. 

The  desperate  men  inside  seemed  resolved  to  sell 
their  lives  dearly  rather  than  surrender.  General 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      243 

Hagood  had  arrived  with  Colonel  Harrison's  regi 
ment,  the  Thirty-second  Georgia,  to  reinforce  the 
garrison.  That  regiment  was  sent  along  the  para 
pet  to  the  left  and  on  the  top  of  the  magazine  and 
approached  the  rear  of  the  imprisoned  Federals, 
who,  seeing  themselves  so  greatly  outnumbered  and 
with  no  hope  of  escape,  laid  down  their  arms.1 

The  repulse  was  complete  and  disastrous.  Gen 
eral  Seymour  attributes  the  failure  of  the  assault 
"solely  to  the  unfortunate  delay  that  hindered 
Colonel  Putnam  from  moving  promptly  in  obedience 
to  my  orders,  and  to  his  not  being  supported  after 
he  had  essentially  succeeded  in  the  assault.'*  The 
heavy  losses  of  the  assailants  attest  their  daring  and 
determined  resolution,  and  their  division  commander 
awards  them  the  highest  praise  for  the  gallantry 
with  which  they  "did  their  full  duty  that  night." 

The  light  of  the  next  morning  disclosed  a  ghastly 
scene  of  slaughter.  The  ditch  and  ground  in  front 
of  Wagner  were  thickly  strewn  with  killed  and 
wounded. 

The  Confederate  loss  was  only  174;  surprisingly 


Lewis  Butler,  of  the  Sixty-seventh  Ohio,  who  was  by 
the  side  of  Colonel  Putman  when  the  latter  was  killed,  says  : 
"It  is  but  just  that  I  notice  a  special  order  of  General  Beaure- 
gard,  under  date  of  July  27,  1863  (if  I  am  correct  as  to  date), 
directing  that  special  care  be  taken  of  the  wounded  captured 
at  Wagner,  as  men  who  were  brave  enough  to  go  in  there  de 
served  the  respect  of  their  enemies.  Another  act  of  courtesy  : 
The  effects,  money,  and  papers  belonging  to  members  of  the 
Sixty-seventh  Ohio  Volunteer  Infantry  who  died  in  Charleston 
Hospital  were  sent  through  the  lines  by  flag  of  truce." 


244      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

small,  thanks  to  the  sheltering  capacity  of  sand 
works.  The  loss  on  both  sides  had  been  unusually 
heavy  in  commissioned  officers.  Among  the  Con 
federate  killed  were  Lieutenant  Colonel  J.  C.  Sim- 
kins,  First  South  Carolina  Infantry;  Captain  W.  H. 
Ryan,  of  the  Charleston  Battalion;  Captain  W.  T. 
Tatam,  First  South  Carolina  Infantry,  and  Lieu 
tenant  G.  W.  Thompson,  commanding  company, 
Fifty-first  North  Carolina.  Major  David  Ramsay, 
of  the  Charleston  Battalion,  was  severely  wounded. 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Simkins,  as  Chief  of  Artillery, 
had  directed  the  operations  of  that  arm  with  ad 
mirable  skill  and  daring,  and  when  the  assault  com 
menced  mounted  the  parapet  to  aid  and  encourage 
the  infantry.  "There  on  the  ramparts  in  the  front 
this  admirable  soldier  and  accomplished  gentleman 
sealed  his  devotion  to  our  cause  by  an  early  but 
most  heroic  death." 

The  Federal  loss  has  never  been  officially  ascer 
tained.  General  Taliaferro  estimated  it  at  not  less 
than  2000,  perhaps  much  more.  General  Beaure- 
gard  in  his  official  report  says  their  loss  must  have 
been  3000,  as  800  bodies  were  interred  in  front  of 
Battery  Wagner  on  the  following  morning. 

In  a  letter  of  the  2Oth  to  Admiral  Dahlgren  Gen 
eral  Gillmore  tells  that  during  the  ten  days  from 
the  beginning  of  his  operations  he  had  lost  thirty- 
three  per  cent,  of  his  troops  in  killed,  wounded, 
missing,  and  sick.  He  had  commenced  with 
somewhat  more  than  13,000  on  Morris  and  Folly 
islands,  and  his  tri-monthly  report  for  the  2Oth  of 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      245 

July  shows  an  aggregate  sick  on  those  two  islands 
of  1241.  It  wrould  seem  therefore  that  General 
Beauregard's  estimate  was  not  excessive. 

General  Hagood  relieved  General  Taliaferro  in 
command  of  Wagner  on  the  mon  ing  of  the  I9th. 
The  latter  had  been  in  command  since  the  I3th,  and 
he  and  the  officers  and  men  of  his  command  received 
the  highest  encomiums  from  Generals  Beauregard 
and  Ripley  for  skill  and  gallantry  in  the  defense  of 
this  important  post.  The  Fifty-first  North  Caro 
lina  had  brilliantly  sustained  the  honor  of  their  State, 
and  was  highly  commended,  especially  the  field 
officers,  Colonel  McKethen,  Lieutenant  Colonel  C. 
B.  Hobson,  and  Major  McDonald.  The  next  year 
in  the  operations  around  Petersburg  the  Thirty-first 
North  Carolina  wiped  out  the  reproach  it  had  in 
curred  in  a  terrible  moment  of  weakness.  Sunday, 
July  19,  passed  quietly  and  was  devoted  under  a 
flag  of  truce  to  burying  the  dead  and  caring  for  the 
wounded. 

The  next  day  the  bombardment  was  renewed  from 
both  land  and  naval  batteries.  The  Admiral  sug 
gested  to  the  General  to  advance  his  batteries  and 
renew  the  assault  by  columns  advancing  simultane 
ously  on  the  southern  and  northern  fronts.  Gen 
eral  Gillmore  demurred,  because  the  attempt  would 
involve  too  heavy  a  loss  of  life  for  his  already 
greatly  reduced  force.  He  agreed,  however,  to 
make  another  assault,  provided  the  Admiral  would 
furnish  from  his  fleet  the  column  to  assail  the  work 
from  the  north,  a  proposal  which  the  Admiral 


246      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

promptly  declined.  The  policy  of  carrying  Wagner 
by  assault  was  therefore  abandoned  and  the  science 
of  engineering  resorted  to.  The  object  which  the 
assaulting  columns  had  failed  to  effect  it  was  de 
cided  to  attain  by  the  slower  process  of  a  regular 
siege. 


CHAPTER  XII 

Assault  of  Wagner  abandoned — Its  reduction  by  siege  planned — 
Fort  Sumter  again  bombarded — Siege  operations — Federal 
defenses — Death  of  Captain  Wampler — Sumter  silenced — 
The  "Swamp  Angel" — Surrender  of  Sumter  and  Morris 
Island  demanded — Charleston  bombarded. 

Referring  to  Battery  Wagner,  Major  General 
Gillmore  says  in  the  official  report  of  his  operations 
on  Morris  Island:  "The  nature  of  its  construction 
demanded  and  enticed  an  actual  attempt  upon  the 
works  to  make  manifest  its  real  and  concealed  ele 
ments  of  strength."  He  had  on  two  occasions  yielded 
to  its  enticements  to  attack  first  on  the  morning  of 
the  nth  and  again  on  the  evening  of  the  i8th  of 
July,  1863,  and  the  results  had  been  disastrous  on 
both  occasions,  especially  on  the  evening  of  July  18, 
when  the  assault  had  signally  failed  with  a  loss  in 
his  command  variously  estimated  at  from  1600  to 
3000  men,  among  their  killed  being  General  G.  C. 
Strong  and  Colonel  H.  S.  Putnam,  commanding  the 
two  brigades  which  made  the  assault,  and  Colonels 
J.  L.  Chatfield  and  R.  G.  Shaw,  commanding  regi 
ments. 

Battery  Wagner  had  exhibited  such  formidable 
strength  in  itself,  and  its  gallant  commanders  on 
both  occasions,  General  William  B.  Taliaferro  and 
Colonel  Graham,  and  the  officers  and  men  under 

247 


248      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

their  command  such  skill  and  resolution  in  utilizing 
that  strength  to  its  utmost,  as  convinced  General  Gill- 
more  that  the  work  could  not  be  carried  by  assault, 
even  with  the  aid  of  the  most  powerful  land  and 
naval  batteries  ever  brought  to  bear  upon  so  small 
an  object  without  a  greater  sacrifice  of  men  than 
he  was  disposed  to  make.  He  did  indeed  assent 
to  a  suggestion  made  by  Admiral  Dahlgren  to  renew 
the  assault  with  columns  advancing  simultaneously 
on  the  north  and  south  fronts  of  the  battery,  but 
only  on  the  condition  that  the  Admiral  should  fur 
nish  from  his  fleet  the  column  to  assault  the  northern 
front.  He  had,  he  said,  lost  one-third  of  his  com 
mand  in  killed,  wounded,  captured  and  sick  during 
the  ten  days'  operations  on  Morris  Island.  Another 
assault  would  involve  a  heavier  loss  of  life  than  his 
already  greatly  reduced  force  alone  could  bear.  The 
Admiral  declined  to  furnish  an  assaulting  column 
from  his  fleet,  which  had  also  a  fearfully  large  sick 
list. 

The  plan,  therefore,  of  carrying  Battery  Wagner 
by  assault  was  abandoned  and  the  longer  and  more 
tedious  process  of  reducing  it  scientifically  by  regular 
approaches  was  adopted.  The  contest  for  the  pos 
session  of  Morris  Island  lapsed  therefore  into  one 
of  engineering  skill  and  steady  endurance.  With 
sufficient  labor,  long-range  guns,  and  other  necessary 
material  the  prospect  of  a  successful  defense  would 
have  been  encouraging — without  them  it  was  hope 
less.  The  wealth  of  material  and  all  manner  of 
necessary  appliances  for  siege  operations  on  the 
Federal  so  greatly  exceeded  that  of  the  Confederate 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      249 

side  that  the  ultimate  result  was  never  for  a  moment 
doubtful.  From  the  moment  that  General  Gillmore 
secured  so  firm  a  foothold  on  Morris  Island  that 
General  Beauregard  felt  and  acknowledged  his  in 
ability  to  dislodge  him,  the  ultimate  occupation  of 
the  whole  island  was  only  a  question  of  time. 

Charleston  was  General  Gillmore's  objective 
point,  which  he  proposed  to  gain  by  way  of  Morris 
Island  and  the  subsequent  action  of  the  fleet.  For 
the  complete  success  of  his  plan  it  wras  exceedingly 
important  that  he  should,  with  the  least  possible 
delay,  demolish  Fort  Sumter  and  silence  Fort  Moul- 
trie  and  other  batteries  on  the  west  of  Sullivan's 
Island,  the  accomplishment  of  which  formed  a  part 
of  his  plan,  and  thus  open  the  gate  to  Charleston  for 
the  entrance  of  the  fleet  before  his  adversary  could 
prepare  other  works  to  bar  his  approach  to  the  city. 
Every  hour's  delay  was  important  to  the  Confeder 
ates,  which  gave  them  time  to  prepare  interior  works 
of  defense. 

In  that  view  of  the  case  it  would  seem  that  in  an 
affair  of  so  much  moment,  instead  of  relying  upon 
two  brigades,  or  one,  as  General  Seymour  intimates 
that  General  Gillmore  did,  to  carry  Battery  Wagner 
by  assault  on  the  evening  of  July  18,  it  would  have 
been  better  in  a  humane,  as  well  as  a  military  point 
of  view,  if  General  Gillmore  had  on  that  occasion 
hurled  his  whole  available  force  against  it,  or  even 
to  have  renewed  the  assault  as  soon  as  his  shattered 
columns  could  have  been  re-formed  and  brought  up 
to  the  work  and  before  reinforcements  could  arrive. 
That  course  might,  perhaps,  have  resulted  in  the 


250      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

capture  of  Wagner.  The  loss  would  probably  not 
have  been  greater  than  that  which  resulted  from  the 
daily  tale  of  killed  and  wounded  in  the  trenches  and 
the  heavier  loss  by  disease  attending  the  fifty  days' 
siege  which  followed,  and  the  physical  suffering 
would  have  been  less. 

It  had  been  deemed  essential  to  the  success  of 
General  Gillmore's  plan  of  operations  that  his  force 
should  occupy  the  whole  of  Morris  Island  before 
proceeding  to  demolish  Fort  Sumter  and  silence  the 
Sullivan's  Island  works.  To  gain  possession  of  the 
island  involved  the  necessity  of  capturing  Batteries 
Wagner  and  Gregg.  Ten  days'  experience  on  the 
island  had  demonstrated  that  the  reduction  of  the 
two  batteries  would  require  a  much  longer  time  than 
had  been  supposed. 

General  Gillmore  was  amply  supplied  with  means, 
and  though  untrammeled  by  instructions  from  his 
government  he  was  under  a  strong  pressure  of  public 
opinion  and  expectation  to  hasten  forward  his  opera 
tions.  He  had  been  selected  by  President  Lincoln 
for  this  important  service,  on  which  he  had  entered 
on  the  urgent  recommendation  of  the  most  distin 
guished  and  influential  journalist  of  that  day  in  this 
country,  and  had  staked  his  professional  reputation 
on  the  accomplishment  of  the  task  he  had  under 
taken.  There  were,  besides,  newspaper  correspond 
ents  with  his  command  to  prick  him  on  to  action,  if 
necessary,  and  to  keep  the  public  informed  of  the 
progress  of  the  operations  for  the  capture  of 
Charleston.  To  gain  time,  therefore,  he  somewhat 
modified  his  original  plan  of  operations  and  decided 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      251 

to  attempt  the  demolition  of  Fort  Sumter  with  bat 
teries,  to  be  established  on  ground  already  in  his 
possession,  firing  over  Wagner  and  Gregg. 

The  conception  and  execution  of  this  plan  of 
operations  strikingly  illustrates  the  marvelous  pro 
gress  that  had  been  made  in  a  year  or  so  in  the 
manufacture  of  heavy  ordnance.  About  fifteen 
months  earlier  it  had  been  thought  wonderful  that 
breaching  batteries  at  the  distance  of  a  mile  had 
reduced  Fort  Pulaski  at  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah 
River.  Now  at  more  than  double  the  distance  it  was 
proposed  to  reduce  Fort  Sumter.  Nothing  in  siege 
operations  approaching  it  had  ever  been  known. 

Immediately  after  the  repulse  of  the  assaulting 
columns  on  the  evening  of  July  18,  and  while  hun 
dreds  of  his  killed  and  wounded  were  lying  on  the 
ground  where  they  had  fallen  in  front  of  Wagner, 
General  Gillmore  gave  orders  for  converting  the 
positions  occupied  by  his  most  advanced  batteries 
into  a  strong  defensive  line  capable  of  withstanding 
the  most  formidable  attack  his  adversary  could  prob 
ably  make  against  it,  and  for  the  erection  of  breach 
ing  batteries  against  Fort  Sumter. 

Probably  no  besieging  army  was  ever  better 
equipped  for  the  work  to  be  done  than  was  that 
which  General  Gillmore  commanded.  In  addition 
to  a  corps  of  skillful  engineer  and  artillery  officers, 
there  was  in  his  command  an  admirable  and  most 
useful  engineer  regiment — the  First  New  York  En 
gineers.  The  Colonel,  E.  W.  Serrell,  and  many  of 
the  officers  were  practical  engineers.  The  enlisted 
men  were  picked  and  many  of  them  skilled  mechan- 


252      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

ics,  who  were  of  incalculable  service,  not  only  for 
the  actual  labor  they  performed,  but  for  their  ca 
pacity  to  instruct  and  direct  others  in  all  the  mechani 
cal  work  incident  to  a  siege.  And  although  the 
ground  was  in  many  respects  exceedingly  unfavor 
able  for  offensive  engineering  operations,  presenting 
as  it  did  much  too  narrow  a  front,  and  being  in  some 
places  subject  to  overflow  in  stormy  weather,  these 
drawbacks  were  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the 
presence  of  a  powerful  fleet  immediately  on  the  right 
flank,  within  easy  and  effective  range,  and  always 
ready  to  aid  and  sustain  the  operations  on  land  by 
its  heavy  and  accurate  fire.  Unquestionably  Admiral 
Dahlgren's  fleet  contributed  greatly  to  the  success 
of  the  operations  on  land.  Indeed,  it  is  not  probable 
that  the  plan  of  operations  by  way  of  Morris  Island 
would  ever  have  been  undertaken  without  the  cer 
tainty  of  the  naval  co-operation,  or  if  undertaken 
without  such  co-operation  they  would  probably  have 
failed,  General  Gillmore's  opinion  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding. 

Anticipating  the  damaging  effect  on  Fort  Sumter 
of  the  enemy's  heavy  rifled  guns  firing  from  station 
ary  batteries  on  Morris  Island,  General  Beauregard 
had  early  commenced  and  continued  nightly  a  partial 
disarmament  of  that  fort,  removing  all  long-range 
guns  that  could  be  spared  to  be  mounted  elsewhere 
on  interior  lines.  He  instructed  General  Ripley,  who 
commanded  the  military  district  embracing  the  scene 
of  operations,  to  strengthen  the  gorge  wall  south 
face  of  Sumter  on  the  interior  by  bales  of  cotton 
kept  damp,  the  space  between  them  to  be  filled  in 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      253 

with  sand-bags,  and  also  to  place  a  covering  of 
sand-bags  on  the  scarp  wall  of  the  same  face  from 
bottom  to  top,  if  possible,  and  to  protect  the  guns 
remaining  in  the  fort  by  traverse  and  merlons. 

The  armament  of  Battery  Wagner  was  slightly 
increased;  so  was  that  of  Fort  Johnson.  Fort 
Moultrie  and  Battery  Bee  were  to  be  connected  by 
a  covered  way,  and  orders  were  given  to  press  rapidly 
to  completion  the  new  works  on  Shell  Point  (called 
Battery  Simkins  in  honor  of  the  gallant  Colonel  of 
that  name  who  fell  on  the  parapet  of  Wagner  during 
the  assault  of  July  18),  and  Batteries  Chevers  and 
Haskel  in  close  proximity  to  it.  General  Beaure- 
gard's  plan,  briefly  stated,  was  to  establish  a  circle 
of  batteries  from  Legare's  Point  on  Schooner  Creek, 
James  Island,  to  Battery  Beauregard,  on  Sullivan's 
Island,  so  as  to  concentrate  their  fire,  including  that 
of  Sumter  and  Moultrie,  on  the  northern  half  of 
Morris  Island,  to  retard  the  siege  operations  and  to 
overwhelm  or  harass  the  enemy  so  soon  as  he  should 
gain  full  possession  of  that  island. 

The  attack  and  defense  were  both  conducted  with 
admirable  and  determined  courage.  It  was  a 
species  of  warfare  most  trying  to  the  patience  and 
endurance  of  the  troops  engaged,  and  for  which  it 
might  have  been  supposed  new  troops  were  least 
adapted.  Many  consecutive  days  and  nights  the 
monotonous  work  went  on,  exposing  the  men  to  the 
perils  without  the  excitement  of  battle.  While  the 
heavy  guns  on  each  side  were  actively  employed  to 
retard  and  demolish  the  works  of  the  other,  skillful 
marksmen,  armed  with  the  longest  range  rifles,  were 


254      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

employed  in  efforts  to  pick  off  the  gunners,  and  the 
daily  reports  of  the  progress  of  the  works  were  as 
regularly  accompanied  by  the  reports  of  the  killed 
and  wounded  in  accomplishing  it.  Whenever  the 
Confederate  fire  became  so  galling — as  it  often  did 
—that  work  on  the  trenches  and  batteries  could  not 
be  continued  without  too  heavy  a  sacrifice  of  life 
and  limb,  a  signal  from  the  General  to  the  Admiral 
would  send  a  monitor  or  so  abreast  of  Wagner,  and 
a  storm  of  iron  and  lead  would  be  thrown  into  the 
work,  which  generally  ended  in  driving  the  garrison, 
with  the  exception  of  the  necessary  gunners  and 
sentinels,  to  the  cover  of  the  bomb-proof  until  the 
fire  from  the  ironclads  should  cease.  But  the 
heaviest  fire  could  not  wholly  suppress  the  fire  of 
the  sharpshooters,  who  had  become  exceedingly  ex 
pert  in  covering  themselves  in  the  sand  hills  and  with 
sand-bags. 

The  greater  part  of  the  work  was  done  under 
cover  of  the  darkness  of  night,  interrupted  oc 
casionally  when  the  bright  harvest  moon  would  light 
up  the  scene.  A  most  unpleasant  and  revolting  part 
of  the  work  in  the  trenches  was  the  removal  of  the 
dead  bodies — sometimes  as  many  as  ten  in  a  night — 
of  those  who  had  been  killed  by  the  sharpshooters, 
which  the  sappers,  while  prosecuting  their  work,  dis 
turbed  in  their  graves.  At  first  these  bodies  were 
moved  and  reburied  out  of  the  way,  as  was  sup 
posed,  but  the  exigencies  of  the  engineering  opera 
tions  demanded  all  the  space  not  covered  by  marsh, 
and  it  soon  became  necessary  to  disturb  again  and 
again  their  dead  comrades,  until  the  attempt  to  re- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      255 

bury  them  beyond  reach  was  abandoned,  and  in 
future  when  the  graves  were  encountered  the  bodies 
were  built  with  mother  earth  into  the  parapets  and 
there  left. 

By  the  evening  of  August  16  the  third  parallel 
had  been  completed  and  twelve  batteries  erected  and 
made  ready  for  action.  Those  especially  intended 
for  the  bombardment  of  Sumter  were  at  an  average 
distance  from  that  fort  of  3917  yards — the  nearest 
being  3428  and  the  most  remote  4290  yards.  The 
twelve  batteries  mounted  twenty-eight  heavy  rifles  of 
calibers  from  32-  to  3OO-pounders,  and  twelve  10- 
inch  mortars;  in  all  forty  pieces.  One  of  them, 
called  the  "Naval  Battery,"  mounting  two  8-inch 
Parrott  rifles  and  two  So-pounder  Whitworth  rifles, 
was  manned  by  sailors  from  the  United  States 
frigate  W abash  and  commanded  by  Captain  Foxhall 
A.  Parker,  United  States  Navy.  The  others  were 
manned  by  the  Third  Rhode  Island  Heavy  Artillery 
and  detachments  from  the  One  Hundredth  and  One 
Hundred  and  Seventy-eighth  New  York,  the  Seventh 
Connecticut,  and  Eleventh  Maine  Infantry,  and 
Company  C,  First  United  States  Artillery. 

The  positions  occupied  by  the  Federal  troops 
were  thoroughly  protected  by  defensive  works  and 
covered  by  inclined  palisading  and  wire  entanglements 
stretching  entirely  across  the  island.  Provision  was 
made  for  sweeping  the  fronts  of  the  defensive  works 
by  the  fire  of  eight  field  guns  and  several  Requa 
batteries.  The  latter  were  novelties  in  warfare, 
and  consisted  each  of  twenty-five  rifle  barrels,  so  ad 
justed  on  a  frame  as  to  deliver  a  diffused  fan-shaped 


256      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

fire  of  175  shots  a  minute,  and  it  was  claimed  were 
effective  at  the  distance  of  a  mile  or  more.  The 
Federal  position  on  Morris  Island  was  thus  made  as 
secure  against  an  assault  as  was  Battery  Wagner 
itself. 

Fort  Sumter,  against  which  these  powerful  breach 
ing  and  mortar  batteries  were  to  be  directed,  was  at 
that  time  commanded  by  the  same  officer,  Colonel 
Alfred  Rhett,  of  the  First  South  Carolina  Artillery, 
aided  by  Major  Ormsby  Blanding,  of  the  same 
regiment,  who  had  so  gallantly  and  successfully  de 
fended  it  on  April  7  against  the  ironclad  attack 
and  the  fort  was  garrisoned  as  then  by  men  of  his 
own  regiment.  About  day  dawn  on  the  morning  of 
August  17  the  land  batteries  opened  on  Sumter, 
directing  the  fire  of  the  rifles  or  breaching  guns 
against  the  gorge  wall,  the  mortars  dropping  shells 
into  the  fort.  The  ironclads  and  gunboats  soon 
took  up  their  prescribed  positions  and  joined  in  the 
general  fire. 

Batteries  Wagner  and  Gregg  replied  with  spirit, 
but  for  several  hours  Sumter  gave  no  sign  of  life, 
the  only  object  visible  about  it  being  the  flag  which 
floated  over  it  in  the  summer  breeze.  Wagner  and 
Gregg  continued  the  fire,  while  the  fifteen-  and  eleven- 
inch  shells  from  the  ironclads  hurled  the  sand  in 
cartloads  from  their  parapets.  About  midday  these 
two  batteries  ceased  firing,  and  Fort  Sumter  opened, 
and  so  the  thunder  of  heavy  guns  went  on,  gradually 
ceasing  as  if  from  exhaustion  as  the  long  summer 
day  passed,  and  the  first  day's  bombardment  ended. 
Nine  hundred  and  forty-eight  shots  had  been  fired  at 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      257 

Sumter,  and,  the  fire  being  surprisingly  accurate  for 
the  great  distance  at  which  it  was  delivered,  the  fort 
was  much  damaged.  The  gorge  wall  had  been 
deeply  cut  into  and  other  walls  badly  shaken.  One 
man  of  the  garrison  had  been  killed  and  Lieutenants 
John  Johnson,  of  the  Engineers,  and  John  Middle- 
ton  and  Julius  Rhett,  of  the  First  South  Carolina 
Artillery,  and  ten  men  wounded. 

Usually  the  monitors  performed  their  part  in  the 
bombardments  with  immunity  to  life  and  limb,  the 
officers  and  men  being  shielded  by  an  eleven-inch 
thickness  of  iron.  On  this  day,  however,  soon  atter 
they  had  gone  into  action,  the  Kaatskill  was  seen 
steaming  away,  going  southward,  a  signal  from  her 
announcing  that  her  commander,  Captain  G.  W. 
Rodgers,  had  been  killed.  He  was  the  Admiral's 
chief  of  staff,  and  usually  accompanied  him  into 
action,  but  on  this  occasion  he  had  asked  to  be  al 
lowed  to  command  his  monitor,  the  Kaatskill.  The 
action  had  scarcely  commenced  when  a  shot  struck 
the  pilot  house,  forcing  off  a  large  piece  of  iron  on 
the  inside,  which  struck  and  killed  Captain  Rodgers 
and  Paymaster  John  G.  Woodbury,  who  was  stand-* 
ing  by  him,  and  wounding  the  pilot  and  quarter 
master.  The  Admiral  speaks  in  the  most  compli 
mentary  terms  of  Captains  Rodgers'  great  merit. 

Battery  Wagner  had  suffered  but  little  except  in 
the  death  of  its  engineer,  Captain  Wampler.  In 
the  midst  of  the  heaviest  fire,  which  had  driven  the 
garrison,  with  the  exception  of  the  gunners,  sentries, 
and  sharpshooters  to  the  shelter  of  the  bomb-proof, 
it  was  discovered  that  the  heavy  bombardment  had 


258      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

slipped  the  covering  of  sand  from  the  principal 
magazine  to  such  an  extent  as  greatly  to  endanger 
the  whole  garrison.  Captain  Wampler,  with  a 
party  of  men,  hastened  to  repair  the  injury,  under 
the  destructive  fire.  In  the  evening,  when  it  was 
supposed  the  firing  had  ceased  for  the  night,  he  was 
sitting  with  the  commanding  officer,  Colonel  Keitt, 
and  Lieutenant  Charles  S.  Hill,  ordnance  officer, 
when  a  shell  from  the  Ironsides  fell  in  the  midst  of 
them  and,  bursting,  crushed  the  gallant  young  officer. 

The  fire  from  the  breaching  batteries  continued 
for  seven  consecutive  days  and  was  incessant  from 
daylight  until  dark.  At  the  close  of  the  seventh 
day  of  the  bombardment,  the  twenty-third  day,  the 
destruction  of  the  offensive  powers  of  Fort  Sumter 
seemed  complete. 

The  heavy  firing  ceased,  and  though  a  slow  fire 
was  maintained,  the  bombardment  was  regarded 
as  having  successfully  accomplished  its  purpose. 
Sumter  seemed  a  shapeless  mass  of  ruins.  There 
was  but  one  gun  in  the  fort  that  could  be  fired,  and 
that  was  a  thirty-two  pounder  smooth-bore,  whose 
only  use  was  to  fire  the  usual  evening  gun.  Within 
the  fort  the  debris  of  masonry,  broken  guns  and 
carriages,  cotton  bales  and  sand-bags,  ripped  and 
torn  to  pieces,  were  mingled  in  inextricable  confusion. 
General  Gillmore  reported  officially  that  Fort 
Sumter  was  demolished,  its  offensive  powers  de 
stroyed,  and  that  it  was  reduced  to  the  condition  of 
a  mere  infantry  outpost,  incapable  of  retarding  the 
approaches  to  Battery  Wagner  or  of  inflicting  injury 
upon  the  ironclads.  Nevertheless  the  Confederate 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      259 

flag  still  floated  over  the  ruins,  and  the  usual  evening 
gun  announced  that  the  fort  was  still  occupied. 

Now  that  its  batteries  were  effectually  silenced, 
it  had  ceased  to  be  an  artillery  post,  and  the  gar 
rison  which  had  so  long  and  gallantly  defended  it 
was  withdrawn  on  the  night  of  September  4,  and  as 
signed  to  other  duty,  the  Charleston  Battalion  of  in 
fantry,  Major  Julius  A.  Blake,  succeeding  the 
artillery  as  the  garrison  of  the  ruined  fort.  Major 
Stephen  Elliott  succeeded  Colonel  Rhett  in  command 
of  Fort  Sumter.  The  latter  gentleman  had  com 
manded  longer  than  any  other  officer,  and  his  name, 
together  with  that  of  his  regiment,  the  First  South 
Carolina  Regular  Artillery,  is  indissolubly  linked 
with  the  famous  fort  they  had  so  long  defended  with 
admirable  skill  and  comspicuous  gallantry. 

General  Gillmore  regarded  his  part  in  the  general 
plan  for  the  capture  of  Charleston  as  virtually  ac 
complished  when  he  had  succeeded  in  destroying  the 
offensive  power  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  thus  opened  the 
gate  to  Charleston  for  the  entrance  of  the  ironclad 
fleet.  But  during  the  month  of  August  his  com 
mand  had  been  reinforced  by  General  George  H. 
Gordon's  Division  of  two  brigades  (Schimmel- 
fennig's  and  Ames')  and  three  other  brigades, 
Wild's  Foster's,  and  Alford's,  and  with  the  force 
and  material  at  his  command  something  more  than 
the  silencing  of  Sumter  was  expected  of  him.  The 
possession  of  the  whole  of  Morris  Island,  includ 
ing  Batteries  Wagner  and  Gregg,  he  did  not  re 
gard  as  essential  to  the  entrance  of  the  fleet  into 
the  harbor.  Wagner  and  Gregg  were  mere  out- 


26o      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

i 

works  auxiliary  to  the  defense  of  Sumter;  the 
latter  having  been  silenced,  the  possession  of  the 
iormer  was  important  only  as  facilitating  a  stricter 
blockade  of  the  port.  It  only  remained,  so  General 
Gillmore  thought  and  said,  for  Admiral  Dahlgren 
to  perform  his  part  of  the  general  plan,  to  enter  the 
harbor  with  his  fleet  and  take  possession  of  the  city 
of  Charleston. 

The  Admiral,  however,  did  not  so  regard  it;  in 
deed,  he  did  not  admit  that  he  was  a  consenting 
party  to  any  such  general  plan.  He  was  ready  and 
anxious  to  enter  the  harbor  when  the  obstructions  in 
the  way  should  have  been  removed;  but  they  were 
not  yet  removed.  There  stood  Sumter,  an  obstacle 
in  itself,  and  protecting  other  obstacles  which  the 
Confederates  had  placed  in  the  way. 

While  approaching  Wagner  and  preparing  to 
demolish  Sumter,  General  Gillmore  had  made  other 
preparations,  by  which  he  seems  to  have  supposed 
that  he  might  gain  possession  not  only  of  Sumter, 
but  of  the  whole  of  Morris  Island,  without  striking 
another  blow.  He  had  with  great  difficulty  and  at 
much  cost  constructed  a  battery  known  as  the 
"Swamp  Angel,"  in  the  marsh  between  Morris 
Island  and  the  Confederate  works  on  James  Island, 
from  which  Charleston  could  be  bombarded.  On 
August  21  he  addressed  a  letter  to  General  Beaure- 
gard  demanding  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  and 
the  whole  of  Morris  Island.  There  was  some  de 
lay  in  the  delivery  of  this  letter,  and  when  opened 
it  was  found  to  be  without  signature,  and  was  re 
turned  to  General  Gillmore's  headquarters.  Of 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      261 

course  General  Beauregard  declined  to  comply  with 
the  extraordinary  demand,  and  a  little  after  mid 
night  the  bombardment  of  Charleston  commenced 
and,  it  may  be  added,  was  continued  with  varying 
violence  for  nearly  eighteen  months.  Fifteen  in 
cendiary  shells  were  fired  into  the  city  that  night 
from  an  eight-inch  Parrott  rifle,  destroying  some 
medical  stores,  but  doing  little  damage  to  the  city. 

The  indignant  refusal  of  General  Beauregard  to 
surrender  Fort  Sumter  and  Morris  Island,  coupled 
with  a  reminder  that  "after  two  years  of  trial  you 
have  failed  to  capture  this  city  or  its  defenses," 
prompted  General  Gillmore  to  attempt  at  once  to 
seize  Sumter  by  assault.  The  assaulting  party  was 
to  consist  of  six  hundred  men  to  be  selected  by 
colonels  of  regiments,  and  General  Ames,  command 
ing  a  brigade  of  General  Gordon's  Division,  was 
selected  to  command  it.  He  did  not  purpose  to 
hold  Sumter  after  seizing  it,  but  to  blow  it  up.  He 
was  dissuaded,  however,  from  making  the  assault, 
the  more  readily  because  he  had  received  informa 
tion  which  he  regarded  as  reliable,  that  the  Con 
federates  themselves  intended  to  blow  up  the  fort 
when  it  should  be  rendered  untenable. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

Resumption  of  operations  against  Wagner — Siege  lines  tightened 
— Losses  and  sick  list  enormous — North  clamors  for  reduc 
tion  of  Charleston — Night  attack  on  Wagner — Repulse — 
Wagner  bombarded — Horrors  of  the  siege — Evacuation  of 
Morris  Island — Confederate  loss. 

Operations  against  Wagner,  which  had  been 
somewhat  delayed  by  the  bombardment  of  Sum- 
ter,  were  resumed  with  redoubled  vigor  when  the 
latter  work  was  apparently  demolished.  Between 
two  and  three  hundred  yards  in  front  of  Wagner 
was  a  sand  ridge  occupied  by  Confederate  sharp 
shooters,  who  greatly  annoyed  the  sappers  engaged 
in  pushing  forward  the  trenches.  In  conjunction 
with  the  fire  from  James  Island,  Wagner,  and  Gregg 
they  occasionally  interrupted  entirely  the  work  in 
the  trenches.  On  the  evening  of  August  21  the  One 
Hundredth  New  York,  Colonel  Dandy,  made  a 
dash  to  drive  them  off,  but  was  repulsed.  All  of 
the  lighter  mortars  were  then  moved  up  to  the 
front  to  dislodge  them  by  a  vertical  fire,  but  that 
attempt  also  failed.  The  Union  engineer  officers  in 
charge  reported  that  while  the  efficiency  of  the  Con 
federate  sharpshooters  was  daily  increasing,  their 
own  was  falling  off,  and  that  for  the  further  prose 
cution  of  the  work  it  was  absolutely  essential  that 

262 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      263 

the  Confederates  should  be  driven  off  or  captured 
and  the  ridge  occupied  by  Union  troops. 

On  the  26th  General  Gillmore  placed  the  re 
sources  of  the  command  at  the  disposal  of  General 
Terry,  who  was  in  immediate  command,  with  orders 
to  dislodge  those  sharpshooters  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet  and  hold  the  ridge.  Between  six  and  seven 
that  evening  the  Twenty-fourth  Massachusetts,  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  F.  A.  Osborne,  supported  by  the 
Third  New  Hampshire,  Captain  I.  F.  Randlett, 
were  thrown  upon  the  ridge  and  readily  occupied  it, 
capturing  seventy-six  of  the  eighty-nine  men  of  the 
Sixty-first  North  Carolina  Regiment,  which  con 
stituted  the  whole  picket  line.  The  fourth  parallel 
was  immediately  marked  out  and  constructed  on  that 
ridge  within  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  of  Wagner. 

The  darkest  and  gloomiest  days  of  the  siege  were 
now  at  hand.  The  exceedingly  narrow  front  of  ap 
proach,  in  one  place  scarcely  more  than  twenty-five 
yards  at  high  tide,  gave  great  effect  to  the  direct  and 
flank  fire  on  the  head  of  the  sap.  The  way  was  over 
ground  defended  by  torpedoes,  which  were  designed 
to  explode  by  the  tread  of  persons  passing  over 
them,  or  by  the  chance  strokes  of  the  picks  and 
shovels  in  the  hands  of  the  sappers.  "Here  is  a 
log  in  my  way,"  said  a  sapper  to  the  officer  who  was 
directing  the  work..  "Never  mind,  dig  around  it," 
was  the  reply,  and  the  next  instant  the  supposed  log 
exploded,  blowing  the  sapper  to  pieces. 

The  losses  in  the  trenches  were  increasing  from 
day  to  day  and  the  progress  was  discouragingly  slow 
and  uncertain.  The  sick  list  was  fearfully  large;  so 


264      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

large  that  it  is  said  the  chief  surgeon  had  advised 
that  the  work  be  again  assaulted  and  the  siege  ended 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  as  involving  a  probable 
less  loss  of  life  than  the  slow  process  of  regular  ap 
proaches  was  inflicting  on  the  command.  The  re 
turns  of  the  Union  forces  for  August  show  a  sick  list 
of  4661  in  an  aggregate  force  present  of  29,405, 
and  for  September  of  5269  in  an  aggregate  of 
28,981.  About  the  middle  of  August  the  sick  list 
was  nearly  one-fourth  of  the  aggregate  force  present. 

"Matters  indeed  seemed  at  a  standstill,"  says 
General  Gillmore,  "and  a  feeling  of  despondency 
began  to  pervade  the  rank  and  file  of  the  command. 
There  seemed,  indeed,  no  adequate  return  to  ac 
complished  results  for  the  daily  losses  which  we 
suffered  and  no  means  of  relief  cheering  and  en 
couraging  to  the  soldiers  appeared  near  at  hand." 

No  wonder  that  there  was  gloom  and  despon 
dency  among  the  rank  and  file,  when  it  had  long 
since  begun  to  dawn  upon  officers  high  in  rank,  and 
had  strengthened  into  conviction,  that  possession  of 
the  whole  of  the  little  sandbank  would  be  but  a 
lamentably  inadequate  return  for  the  expenditure  of 
so  much  labor,  treasure,  health,  and  life.  Public 
sentiment  at  the  North  clamored  for  the  destruction 
of  Sumter  and  the  capture  of  Charleston.  The 
sentiment  which  demanded  the  destruction  of  Sumter 
had  been  gratified  when  General  Gillmore  reported 
that  the  fort  had  been  demolished  and  reduced  to  a 
mere  infantry  outpost,  but  the  Union  forces  were 
practically  no  nearer  to  Charleston  than  when  the 
campaign  opened.  The  question  naturally  sug- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      265 

gested  itself,  Would  the  possession  of  Wagner  really 
bring  them  any  nearer  to  the  objective  point?  And 
with  many  the  answer  was  emphatically  No !  It 
seemed  that  the  siege  must  be  abandoned  or  new  life 
and  vigor  thrown  into  it. 

General  Gillmore  determined  to  pursue  the  latter 
course.  Wagner  should  be  overwhelmed  by  the 
heaviest  fire  from  land  and  naval  batteries,  driving 
the  men  to  the  shelter  of  the  bomb-proofs  and  keep 
ing  them  there,  while  the  heaviest  rifle  guns  should 
pound  and  demolish  the  bomb-proofs  and  so  un 
cover  and  expose  the  garrison  to  the  heaviest  fire 
that  had  yet  been  thrown  against  it.  In  the  mean 
time  the  sap  should  be  pressed  forward  to  the 
ditch  and  the  fort  stormed  and  carried  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet,  if  the  stubborn  garrison  would  not 
surrender  before  that  last  resort  became  necessary. 

As  preliminary  to  the  complete  success  of  these 
final  operations,  General  Gillmore  proposed  to  sur 
prise  and  seize  Battery  Gregg,  thus  at  once  cutting 
off  reinforcements  for  Wagner  and  the  escape  of 
the  garrison. 

The  attempt  was  made  on  the  night  of  the  4th 
by  troops  in  barges,  supported  by  naval  boats, 
armed  with  howitzers.  All  was  in  readiness  soon 
after  dark  except  one  boat,  which,  having  pulled  out 
further  toward  Sumter  than  the  others,  discovered 
a  small  Confederate  boat,  which  happened  just  at 
that  time  to  be  carrying  to  Charleston  Major  W.  F. 
Waley,  of  the  Second  South  Carolina  Artillery,  who 
had  been  badly  wounded  that  day.  The  officer  in 
charge  of  the  Union  boat  could  not  resist  the  temp- 


266      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

tation  to  capture  the  Confederate,  gave  chase,  and 
fired  upon  it.  He  succeeded  in  capturing  the  boat 
and  the  wounded  officer,  but  the  firing  had  aroused 
the  garrison  of  Gregg,  disclosed  the  surprise  party, 
and  defeated  the  expedition.  It  was  attempted 
again  the  next  night,  but  it  could  scarcely  have 
been  expected  that  a  garrison  which  had  so  nar 
rowly  escaped  a  formidable  surprise  attack  on  the 
preceding  night  would  not  be  on  the  alert.  If  there 
was  any  such  expectation  General  Gillmore  effec 
tually  defeated  it  himself.  In  the  afternoon  of  the 
5th  he  signaled  Admiral  Dahlgren:  "I  shall  try 
Cummings'  Point  to-night  and  want  the  sailors  again 
early.  Will  you  please  send  in  two  or  three  moni 
tors  just  by  dark  to  open  fire  on  Moultrie  as  a  diver 
sion?  The  last  time  they  were  in  they  stopped  rein 
forcements  and  may  do  it  to-night.  Don't  want  any 
fire  in  the  rear  from  reinforcements.  The  signal 
for  assault  will  be  the  hauling  down  of  the  red  light 
on  the  Ironsides.  I  shall  display  skirmishers  be 
hind  Wagner  and  Gregg.  Don't  fire  into  them;  let 
the  Ironsides  engage — by  nine  o'clock." 

This  dispatch  was  intercepted  by  a  Confederate 
signal  officer  and  forwarded  to  General  Ripley,  who 
communicated  it  to  Colonel  Keitt,  commanding 
Wagner,  with  instructions  to  him  to  prepare  to  repel 
the  attack. 

Major  James  Gardner,  commanding  the  Twenty 
seventh  Georgia  Infantry,  already  supporting 
Gregg,  was  warned  of  the  impending  attack  and  re 
inforced  after  dark  by  seventy  men  of  the  Twenty- 
fifth  South  Carolina  Infantry  and  two  field  how- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      267 

itzers,  manned  from  Kanapaux's  Light  Artillery, 
Lieutenant  Macbeth  commanding,  and  directed  to 
prepare  to  repel  the  attack.  The  beach  between 
Wagner  and  Gregg  was  picketed  by  50  men  of  the 
Twenty-eighth  Georgia.  At  ten  o'clock  Major 
Gardner  reported  that  his  whole  force  numbered 
only  234  men — too  small  for  the  work  required  of 
it,  but  added:  "I  shall  hold  the  place  if  it  is  pos 
sible." 

The  monitors  were  promptly  in  position  and 
swept  with  their  fire  the  ground  between  the  two 
forts;  but  there  was  confusion  in  assembling  the 
barges  in  position  and  so  much  delay  that  it  was 
past  midnight  before  the  assault  was  attempted, 
when  Captain  Lesesne,  commanding  Battery  Gregg, 
discovered  fifteen  or  twenty  barges  approaching 
from  the  junction  of  Vincent  and  Schooner  creeks 
with  muffled  oars.  He  waited  until  they  approached 
to  within  about  one  hundred  and  seventy  yards, 
when  he  opened  upon  them  with  ten-inch  canister. 
Fort  Moultrie  also  opened  fire,  sweeping  the  water 
on  both  sides  of  Cummings'  Point. 

The  fire  produced  a  panic  among  the  assaliants, 
who  had  expected  to  surprise  the  post.  Some  of 
the  boats  were  turned  back  and  pulled  rapidly  away; 
others  were  pulled  toward  the  beach,  some  men  in 
them  crying  out  not  to  fire,  that  they  were  friends, 
but  they  were  answered  by  a  fire  from  the  infantry 
and  the  field  howitzers.  All  these  turned  and  were 
pulled  rapidly  back  through  the  creeks  and  marshes 
with  serious  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  the  troops 
generally  dispirited  by  the  failure  of  the  expedition. 


268      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

In  this  affair  Captain  J.  R.  Haines,  of  the  Twenty- 
eighth  Georgia,  and  Lieutenant  R.  A.  Blum,  of  the 
Twenty-fifth  South  Carolina,  were  killed  by  a  shell 
from  a  monitor. 

At  dawn  on  the  5th  the  final  bombardment  of 
Wagner  commenced,  and  for  forty-two  consecutive 
hours  seventeen  mortars  and  twenty-four  rifled  guns 
— one  hundred-,  two  hundred-,  and  three  hundred- 
pounders — and  the  guns  of  the  New  Ironsides 
poured  an  incessant  fire  of  shot  and  shell  night  and 
day  on  the  battery.  The  heavy  rifle  fire  was  directed 
against  the  southeast  angle  of  the  bomb-proof  for 
the  purpose  of  demolishing  it  and  exposing  the  gar 
rison  to  the  vertical  fire  of  the  mortars  and  the  Iron 
sides.  The  ricochet  fire  of  the  ironclads  was 
especially  effective.  Long  practice  had  given  the 
gunners  great  accuracy  of  aim  and  their  eleven-inch 
shells,  bounding  gracefully  from  the  water,  leaped 
over  the  parapet  and,  bursting  within,  searched  the 
doomed  work  in  every  part.  At  Wagner  night  was 
turned  into  day.  Calcium  lights  thrown  on  the  fort 
brilliantly  lighted  it,  bringing  out  every  object  in 
vivid  and  sharp  relief,  while  the  besiegers  were 
shrouded  in  impenetrable  darkness. 

Under  this  overpowering  fire  the  trenches  were 
pressed  forward  rapidly  and  almost  with  impu 
nity,  for  the  sappers  were  so  near  Wagner  that  the 
distant  batteries  on  James  and  Sullivan's  islands  could 
not  fire  upon  them  without  risk  of  dropping  their 
shot  into  the  fort.  With  the  exception  of  an  oc 
casional  telling  fire  from  the  sharpshooters,  Wagner 
itself  was  almost  as  silent  as  the  grave.  At  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      269 

first  shot  from  the  Ironsides  nearly  all  of  the  in 
fantry  not  already  in  the  sandhills  between  Wagner 
and  Gregg  were  ordered  into  the  bomb-proof,  leav 
ing  a  few  sentinels  and  sharpshooters  at  the  parapet. 
Full  detachments  of  artillerymen  were  kept  at  the 
guns  on  the  land  front.  It  would  have  been  a  use 
less  waste  of  life  to  keep  men  exposed  to  that 
storm  of  shot  and  shell.  The  best  that  could  be 
done  was  to  husband  all  resources  to  repel  the  as 
sault  which  was  anticipated. 

Life  in  the  bomb-proof  during  the  forty-two  hours 
of  the  bombardment  had  become  almost  unen 
durable.  The  men  were  crowded  together  in  the 
dark  place,  where  the  surgeons  were  occasionally 
obliged  to  operate  on  the  wounded  by  the  dim  light 
of  a  candle.  Some  men  fainted  and  others  were 
exhausted  by  breathing  the  hot,  vitiated  atmosphere; 
if  a  man  stepped  out  for  an  instant  to  catch  a  breath 
of  fresh  air  he  did  so  at  the  peril  of  his  life.  The 
men  who  had  been  killed  in  the  two  assaults  had  been 
buried,  the  Federals  in  front  and  the  Confederates 
in  rear  of  Wagner.  The  graves  were  necessarily 
shallow  and  in  shifting  sand.  The  besiegers  had 
been  burrowing  through  the  graves,  removing  the 
bodies.  The  ground  had  been  torn  up  in  every 
direction  by  nearly  two  months'  firing  and  the  wind 
had  blown  off  the  sand,  exposing  corpses  to  the 
fierce  summer  sun,  tainting  and  poisoning  the  air. 
Even  the  water  in  the  shallow  wells  within  the  fort 
was  so  tainted  as  to  be  unfit  for  use,  and  the  gar 
rison  had  to  rely  upon  the  precarious  supply  that 
could  be  brought  from  Charleston. 


270      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

The  effect  of  the  heavy  rifle  fire  was  exceedingly 
destructive  to  the  southeast  angle  and  bomb-proof, 
scattering  the  covering  of  sand  and  blocking  up 
the  passageways.  The  engineer  officer,  Captain  T. 
B.  Lee,  was  powerless  to  arrest  the  destruction  or 
repair  the  damages.  Early  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
second  day  of  the  bombardment  the  chief  engineer, 
Colonel  D.  B.  Harris,  made  his  way  through  the 
terrific  fire  to  Wagner  to  inspect  the  work  and 
directed  some  alterations  and  repairs,  leaving  Cap 
tain  F.  D.  Lee  to  relieve  Captain  T.  B.  Lee.  But 
so  destructive  was  the  fire  that  it  was  found  imprac 
ticable  to  work  under  it.  Heroic  endurance  was  all 
that  remained  for  the  besieged. 

Soon  after  dark  the  sappers  had  pushed  beyond 
and  to  the  right  of  the  south  front,  following  the 
direction  of  the  east  or  sea  front  and  crowning  the 
crest  of  the  counterscarp  near  the  flank  of  that 
front,  completely  masking  the  guns  of  the  fort.  A 
row  of  long  pikes,  which  were  planted  at  the  foot  of 
the  counterscarp  as  an  obstacle  to  an  assault,  were 
removed  by  the  sappers  early  in  the  night.  The 
long  and  heavy  bombardment  had  so  torn  and  cut 
down  both  scarp  and  counterscarp  as  to  render  the 
mounting  of  the  parapets  by  a  storming  party  com 
paratively  easy.  The  sappers  by  spade  and  shovel 
had  facilitated  the  ascent  and  only  the  light  of 
another  day  was  awaited  for  making  the  final  as 
sault  of  the  work. 

General  Gillmore  gave  minute  orders  for  the  as 
sault  to  be  made  at  nine  o'clock  the  next  morning, 
that  being  the  time  of  low  tide,  when  the  beach 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      271 

could  be  used  for  the  movements  of  troops. 
Brigadier  General  A.  H.  Terry  was  ordered  to  com 
mand  the  assault  in  person. 

On  the  4th  General  Beauregard  had  called  about 
him  his  general  officers  and  chief  engineer  in  con 
sultation  to  determine  how  much  longer  it  would  be 
advisable  to  hold  Wagner.  The  questions  pre 
sented  for  consideration  were,  How  long  could  it 
be  held  with  regard  to  the  safety  of  the  garrison? 
How  long  without  regard  to  the  safety  of  the  gar 
rison?  How  long  with  reasonable  prospect  of 
ultimately  withdrawing  the  troops?  How  long 
after  the  fall  of  Wagner  could  Battery  Gregg  be 
held?  Could  the  heavy  guns  (two  in  Wagner  and 
three  in  Gregg)  be  withdrawn  without  endangering 
the  safety  of  the  works  and  garrison,  and,  lastly, 
could  the  offensive  be  taken  with  fair  prospect  of 
success  by  throwing  three  thousand  men  on  the 
north  end  of  Morris  Island  in  the  night,  which,  with 
the  garrisons  of  Wagner  and  Gregg,  would  make 
an  effective  force  of  about  four  thousand  men,  with 
the  certainty  that  no  more  reinforcements  could  be 
sent  them  until  the  next  night  and  probably  not 
then? 

The  result  of  the  deliberations  was  that  the  heavy 
guns  were  necessary  for  the  defense  of  the  posts  to 
the  last  extremity;  that  there  were,  besides,  insur 
mountable  obstacles  in  the  way  of  removing  them, 
and  that  they  should  be  ultimately  disabled  and  left 
when  it  became  necessary,  as  it  was  evident  it  soon 


272      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

would  be,  to  abandon  the  batteries,  which,  how 
ever,  should  be  held  as  long  as  communication  with 
them  by  rowboats  by  night  could  be  maintained. 

Colonel  Keitt  kept  the  general  commanding  fully 
informed  of  the  progress  of  the  enemy's  sap  and 
the  destructive  effects  of  the  fire.  During  the  6th 
he  wrote :  "The  enemy  will  to-night  advance  their 
parallel  to  the  moat  of  this  battery  (Wagner).  The 
garrison  must  be  taken  away  immediately  after  dark, 
as  it  will  be  destroyed  or  captured.  It  is  idle  to 
deny  that  the  heavy  Parrott  shells  have  breached  the 
walls  and  are  knocking  away  the  bomb-proofs.  Pray 
have  boats  immediately  after  dark  at  Cummings' 
Point  to  take  away  the  men.  I  say,  deliberately, 
that  this  must  be  done  or  the  garrison  will  be  sacri 
ficed.  I  am  sending  the  wounded  and  sick  now  to 
Cumming's  Point,  and  will  continue  to  do  so,  if  pos 
sible,  until  all  are  gone.  I  have  not  in  the  garrison 
four  hundred  effective  men,  excluding  artillery. 
The  engineers  agree  in  opinion  with  me,  or  rather 
shape  my  opinion." 

And  again  later:  "The  enemy's  sap  has  reached 
the  moat  and  his  bombardment  has  shattered  large 
parts  of  the  parapet.  The  retention  of  the  post 
after  to-night  involves  the  sacrifice  of  the  garrison. 
If  the  necessities  of  the  service  make  this  advisable 
the  men  will  cheerfully  make  it,  and  I  will  cheer 
fully  lead  them.  I  prefer  to  assault  the  enemy  to 
await  the  assault  and  I  will  at  four  o'clock  in  the 
morning  assail  his  works." 

General  Beauregard,  accepting  the  situation,  gave 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      273 

minute  instructions  for  the  evacuation  of  Morris 
Island.  Between  4  and  5  P.  M.  General  Ripley 
signaled  the  information  to  Colonel  Keitt,  and  at 
dark  Captain  McCabe,  of  General  Ripley's  staff, 
delivered  to  the  Colonel  the  General's  instructions 
for  the  evacuation. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th  there  were  about  nine 
hundred  Confederates  on  the  island,  only  about  two- 
thirds  of  them  effective,  the  others  being  wounded 
or  sick.  There  were  about  nine  thousand  Union 
soldiers  on  the  island  exclusive  of  the  sick,  and 
the  most  advanced  of  them  were  abreast  of  Wag 
ner,  only  across  the  street,  as  it  were,  from  the 
Confederates.  The  space — about  three-quarters  of 
a  mile — between  Wagner  and  Cumming's  Point 
where  the  garrison  was  to  embark  was  swept  by 
the  fire  of  the  monitors,  and  there  were  armed 
guard  boats  on  the  other  side,  in  Vincent's  Creek,  to 
give  warning  of  any  attempt  to  escape. 

Anticipating  pursuit,  Lieutenant  Robert  M. 
Stiles,  engineering  officer  at  Gregg,  had  constructed 
after  dark  a  rifle-pit  across  the  island  at  a  narrow 
point  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  front  of  Gregg,  from 
which  to  cover  the  embarkation.  Two  Confederate 
ironclads,  the  Charleston  and  Palmetto  State,  under 
Captain  John  R.  Tucker,  had  taken  position  near 
Fort  Sumter,  their  guns  bearing  on  Cumming's  Point 
and  to  the  eastward  of  it,  and  the  land  batteries  were 
in  readiness  to  sweep  the  water  face  of  Battery 
Gregg.  Transport  steamers  were  as  near  Cum 
ming's  Point  as  prudence  would  permit,  to  receive 


274      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  men  from  the  small  boats  in  which  they  were  to 
leave  the  island. 

During  the  two  days'  bombardment  the  sick  and 
wounded  had  been  sent  to  Cumming's  Point  as 
promptly  as  transportation  between  that  point  and 
Wagner  could  be  provided,  and  they  were  first  cared 
for  and  left  the  island  in  the  first  boats.  Im 
mediately  after  dark  the  movement  from  Wagner 
commenced;  four  companies  (one  hundred  men)  of 
the  Twenty-fifth  South  Carolina  Regiment,  and  a 
field  piece  taken  from  Wagner,  moved  first  and 
embarked.  Half  an  hour  later  Captain  W.  P. 
Crawford,  with  the  Twenty-eighth  Georgia  Regi 
ment  and  a  howitzer,  moved  out,  occupied  the  rifle- 
pits  in  front  of  Gregg  and  embarked  by  company  as 
transportation  could  be  in  readiness.  Major  James 
Gardner,  with  the  Twenty-seventh  Georgia,  suc 
ceeded  the  Twenty-eighth  Georgia  in  the  rifle-pits, 
and  in  turn  was  followed  by  the  remainder  of  the 
Twenty-fifth  South  Carolina,  Lieutenant  Colonel  J. 
G.  Pressly  commanding,  and  artillery. 

The  movement  was  made  quietly  and  in  admirable 
order,  the  majority  of  the  men  being  under  the  im 
pression  that  they  were  about  to  be  relieved  as  usual, 
having  served  their  tour  of  duty  in  Wagner.  At 
eleven  o'clock  Colonel  Keitt  proceeded  to  Cum 
ming's  Point,  leaving  Captain  Thomas  A.  Huguenin 
in  Wagner  commanding  the  rear  guard,  consisting 
of  a  few  gunners  and  twenty-five  men  of  the  First 
and  ten  of  the  Twenty-fifth  South  Carolina,  under 
Lieutenants  F.  B.  Brown  and  B.  M.  Taft.  As  soon 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      275 

as  the  infantry  had  left  Cumming's  Point  Captain 
H.  R.  Lesesne,  who  had  for  a  long  time  commanded 
Battery  Gregg,  and  Captain  Kanapaux,  commanding 
the  three  remaining  howitzers,  which  he  had  just 
brought  up  from  Wagner,  spiked  their  guns  and 
embarked  their  men. 

Left  in  Wagner  with  about  thirty-five  men,  Cap 
tain  Huguenin  kept  up  a  slow  fire,  chiefly  of  sharp 
shooters,  with  an  occasional  mortar  fire  to  deceive,  if 
possible,  his  enemy  as  to  his  real  purpose,  and  was 
busy  with  his  final  preparations.  About  midnight 
the  rear  guard  was  sent  off,  leaving  Captain  Hu 
guenin,  with  Captain  C.  C.  Pinckney  and  Lieutenant 
Mazyek,  of  the  Ordnance;  Lieutenant  James  A. 
Ross,  of  the  Twenty-fifth  South  Carolina  Volunteers, 
and  Ordnance  Sergeant  Leath  in  Wagner  to  spike 
guns,  destroy  such  property  as  they  could,  and  lay 
the  train  to  burst  the  only  useful  ten-inch  gun  in 
the  work  and  to  blow  up  the  magazine. 

In  the  meantime  the  Federal  guard  boats  in  Vin 
cent  Creek  had  discovered  the  passage  of  boats 
carrying  away  troops  and  opened  fire  upon  them. 
Colonel  Keitt  dispatched  a  messenger  to  Captain 
Huguenin  to  say  that  boats  were  in  readiness  and 
that  he  must  at  once  abandon  the  battery,  which  he 
did,  reaching  Cumming's  Point  about  half-past  one 
o'clock,  under  a  rapid  fire  from  the  Union  guard 
barges. 

The  safety  fuse  for  blowing  up  the  magazine  of 
Battery  Gregg  was  laid  by  the  commissary  of  the 
post,  Captain  Holcumb,  and  was  burning  brightly 
when  the  last  officer  stepped  into  the  boat,  but  from 


276      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

some  cause,  probably  defective  fuse,  neither  mag 
azine  was  blown  up. 

The  steam  transportation  was  under  the  manage 
ment  of  Major  Matt.  A.  Pringle,  the  embarkation 
of  the  troops  was  superintended  by  Colonel  Daut- 
zler,  Twentieth  South  Carolina  Infantry,  and  the 
small  boats  employed  in  moving  the  troops  were 
under  the  control  of  Captain  W.  H.  Webb,  of  the 
ironclad  Palmetto  State.  The  whole  was  conducted 
systematically  and  with  great  success,  only  two 
boats'  crews  of  nineteen  men  and  twenty-seven 
soldiers  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Under 
the  circumstances  of  difficulty  and  peril  which  at 
tended  the  movement  in  the  face  of  an  overwhelming 
numerical  force,  it  was  marked  by  a  degree  of  cool 
ness  and  discipline  worthy  of  the  best  tried  veterans. 

The  different  organizations  in  the  military  district 
served  there  by  turn,  and  were  commanded  succes 
sively  by  Brigadier  Generals  Taliaferro,  Johnson 
Hagood,  A.  H.  Colquitt,  and  T.  L.  Clingman,  and 
Colonels  George  P.  Harrison  and  Lawrence  M. 
Keitt.  The  Confederate  loss  on  the  island  during 
the  whole  fifty-eight  days'  operations  was  but  641 
killed  and  wounded,  and  it  is  illustrative  of  the 
sheltering  capacity  of  sand  that,  deducting  the  loss 
due  to  the  descent  on  the  island  on  July  10  and  the 
assaults  of  the  nth  and  i8th,  the  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  during  the  whole  of  the  terrible  bombard 
ment  was  but  296  men.  It  is  still  more  remarkable 
that  during  the  same  period  in  the  fire  which  de 
molished  Sumter  only  3  men  were  killed  and  49 
wounded.  Before  dawn  on  the  7th  the  Union 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      277 

troops  occupied  both  Wagner  and  Gregg,  and  were 
thus  at  last  in  possession  of  the  little  sand  island  of 
four  hundred  acres  for  which  they  had  so  persever- 
ingly  contended  for  nearly  two  months. 

General  Gillmore  was  rewarded  by  his  govern 
ment  with  a  major  general's  commission,  and  there 
was  naturally  great  exultation  in  the  Union  camp 
over  the  success  of  the  operations  on  Morris  Island. 
Salutes  were  fired  and  patriotic  speeches  delivered, 
but  it  was  all  too  plain  to  intelligent  men  that  they 
had  at  best  achieved  but  a  barren  victory.  The 
blow  which  had  been  aimed  and  delivered  against 
Charleston  with  so  much  care  had,  as  it  were, 
glanced  and  exhausted  its  force  on  the  end  of  a 
barren  sandbank  nearly  four  miles  distant  from  the 
objective  point  of  the  campaign.  From  Cummings' 
Point  the  Union  troops,  still  under  Confederate  fire, 
looked  over  a  wide  sheet  of  water  bordered  with 
heavy  batteries  and  defended  by  torpedoes  and 
other  obstructions  over  which  they  must  pass  to 
reach  Charleston. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

Dahlgren  demands  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter — Fort  Moultrie 
engaged — Assault  of  Fort  Sumter — Disastrous  result — 
Army  and  navy  mutually  jealous — Obstacles  in  approach  to 
Charleston — Can  the  harbor  be  entered? — Second  bombard 
ment  of  Fort  Sumter — Sumter  still  resists — What  now? — 
Operations  against  Charleston  abandoned. 

Having  silenced  Fort  Sumter,  reduced  Battery 
Wagner,  and  occupied  the  whole  of  Morris  Island, 
General  Gillmore  conceived  that  the  land  force  had 
accomplished  all  that  could  be  reasonably  expected 
of  it  in  the  prosecution  of  the  general  plan  of  opera 
tions.  To  make  the  campaign  a  complete  success  it 
only  remained,  in  his  opinion,  for  the  naval  force  to 
perform  its  part, — namely,  to  remove,  if  necessary, 
any  obstructions  that  might  be  in  its  way,  proceed 
to  within  easy  range  of  Charleston  and  compel  its 
surrender.  That  he  thought  could  and  should  have 
been  done  at  any  time  from  August  23,  when  Sumter 
was  apparently  demolished,  to  September  7,  when 
Battery  Wagner  was  evacuated  by  the  Confederate 
force  and  the  island  occupied  by  the  Union  troops; 
and  he  was  exceedingly  impatient  at  what  he  re 
garded  as  the  culpable  delay  of  the  Admiral. 

Admiral  Dahlgren,  however,  did  not  think  the 
time  had  yet  arrived  for  making  the  attempt  to  enter 
the  harbor  with  his  ironclads.  The  Union  flag 

278 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      279 

should  float  over  Sumter  before,  in  his  opinion,  he 
could,  with  due  consideration  for  the  safety  of  his 
monitors,  venture  to  carry  them  into  the  inner  har 
bor.  Early  on  September  7,  when  he  learned  that 
the  Confederate  troops  had  evacuated  Morris  Island, 
he  sent,  under  flag  of  truce,  to  Major  Stephen  El 
liott,  commanding  Fort  Sumter,  a  demand  for  the 
surrender  of  that  fort.  Major  Elliott  refused  to 
surrender  his  post,  and  forwarded  the  demand  to 
General  Beauregard,  who  replied  that  the  Admiral 
could  have  Fort  Sumter  only  when  he  could  take  and 
hold  it.  Preparatory  to  enforcing  his  demand,  the 
New  Ironsides  and  five  monitors  steamed  up,  and 
at  about  6  P.  M.  took  position  between  Cumming's 
Point  and  Fort  Moultrie  and  opened  fire  on  that 
fort,  throwing  an  occasional  shot  into  Sumter.  The 
Sullivan's  Island  batteries  replied,  and  until  after 
dark  a  fierce  cannonade  was  maintained,  the  Iron 
sides  continuing  the  fire  until  nine  o'clock. 

During  the  night  one  of  the  monitors,  the  Wee- 
hawken,  ran  aground  on  Morris  Island  beach  within 
range  of  Fort  Moultrie.  When  it  was  discovered 
the  next  morning,  Colonel  William  Butler,  com 
manding  Moultrie,  opened  fire  on  it,  which  was 
promptly  returned,  both  firing  with  accuracy  and 
effect.  About  nine  o'clock  five  other  monitors  and 
the  Ironsides  came  up  and,  taking  positions  varying 
from  nine  hundred  to  fifteen  hundred  yards  from 
Moultrie,  opened  fire,  and  a  furious  cannonade  was 
maintained  for  about  five  hours,  when  the  fleet  with 
drew,  leaving  the  Weehawken  aground,  and  one 
monitor  badly  crippled.  Usually  in  affairs  between 


28o      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

the  forts  and  monitors  the  former  had  the  advantage 
of  being  able  to  fire  more  rapidly  than  the  latter. 
On  this  occasion  a  scant  supply  of  ammunition  in 
the  land  batteries  made  their  fire  slower  than  that 
of  the  ironclads.  Early  in  the  action  a  shell  from 
the  Weehavcken  struck  the  muzzle  of  a  columbiad  in 
Moultrie,  and,  glancing  and  bursting  among  some 
ammunition,  caused  an  explosion  which  instantly 
killed  sixteen  and  wounded  twelve  men  of  Captain 
R.  P.  Smith's  company  of  the  First  South  Carolina 
Infantry  (Third  Artillery).  Captain  B.  S.  Burnet's 
company  of  the  same  regiment  was  quickly  brought 
up  from  Battery  Beauregard  to  supply  the  place  of 
Captain  Smith's.  The  fire  had  been  mainly  directed 
against  Moultrie,  in  which,  in  addition  to  the  loss  by 
the  explosion,  three  men  were  killed  and  two  officers 
(Captain  G.  A.  Wardlaw  and  Lieutenant  D.  B.  De- 
Saussure)  and  fourteen  men  were  wounded.  Lieu 
tenant  Edward  W.  Macbeth  was  wounded  in  Bat 
tery  Beauregard  and  one  officer  and  one  man  in  Bat 
tery  Bee. 

While  the  affair  between  the  ironclads  and  forts 
was  in  progress,  both  the  Admiral  and  General  were 
preparing  to  carry  Fort  Sumter  by  assault.  Strangely 
enough,  both  commanders  were  without  concert  pre 
paring  to  assault  the  same  work  on  the  same  night. 
Whatever  cordiality  of  feeling  there  may  have  been 
between  them  seems  to  have  ceased.  Each  was  con 
fident  of  his  ability  to  seize  the  work  without  the 
aid  of  the  other,  and  each  ambitious  of  the  honor  of 
capturing  the  fort  which  had  so  long  resisted  and 
defied  them.  Needing  some  additional  boats  for  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      281 

expedition,  the  Admiral  sent  to  borrow  them  from 
the  General.  The  latter  replied  that  he  could  not 
spare  them  because  he  proposed  to  storm  Sumter 
himself  that  night.  Learning  the  General's  inten 
tion,  the  Admiral  seems  to  have  desired  co-operation, 
but  declined  the  former's  suggestion  that  the  army 
officer  commanding  his  storming  party  should  also 
control  the  naval  party.  Each  therefore  proceeded 
independently  of  the  other,  the  only  agreement  be 
tween  them  being  that,  to  prevent  accident  of  colli 
sion,  of  the  two  storming  parties  the  first  which 
entered  the  fort  should  display  a  red  light  from  the 
battered  walls. 

The  naval  storming  party  consisted  of  450  picked 
men,  sailors  and  marines.  Captain  Thomas  H. 
Stephens  was  selected  to  command  it.  The  several 
divisions  of  boats  were  commanded  by  Lieutenants 
E.  P.  Williams,  G.  C.  Raney,  S.  W.  Preston,  F.  J. 
Higginson,  T.  M.  Bunce,  E.  T.  Brewer,  and  En 
signs  James,  Wallace,  Porter,  and  Crane  of  the 
navy,  and  Captain  C.  G.  McCawley,  First  Lieutenr 
ants  Charles  H.  Bradford  and  John  C.  Harris,  and 
Second  Lieutenants  R.  L.  Meade,  Lyman  P.  Wal 
lace,  and  L.  E.  Fagan,  of  the  Marine  Corps.  Lieu 
tenant  Morean  Forest  was  adjutant  of  the  expedi 
tion. 

The  party  assembled  at  the  flagship  Philadelphia, 
and  left  it  in  tow  of  the  steam  tug  Daffodil  about  ten 
o'clock  at  night.  When  within  about  eight  hundred 
yards  of  Sumter  the  tug  stopped,  the  final  instruc 
tions  were  given  to  the  officers  commanding  the  dif- 


282      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

ferent  divisions,  the  boats  were  cast  off  and  pulled 
toward  Sumter. 

Lieutenant  Higginson  had  been  ordered  to  pull  up 
to  the  northwestern  front,  for  the  purpose  of  draw 
ing  the  attention  of  the  garrison  from  the  real  point 
of  attack.  The  remaining  divisions  were  ordered  to 
close  up  and  await  orders  to  advance  upon  the  south 
front,  where  it  was  intended  to  make  the  assault. 
Captain  Stephens'  purpose  for  delaying  the  advance 
of  the  main  body  was  to  profit  by  all  the  advantage 
he  hoped  to  derive  from  Lieutenant  Higginson's 
diversion.  The  latter's  movement,  however,  seems 
to  have  been  mistaken  by  some  of  the  boat  com 
manders,  for  a  general  advance,  "and,  in  that  spirit 
of  gallantry  and  emulation  which  characterize  the 
service,"  says  Captain  Stephens,  "they  pulled  for  the 
fort."  It  was  too  late  to  stop  the  movement,  and 
Stephens  gave  the  signal  for  all  to  advance. 

The  demand  for  the  surrender  of  Sumter  had 
given  significant  warning  that  an  assault  was  im 
pending.  Two  Confederate  ironclads  were  in  posi 
tion  to  sweep  with  their  fire  the  exposed  faces  of 
Sumter.  Forts  Moultrie  and  Johnson  were  in  readi 
ness  on  a  signal  from  Sumter  to  open  fire. 

Major  Stephen  Elliott,  Jr.,  commanded  the  fort, 
which  was  garrisoned  by  the  First  South  Carolina 
Battalion  of  Infantry,  205  men,  under  Major  Julius 
A.  Blake.  A  boat  attack  had  been  expected  for  sev 
eral  nights  past,  and  one-third  of  the  garrison  was 
kept  constantly  under  arms  on  the  parapet,  the  re 
mainder  close  at  hand. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      283 

At  one  o'clock  Major  Elliott  saw  the  fleet  of 
barges  approaching  from  the  east.  He  immediately 
ordered  up  three  companies,  and  reserved  his  fire 
until  the  boats  had  deployed  and  the  men  began  to 
land,  then  opened  fire.  The  outer  boats  returned 
the  fire  rapidly  for  a  few  minutes.  The  crews  of 
those  that  had  effected  a  landing  rushed  to  the  south 
wall,  where  they  expected  to  find  a  practicable  ramp 
formed  by  the  debris  of  the  wall,  up  which  they 
might  charge  into  the  fort.  They  found  indeed  a 
ramp,  but  at  the  top  of  it  a  wall  from  fifteen  to 
twenty  feet  high,  and  the  storming  party  was  not 
provided  with  scaling  ladders.  Unable  to  get  in  or 
away,  they  sought  shelter  under  the  projecting 
masses  of  the  wall.  Immediately  on  the  signal  of 
fire  from  Sumter,  the  ironclad  Chicora,  lying  a  short 
distance  to  the  north,  the  Sullivan's  Island  batteries 
to  the  northeast,  and  Fort  Johnson  to  the  westward 
opened  and  encircled  Sumter  with  their  fire,  effec 
tually  assisting  to  prevent  the  more  distant  boats 
from  coming  up.  Some  that  had  come  nearest  were 
disabled  by  hand  grenades  and  masses  of  loose 
masonry  hurled  from  the  parapet.  The  men  who 
had  landed  and  sought  shelter  from  fire  under  pro 
jecting  masses  of  masonry  were  dislodged  by  hand 
grenades  and  fire  balls.  Cut  off  from  reinforcements 
and  escape,  they  called  for  quarter,  and  were  ordered 
to  make  their  way,  by  detachments,  to  the  gorge  of 
the  fort,  where  they  were  taken  within. 

The  boats  which  had,  on  a  signal  from  Captain 
Stephens,  not  landed,  turned  and  fled.  "All  who  had 
landed,"  says  Captain  Stephens,  "were  killed  or 


284      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

taken  prisoners,  and  serious  casualties  occurred  in 
the  boats  nearest  the  fort."  Only  eleven  officers  and 
116  men  had  landed,  of  whom  6  were  killed,  15 
wounded,  and  106  made  prisoners.  Five  barges 
and  as  many  colors  were  also  captured.  The  affair 
ended  in  complete  failure  in  about  twenty  minutes. 
Admiral  Dahlgren,  who  was  on  a  monitor  about  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  off,  says:  "Moultrie  fired  like  a 
devil,  the  shells  breaking  around  me  and  screaming 
in  chorus.  It  did  not  look  like  a  vigorous  assault. 
Some  of  the  boats'  crews  jumped  overboard  at  the 
first  fire,  and  I  fell  in  with  two  boats  a  mile  from 
Sumter.  I  came  away  without  being  able  to  see  how 
the  matter  ended,  and  after  a  weary  pull  got  on 
board  the  Lodona"  He  adds  later  in  his  journal: 
"Thus  this  attack  on  a  fort  which  General  Gillmore 
assumes  he  had  demolished,  necessarily  failed." 

General  Gillmore's  storming  party  consisted  of 
six  or  seven  hundred  infantry.  It  was  delayed  some 
what  by  the  state  of  the  tide,  but  presently  proceeded 
in  barges,  toward  Sumter.  When  the  firing  of  the 
naval  party  commenced,  the  barges  halted,  and  when 
it  was  apparent  that  the  naval  attack  had  failed, 
they  pulled  back  to  Morris  Island.  Why  the  failure 
of  the  naval  assaulting  party  should  have  induced  the 
larger  land  force  to  abandon  the  assault  which  it 
had  started,  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive.  It  would 
seem  that  the  chances  of  success  would  have  been 
enhanced  if  the  two  parties  had  assaulted  simulta 
neously.  And  if  made  separately,  the  troops  had 
a  better  prospect  of  success  than  the  naval  party, 
because  the  latter  attempted  the  assault  on  a  front 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      285 

where  the  breach  was  not  practicable,  whereas  on 
the  gorge  front  which  troops  would  have  assaulted 
there  was  and  had  been  for  some  weeks  a  practicable 
breach. 

"The  result,"  says  General  Gordon,  "did  not  dis 
sipate  the  growing  feeling  of  ill  humor  that  had  been 
for  some  time  manifest  between  the  land  and  naval 
forces.  With  no  single  head  to  devise  and  execute 
operations  looking  to  the  same  end,  there  must  needs 
be  clashing  and  inefficiency  and  bad  blood.  In  the 
meantime  Sumter  grew  daily  in  strength." 

For  several  weeks  after  gaining  possession  of 
Morris  Island  the  Federal  force  was  diligently  at 
work  altering  and  enlarging  Batteries  Wagner  and 
Gregg  to  adapt  them  to  the  changed  purposes  for 
which  they  were  designed,  and  in  constructing  new 
and  formidable  batteries  between  the  two.  A  rather 
slow  fire  was  maintained  on  the  working  parties  by 
the  batteries  on  James'  and  Sullivan's  islands,  enough 
to  retard  but  not  to  prevent  the  construction  of  the 
work.  If  it  had  been  possible  under  the  most  favor 
able  circumstances,  with  the  Confederate  guns  in  po 
sition  at  so  great  a  distance,  to  have  prevented  the 
construction  of  the  Federal  works,  there  was  not 
ammunition  enough  in  the  Confederate  batteries  to 
have  maintained  an  effective  fire;  nor  was  it  practi 
cable  to  procure  a  sufficient  supply.  Twenty  tons 
of  shot  and  shell  per  day  would  not  have  sufficed, 
and  that  could  not  be  supplied.  Late  in  September 
a  slow  fire  was  maintained  from  day  to  day  on  Sum 
ter,  enough  as  it  was  supposed,  but  erroneously,  to 
prevent  repairs  and  the  remounting  of  guns. 


286      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

The  most  favorable  time  for  the  ironclad  fleet  to 
attempt  to  force  an  entrance  into  the  inner  harbor 
was  passing  rapidly  away;  for  while  the  Federals 
were  busily  at  work  on  Morris  Island  the  Confed 
erates  were  not  idle.  They  were  strengthening  the 
inner  line  of  defensive  works,  arming  them  with  guns 
taken  from  Sumter,  and  five  or  six  were  remounted 
in  Sumter  itself.  Still  the  ironclad  fleet  made  no 
attempt  to  enter,  and  to  General  Gillmore  it  seemed 
that  the  fruits  of  his  success  on  Morris  Island  were 
passing  away  in  consequence  of  the  Admiral's  delay. 
Newspaper  correspondents  near  the  General's  head 
quarters  sent  to  New  York  papers  the  most  glowing 
accounts  of  the  achievements  of  the  army,  giving 
little  notice  and  no  commendation  to  the  part  per 
formed  by  the  navy.  On  the  contrary,  the  general 
tenor  of  the  letters  from  the  special  correspondents 
at  the  seat  of  war  in  the  Department  of  the  South 
produced  the  impression  that  the  delay  of  the  naval 
commander  alone  prevented  the  complete  fruition 
of  all  the  hopes  and  expectations  based  on  the  cam 
paign  for  the  capture  of  Charleston. 

Admiral  Dahlgren  was  keenly  alive  to  the  deli 
cacy  and  responsibility  of  his  high  position  in  the 
government  service.  He  knew  and  shared  the  in 
tensely  hostile  feeling  pervading  the  North  which 
demanded  the  reduction  and  occupation  of  Charles 
ton,  which  was  looked  upon  as  the  hotbed  of  seces 
sion  and  the  initial  point  of  the  war.  At  the  same 
time  he  fully  appreciated  the  injury  that  would  result 
to  the  cause  he  served  with  great  zeal  if  any  serious 
disaster  should  befall  the  ironclad  fleet  he  com- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      287 

manded  and  which  he  deemed  essential  to  the  mainte 
nance  of  the  blockade  of  the  port,  a  measure  he 
regarded  as  even  more  important  than  the  occupa 
tion  of  the  city  itself. 

One  of  his  officers,  Captain  Daniel  Ammen,  recon- 
noitered  and  examined  the  obstructions  stretching 
from  near  Sumter  across  toward  the  northwestern 
extremity  of  Sullivan's  Island,  and  reported  that 
they  could  be  removed,  and  that  he,  with  volunteers 
from  the  fleet,  would  make  the  attempt  to  remove 
them.  The  Admiral  seems  to  have  entertained  the 
offer  and  given  it  serious  thought.  It  is  a  significant 
manifestation  of  the  estimate  he  placed  on  the  zeal 
for  the  naval  service  of  the  men  under  his  command, 
that  he  suggested  as  a  suitable  and  tempting  reward 
for  gallant  service  to  announce  that  those  who  sur 
vived  the  attempt  should  be  honorably  discharged 
from  the  service.  But  the  attempt  was  not  made. 
It  was  recognized  that  within  the  harbor  were  more 
formidable  obstacles  to  encounter  than  the  rope  and 
timber  and  torpedo  obstructions  at  its  entrance. 

Before  leaving  Washington  to  enter  on  the  cam 
paign,  General  Gillmore  had  expressed  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  the  Navy  his  conviction  that  when  he  had 
gained  possession  of  Morris  Island  and  had  demol 
ished  Fort  Sumter  he  could,  with  batteries  erected 
on  Cumming's  Point,  silence  the  batteries  on  Sulli 
van's  Island,  thus  completely  opening  the  gate  to 
Charleston.  His  experience  before  Wagner  had 
long  since  demonstrated  the  utter  hopelessness  of 
attempting  to  silence  the  Sullivan's  Island  batteries, 


288      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

a  mile  and  a  half  distant,  across  the  channel.  Those 
batteries  were  still  intact. 

The  Admiral  perhaps  had  that  fact  in  mind  when 
at  this  time  he  addressed  a  formal  letter  to  Gen 
eral  Gillmore,  reminding  him  that  the  obstacles 
which  barred  the  entrance  to  Charleston  harbor  had 
not  yet  been  removed  or  destroyed.  Sumter  he  re 
garded  as  still  a  serious  obstacle  in  itself,  and  as 
guarding  other  obstructions.  "The  only  fort  you 
have  attempted — Sumter — you  have  not  reduced," 
and  he  asked  that  it  be  occupied  by  the  Union  troops. 
The  General  replied  sharply,  that  from  the  concur 
rent  testimony  of  the  Confederates  themselves,  and 
the  Admiral's  own  admission,  Sumter  was  no  longer 
regarded  as  capable  of  any  harm  to  anyone.  If, 
however,  the  Admiral  thought,  after  only  one  abor 
tive  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  navy  to  capture  the 
fort,  that  the  few  infantry  soldiers  who  held  it  could 
offer  any  serious  impediment  to  the  removal  of  the 
obstructions  between  the  fort  and  Sullivan's  Island, 
he,  the  General,  would  remove  them  with  his  own 
troops.  The  Admiral  replied,  if  the  obstructions 
were  to  be  removed,  it  was  properly  his  province  to 
remove  them,  and  he  did  not  need  the  services  of  the 
troops  for  that  purpose.  All  he  desired  was  that  the 
Union  troops  should  occupy  the  fort. 

If  the  removal  of  the  obstructions  was  regarded 
as  an  important  preliminary  to  the  entrance  of  the 
fleet,  it  was  surely  an  excess  of  punctilio  to  stand 
on  the  order  of  their  removal,  whether  by  the  land 
or  naval  force. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      289 

But  in  truth  the  obstructions  were  by  no  means 
so  formidable  as  was  supposed.  There  was  no  doubt 
risk  to  be  encountered  from  submerged  torpedoes, 
as  was  subsequently  discovered  by  the  explosion  of 
one  under  the  monitor  Patapsco  while  covering  an 
attempt  to  remove  obstructions,  instantly  sinking 
the  monitor  and  more  than  half  of  her  crew,  and 
like  experiences  elsewhere.  But  risks  are  inevitable, 
and  these  were  such  as  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
navy  expected  and  were  perfectly  ready  to  encounter 
for  the  accomplishment  of  commensurate  results. 
The  difficulty  was  not  so  much  to  get  into,  as  to  get 
out  of  the  inner  harbor;  and  it  was  a  question  for 
grave  consideration  whether  the  results  which  might 
reasonably  be  expected  to  follow  a  successful  en 
trance  into  the  inner  harbor  would  be  at  all  com 
mensurate  with  the  risk  to  the  ironclads.  A  glance 
at  the  map  of  the  harbor  will  show  that,  leaving  out 
of  consideration  Sumter  and  the  formidable  batteries 
on  Sullivan's  Island,  there  were  seventeen  batteries 
mounting  fifty-eight  guns  covering  the  waters  of  the 
inner  harbor.  Long  experience  in  the  bombardment 
of  Wagner  and  Moultrie  had  most  clearly  demon 
strated  that  the  combined  land  and  naval  batteries, 
throwing  a  weight  of  metal  such  as  had  never  before 
been  thrown  on  any  work,  could  not  permanently 
silence  these  land  forts,  or  silence  them  any  longer 
than  they  were  immediately  under  fire.  It  would 
have  been  idle  to  suppose  that  the  naval  batteries 
alone  could  accomplish  on  the  works  within  the  har 
bor  what  the  combined  land  and  naval  batteries  had 
failed,  under  much  more  favorable  circumstances,  to 


29o      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

effect  on  those  without.  There  were,  besides,  two 
new  and  formidable  Confederate  ironclads  within 
the  harbor,  which  would  have  played  a  conspicuous 
part  in  any  engagement  in  those  waters.  "The  truth 
is,"  says  Admiral  Dahlgren,  "that  the  entrance  of 
ironclads  could  only  make  sure  of  the  destruction  of 
the  city, — and  not  this  without  undue  risk,  if  these 
were  only  monitors.  The  act  itself  could  not  be  ob 
jected  to  by  the  Rebels,  for  it  was  understood  to 
be  their  intent  to  destroy  the  place  themselves  rather 
than  that  we  should  occupy  it.  If  so,  it  was  quite  as 
logical  that  we  should  destroy  it  rather  than  they 
should  occupy  it." 

All  arguments  in  favor  of  the  entrance  of  the  iron 
clads  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  they  were  in 
good  condition  for  action,  which  was  far  from  being 
the  case.  They  had  all  been  under  steam  for  six  or 
seven  months;  their  bottoms  were  so  foul  as  mate 
rially  to  impair  their  speed;  they  had  been  repeatedly 
in  action  and  were  much  damaged  by  the  battering 
they  had  received,  and  two  of  the  twenty-six  guns 
they  carried  had  been  disabled  and  needed  repairs 
before  going  again  into  action. 

But  public  sentiment  in  the  North  clamored  for 
the  reduction  of  Charleston,  and  the  "special  cor 
respondents  at  the  seat  of  war"  continued  to  lay  the 
blame  of  the  failure  to  accomplish  that  so  eagerly 
desired  consummation,  to  the  navy. 

At  the  instance  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Ad 
miral  Dahlgren,  on  October  24  convened  a  council 
of  the  ironclad  captains,  and  in  a  session  of  six  hours' 
duration  the  whole  subject  was  discussed  fully  and 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      291 

without  restraint.  It  was  decided  by  a  vote  of  six 
to  four,  the  senior  officers  being  in  the  majority,  that 
an  attempt  to  enter  the  harbor  and  proceed  to  the 
city  would  be  attended  with  extreme  risk  without 
adequate  results.  To  the  question,  Should  the  Iron 
sides  enter  with  the  monitors?  there  was  no  decision, 
— four  for,  four  against,  and  two  undecided;  there 
was  but  one  dissenting  voice  to  the  question,  Would 
it  be  advisable  to  co-operate  with  the  army  in  an 
attack  on  Sullivan's  Island?  and  to  the  question,  Can 
Forts  Johnson  and  Moultrie  be  reduced  by  the  pres 
ent  force  of  ironclads,  unsupported  by  the  army? 
the  answer  was  unanimously  No.  The  matter  was 
briefly  and  forcibly  stated  by  Commodore  Rodgers 
in  reply  to  an  inquiry  by  a  committee  of  the  United 
States  Senate,  as  follows: 

"Ordinarily  and  popularly,  to  take  a  place  means 
to  take  its  defenses.  General  Gillmore  was  forty- 
eight2  days  on  Morris  Island,  acting  against  Fort 
Wagner,  with  some  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men 
against  a  garrison  of  about  1500  men  or  less,  assisted 
by  the  monitors  and  by  artillery  which  excited  the 
wonder  of  Europe.  After  forty-eight  days  he  took 
the  place,  not  by  his  artillery  nor  by  monitors,  but 
by  making  military  approaches  and  threatening  to 
cut  off  their  means  of  escape  and  take  the  place  by 
assault;  and  when  he  took  it,  it  was  not  so  greatly 
damaged  as  to  be  untenable.  Now,  if  General  Gill- 
more,  on  the  same  island,  assisted  by  his  artillery 
and  the  whole  force  of  the  monitors,  in  forty-eight 

2He  was  so  engaged  from  July  10  to  September  7. 


292      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

days  could  not  capture  Fort  Wagner  alone  by  them, 
it  is  perfectly  certain  that  the  monitors  alone  never 
can  take  the  much  stronger  defenses  which  line 
James  Island  and  Sullivan's  Island.  In  going  up  to 
Charleston,  therefore,  he  would  have  to  run  by  the 
defenses,  and  leave  the  harbor,  so  far  as  they  con 
stitute  the  command  of  it,  in  the  power  of  the  enemy; 
and  when  he  got  up  to  the  city  he  could  not  spare  a 
single  man  from  his  monitors,  even  if  they  should 
consent  to  receive  him;  and  if  he  burned  the  town 
he  would  burn  it  over  the  heads  of  non-combatant 
women  and  children,  while  the  men  who  defend  it 
are  away  in  the  forts.  I  should  be  reluctant  to  burn 
a  house  over  a  woman's  and  child's  head  because  her 
husband  defied  me.  Dahlgren,  if  he  burns  Charles 
ton,  will  be  called  a  savage  by  all  Europe,  and  after 
the  heat  of  combat  is  over  he  will  be  called  a  savage 
by  our  own  people.  But  there  are  obstructions  in  the 
way  which  render  it  doubtful  whether  he  can  get 
there.  And  if  he  goes  up  under  the  guns  of  those 
fortifications,  sticks  upon  the  obstructions,  and  is 
finally  driven  off  by  any  cause,  leaving  one  or  two 
of  his  monitors  there  within  their  power,  they  will 
get  them  off,  repair  them,  and  send  them  out  to  what 
part  of  the  coast  they  please  and  give  a  new  character 
to  the  war.  The  wooden  blockade  will  be  mainly  at 
an  end,  unlimited  cotton  going  out  and  unlimited 
supplies  coming  in.  I  see  no  good  to  compensate 
for  that  risk,  except  it  be  in  satisfying  the  national 
mind  that  retributive  justice  has  been  done  against 
the  city  of  Charleston,  the  nursery  of  the  Rebellion. 
He  might  possibly  go  up  there  and  burn  the  town, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      293 

in  which  there  are  no  combatants,  and  a  place  which, 
in  a  purely  military  point  of  view,  as  far  as  I  know, 
possesses  no  value.  To  do  that  he  risks  losing 
vessels  upon  the  obstructions,  and  if  they  should  be 
so  lost,  and  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands,  a  new  phase 
will  be  given  to  the  war.  In  a  word,  I  do  not  think 
the  game  is  worth  the  candle.  Whether  these  reasons 
operate  with  him,  I  do  not  know;  they  would  with 


me." 


Admiral  Dahlgren  decided  to  make  no  attempt 
to  enter  the  inner  harbor  until  the  monitors  should 
be  repaired,  cleaned,  and  put  in  fighting  trim,  which 
would  not  be  sooner  than  about  the  middle  of  No 
vember.  He  was,  however,  ready  to  co-operate  with 
the  land  force  in  any  operation  it  might  undertake 
against  Sullivan's  Island  or  elsewhere.  But  General 
Gillmore,  believing  that  he  had  accomplished  his 
part  of  the  general  plan,  was  not  disposed  to  enter 
on  any  new  operations  without  reinforcements.  His 
batteries  at  and  near  Cumming's  Point  being  ready 
for  action  on  October  26,  he  commenced  what  he 
calls  the  second  bombardment  of  Sumter,  in  which 
the  ironclads  as  usual  bore  a  conspicuous  part,  their 
1 1-  and  15-inch  guns  being  especially  effective.  This 
bombardment  was  maintained  with  great  violence 
for  about  ten  days,  until  many  of  the  guns  in  the  land 
batteries  were  worn  out.  The  second  bombardment 
had  resulted  in  rendering  the  southeast  face  a  more 
complete  ruin  than  the  gorge  wall,  and  other  faces 
were  greatly  shaken.  What  further  to  do  to  bring 
the  compaign  to  a  successful  end  was  a  most  per 
plexing  problem.  Various  projects  were  suggested 


294      THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON 

and  discussed  in  frequent  conferences  between  the 
commanders  of  the  land  and  naval  forces.  One  was 
to  attempt  to  capture  Fort  Johnson,  but  General 
Gillmore  was  unwilling  to  attempt  to  hold  the  ground 
west  of  Johnson  or  co-operate  with  the  navy  within 
the  harbor,  without  an  addition  to  his  force  of 
15,000  men,  and  that  he  could  not  get.  Another 
plan  was  to  operate  against  Sullivan's  Island  by 
way  of  Bull's  Bay.  Since  it  seemed  that  Charleston 
could  not  then  be  taken,  it  was  suggested  that  the 
combined  force  be  turned  upon  Savannah  and  cap 
ture  that  city,  and  this  project  was  discussed  until  it 
became  known  in  Savannah,  when  preparations  were 
in  progress  to  meet  it.  Pending  the  consideration 
of  these  projects  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  divert 
public  attention  and  let  it  be  understood  that  further 
operations  against  Charleston  were  abandoned. 
General  Gillmore  undertook  to  have  that  report 
spread  abroad  by  the  special  newspaper  correspon 
dents. 

Meanwhile  no  explicit  instructions  came  from 
Washington,  and  it  was  understood  that  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  and  the  General-in-Chief  of  the  army 
were  averse  to  any  further  active  operations  at  that 
time  by  the  army  against  Charleston,  the  occupation 
of  which  they  would  have  regarded  as  an  "elephant 
on  their  hands." 

Indeed,  the  purpose  of  the  Administration  in 
Washington  in  regard  to  Charleston  is  shrouded  in 
some  doubt,  not  withstanding  the  efforts  made  to  cap 
ture  that  city. 

In  a  letter  from  Colonel  A.  B.  Ely,  who  had  been 


THE  SIEGE  OF  CHARLESTON      295 

General  Benham's  chief  of  staff,  to  Major  General 
G.  W.  Cullum,  he  says,  referring  to  the  failure  of 
the  assault  on  Secessionville  June  16,  1862  :  "I  could 
give  you  the  reason  of  the  want  of  success,  but  1 
need  not  now  disparage  anybody  in  that  regard,  nor 
is  it  needful  that  I  should  speak  of  the  weak  and 
wicked  considerations  which  interfered  to  prevent 
any  further  action  of  General  Benham  in  that  direc 
tion,  particularly  when  I  was  assured  by  the  Presi 
dent  himself  that  he  did  not  want  we  should  take 
Charleston."* 

Eighteen  months  after  the  assault  on  Secession 
ville,  in  December,  1863,  General  Gillmore,  in  con 
ference  with  Admiral  Dahlgren  in  regard  to  their 
future  operations,  said  that  the  War  Department 
had  "never  entertained  an  idea  beyond  the  occupation 
of  the  exterior  islands." 

The  exterior  islands — Morris  and  Folly — were 
securely  held,  and  a  slow  fire  was  maintained  on  the 
city  and  Forts  Sumter  and  Moultrie;  but  whatever 
may  have  been  the  wishes  of  the  Administration, 
General  Gillmore's  campaign  of  four  months'  dura 
tion  virtually  ended  with  the  second  bombardment  of 
Fort  Sumter. 

'The  letter  is  dated  Boston,  Mass.,  June  12,  1867. 


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